Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital

Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen

6. Asiatische Beziehungsnetzwerke

6. Indonesien: Pribumi

von Margarete Payer

mailto: payer@payer.de

Zitierweise / cite as:

Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 6. Asiatische Beziehungsnetzwerke. -- 6. Indonesien: Pribumi. -- Fassung vom 2005-10-20. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital030606.htm            

Erstmals publiziert: 2005-10-11

Überarbeitungen: 2005-10-20 [Ergänzungen]

Anlass: Lehrveranstaltung an der Hochschule der Medien Stuttgart, Wintersemester 2005/06

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0. Übersicht

1. Motto

"Indonesien gilt als extrem korrupt

SINGAPUR afp Indonesien ist aus Sicht von Geschäftsleuten das korrupteste Land Asiens. Das geht aus einer Studie hervor, die gestern das Hongkonger Wirtschafts- und Politikberatungsunternehmen PERC veröffentlichte. Demnach könnte sich das Thema Korruption entscheidend für das wirtschaftliche Überleben Indonesiens erweisen. Für die Studie wurden Anfang dieses Jahres rund 900 Unternehmer in ganz Asien befragt. Der indonesische Präsident Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sei als "relativer Außenseiter" im vergangenen Jahr vor allem deshalb gewählt worden, weil die Bevölkerung "von der Korruption einer eingefahrenen, weltlichen Elite angewidert" gewesen sei. In der Studie wurden Singapur, Japan und Hongkong als die asiatischen Länder mit den geringsten Korruptionsproblemen genannt."


2. Einleitung

Pribumi = idonesienstämmiger Indonesier (vor allem im Gegensatz zu den chinastämmigen Indonesiern verwendet)


YENNI KWOK, 25, is an Asiaweek staffer based in Hong Kong.

HOW INDONESIAN AM I? Let me put it this way. The other night, when a rainstorm woke me up in the middle of the night, my first thoughts were "Wonderful! Maybe it will help put out the fires in town." In what town? The fires were in Jakarta; I've been living in Hong Kong since last year. So, yes, I'm Indonesian, all right. But I'm also ethnically Chinese. Some people think I can't be both. Not completely, anyway.

I feel as Indonesian as any indigenous pribumi. I was born in Jakarta. So were my three sisters and one brother. And my mom and dad too. We speak Indonesian at home. My roots and my future are there. I'm passionate about the country - from the culture to the beauty of the countryside to the mysteries of its political life. For me, China is an exotic faraway place, somewhere I would love to visit. But that's all. My parents went there once and I got the impression that for them it was a bit like, say, an Australian going to Europe to see where his ancestors had come from.

Since the rioting started, I have been in touch with my family regularly. They are frightened, of course, but they are fine. They say there has been no trouble in the mainly pribumi area where they live. But, elsewhere in town, an aunt's house was attacked with rocks and a store house owned by a friend was burned to the ground. "It's finished, totally finished," my sister said on the phone. She was too distressed for me to establish whether she was talking about our friend's business or the country.

But now a confession. For all my "Indonesian-ness," I was brought up almost in a different world from the pribumi. Chinese schools are banned in Indonesia (as are the public display of Chinese characters and the celebrating of the lunar New Year, among other things), so most Chinese go to private Christian schools. At the one I attended, the only other children were Chinese. There were pribumi living on my street, but I can't honestly say I knew much about them. A brief "hello" here; a "how are you?" there. Anyway, like most Chinese parents, my mom and dad crammed my after-school hours with so many classes (English, music and others) that I didn't have a lot of time for socializing with anybody.

It wasn't until I returned from studying in the U.S. and took a job in journalism that I got to know any pribumi. Now I count a number of them among my closest friends. But I am an exception. For most Chinese, the only pribumi they ever get to know is their household maid, their pembantu. Once they reach adulthood, there is almost no further social contact. Even in professional life, the two groups rarely mingle.

Is it any wonder, then, there is suspicion and prejudice - on both sides? I have never had any racist remarks directed at me personally, but I know the Chinese are accused of being concerned only with their own welfare and with making money. As for Chinese attitudes about the pribumi, I remember, when I was a youngster, asking my father why they were referred to as fangui (literally "rice devils," but meaning inferior). "We eat rice too," I said. "So we're also fangui, right?" My father just smiled. It was too difficult - and probably too embarrassing - to explain.

And so it goes on. If I am seen on the street with a Chinese male, no one pays any attention. If I am with a Westerner, people may look but no more. But if I'm in the company of a pribumi, we draw stares - hostile looks that suggest there is something distasteful about our relationship. Those glares hurt, of course, but they are also saddening. Do they mean there is no place for a Chinese in Indonesia - even one who wakes up worrying about her town burning down?"

[Quelle: http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/98/0529/cs4.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"How the Chinese Learned to Trade
 From: AW in Jakarta <award@cbn.net.id
 Date: Thursday, October 08, 1998 2:29 PM
My latest article was published in the Jakarta Post today (Oct 7, 98). You  are welcome to post by quoting "directly" from Jakarta Post.      

By Agus Widjaja

JAKARTA (JP): Ever since the May riots, the controversial debate on the  income disparity between pribumi (indigenous Indonesians) and Chinese Indonesians has raged with renewed vigor.
Some have argued that the Chinese Indonesians' entrepreneurial skills are  rooted in the preferential treatment accorded them by the country's Dutch  colonial rulers. The advocates of this "blame the past theory" claim that  if it were not for this special treatment, this minority would not have  achieved their present status in the Indonesian commerce, and thus would  not have fared better than the pribumi.
One of those who subscribes to this argument is President B. J. Habibie.   In a meeting with a foreign journalist a few months ago said that the Dutch  has given the ethnic Chinese Indonesians a 360-year head start in  Indonesian commerce.
The issue of racially characterized economic inequality in Indonesia is a  complex and prickly one. Solving it will require honesty, time, and a  strong political will. But confusion - particularly on the part of the  authorities - between ethnic Chinese dominance in commerce and income  inequality will make it even more difficult to solve. The fact that most  Chinese Indonesians run businesses does not mean that all of them are  wealthy. By the same token, the simple assumption that the Chinese, on
the  average, have a higher income than their pribumi counterparts, does not  mean that all of them are entrepreneurs.
Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen is not here to defend himself, but  blaming the Dutch will not only turn a blind eye to the real cause of the  issue but is unfair on the ordinary Indonesians of Chinese heritage who  have achieved their own success through generations of hard work,  perseverance, and resourcefulness.
Worse still, it is discouraging to the aspiring pribumi. It is as if  telling them that what was implemented by the Dutch cannot be undone.  That  they will not be able to catch up with their fellow Chinese businessmen  because they have lagged behind for 360 years.

 This article is not intended to shed light on the increasingly urgent  problem of economic inequality between the two races. Rather it is meant  to provoke reader's critical thinking on the validity of such a convenient  argument to an intricate issue. And to decide whether such an argument is  indeed sufficiently supported by historical and demographic facts.
There are a few factors that strongly work against the validity of this  argument, namely:

  1. The Dutch left Indonesia 56 years ago;
  2. The Chinese  started trading with Malay kingdoms before the Dutch came;
  3. Not every  Chinese-Indonesian today is a trader; and
  4. Ethnic Chinese minorities   perform similarly well elsewhere.

The last Dutch ruler left Indonesia 56 years ago whereas most ethnic  Chinese entrepreneurs today are aged between 35 and 55 years.  Obviously,  it doesn't take a historian to appreciate that few of these entrepreneurs  were born when the last Dutch masters relinquished Indonesia.
Some of the post-independence ethnic Chinese tycoons were born prior to the  Dutch departure, but they were still young children sitting in their  elementary classrooms in 1942. The following ethnic Chinese tycoons and  their ages are just some of the examples:

  • Mochtar Riady 13,
  • The Ning King  11,
  • Ciputra 11,
  • Budi Brasali 11,
  • Ang Kang Ho six,
  • Mu'min Ali Gunawan three. 
  • Sofyan Wanandi, Prayogo Pangestu, Syamsul Nursalim and most others were  not even born.

