Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital

Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen

7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen

1. Russland  (Россия)

2. Personen

von Margarete Payer

mailto: payer@payer.de

Zitierweise / cite as:

Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 2. Russland  (Россия). -- 2. Personen. -- Fassung vom 2014-07-04. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307012.htm          

Erstmals publiziert: 2005-12-17

Überarbeitungen: 2014-07-04 [Entfernung eines Zitats zu Wekselberg]

Anlass: Lehrveranstaltung an der Hochschule der Medien Stuttgart, Wintersemester 2005/06

Copyright: Dieser Text steht der Allgemeinheit zur Verfügung. Eine Verwertung in Publikationen, die über übliche Zitate hinausgeht, bedarf der ausdrücklichen Genehmigung des Verfassers.

Creative Commons-Lizenzvertrag
Diese Inhalt ist unter einer Creative Commons-Lizenz lizenziert.

Dieser Text ist Teil der Abteilung  Länder und Kulturen von Tüpfli's Global Village Library

Yahoo! Nachrichten durchsuchen
Klicken Sie hier für "Wirtschaft Russland" in den Schlagzeilen

Russische Föderation
Российская Федерация

0. Übersicht

Die Geschäftsleute sind nach dem Alphabet der deutschen Umschrift ihres Namens angeordnet.

1. Vorbemerkung

Die folgende Zusammenstellung will weder alle Genannten in einen Topf werfen, noch strebt sie Vollständigkeit an. Die "Fakten" sind nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen wiedergegeben, konnten aber nicht durch eigene Recherchen vor Ort überprüft werden.

2. Russland — Россия

Abb.: Russland
(Bildquelle. CIA)

3. Paul Klebnikov (1963 - 2004) — ein Opfer?

"The Killing of Paul Klebnikov

Born in New York in 1963 to a family of Russian immigrants, Paul Klebnikov graduated from California University, Berkley and the London School of Economics, completing his doctorate in 1991. Klebnikov started working for Forbes Magazine in 1989. Promoted to senior editor, Klebnikov was an expert on Russian and East European politics and economics. His special field of interest was conducting investigations into the origins of wealth of the so-called oligarchs and their possible ties to the Russian mafia.

In 1996 he wrote an article in Forbes calling exiled Russian businessman Boris Berezovsky the “Godfather of the Kremlin” and suggesting that the tycoon — who made his fortune during Russia’s controversial privatisation programme in the 1990s — might have been implicated in the murder of a well-known TV anchorman and had links with Chechen organized crime groups.

Berezovsky sued the magazine for defamation, after which Forbes admitted in open court that the allegations were unfounded and Berezovsky withdrew his suit. During the proceedings, however, Klebnikov published an equally controversial book, Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia in which he asserted that Berezovsky had also channelled hundreds of millions of dollars out of Russia.

Abb.: Buchtitel

Klebnikov’s second book, Conversation With a Barbarian, written in Russian and published in 2003, was based on a series of interviews with Chechen separatist leader Khozh Akhmed Nukhayev and dealt, among other subjects, with organized crime in Russia’s ongoing war in Chechnya.

Paul Klebnikov became the editor-in-chief of the Russian edition of Forbes in April 2004. In May, the magazine published a list of the 100 wealthiest people in Russia, many of whom said they were unhappy about the publication.

While in charge of the new Russian Forbes, Klebnikov was also undertaking certain independent investigations that he did not speak of, Russian online news service Gazeta.ru reported, citing the source from Forbes.

On Friday night, July 9, 2004, Paul Klebnikov was shot several times as he was leaving his office building in Moscow. He died while in an ambulance en route to the hospital.

Updated: 06.12.2005 13:27 MSK"

[Quelle: http://mosnews.com/mn-files/klebnikov.shtml#news. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

"Paul Klebnikov (3 June 1963 - 9 July 2004) was an American journalist of Russian descent. Born in New York, USA, Klebnikov attended Phillips Exeter Academy, graduated from University of California, Berkeley in 1984 and London School of Economics and joined Forbes in 1989. He rose to the position of senior editor at the magazine, specializing in Russian and Eastern European politics and economics, before becoming the first editor of Forbes Russian edition when it was launched in April 2004.

Abb.: Buchtitel

He wrote Godfather of the Kremlin (September 2000), a biography of Boris Berezovsky [Борис Березовский], a Russian tycoon. Berezovsky was openly critical of Klebnikov's writings, particularly an article published in Forbes in 1996 about his (alleged) criminal activities for which he filed a libel suit. Forbes was forced to retract the allegations. Berezovsky is wanted in Russia on fraud charges and was granted political asylum in the UK.


Klebnikov was shot to death on a Moscow street late at night on 9 July 2004, allegedly by Chechen assailants.

The publisher of Forbes Russian edition has said that the murder is "definitely linked to his professional activity". According to Russia's radio Ekho-Moskvy, Klebnikov said that he had not received specific threats after publishing a list of Russia's wealthiest people, but rather suspect the murder may have stemmed from Klebnikov's revelations of ties between Chechen warlords and the exiled tycoon Berezovsky.

On November 29, 2004 two main suspects (Kazbek Dukuzov and Valid Agayev) were arrested in Minsk [Мінск], Belarus [Беларусь], to where they allegedly fled from Russia. Both arrested men are ethnically Chechen and are Russian citizens. They were being held in Minsk KGB jail and were handed over to Russians almost three months later on February 22, 2005. The delay in extradition, the Belarus authorities say, was because they were waiting for paperwork and necessary evidence from the Russian side.

On November 21, 2005, according to the press release from the Russian Prosecutor General , the indictment has been sent by prosecutors to court. According to the indictment, ethnic Chechens Kazbek Dukuzov, Magomed Dukuzov, Musa Vakhayev, Magomed Edilsultanov and others were a criminal gang, and they were involved in racketeering and murder-for-hire. Chechen warlord Khozh-Akhmed Nukhayev, who was unhappy with the book Khlebnikov published about him in 2003, "Conversations with a Barbarian", allegedly hired that gang to murder Khlebnikov. A paralegal from Moscow, Fail Sadretdinov, was co-indicted with them because he allegedly paid the same gang to murder a Moscow businessman Aleksei Pichugin. Kazbek Dukuzov, Vakhayev and Sadretdinov have been arrested, other people indicted are still wanted by the police.


In 2005, to honor Klebnikov's commitment to scholarship and research on Russia and the former Soviet states, the London School of Economics established the Paul Klebnikov Prize for outstanding masters degree students in Russian and Post-Soviet Studies. The inaugural prize was awarded to Joseph Wolpin on November 1, 2005."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Klebnikov. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

4. Борис Николаевич Ельцин — Boris Nikolajewitsch Jelzin (Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin) (1931 - ) — der "Familienvater"

Abb.: Präsidentengalerie: Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin (Владимир Владимирович Путин),
Boris Nikolajewitsch Jelzin (Борис Николаевич Ельцин),
Michail Sergejewitsch Gorbatschow (Михаи́л Серге́евич Горбачёв) und
Leonid Iljitsch Breschnew (Леонид Ильич Брежнев),
Moskau, 2000
[Bildquelle: http://vladimirputin.4u.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-09]

Putin, Yeltsin, Gorbachev and Brezhnev, spotted in Moscow, March 2000.

Abb.: Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin (Борис Николаевич Ельцин)

"Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin (Russian: Борис Николаевич Ельцин) (born February 1, 1931) was President of Russia from 1991 to 1999.

Early Life

Boris Yeltsin was born to a peasant family in Butka village, Talitsa district, Sverdlovsk region [Свердло́вская о́бласть]. His father, Nikolai Yeltsin, was convicted of anti-Soviet agitation in 1934 and served in a gulag for three years. After his release he remained unemployed for a while and then worked in construction. His mother, Klavdiya Vasilyevna Yeltsina, worked as a seamstress.

As a young boy Yeltsin lost two fingers from his left hand as the result of an accident involving a hand grenade whilst he was camping with his "young pioneer" unit.