The oldest among this generation of ethnic Chinese businessmen namely Liem  Sioe Liong and Eka Tjipta Widjaja, were only in their early twenties.   Assuming Liem and Widjaja, even at their very young age, were indeed  granted favorable treatment by the Dutch in trading, would that have had an  impact on the remaining eight million ethnic Chinese spread across the thousands of islands of Indonesia? Could these two men have nurtured the  rest of the Chinese-Indonesians to surpass their pribumi counterparts in  commerce and therefore create the economic gap that now exists between  them?
Most of the business concerns started by the previous generation of Chinese  immigrants in the colonial era ceased decades ago following the deaths of  their founders. Oei Tiong Ham's concern and the business of Tjong A Fie did  not survive the sixties. Indeed, ironically enough, Oei Tiong Ham  concerns  were confiscated by the Indonesian government in 1961.
 If there are actually Chinese businesses formed in the colonial era which  have survived until today I wonder if our government has really been  keeping records of who owns and how they have actually contributed to the  sharp contrast between the ethnic Chinese and pribumi entrepreneurs? How  many of their assets or management skills acquired during the colonial days  are actually significant today? And what impacts did they have in creating  the perceived contrast in prosperity between the newcomers and the natives?
The first wave of Chinese traders came to the Malay archipelago almost 900   years before the Dutch did. Unlike the Europeans who came here to conquer,  the docile Chinese came to trade. They arrived in the seventh century as  seasoned merchants to trade with the Sriwijaya Kingdom. And by 1433, the  Chinese traders under their Moslem Admiral Zheng-Ho have set up numerous  trading posts in various seaports including Gresik, Palembang, Kupang,  Banjarmasin, Tuban, Banten, and Deli.
Historical records also show that, instead of fostering the Chinese to  become merchants, the Dutch actually exploited the already experienced  Chinese merchants and their established network to supply them with food  and other basic items.
The colonial masters moreover used these largely submissive oriental  artisans and constructors to build their first town - Batavia. Contrary  to what some would believe, the choice of using the Chinese is one of a  necessity rather than preference. As Professor Bruce Glassburner wrote in  his book The Economy of Indonesia the Dutch had no choice but to use  Chinese commercial aptitude after failing to find others who had the skills  or the interest in doing business. The profession as a merchant was  considered lowly and risky and hence shunned by many pribumi at that time.

The educated elite pribumi were more interested in being civil servants due  to their perceived high status in the society, whereas the rural pribumi  were more interested in cultivating land.   The relationship between the European masters and the Chinese was
anything  but cordial. The pribumi were not the only ones who had to submit to the  domineering colonizers, the Chinese immigrants had to in just the same way.   Instead of fostering the economic influence of the Chinese immigrants,  the Dutch at times felt threatened by their growing dominance of local  trade.
There were instances when the Dutch tried to limit the Chinese's scope of  trading activities. Confining the Chinese in Chinatowns was evidence of  such policy. Even though both groups were here to seek spices and other  local products, the Chinese merchants bartered local products with  porcelain and silk from China, while the Dutch transacted business under
 their guns and cannons.
Another consideration this argument has failed to take into account is the  fact that like the pribumi, the Indonesians of Chinese ancestry today hold  various different occupations. To think that every Chinese Indonesian is an  entrepreneur and is therefore wealthier than his or her pribumi  counterparts is completely absurd.
Out of the total number of Chinese heads of household, only a minority are  entrepreneurs. Most of them are salaried employees. Other than those who  are entrepreneurs and employees, there are also those who are neither  entrepreneurs nor salary earners but instead earn a living as self-employed  persons. Some of the examples are doctors, lawyers, language teachers,
 peasants, pedicab drivers, road side vendors, artists, priests, barbers,  and beauticians.
It may be true that the percentage of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs from its  total population is higher than the percentage of pribumi entrepreneurs  from the total pribumi population. But, again, this does not mean that  most ethnic Chinese are entrepreneurs. For instance, assuming there are  eight million ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and if the percentage of ethnic  Chinese who are entrepreneurs is 30 percent of their total number or 2.4  million, whereas the percentage of pribumi who are entrepreneurs is only  10 percent of their total number of, say, 200 million, the number of ethnic  Chinese who are not entrepreneurs is still higher at 70 percent or 5.6  millions.
Perhaps the biggest weakness of this argument is its failure to regard the  achievements of ethnic Chinese minorities elsewhere. In order to better  understand the racial/economic disparity in Indonesia, we should pause and  take a look at similar issues in other countries where ethnic Chinese is  involved.
There are ethnic Chinese minorities in other societies in the world where  there was no native-Chinese-colonizer interaction, yet the Chinese are  performing relatively well. Some of these societies are in the US,  Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Korea, and Japan.

On the other hand, there are also societies where native-Chinese-colonizer  interaction exists similar to what we have here in Indonesia. The Chinese  minorities in Tahiti, Fiji, South Africa, Guam, and Suriname have made  remarkable contributions to their respective economies for decades. It is  worth noting here that instead of getting support from the European  immigrants or colonizers, quite often the Chinese immigrants had to face  direct competition from them.
In the United States, the ethnic Chinese represent nearly 10 percent of the  nation's 67,000 medical students while the Chinese minority only makes up  one percent of the overall population. The Chinese youngsters also score  remarkably highly in tests in primary and high schools.    Chinese-Americans' median family income is approximately $43,000 and their  college completion rate is 42 percent. This surpasses any other racial or  ethnic group in the country including whites. In comparison, the US
 national gross per capita income is about $30,000.
Instead of being accused of getting preferential treatment,  Chinese-Americans are often depicted by the US Government as America's  model minority because of their self-reliance and high achievements in  education and finance.
To argue that sino-Indonesians' renown in commercial acumen and perceived  better prosperity stems from assistance of the colonial ruler is arbitrary  and lacking in historical facts and demographic statistics. As a head of  state Habibie should not echo this argument before doing his homework.   The government is responsible for surveying and maintaining credible records
on  the population's income, race, occupation, age, etc. They should have the  statistics and historical facts in place and study them thoroughly before  making suggestions about the population.
Not every Chinese Indonesian is Liem Sioe Liong or Eka Tjipta Widjaja.   There are seven to eight million Indonesians of full or partial Chinese  parentage spread throughout the archipelago and holding many different  occupations. Some are wealthy but many are poor. It is no secret that the  ethnic Chinese in Kalimantan are living from hand to mouth.
Those who succumb themselves to this "blame the past theory" can be best  described with the Indonesian saying: Ibarat katak dalam tempurung which  literally translates as: "Like a frog in a coconut shell". They are so  myopic in their outlook that they have failed to see the facts beyond their  immediate surroundings.
We all should be concerned with the income disparity between not only  different racial groups but also between regions, and between different  native ethnic groups in this country. Unless our government is honestly  willing to diagnose the problem, the effective solution will not possibly  be found, let alone be implemented until the less fortunate pribumi's lot  is improved."

[Quelle: http://www.nyct.net/~china/ic_11_981008.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"The Indonesian family conglomerates - one for all and all for one

The Overseas Chinese control more than 33 major conglomerates in Indonesia and almost all of them are interlinked. In recent years, interlinkages occurred through cross-shareholdings and directorships, joint ventures between conglomerates and family links such as marriages between the major business families. Overseas Chinese controlled conglomerates linked by family connections include the Lippo Group and the Myapada Group; the Lippo Group and Panin Bank; the Gadjah Tunggal Group and the Ometraco Group; the Gunung Sewu Group and the Dharmala Group; and, the Gemala Group and the Danamon Group.

The interlinkages have turned potential competitors into colleagues, allowing the conglomerates to access new sources of capital and to maintain market share. The management of political risk forms one important byproduct of the interlinkages. If the Indonesian government, in the form of one of ex-President Suharto's successors, turns unfavorable towards even one conglomerate, the interlinkages ensure that the unfavorable currents will flow onto most of the other major conglomerates. Consequently, each conglomerate has a vested interest in maintaining all the others' interests. Future political leaders will probably not challenge the conglomerates' economic positions for fear of widespread economic repercussions. The conglomerates have responded to political uncertainty in Indonesia by arraying themselves as interdependent dominos.

Some conglomerates also have links to key members of the Suharto family, particularly to ex-President Suharto's sons and daughters through joint ventures. Although well-connected pribumi or ethnic Indonesian politicians bring small amounts of equity to the joint ventures, they achieve a high proportion of the profits: the pribumis generally bring political capital; by negotiating bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles, they earn high returns on their political capital."

[Quelle: Haley, George T. ; Tan, Chin Tiong ;  Haley, Usha C. V.: New Asian emperors : the overseas Chinese, their strategies and competitive advantages. -- Oxford [u.a.]  : Butterworth Heinemann, 1998. --  XII, 164 S. : Ill. ; 24 cm. -- S. 60. -- ISBN 0750641304. -- {Wenn Sie HIER klicken, können Sie dieses Buch  bei amazon.de bestellen}]

3. Die indonesische Wirtschaft

"The economical situation in Indonesia has been thoroughly described by Rickard Robison in Indonesia - The Rise of Capital. In it, he identify three different actors on the economical scene. I will here describe them in a few words.

[Robison, Richard <1943 - >: Indonesiathe rise of capital. -- [Canberra?] : Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1986. -- XXV, 425 S. ; 21 cm.  -- (Southeast Asia publications series ;no. 13). -- ISBN 0049090240]  

The State Corporate Sector and State Managers of Capital

This is the largest sector and most crucial element of domestic capital in Indonesia. It is upheld by the state for several reasons. The state fears that a let-over to indigeonous entrepreneurs, pribumi, who are weak, would be like giving the Indonesian economy away to Western and Chinese capital. Further, since the State is strong, it can lead the way for pribumi later on by developing industries and build a functional infrastructure.

The Military-Owned Business Groups

The military has been involved in the economical sector since the war, and has never let go of that involvement. In the early 1950s, it was primarily to raise extra-budgetary revenue for the operations of individual commands and units as well as for the personal and political needs of individual officers and political factions. These economic activities ranged from illegal levies on businessmen to smuggling and providing protection.

Today the military-owned businesses operate in most areas of domestic investment and are partners in a range of joint-ventures with foreign and Chinese partners. But the real significance of the military companies lies in the crucial role they play in relation to the state and to the structure of the emerging capitalist class.

Chinese-Owned Capital

After 1965 the Chinese economical activities began to prosper. Under the Sukarno era, the goal was to build a strong pribumi class who could build a strong Indonesian economy. The Chinese suffered under discriminatory restrictions and couldn't grow at the rate they had capacity for.

Suharto, on the other hand, seemed more interested in economic prosperity, no matter who it was who made the money. The Chinese took the opportunity and some of the Chinese businessmen are today amongst the richest people in the world.

A fenomena that developed during that period was the so called Cukong system. Cukong is Chinese for Master or Lord, and it was really two masters going steady. The master of capital was the Chinese and the master of politics was the Indonesian, almost always military men. The most capital generating Cukong relation was between Suharto and Liem (aka Salim).

What's more

This is of course only a short summary of economic activity in Indonesia, it is supposed to be instant, isn't it?  I can really recommend the book by Robison, and also the book by Adam Schwarz, A nation in Waiting - Indonesia in the 1990s."

[Quelle: http://home.swipnet.se/~w-15266/indons/instant/economy.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

4. Die Suharto Familie und ihre Freunde (bis zum Fall Suhartos 1998)

Die Suharto Familie und ihre Freunde (bis zum Fall Suhartos 1998)

Familienmitglied Hauptunternehmen Hauptgeschäftspartner
Erste Tochter: Siti Hardijanti Rukmana,
verheiratet mit Indra Rukmana
Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada,
Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada
Prajogo Pangestu
Erster Sohn: Sigit Harjojudanto,
verheiratet mit Elsye Anneke Ratnawati
Hanurata Group,
Humpuss Group,
Jüngerer Bruder Tommy,
Mohammed Bob Hasan
Zweiter Sohn: Bambang Trihatmodjo,
verheiratet mit Siti Halimah
Bimantara Citra,
Chandra Asri
Rosano Barack,
Muhamad Tachril,
Peter Gontha,
Johannes Kotjo,
Henry Pribadi,
Anthony Salim
Zweite Tochter:  Siti Hedijanti Harijadi,
verheiratet mit dem pensionierten General­leutnant Prabowo Subianto
Maharani Paramita Hashim Djojohadikusumo
Dritter Sohn: Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy)
verheiratet mit Ardhia Pramesti Regita Cahyani
Humpuss Group,
Sempati Air
Mohammed Bob Hasan,
Kia Motors
Dritte Tochter: Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih
verheiratet mit Pratikto Prayitno Singgih
Transport und Landgewinnung,
Leiterin der Mekarsari-Obstplantage
Besitzt mehrere Beteiligungen an Unternehmen der älteren Geschwister
Sudwikatmono (Suhartos Cousin) Indofood,
Mulia Land
Liem Sioe Liong
Probosutedjo (Suhartos Halbbruder) Mercu Buana Group Hardijanti Rukmana

[Quelle: Hiscock, Geoff: Asiens Club der Einflussreichen : das Who is who der asiatischen Geschäftswelt. -- Frankfurt/Main [u.a.] : Campus-Verl., 1999. -- 420 S. : Ill. ; 22 cm. -- Originaltitel: Asia's wealth club (1997). -- ISBN: 3-593-36019-5. -- S. 139]

4.1. Suharto (1921 - )

Abb.: Suharto
[Bildquelle: http://www.lrytas.lt/ekstra/archyvas/2002/1104/. -- Zugriff am 2005-09-27]

"General Soeharto (commonly spelled Suharto in the English-speaking world) (born June 8, 1921) was an Indonesian leader and military strongman. He was the second President of Indonesia, from 1967 to 1998.

His years as leader of Indonesia were characterized by substantial economic growth that reduced poverty in that country, although much of the standard of living gains made were eventually reversed by the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997. In exchange for this economic growth, Suharto enriched his family and his associates through a variety of state monopolies, subsidies, and other schemes. He constructed a strong, centralized national government that maintained political stability in the diverse Indonesian archipelago through suppression of political dissent and regular use of the military to preserve control.

According to Transparency International, Suharto was the most corrupt head of government of all time.


Suharto was born in Kemusuk Argamulja, Yogyakarta, in central Java. He joined the Dutch colonial forces and studied in a Dutch-run military academy. During World War II, he became a battalion commander in the Japanese-sponsored local military.

After the Indonesian Declaration of Independence by Sukarno in 1945 Suharto's troops fought against Dutch and Western attempts to re-establish colonial rule during the Indonesian National Revolution. He first became widely known in the military for his surprise attack which seized Yogyakarta on March 1, 1949. Yogyakarta was held for only one day, but this action was widely seen as symbolic of continuing Indonesian resistance against Dutch forces.

During the following years he served in the Indonesian National Army, stationed primarily on Java. In 1959 he was accused of smuggling and transferred to the army Staff College in Bandung, West Java. In 1962 he was promoted to the rank of major general and took command of the Diponegoro division. During the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, Suharto was a commander of Kostrad (Strategic Reserve), a sizeable army combat force, which most importantly had significant presence in the Jakarta area. By 1965, the armed forces split into two factions, one left wing and one right wing, with Suharto in the right-wing camp.

Rise to power

On the morning of October 1, 1965, some of Sukarno's closest guards kidnapped and murdered six of the right-wing anti-Communist generals. One survivor, who was not targeted in the suspected coup attempt, was Suharto. Sukarno's guards claimed that they were trying to stop a CIA-backed military coup which was planned to remove Sukarno from power on "Army Day", October 5.

The assassinations brought swift retaliation from Suharto and the rest of the right-wing military, who purged the Indonesian armed forces of pro-Sukarno and pro-Communist elements. General Suharto and his followers called this group the "30th of September Movement" (commonly referred to in its Bahasa Indonesia abbreviation, "G30S" or "Gestapu"). The presence of Suharto's Kostrad units in Jakarta allowed his allies to quickly mobilize and seize control of the capital.

Establishment of the "New Order"

Soon after seizing the capital and surrounding areas, the faction of the military loyal to Suharto (along with allies in Islamic and student groups) demanded Sukarno's ouster. They acted as vigilantes against alleged Sukarno-loyalists, communist sympathizers, and the Indonesian Chinese minority throughout the country.

On March 11, 1966 the ailing Sukarno wrote a letter (the Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret or "Supersemar") that formally granted Suharto emergency powers over the nation. Through this, Suharto established what he called the New Order (Orde Baru). He consolidated his power by banning the Communist Party of Indonesia and its alleged front groups, purging the parliament and cabinet of Sukarno-loyalists, eliminating independent labor unions and instituting press censorship.

Internationally, Suharto put Indonesia on a course toward improved relations with Western nations, while ending its friendly relations with the People's Republic of China. He dispatched his foreign minister, Adam Malik to mend strained relations with the United States, United Nations, and Malaysia and end the Confrontation.

On March 12, 1967 Suharto was named President by Indonesia's Provisional Parliament. On March 21 he was formally elected for the first of his five-year terms as President. He directly appointed 20% of the House of Representatives. The Golkar Party became the favored party and the only acceptable one for government officials. Indonesia also became one of the founding members of ASEAN.

To maintain order, Suharto greatly expanded the funding and powers of the Indonesian state apparatus. He established two intelligence agencies—the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB) and the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN)—to deal with threats to the regime. Suharto also established the Bureau of Logistics (BULOG) to distribute rice and other staple commodities granted by USAID. These new government bodies were put under the military regional command structure, that under Suharto was given a "dual function" role as both a defense force and as civilian administrators.


Due to a number of factors (chiefly Suharto-era censorship), the numbers of casualties from the 1965–67 civil war are heavily disputed. Estimates of the death toll of the conflict range from over 100,000 to 1.5 million.

It is known that with Suharto's rise, those Indonesian dissidents who survived were branded tapol (short for tahanan politik or "political detainee"). During Suharto's reign, tapol were given harsh prison sentences and their property seized by the government, and upon release carefully monitored and banned from public life. The status of tapol equally tainted the reputations of their spouses, children, and relatives.

These included prominent figures from the Sukarno years, including Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Indonesia's best known literary author. He was accused of belonging to a communist-led intellectual group LEKRA and sentenced to a penal colony on Buru. When restrictions on tapol's communication were eased Pramoedya published a book of memoirs, The Mute's Soliloquy, with detailed accusations of forced labour, starvation, and other abuses within the colony. ("Tapol Troubles" 1999)

Both supporters and critics of Suharto acknowledge that the period of the civil war was marked by human rights abuses. Supporters of Suharto claim that these were justified due to the imminent threat of a PKI-led coup, as was attempted in 1948. Critics of Suharto note that the PKI in 1965 had an inclination that was similar to Eurocommunism and preferred electoral politics to armed insurrection. They contend that Suharto's actions from 1965-1967 were motivated solely by personal ambition.

The change in regime from Sukarno to Suharto, though brutal, brought a shift in policy that allowed for USAID and other relief agencies to operate within the country. The short-term result was the alleviation of famine conditions due to shortfalls in rice supply and Sukarno's reluctance to take Western aid.