Yeltsin studied at Pushkin High School in Berezniki, Perm [Пермь] region and the Ural Polytechnic Institute [Уральский Государственный
Технический Университет - УПИ
] in Sverdlovsk [Свердло́вск, heute: Yekaterinburg Екатеринбу́рг], majoring in construction, and graduated in 1955.

CPSU Member

Member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) [Коммунисти́ческая Па́ртия Сове́тского Сою́за = КПСС] from 1961 to July 1990, he began working in the Communist administration in 1969. In 1977 as party boss in Sverdlovsk, he ordered the destruction of the Ipatiev House where the last Tsar had been murdered. Appointed to the Politburo [Политбюро]  by Mikhail Gorbachev [Михаи́л Серге́евич Горбачёв], Yeltsin was also "Mayor" of Moscow [Москва́] (First Secretary of the CPSU Moscow City Committee) from December 24, 1985 to 1987, when he was sacked from both positions after criticizing Gorbachev and the pace of reform in the USSR.

The brusque manner of his criticisms of Gorbachev during meetings of the politburo violated a convention of procedure which mandated that strong criticisms be circulated beforehand to avoid personal clashes during actual meetings. Yeltsin was not exiled or imprisoned as once would have been the consequence, but demoted to the position of First Deputy Commissioner for the State Committee for Construction. Yeltsin was perturbed and humiliated but plotted his revenge. His opening came with Gorbachev's establishment of the Congress of People's Deputies.

President of the RSFSR

In March 1989, Yeltsin was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies and gained a seat on the Supreme Soviet [Верховный Совет]. In May 1990, he was appointed speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). On June 12, 1990, Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR adopted a declaration of sovereignty and, in July, Yeltsin quit the CPSU.

On June 12, 1991, Yeltsin won 57 percent of the popular vote in democratic presidential elections for the Russian republic, defeating Gorbachev's preferred candidate, Nikolai Ryzhkov [Николай Иванович Рыжков]. Yeltsin took office on July 10.

On August 18, 1991, a coup against Gorbachev was launched by hardline communists headed by Vladimir Kryuchkov [Владимир Александрович Крючков]. Gorbachev was held in the Crimea [Крым] while Yeltsin raced to the White House of Russia in Moscow to defy the coup. The White House was surrounded by the military but the troops defected in the face of mass popular demonstrations, Yeltsin making a memorable speech from the turret of a tank. By August 21 most of the coup leaders had fled Moscow and Gorbachev was "rescued" from the Crimea and then returned to Moscow. Yeltsin was subsequently hailed by his supporters around the world for rallying mass opposition to the coup.

Although restored to his position, Gorbachev's powers were now fatally compromised. Neither union nor Russian power structures heeded his commands as support had swung over to Yeltsin. Through the fall of 1991, the Russian government took over the union government, ministry by ministry. In November 1991, Yeltsin issued a decree banning the Communist Party throughout the RSFSR.

In early December 1991, Ukraine [Україна, Ukrayina] voted for independence from the Soviet Union. A week later, on December 8, Boris Yeltsin met with Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk [Леонід Макарович Кравчук] and the leader of Belarus [Беларусь], Stanislau Shushkevich [Станісла́ў Станісла́вавіч Шушке́віч], in Belovezhskaya Pushcha [Белавеская пушча] residence, where the three presidents announced the dissolution of the USSR and that they would establish a voluntary Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) [Содружество Независимых Государств (СНГ)] in its place.

On December 24, the Russian Federation took the Soviet Union's seat in the United Nations. The next day, President Gorbachev resigned and the USSR ceased to exist (see Collapse of the Soviet Union), thereby ending the world's largest and most influential communist regime.

Post-Soviet Presidency

Following the dissolution of the USSR, the acceleration of economic restructuring became one of Yeltsin's main priorities with his government overseeing a massive privatization of state-run enterprises. However, the Yeltsin government's incompetence and destructive activities of pro-inflation forces caused the Russian economy to further deteriorate.