Western support

Despite a longtime veil of Cold War secrecy that still remains over this time period, there is archival and anecdotal evidence of Western (primarily American, British, and Australian) assistance in Gen. Suharto's seizure of power. These countries had each taken an interest in regime-change from Sukarno, viewed as belligerent due to his embrace of the People's Republic of China and because of the Confrontation in Malaysia, to a more Western-friendly leader.

Beginning in 1990, American diplomats divulged to the Washington Post and other media outlets that they had compiled lists of Indonesian "communist operatives" had turned over as many as 5,000 names to military and intelligence loyal to Gen. Suharto. (Kadane 1990)

In 2001, the National Security Archive at George Washington University obtained several internal documents of the U.S. Department of State, bolstering the ambassadors' claims of American collaboration with Gen. Suharto. However, the National Security Archives claim that communications between Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have been heavily redacted.

The role of the United Kingdom's Foreign Office and MI6 intelligence service has also come to light, in a series of exposés in The Independent newspaper beginning in 1997. The revelations included an anonymous Foreign Office source stating that the decision to unseat Pres. Sukarno was made by Prime Minister Harold MacMillan then executed under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. In particular, it was alleged that the Foreign Office's Information Research Department coordinated psychological warfare efforts along with the British military to spread propaganda that cast the PKI, Indonesian Chinese, and Sukarno in a bad light.

The role of MI6 in Suharto's rise, while strongly implicated by the use of the Information Research Department, is denied by the UK government and papers relating to it have yet to be declassified by the Cabinet Office. (Lashmar and Oliver 2000)

Height of the New Order

The two decades immediately following Suharto's wresting of power were marked by an expansion of Indonesia's military and economic power, as well as the assertion of Indonesian identity over regional or ethnic identities. Conversely, Indonesia under Suharto had little tolerance for dissent, and is generally thought of as an abuser of human rights.

Indonesia as "Asian Tiger"

On economic matters, Pres. Suharto relied on a group of American-educated economists, nicknamed the "Berkeley Mafia," to set policy. Soon after coming to power, he passed a number of reforms meant to establish Indonesia as a center of foreign investment. These included the privatization of its natural resources to promote their exploitation by industrialized nations, labour laws favorable to multinational corporations, and soliciting funds for development from institutions including the World Bank, Western banks, and friendly governments. ("Indonesia Economic" 2005)

As unchecked forces in Indonesian society under New Order, however, members of the military and Golkar Party were heavily involved as intermediaries between businesses (foreign and domestic) and the Indonesian government. This lead to a great deal of corruption in the form of bribery, racketeering, and embezzlement. Funds from these practices often flowed to foundations (yayasan) controlled by the Suharto family. The system became so pervasive that Berlin-based NGO Transparency International named Suharto as the most corrupt politician, and so entrenched that Indonesia has been consistently rated among the most corrupt nations.

Unitary state and regional unrest

From his assumption of office until his resignation, Suharto continued the policy of his predecessor Sukarno in asserting the Republic of Indonesia's sovereignty. He acted zealously to stake and enforce territorial claims over much of the region, through both diplomacy and military action.

In 1969, Suharto moved to end the longtime controversy over the last Dutch territory in the East Indies, western New Guinea. Working with the United States and United Nations, an agreement was made to hold a referendum on self-determination, in which participants could choose to remain part of the Netherlands, to integrate with the Republic of Indonesia, or to become independent. Though originally phrased to be a nationwide vote of all adult Papuans, the "Act of Free Choice" was held July–August 1969 allowed only 1022 "chiefs" to vote. The unanimous vote was for integration with the Republic of Indonesia, leading to doubts of the validity of the vote. (Simpson)

In 1975, after Portugal withdrew from its colony of East Timor and the Fretilin movement momentarily took power, Suharto ordered troops to invade the country. Later the puppet government installed by Indonesia requested the area be annexed to the country. It was estimated that 100,000 people, roughly a third of the local population, were killed by the Indonesian army. On July 15, 1976 East Timor became the province of Timor Timur until it was transferred to the United Nations in 1999.

In 1976, the regime was challenged in the province of Aceh by the formation of the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM, who demanded independence from the unitary state. Suharto quickly authorized troops to put down the rebellion, forcing several of its leaders into exile in Sweden. Prolonged fighting between GAM and the Indonesian military and police led Suharto to declare martial law in the province, by naming Aceh a "military operational area" (DOM) in 1990.

Underpinning Suharto's territorial ambitions was the rapid development of Indonesia's traditional urban centers. The rapid pace of this development had vastly increased their population density. In response, Suharto pursued the policy of transmigration to promote movement from crowded cities to rural regions of the archipelago where natural resources had not yet been exploited.

Politics and dissent

In 1970, corruption prompted student protests and an investigation by a government commission. Suharto responded by banning student protest, forcing the activists underground. Only token prosecution of cases recommended by the commission was pursued. The pattern of co-opting a few of his more powerful opponents while criminalising the rest became a hallmark of Suharto's rule.

In order to maintain a veneer of democracy, Suharto made a number of electoral reforms. He stood for election before electoral college votes every five years, beginning in 1973. According to his electoral rules, however, only three parties were allowed to participate in the election: his own Golkar party; the Islamist United Development Party (PPP), and the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI). All the previously existing political parties were forced to be part of either the PPP and PDI, with public servants under pressure to join the membership of Golkar. In a political compromise with the powerful military, he banned its members from voting in elections, but set aside 100 seats in the electoral college for their representatives. As a result, he won every election in which he stood, in 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998.

This authoritarianism became an issue in the 1980s. On May 5, 1980 a group Petition of Fifty (Petisi 50) demanded greater political freedoms. It was composed of former military men, politicians, academics and students. The Indonesian media suppressed the news and the government placed restrictions on the signatories. After the group's 1984 accusation that Suharto was creating a one-party state, some of its leaders were jailed.

In the same decade, it is believed by many scholars that the Indonesian military split between a nationalist "red and white faction" and an Islamist "green faction." As the 1980s closed, Suharto is said to have been forced to shifted allies from the former to the latter, leading to the rise of Jusuf Habibie in the 1990s.

After the 1990s brought end of the Cold War, Western concern over communism waned, and Suharto's human rights record came under greater international scrutiny. In 1991, the murder of East Timorese civilians in a Dili cemetery, also known as the "Santa Cruz Massacre" , caused American attention to focus on its military relations with the Suharto regime and the question of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. In 1992, this attention resulted in the Congress of the United States passing limitations on IMET assistance to the Indonesian military, over the objections of President George H.W. Bush. In 1993, under President Bill Clinton, the U.S. delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission helped pass a resolution expressing deep concern over Indonesian human rights violations in East Timor.

Reformation protests and the fall of Suharto

In 1996 Suharto undertook efforts to pre-empt a challenge to the New Order government. The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), a legal party that had traditionally propped up the regime had changed direction, and began to assert its independence. Suharto fostered a split over the leadership of PDI, backing a co-opted faction loyal to deputy speaker of Parliament Suryadi against a faction loyal to Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno and PDI's proper chairperson.

After the Suryadi faction announced a party congress to sack Megawati would be held in Medan June 20 - 22, Megawati proclaimed that her supporters would hold demonstrations in protest. The Suryadi faction went through with its sacking of Megawati, and the demonstrations manifested themselves throughout Indonesia. This lead to several confrontations on the streets between protesters and security forces, and recriminations over the violence. The protests culminated in the military allowing Megawati's supporters to take over PDI headquarters in Jakarta, with a pledge of no further demonstrations.

Suharto allowed the occupation of PDI headquarters to go on for almost a month, as attentions were also on Jakarta due to a set of high-profile ASEAN meetings scheduled to take place there. Capitalizing on this, Megawati supporters organized "democracy forums" with several speakers at the site. On July 26, officers of the military, Suryadi, and Suharto openly aired their disgust with the forums. (Aspinall 1996)

On July 27, police, soldiers, and persons claiming to be Suryadi supporters stormed the headquarters. Several Megawati supporters were killed, and over two-hundred arrested and tried under the Anti-Subversion and Hate-spreading laws. The day would become known as "Black Saturday" and mark the beginning of a renewed crackdown by the New Order government against supporters of democracy, now called the "Reformasi" or Reformation. (Amnesty International 1996)

In 1997 Asian financial crisis had dire consequences for the Indonesian economy and society, and Suharto's regime. The Indonesian currency, the rupiah, took a sharp dive in value. Suharto came under scrutiny from international lending institutions, chiefly the World Bank, IMF and the United States, over longtime embezzlement of funds and some protectionist policies. In December, Suharto's government signed a letter of intent to the IMF, pledging to enact austerity measures, including cuts to public services and removal of subsidies, in return for receiving the aid of the IMF and other donors.

Beginning early 1998, the austerity measures approved by Suharto had started to erode domestic confidence in the regime. Prices for goods such as kerosene and rice, and fees for public services including education rose dramatically. The effects were exacerbated by widespread corruption.

Suharto stood for reelection by parliament for the seventh time in March 1998, justifying it on the grounds of the necessity of his leadership during the crisis. The parliament approved a new term. This sparked protests and riots throughout the country, now termed the Indonesian 1998 Revolution. Dissension within the ranks of his own Golkar Party and military finally weakened Suharto, and on May 21 he stood down from power. He was replaced by his deputy Jusuf Habibie.

After the fall

In May 1999, Time Asia reported that the Suharto family fortune is worth an estimated US$15 billion in cash, shares, corporate assets, real estate, jewelery and fine art. US$9 billion of this is reported to have been deposited in an Austrian bank. The family is said to control about 36,000 km² of real estate in Indonesia, including 100,000 m² of prime office space in Jakarta and nearly 40 percent of the land in East Timor. Over US$73 billion is said to have passed through the family's hands during Suharto's 32-year rule.

On May 29, 2000, Suharto was placed under house arrest when Indonesian authorities began to investigate the corruption during his regime. In July, it was announced that he was to be accused of embezzling US$571 million of government donations to one of a number of foundations under his control and then using the money to finance family investments. But in September court-appointed doctors announced that he could not stand trial because of his declining health. State prosecutors tried again in 2002 but then doctors blamed an unspecified brain disease. He has since been hospitalized repeatedly for stroke and heart problems.

Unable to prosecute Suharto, the state prosecuted his son Hutomo Mandala Putra, more widely known as Tommy Suharto. He was sentenced to 15 years in jail for arranging the murder of a judge who sentenced him to 18 months for his role in a land scam in September 2000. He is the first member of the Suharto family to be found guilty and jailed for a criminal offence. Tommy Suharto maintains his innocence but says he will not appeal the verdict or the sentence.

On May 6, 2005, Suharto was taken to Pertamina Hospital in Jakarta with intestinal bleeding, believed to be from diverticulosis. The political elite of Indonesia, including President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, visited his bedside. He was released and returned home, May 12, 2005.

On May 26, 2005, the Jakarta Post reported that amid an effort by the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to crack down on corruption, Indonesian Attorney General Abdurrahman Saleh appeared before a Parliamentary commission to discuss efforts to prosecute New Order figures, including Suharto. Attorney General Abdurrahman remarked that he hoped Suharto could recover so that the government could begin inquiries into New Order human rights violations and corruption for purposes of compensation and recovery of state funds, but expressed skepticism that this would be possible. The Supreme Court of Indonesia also issued a decree making the office of the Attorney General responsible for supervising Suharto's medical care."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suharto. -- Zugriff am 2005-09-27]

4.2. Erste Tochter: Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Mbak Tutut) (1949 - )

Abb.: Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Mbak Tutut)
[Bildquelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana "Tutut" Suharto (daughter)
Age: 50
Estimated wealth: $700 million
Major holdings: Citra Lamtoro Gung Group, with interests in more than 90 companies ranging from telecommunications to infrastructure, including tollway projects in Indonesia and the Philippines.
Property: 12-room, $1 million house with tennis court and heated pool near Boston; house on London's Hyde Park Square.
Last sighted: Requesting a hike in tollway rates from Indonesia's parliament.
Operating style: Politically ambitious, Tutut ascended to the level of Minister of Social Affairs in her father's last cabinet. Got her start in business at age 25, when "Uncle" Liem Sioe Liong gave her 14% of BCA, the country's largest private bank. She has also adopted her nephew Ari Sigit's out-of-wedlock daughter, Suharto's great-grandchild.
Siti Tutut Suharto's Hotel Interests: Nusa Dua Beach Hotel."

[Quelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Siti Hardijanti Rukmana

An icon on television broadcasts in her Muslim scarf, the 47-year-old is active in the political and business worlds. Commonly known as Mbak (sister) Tutut, she is married to prominent businessman Indra Rukmana. She started in business in 1983 with trading company Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada. Her husband and younger sisters have shares in the company. Tutut also holds a 17.5% stake in the Salim group-controlled Bank Central Asia.

Since its start, the Citra Lamtoro group has moved into telecommunications, infrastructure, agribusiness, pulp and paper, fisheries, television, building materials and ship manufacturing. The group is best known for its work in toll-road construction; it has won contracts during the past two years to build roads in Malaysia and the Philippines. Among her business partners, she counts timber magnate Prajogo Pangestu and the Sultan of Brunei. Like Bambang, she insists none of her success is due to special concessions.

Tutut says her businesses are a way of supporting her social work: "This sort of work needs money. If you constantly ask for sponsorship, that's not nice." Now head of the Indonesian Red Cross and two sports organizations, she is perhaps best known as chairwoman of the central board of ruling group Golkar. She is said to harbor higher political ambitions, but for now her father seems to prefer to keep her in the wings."

[Quelle: Keith Loveard. -- In:  Asiaweek. -- 1996. -- http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0412/feat13.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

4.3. Erster Sohn: Sigit Harjojudanto (1951 - )

Abb.: Sigit Harjojudanto
[Bildquelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Sigit Harjoyudanto Suharto (son)
Age: 48
Estimated wealth: $800 million
Major holdings: 40% of brother Tommy's Humpuss Group; silent partner in hundreds of other companies and properties.
Property: Two homes in exclusive Hampstead area of London worth $12 million each, one in Los Angeles, one outside Geneva
Last sighted: Suharto family compound in Menteng district of Jakarta.
Operating style: Serious gambler. Frequented roulette and baccarat tables in London (he loved the Ritz), Atlantic City, Las Vegas and Perth; gambling partners say he wagered up to $3 million a night, with career losses of more than $150 million. After Sigit suffered a bad run in Las Vegas in the late 1980s, his father banned him from gambling abroad. Jakarta bookies organized a call-in cable TV show featuring a baccarat table; Sigit, a friend says, lost more than $20 million: "They set up the scam just for Sigit".
Sigit Suharto's Hotel Interests: Bali Cliff Resort, Nikko Bali Resort & Spa, Westin Nusa Dua, Amanusa Resort Nusa Dua.
Sigit Suharto's Other Bali Interests: Uluwatu Ocean Resort."

[Quelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Sigit Harjojudanto

One of the least visible of the Suharto offspring, he is a major shareholder in top-ranked Bank Central Asia. Harjojudanto, 44, is also involved in PT PENI, a petrochemicals joint venture with British Petroleum. He helped found younger brother Hutomo Mandala Putra's fast-rising Humpuss group, of which he holds 40%.

The subject of rumors in his youth because of a reported gambling habit, Harjojudanto attracted negative publicity in the early 1990s for his role as one of the managers of the controversial SDSB lottery. Designed to provide funding for sports, the lottery was banned in 1993 after Muslim groups called it a form of gambling.

Harjojudanto was upstaged by his wife Elsye Anneke Ratnawati late last year when she was named as one of the Indonesians active in aggressive share-buying on the Singapore Stock Exchange. Their first son, Ari Haryo Sigit, 24, attracted even more heat in February when one of his companies imposed a levy on beer and alcohol sales in Bali. President Suharto ordered the levy removed in March."

[Quelle: Keith Loveard. -- In:  Asiaweek. -- 1996. -- http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0412/feat13.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

4.4. Zweiter Sohn: Bambang Trihatmodjo (1953 - )

Abb.: Bambang Trihatmodjo
[Bildquelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Bambang Trihatmodjo Suharto (son)
Age: 45
Estimated wealth: $3 billion
Major holdings: 38% of Bimantara Citra, one of Indonesia's largest conglomerates with 27 subsidiaries and interests in everything from oil and gas to hotels, telecommunications and animal feed
Property: $8.2 million Singapore apartment, $12 million Los Angeles estate.
Last sighted: At a bowling alley near Los Angeles
Operating style: Has been transferring cash overseas and buying shares in foreign markets for several years. In 1997, say Dutch authorities, he made a "private visit" to the Netherlands-controlled Caribbean island of Curaçao, apparently to make a large deposit in the local branch of an international bank.

Bambang Suharto's Hotel Interests: Sheraton Laguna Nusa Dua, Bali Intercontinental Resort Hotel.
Bambang Suharto's Other Bali Interests: Bali Turtle Island Development (4800 Ha tourist resort, Project), Nustra Tours & Travel, promotes golf tours & has enforced a monopoly over "convention" tours in Bali. "

[Quelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]


Slowly and quietly, the Indonesian president's second son has been building a robust business empire. Who is Bambang Trihatmodjo and why are people whispering about him?

By Keith Loveard / Jakarta

IT'S TWO HOURS SINCE the successful launch of the Palapa C-1 satellite at Florida's Cape Canaveral and Indonesian and American officials are visibly relieved. The party has been bused to the plush confines of the nearby La Cita Country Club, where it's time for toasts and glad-handing. Among the top brass is businessman Tommy Winarta, resplendent in gold-trimmed batik. He is a partner in PT Satelindo, which has just spent $190 million on the launch. Among other proud countrymen is Indonesia's Ambassador to the U.S. Arifin Siregar who is so pleased he takes a victory whirl on the dance floor with the wife of an executive from Hughes Space and Communications.