Yeltsin's reform program took effect on January 2, 1992 (see Russian economic reform in the 1990s for background information). Soon afterward prices skyrocketed, government spending was slashed, and heavy new taxes went into effect. A deep credit crunch shut down many industries and brought about a protracted depression. Certain politicians began quickly to distance themselves from the program; and increasingly the ensuing political confrontation between Yeltsin on the one side, and the opposition to radical economic reform on the other, became centered in the two branches of government.

Throughout 1992, opposition to Yeltsin's reform policies grew stronger and more intractable among bureaucrats concerned about the condition of Russian industry and among regional leaders who wanted more independence from Moscow. Russia's vice president, Aleksandr Rutskoy [Александр Владимирович Руцкой], denounced the Yeltsin program as "economic genocide." Leaders of oil-rich republics such as Tatarstan [Татарста́н] and Bashkiria [Башкортостан] called for full independence from Russia.

Also throughout 1992, Yeltsin wrestled with the Supreme Soviet and the Russian Congress of People's Deputies for control over government and government policy. In 1992 the speaker of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov [Руслан Имранович Хасбулатов], came out in opposition to the reforms, despite claiming to support Yeltsin's overall goals.

Congress of People's Deputies attempted to impeach Yeltsin on March 26, 1993. Yeltsin's opponents gathered more than 600 votes for impeachment, but fell 72 votes short.

On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin disbanded the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies by decree, which was illegal under the constitution. On September 21 there was a military showdown, the Russian constitutional crisis of 1993. With military help, Yeltsin held control. The conflict that resulted in a number of civilian casualties was resolved in Yeltsin's favor and elections were held on December 12, 1993.

In December 1994, Yeltsin ordered the military invasion of Chechnya [Нохчичьо] in an attempt to restore Moscow's control over the separatist republic. Yeltsin later withdrew federal forces from Chechnya under a 1996 peace agreement brokered by Aleksandr Lebed [Алекса́ндр Ива́нович Ле́бедь], then Yeltsin's security chief. The deal allowed Chechnya greater autonomy but not full independence (see First Chechen War).

In July 1996, Yeltsin was re-elected as President with financial support from influential business oligarchs. Despite only gaining 35 percent of the first round vote, he successfully defeated his communist rival Gennady Zyuganov [Генна́дий Андре́евич Зюга́нов] in the runoff election. Later that year, Yeltsin underwent heart bypass surgery and remained in hospital for months.

In 1998, a political and economic crisis emerged when Yeltsin's government defaulted on its debts, causing financial markets to panic and the country's currency, the ruble, to collapse.

On August 9, 1999 Yeltsin fired his Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin [Серге́й Вади́мович Степа́шин], and for the fourth time, fired his entire cabinet.

During the 1999 Kosovo war, Yeltsin strongly opposed the NATO military campaign against Yugoslavia and warned of possible Russian intervention if NATO deployed ground troops to Kosovo.

Yeltsin continued as President of Russia until December 31, 1999, but the events of 1991 proved to be something of a high-water mark for him historically and personally. He resigned on December 31, 1999, and in accordance with Russian Constitution, prime minister Vladimir Putin [Влади́мир Влади́мирович Пу́тин] became an Acting President until new elections were held on March 26, 2000.

Life after resignation

Yeltsin's personal and health problems received a lot of attention in the global press. As the years went on, he was seen as an increasingly unstable leader, and not the inspiring figure he once was. The possibility that he might die in office was often discussed.

Yeltsin has remained very low-key since his resignation, making almost no public statements or appearances. However, on September 13, 2004, following the Beslan [Беслӕн] school hostage crisis, and nearly-concurrent terrorist attacks in Moscow, Putin launched an initiative to replace the election of regional governors with a system whereby they would be directly appointed by the President and approved by regional legislatures. Yeltsin, together with Mikhail Gorbachev, publicly criticized Putin's plan as a step away from democracy in Russia and a return to the centrally run political apparatus of the Soviet era.