Yet nowhere among the crowd is Bambang Trihatmodjo, second son of Indonesian President Suharto. As the major shareholder through his Bimantara group in the Palapa satellite, he has the most to gain or lose from the launch. Reports from the other side of the globe indicate he's not at Satelindo's Jakarta ground station either. Trihatmodjo apparently preferred to watch the direct broadcast on television behind the high walls of his home in the elite Jakarta suburb of Kebayoran.

Bambang's absence was typical. For years, the powerful president's most powerful son has shunned the limelight -- while quietly building one of Indonesia's fastest-rising conglomerates. Already a strong presence in such key sectors as broadcasting, cars and oil, the Bimantara Citra group is now looking to make telecommunications its biggest revenue raiser within five years. Trihatmodjo's personal wealth is said to be growing in other ways as well. Through a web of personal and corporate tie-ups, Bambang's reach is extending across the country and overseas.

Interest in the 43-year-old tycoon has grown in concert with his rising wealth and business connections. But getting a clear portrait of the media-shy Trihatmodjo is not easy. Until recently, the Ministry of Information actively discouraged reporters from writing about the first family and its businesses. The lingering effects of that policy and the Suharto family's immense power still keep people quiet today. Adi Adiwoso, of PT Pasifik Satelit Nusantara, which owns six of the 34 transponders on the Palapa C-1 satellite, backs off nervously when asked about the president's son. Another business partner has a similar reaction, adding, "You're kidding, I've got my kids to think about." A Western businessman who deals with Bimantara advises: "Pick another topic."

When there is talk about Trihatmodjo, it is usually gossip passed in whispers or in private. The decision by the government to hand over the satellite business to Satelindo in 1993 is the latest in a line of licenses Bimantara is seen to have grabbed because it has a first family member at its helm. Even those who praise the leadership of President Suharto often raise questions about the children's success.

Like Bambang, his brothers and sisters are reticent about talking to the press. Six in all, the children of President and Madame Tien Suharto are seldom seen among Jakarta social circles. The recent exception is older sister Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, 47, known as Mbak Tutut, who has adopted a more political stance and can be found at functions of the ruling group Golkar. Bambang was elected to Golkar as well, along with younger brother Hutomo Mandala Putra, 34. But they have largely remained behind the scenes or, more likely, uninvolved in political affairs. Other siblings, such as the oldest son Sigit Harjojudanto, 44, are virtually never seen in public (see profiles, pages 34-35).

Trihatmodjo's preference for privacy and the fact that he never went to university have given rise to suggestions that he's not that smart; that his business success is due to having a powerful father. Some even say privately that his wife Siti Halimah, who has an accounting degree from a U.S. university, is the real force behind Bimantara.

All this leads to the questions: Who is Bambang Trihatmodjo and what is his real role at Bimantara? Through a series of interviews with friends, colleagues and business acquaintances, Asiaweek was able to put together a totally different picture of the man than the one painted by popular lore. "He's smart, even manipulative," says one senior Bimantara executive. Another colleague concurs: "He's got a sharp mind and he takes a responsible attitude to his work. The fact that he's got a good management team around him should suggest that he picks his people well, not that they do all the work for him."

Another business partner says Trihatmodjo is fair: "If you work on a project with him and you lose, the loss is shared. If you win, that's shared too. If you go out somewhere together, you share the costs. In a business sense, he's also constructive. He has some good ideas and works them through." And people who have spent time with Trihatmodjo away from the office say he's not stuck-up. "He likes to hunt and he likes to fish," says a friend. "In the mornings, it's common for him to be the one to get the breakfast. He serves us."

Trihatmodjo is also described as the glue that holds the Bimantara partners together. Among the elite Bimantara fold are brother-in-law Indra Rukmana, former schoolmates Rosano Barack and Muhamad Tachril, and Peter Gontha, a former executive at Citibank in Indonesia. While Rukmana, Tutut's husband, doesn't take a major role in management, he is said to often be the one who smoothes out personnel problems and lends a helping hand when it's needed. Barack is described as the "power-seeker" who searches out new business ties. "Affiliation-oriented" Tachril is said to be good at making sure those connections remain strong. Gontha, meanwhile, is called the consummate professional, though he is known for taking on more than he can handle.

Critics tend to disregard the fact that the Bimantara group has for some years been consistently more open than the other Suharto children's companies. In some respects, it is more transparent than many Indonesian enterprises. Since the lead-up to holding company Bimantara Citra's public launch in the middle of 1995, group executives have made themselves available to the press on request. The group is tied by stock market regulatory rules to quarterly reporting, which it has adhered to.

And though he is called "shy" and "insecure," Trihatmodjo does occasionally talk to the press, though he never tends to say much. In one surprise interview last year in Hong Kong, an Asiaweek correspondent recalls that Trihatmodjo was "very cordial, relaxed. He just wasn't talky. He kept repeating himself, or laughing." Corporate public relations sources admit Trihatmodjo's reluctance to be more open tends to cement the image that he's dull. Still, they say they have been unable to persuade him to be more frank and forthcoming.

At a recent press event, however, Trihatmodjo was willing to talk -- though, true to form, he was hardly verbose. "I'm just like you and everyone else, just another human being," he told Asiaweek. On his obvious nervousness in public, Bambang said: "I've been like that since I was a kid. Since I was small I have never said much. What's important is to work."

It wasn't entirely work, though, that led Trihatmodjo to England in the early 1970s. An old friend recalls meeting him and Tachril at a house near the southern seaside city of Brighton: both sported long hair and were walking around with no shirts. It was the post-hippie days in the West, and the boys were apparently sharing in the fun of the flower power generation. Trihatmodjo seems to remember his days in England with warmth; he's named one of his investment companies Brighton.

For a while, Trihatmodjo played in a four-man Jakarta rock band with Tachril, Barack and another friend, Hariyadi. Today, Trihatmodjo, Tachril and Barack are Bimantara's leading lights, while Hariyadi is managing director of PT Bimantara Wisesa, originally a property company but more recently active in trading.

Tachril says Bimantara was conceived when he, Trihatmodjo and Barack made a schoolboy oath to work together in the future. But the dream only began to come together in 1979, when Tachril was working with Indonesian trading giant Bakrie & Brothers and Barack was with electronics firm National Gobel. The trio started to lay plans, formally establishing Bimantara two years later. The three friends frequently consulted Indra Rukmana on how the business should operate; eventually they asked him to join.

The way the founders tell it, Bimantara's beginnings were modest. In the early days Tachril says he found himself "operator, secretary and the guy who went to get the food." It was a friend of Barack's father who put up some money to pay for their office rent while the former band members took out loans to meet other initial expenses. "We started as traders, dealing in anything, operating as brokers," recalls Tachril. The Suharto links apparently helped. Barack's university education in Japan and a brief stint there with electronics conglomerate Matsushita also provided the company with contacts. Tachril nonetheless claims the Suharto name didn't always open doors. He recalls being thrown out of an office at state-owned oil giant Pertamina three times when he tried to arrange a meeting about possible business partnerships.

There were suspicions and criticisms about Bimantara from the beginning, according to Tachril. "After about two years we started to look seriously for professionals to join us. We had to be able to handle the company in a professional manner. A lot of people were saying: You are just a company selling facilities," Tachril says, using an Indonesian euphemism for connections.

Tachril doesn't deny that Bimantara had connections. "I don't think there's anyone in the world who doesn't need connections. The problem is, how do you use those connections? Every major company [in Indonesia] that was ever born or got big did so because of its connections," he claims. "If we had not used ours properly, they could have become a boomerang which would have turned around and hit us."

Among the professionals taken on by Bimantara in its initial expansion was Kadir Assegaff, now group finance director. The former Citibank executive recalls that he had to ask if the managers wanted to make Bimantara into a profit-seeking multinational or a corporate presence that would aid in Indonesia's development. After all, Assegaff says, "I was not only putting myself but my family in this company."

Assegaff signed on in 1984 and credits a dedication to hard work and professionalism for the group's success. That has required shedding many of the subsidiaries formed in the early days. "[Bimantara] companies were being formed every week but they were not hiring any professional talent," Assegaff says. "We had to be serious about how good we could make those companies and how to improve them."

Since 1990, a progressive downsizing of operations has seen Bimantara reduced from over 100 subsidiaries and affiliates to 51. When it went public last year, only 26 of these companies were included in the float; the remainder were placed under holding company PT Bima Intan Kencana. The Bimantara group companies are concentrated in a number of core business groups, notably entertainment, telecommunications, infrastructure, finance, autos and electronics. Some remain speculative enterprises, such as a joint venture waste-treatment facility south of Jakarta run by Aqualindo Mitra Industri. The company also has tie-ups with high-profile multinationals such as Hyundai, Ford, Nestlé, Union Carbide and NEC.

Given the Bimantara track record, doing deals with Trihatmodjo is seen as the way to wealth. "We believe he's the key to success, particularly in communications," says a U.S. satellite executive. "If he signs on, you've got a winner. If he doesn't, you're struggling." Multinational Shell found that out the hard way when Bimantara pulled out of a projected deal to build a petrochemical complex in Central Java in 1991. Negotiations stalled when Bimantara demanded more than 5% of the action. Indonesians close to the deal said Bimantara resented Shell's take-it-or-leave-it attitude. Shell executives were shocked when Bimantara turned around and formed a strategic alliance with Indonesians Prajogo Pangestu and Henry Pribadi in the rival Chandra Asri petrochemical project in West Java.

Today, Bimantara Citra is a publicly listed company with an estimated net profit in 1995 of $47.8 million on revenues of $319 million. Finance director Assegaff is clearly fulfilling all requirements for transparency. From here, all will be clear, but the same is not true about where the seed money came from. Some of it may have been "invested" by companies keen to do business in Indonesia. "We do write checks," admits one U.S. executive, who asked not to be identified. "It's the only way we can guarantee the business." Another businessman insists that his company does not pay anything. But, he adds, "we lose business that way, and one of these days we may have to reconsider our policy." There is of course no evidence that any of the Bimantara principals has ever received a cent in "commissions."

There's good reason everyone wants to tie-up with Bimantara. Among the group's lucrative divisions is PT Samudra Petroleum, an early subsidiary, which holds contracts to ship Indonesian oil overseas. And since the mid-1980s, another long-term source of funds has been PT Mindo, an oil marketing operation that handles around 5% of Indonesian production. Some oil industry executives believe the deal is actually illegal, since the law governing Pertamina says the state firm alone has the authority to market Indonesian oil. One Bimantara executive says that's not true: "The law doesn't state that Pertamina may not subcontract this right. It's a gray area, and Indonesian business is very good at operating in these gray areas."

Bimantara's most important coup before the satellite business was in broadcasting. Commercial station RCTI, bleeding money after its set-up in 1990 when it was restricted to encrypted broadcasts, won the right to broadcast freely the following year. Trihatmodjo's sister Tutut snuck ahead in 1992 with permission to transmit peak-time programming nationally on her TPI station. But RCTI quickly got the government to let it go national too and has since maintained market leadership.

PT Satelindo president Iwa Sewaka says the government had sound reasons to transfer its satellite launch program to private hands. Asked why it chose Satelindo, he simply shrugs. Before the Palapa C-1 launch, United Development Party MP Mohamad Buang stressed that it was high time that such opportunities were offered by tender. The director-general of post and telecommunications, Djakaria Purawidjaja, agrees: he told a pre-launch press conference at Cape Canaveral that in future all telecom projects would be awarded by tender.

Bimantara stands to make a lot of money from its satellites, which are expected to take over from the television station as the group's major profit-generator. Too much money? MP Buang asks why Satelindo should charge between $1.6 million and $4 million a year to rent each of the 34 Palapa C-1 transponders when the government-run Indosat charges less than $1 million.

The cash return of $115 million from the June 1995 IPO of Bimantara and $586 million from the sale of 25% of Satelindo stock to Deutsche Telkom seemed to free up Trihatmodjo for other ventures. Operating with Johannes Kotjo, a former Salim group executive, he has bought a controlling stake in Indonesia's largest textile maker, Kanindo. Kotjo had been actively raiding listed Singapore companies, apparently acting in concert with Bambang. But Kotjo may have been too active or, in the eyes of the Stock Exchange of Singapore, not discreet enough in his comments to the press. In December, Kotjo was banned from joining the board of directors of any additional SES-listed company for 30 months.

Then came a share-buying move late in January in Singapore property and trading company Amcol Holdings from Tommy Winarta and Sugianto Kusuma. The pair are the other major partners with Bimantara in PT Bima Graha, the holding company which controls the major stake in Satelindo. Another Indonesian tycoon, Henry Pribadi, who holds nearly 18% of Amcol, said he welcomed the move.

With Pribadi also linked to Bimantara through holdings in petrochemical company PT Chandra Asri, analysts said there is a strong suggestion of a concerted takeover of Amcol. But a source close to the deal denies such an intent: "As far as I can see we are just looking to make some money. With this sort of speculation around you can expect others to want to get a share of the action."

Trihatmodjo is also active through Asriland, the real estate company he owns with his wife. This is becoming a major investment vehicle for the couple. Asriland is, in turn, a part owner through Bima Graha of Satelindo and may have extensive holdings elsewhere. Is Trihatmodjo trying to ensure a way out of Indonesia if he needs it, for instance through his share deals in Singapore? "That's rubbish," he says. "We are active there so that we can more easily attract funds to use within Indonesia. You know yourself that interest rates here are high."

Complicated share dealings and growing Suharto family empires still lead ordinary Indonesians to question what is going on in their country. There is widespread resentment at what are seen to be special favors. To the elite, that's business as usual. Trihatmodjo and his siblings "are the children of a high official," says one of Bambang's longtime friends. "The culture here is that the children of such high officials are given special deals. It's as simple as that. That's the way Indonesia works."

Trihatmodjo, however, denies that he ever used connections to his father for personal benefit. "We go by the procedures, that's all," he says. He is aware that the world at large doesn't believe him. "People can make their own judgments. It's normal to me now. As long as I don't do anything wrong and as long as we keep within the regulations there is nothing we have to worry about."

The perceived culture of favoritism sparked debate last year about whether the children of high officials should be banned from business. One of Trihatmodjo's close associates calls that idea nonsense. "What are the kids supposed to do? Go to the government and ask for a pension? It's the government's fault if people prefer to do business with someone like Bambang," he says. "If you take a proposal to the government it will sit untouched on someone's desk for three months. With Bambang, you just say, hey, look at this idea. If he likes it, everything is on its way in two days."

Ultimately, of course, the first family firms can't hope to debunk the perception they succeeded because of special treatment until after President Suharto's death. "However good we are, people will always say that we only can do it because of who we are and because we get special deals," a Bimantara executive says. "If we fail, people will say, look, they got all those special deals and still mucked it up. We can't win." That may be true. But however they have gained market share and conquered new corporate frontiers, it looks like Bambang Trihatmodjo and his Bimantara team will remain winners for decades to come."

[Quelle: Keith Loveard. -- In:  Asiaweek. -- 1996. -- http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0412/feat1.html#feat13. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

4.5. Zweite Tochter:  Siti Hedijanti Harijadi (Titiek) (1959 - )

Abb.: Siti Hedijanti Harijadi (Titiek)
[Bildquelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Siti Hediati Hariyadi "Titiek" Suharto
Age: 40
Estimated wealth: $75 million
Major holdings: Financial services, power, computers, banking, property.
Property: Home on London's Grosvenor Square.
Last sighted: Boston, where her son is attending high school. Her husband, Lieut. General Prabowo Subianto, is in Jordan looking after his brother's business interests and visiting an old friend, Jordan's King Abdullah.
Operating style: Chain smoker. Hates dogs. In Jakarta, she slept in one room; her husband and his Alsatians in another. Likes Harry Winston, Bulgari and Cartier. "She loves big chunks of jewelry," says a woman who has accompanied her on excursions to Switzerland and England. Former chairwoman of the Indonesian Fine Arts Foundation, Titiek has a personal art collection valued at more than $5 million. Adores movie stars. At a 1994 Suharto party in Bali to celebrate the opening of Jakarta's Planet Hollywood, she danced the night away with martial arts star Steven Seagal.
Siti Titiek Suharto's Hotel Interests: Nikko Bali Resort & Spa, Ramada Bintang Bali Hotel, Radisson Bali Hotel Sanur.
Siti Titiek Suharto's Other Bali Interests: PT Sanur Hastamitra and PT Sanur Dinamika (Salim Group companies, with 10% shares owned by sons of Bali Governor Ida Bagus Oka), PT Pesona First Pacific (Salim Group), PepsiCo franchise for Indonesia."

[Quelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Siti Hediati Harijadi

President Suharto's fourth child, the 37-year-old is more commonly known as Titiek. Her husband, Brig.-Gen. Prabowo Subianto, is a rising military star; he was just appointed special forces commander. They have one boy. The marriage has also brought with it business connections: Titiek is a partner in Jakarta's elite Plaza Senayan shopping development with brother-in-law Hashim Djojohadikusumo. Her company, Maharani Paramita, established in 1992, is active in telecommunications, finance, property and forestry.

Like Tutut, Titiek is involved in prominent social causes. She heads the Indonesian Arts Foundation, the Table Tennis Association and the national sports body's fundraising foundation."