In September 2005, Yeltsin underwent a hip operation in Moscow after breaking his femur in a fall while vacationing on the Italian island of Sardinia."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Yeltsin. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-03]

"Schon 1997 war der herz- und alkoholkranke Jelzin kaum mehr fähig seine Amtsgeschäfte full-time zu erledigen. Stattdessen wurde seine Politik in großem Maße durch die sogenannte "Jelzin Family" bestimmt.

Kern der "Familie" war Jelzins Tochter Tatjana Djatschenko [Татьяна Борисовна Дьяченко] (1960- ) und der ehemalige Leiter der Präsidialadministration Valentin Yumaschev [Валентин Борисович Юмашев], den sie 2001 heiratete. Tatjana Djatschenko war Programmiererin ballistischer Raketen, stieg aber nach dem Beginn von Jelzins schweren Erkrankungen zur einflussreichsten Kraft in Jelzins Kreis auf.

Schlüsselfiguren der "Jelzin-Family" waren einige Politiker und Geschäftsleute, die in den Jahren 1998 und 1999 den Zugang zum Präsidenten kontrollierten und somit seine Politik weitgehend beeinflussen konnte.

  • Anatoli Tschubais [Анатолий Чубайс (1955 - )] (Jelzins Wahlkampfmanager und ehemaliger Administrationschef, Reformer)
  • Boris Beresowski [Борис Абрамович Березовский alias Platon Elenin (1946 - )]  (Berüchigter Oligarch und Strippenzieher)
  • Wladimir Gussinski [Владимир Гусинский (1952 - )] (Oligarch, der durch einen beispiellosen Einsatz seiner Medien die Wiederwahl Jelzins sichern half).

Abb.: Pavel Borodin — Павел Бродин
[Bildquelle: http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=134. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

  • Pavel Borodin [Павел Бродин] (er verwaltete das nicht unbeträchtliche Vermögen der Präsidialverwaltung)
  • Roman Abramowitsch [Роман Аркадьевич Абрамович (1966 - )] (Sibneft Oil, RUSAL Aluminium)

    Abb.: Alexander Mamut  — Александр Леонидович Мамут
    [Bildquelle: http://www.science-support.ru/fond/fond.nsf/pages/3E8A7B5073BBFF9DC3256A4E002BE229. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

  • Alexander Mamut [Александр Леонидович Мамут (1960 - )] (MDM-Bank [МДМ-Банк], Finanzier der "Family")

    Abb.: Alexander Woloschin  — Александр Стальевич Волошин
    [Bildquelle: http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/03/22/voloshin.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

  • Alexander Woloschin [Александр Стальевич Волошин, (1956 -)] (Leiter der Präsidialkanzlei) "

[Quelle: http://www.netstudien.de/Russland/jelzin.htm#family. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-05]

Abb.: Einbandtitel

"Diese Art von Umgang erinnerte mich lebhaft an die früheren Sitzungen des Gebietskomitees der Partei - gleicher Wortschatz, gleicher Tonfall. Tiefste Vergangenheit. Im verborgenen ganz normale Menschen, bei Sitzungen zugeknöpft bis zum Gehtnichtmehr. Ich begriff, dass ich im Stab einen Vertrauten brauche. Jemanden, der mir ehrlich und unvoreingenommen die Lage schildern könnte. Vor allem musste es jemand sein, der von Gruppeninteressen frei war, die den ganzen Wahlkampf prägten. Eine unbescholtene Persönlichkeit, ohne Intrigen und ohne Leichen im Keller. Woher nehmen?