[Quelle: Keith Loveard. -- In:  Asiaweek. -- 1996. -- http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0412/feat13.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

4.6. Dritter Sohn: Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy) (1962 - )

Abb.: Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy) (1962 - )
[Bildquelle: http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0402/17/nas1.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-09-27]

"Hutomo Mandala Putra "Tommy" Suharto (son)
Age: 36
Estimated wealth: $800 million
Major holdings: 60% of Humpuss Group, which has more than 60 subsidiaries in industries ranging from construction to pharmaceuticals
Property: Ranch in New Zealand, Mill Ride Golf Club, an 18-hole course he partly owns in Ascot, England.
Last sighted: Jakarta courthouse, where he is the only Suharto child to stand trial for graft
Operating style: Accomplished stock car racer (once sponsored by Marlboro). Like brother Sigit, he loves to gamble, thinking nothing of losing $1 million in a single sitting. One gaming partner says he used to leave Jakarta on his plane with millions of dollars to wager in European casinos and stop in Singapore on the way home to deposit what was left. "Tommy loves money," says a former business partner. "And he always wanted it up front." Like his father, says a friend of the family, Tommy is "very polite, very cool".
Tommy Suharto's Hotel Interests: Four Seasons Resort Hotel Sayan, Four Seasons Resort Hotel Jimbaran, Lor In Bali Resort Gianyar.
Tommy Suharto's Other Bali Interests: Mabua Intan Express (Bali / Lombok Ferry), PT Tirtha Artha Buanamulia drinking water project which refines 600 liters/sec for luxury tourist hotels in Nusa Dua, Jimbaran, etc. PT Bali Benoa Marina Benoa Bay, with 18-hole golf course. Sempati Airlines. Gatari Air charter company. Shares in PT Ayung River Rafting company (together with sons of Bali Governor Ida Bagus Oka): this company practically monopolizes rafting on the Ayung river, near Ubud."

[Quelle: http://www.fugly-bali.org/suharto-hoteliers.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Hutomo Mandala Putra

Known as Tommy Suharto, the 34-year-old can be described as Indonesia's most eminent bachelor. The power behind the Humpuss business group and a racing-car enthusiast, he has been linked with a number of beauties.

Started with $100,000 of capital in 1984, the Humpuss group quickly mushroomed into a major player. In 1994, Tommy said the group's annual turnover was as high as $500 million. Included in the Humpuss empire are holdings in private airline Sempati, charter operator Gatari and a host of companies active in shipping, agribusiness, media, toll-road construction, oil and gas exploration and timber. Tommy also heads the clove marketing board BPPC, designed to help growers of the important spice. Critics note that so far BPPC has succeeded only in lowering returns to growers while raising the price to buyers.

Last month, Tommy pulled another coup by forming a car company with Korea's Kia Motors. That deal won the ire of other producers, including brother Bambang, when officials gave the new firm "national car status," freeing it from import duties on components and a luxury tax. Tommy already owns a 60% share in Italian carmaker Lamborghini."

[Quelle: Keith Loveard. -- In:  Asiaweek. -- 1996. -- http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0412/feat13.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

4.7. Dritte Tochter: Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih (Ibu Mamiek) (1964 - )

Abb.: Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih (Ibu Mamiek)
[Bildquelle: http://www.vitapro.com/Indonesia/alipho1.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

"Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih

The youngest of the Suharto clan is 31. She is married to Pratikto Prayitno Singgih, a graduate in economics from the University of Indonesia, with whom she has one boy.

Known as Mamie, her only business interest so far is a share in a company reclaiming land on the north Jakarta coast. That venture is expected to pay dividends in development rights later on. She also serves as director of the Mekarsari Fruit Garden in the hills near Jakarta. An idea started by her mother, the project aims to help make Indonesian fruit growers competitive in world markets."

[Quelle: Keith Loveard. -- In:  Asiaweek. -- 1996. -- http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0412/feat13.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-10-11]

4.8. Cukong: Liem Sioe Liong (1916 - )

Liem Sioe Liong

Abb.: Liem Sioe Liong (林绍良) (1916 - )
[Bildquelle: http://www.investor.co.id/view_artikel.html?id=1349&cari=. -- Zugriff am 2005-09-27]

"林绍良 Liem Sioe Liong (Indonesia)

Chairman of Salim Group, Economic Advisor to The Indonesian Government


BORN:                    July 16, 1916, Fujian province, China
EDUCATION:        Junior high school, Fujian
FAMILY:                Married, four children

Billionaire Indonesian Chinese Liem Sioe Liong, whose wealth rivals American tycoons like Du Pont and Rockefeller, has been crowned one of the world’s six richest.  His close ties to President Suharto date to the early days of the republic, and he single-handedly established Indonesia's largest corporate group (Indocement, Indofood) as well as huge businesses in the Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong and China. However, he was reluctant to publicly list some of his Indonesian companies, probably to avoid scrutiny. His career epitomises the meteoric rise in Chinese fortunes under Suharto and sheds light on the close ties between the community and Indonesia's rulers.  He once said: “Half of one’s success can be attributed to chance and opportunity, while the other half is sheer grit and determination.”  This is his personal motto and reflection of his own struggles to get to the top.

Liem’s Younger Days

Liem Sioe Liong was born in Haikou, Fujian province in 1916.  He was an avid learner with a stunning memory, and was enrolled in his village’s private school at age 7.  Unfortunately, poverty put a stop to his schooling days and at 15, his family rented a shophouse for him in the village to run a stall selling noodle-soup.  After the 918 Incident, his stall was forced to shut down amidst the pandemonium of war.  In 1935, Liem’s father passed away, and the family burden fell upon the shoulders of his mother.  At this time, the village was rife with rumours of the Kuomintang seizing able-bodied young men for conscription.  His mother eventually told him to strike it out in Southeast Asia (Nanyang), partly to take his chances, but mostly to avoid conscription.

The young Liem migrated from Fujian province in the 1920s, arriving in Indonesia with hardly a penny to his name.  He was barely 20 when he reached Indonesia, and spent his initial days staying with an uncle, helping out at his uncle’s provision shop.  However, the provision shop’s business was very thin, and finally, Liem decided to start his own hawker business selling coffee powder.

The days of peddling coffee powder were grueling.  He had to wake up everyday at midnight to grind the coffee beans into coffee powder, and wrap the powder in newspaper, into packets of 50g or 100g.  Rain or shine, he rode his bicycle to places as far as 70 km away to peddle his wares.  But hardship only served to strengthen his will, and through his contacts with his customers, he got to know many people.

Indonesia was originally a colony of the Netherlands. On 7th December 1941, the Japanese waged the Pacific War, and invaded Indonesia.  In August 1945, the Japanese were finally defeated, and Indonesia became a republic.  However, the Dutch returned to reclaim its lost colony, and war broke out yet again.

Liem’s big break came when he acquainted the young nationalist commander Suharto during the war of independence. He saw which way the wind was blowing and started using his trading network to help the independence movement, smuggling supplies and, according to some, arms to the rebels.

While Liem was a military supplier during the war of independence, he spotted an opportunity in cloves.  Cloves are a vital ingredient in Indonesian-style cigarettes or kreteks. By exploiting maritime connections in the Fujian overseas community, Liem was able to get more cloves to more kretek factories faster and cheaper than his competitors. He quickly became a millionaire.

Post-Independence Days

Liem, unlike Riady who was arrested and deported for pro-independence activities, was careful not to attract the notice of the authorities. Following independence, Liem assessed the situation and decided to employ the strategy of first pursuing businesses to meet the people’s basic need for clothing, food, lodging and transportation (衣食住行), and then diversify later into other businesses.

His first venture was in textiles, followed by rubber (for manufacturing tyres), nails (which were in short supply), bicycle parts and soap.  His business formula was an instant hit, and wealth came pouring in.  Under Mr Suharto, the route to success for Chinese Indonesians lay in finding a patron. And patrons did not come bigger than the president himself. With Suharto’s patronage, Liem received monopolies in flour, clove importation and cement.

In 1969, Liem made a proposal to the Government to set up an flour mill in Indonesia to cope with the critical shortage of flour the post-indepedence days. His proposal was swiftly approved, and he was granted 2/3 monopoly rights to the national flour production output.  By the 80s, Liem’s flour mills were able to meet 80percent of the nation’s demand for flour, and was the largest flour mill in Asia.

While this was going on, Liem never gave up his clove business.  In 1986, Liem received sole importer right from the government to import cloves into Indonesia, and he started two companies to handle clove imports.  The amount of imports handled by these companies is approximately 90percent of the clove output in Africa’s largest clove-producing countries.

In 1975, Liem built his cement factory (狄斯水泥).  Annual production capacity rocketed from 500,000 tonnes to 1 million tones, reaching 2 million tones by 1978 with the construction of a larger facility, and becoming the largest cement conglomerate in Indonesia.

A Formula of Diversification

After Mr Suharto began implementing his new economic policy, Liem began moving into banking and other businesses, including textiles, chemicals and property. Rich beyond the dreams of avarice, Liem is involved in everything.

In 1957, Liem started his own bank with help from Bangkok Bank.  In the 70s, he diversified into properties, construction and tourism.  In the late 70s, Liem moved into the auto industry.  Now, Liem’s empire covers textiles, cement, chemicals, electronics, forestry, fishery, freight and transportation, insurance, finance, property, gold and precious stones, hotels, medical equipment, communications, metals etc.  The Salim Group’s headquarter is based in Jakarta, with some 60 subsidiaries across four continent, including countries like Indonesia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Netherlands and the USA.

Business for Liem is a virtuous circle. Salim Group banks manage his trading empire, which in turn transports his raw materials to his factories, which produce goods sold in shops rented from his property interests.

Liem has passed the baton to a new generation. Anthony Salim now takes care of day-to-day operations of the Salim empire.


Compiled and translated by Willie Hsu"

[Quelle: http://www.huayinet.org/biography/biography.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-09-27]

Zu Teil 7: Malaysia: Bumiputra