Eines Tages kam Valentin Jumaschew [Валентин Юмашев] zu mir ins Sanatorium nach Barwicha. Ich teilte ihm meine Sorgen mit und bemerkte, dass ich nicht mehr Herr der Lage sei. Den Augen Viktor lljuschins [Виктор Ильюшин] sah ich an, dass die Situation im Stab sich von Tag zu Tag verschlechterte. Man versank langsam aber sicher in einem Sumpf. Der ganze Stab ein einziges Zerwürfnis. Keine Strategie, sowjetische Verhaltensweisen, von Geschlossenheit keine Rede. »Ich brauche einen verlässlichen Mann im Stab.« Valentin dachte nach. »Warum nicht Tanja [Таня]?« Anfangs habe ich gar nicht begriffen, wovon er redete, so überrascht war ich. Doch nach einigem Nachdenken fand ich seinen Vorschlag reizvoll. Wie aber würde die Öffentlichkeit, würden Journalisten und Politiker reagieren? Und der Kreml? Andererseits war Tanja der einzige Mensch, der mir alle wichtigen Informationen ungefiltert zukommen lassen konnte. Was man mir nicht ins Gesicht sagen würde, würde man ihr sagen. Sie ist ein ehrlicher Mensch, ohne jede Überheblichkeit. Sie würde mir nichts verheimlichen. Und ich würde ihr voll und ganz vertrauen, jung und klug, wie sie ist, mit meinem Charakter und meiner Lebensfreude.

Mitte März hatte ich ein neues Wahlkampfteam zusammengestellt. Ich war der Chef, mein Stellvertreter war Viktor Tschernomyrdin [Виктор Степанович Черномырдин]. Nicht ohne Bangen stellte ich Tanja vor: »Ich möchte Ihnen das neue Mitglied des Wahlkampfstabs präsentieren, Tatjana Djatschenko [Татьяна Борисовна Дьяченко].«

Abb.: Tatjana Djatschenko — Татьяна Борисовна Дьяченко, geb. 1960
[Bildquelle: http://www.compromat.ru/main/eltsyn/mehanizm.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

Zunächst hat niemand begriffen, was da vor sich ging. Ein neues Gesicht, kommt frühmorgens, sitzt bis spät in die Nacht im Büro, nimmt an allen möglichen Beratungen teil, redet mit jedem, stellt naive Fragen. Irgendwann aber wurde klar: In ihrem Beisein waren gewisse Dinge unmöglich. Die Intrigen und die männlichen Eifersüchteleien verschwanden. Ich erfuhr davon erst später, denn diese Beratungen habe ich selbst nie besucht. Tanja kam in diese Kreml-Welt gleichsam aus einem anderen Leben. Ihre natürlichen und schlichten Reaktionen haben gestandene Beamte völlig durcheinandergebracht. Sie fragte einfach: Warum? Sofort trat die von Eitelkeit nur notdürftig überdeckte Dummheit deutlich zutage. Und die Probleme erhielten klare Konturen.

Was empfindet eigentlich der Vater einer erwachsenen Tochter? Es ist eine neue, ganz andere Art von Liebe als gegenüber dem Kind, der Heranwachsenden, der jungen Frau, der jungen Mutter. Es ist jedes Mal anders. Nun aber beobachtete ich bei mir ein erstaunliches Gefühl von Gelassenheit, mit dem ich Tanjas weiblichen Charme, ihre Sanftheit, ihren Verstand und ihre Sensibilität wahrnahm. Gleichzeitig entdeckte ich mit einigem Erstaunen die eigenen genetischen Züge. Dabei ist es ein und derselbe Mensch, der sämtliche Jahre, sämtliche Erinnerungen als teuerstes Gut aufbewahrt.

Zu Beginn waren es nur Gefühle. Widersprüchliche Gefühle, meist aber gute. Tanja war jetzt immer in der Nähe. Ich habe mich ungleich ruhiger gefühlt. Sie tritt an mich heran, zupft mir die Krawatte /.urecht, schließt einen Hemdknopf, und schon ist meine Stimmung besser. Die psychische Verfassung ist für einen Präsidentschaftskandidaten von unschätzbarer Bedeutung. Bevor Tanja in den Stab kam, glaubte ich die Belastungen einer neuerlichen Wahlkampagne nicht mehr durchstehen zu können. Die Wahlkampfreisen und -auftritte hatten mir erheblich zugesetzt. Nun aber dachte ich: Nein, ich mache nicht schlapp, ich schaffe es. Und das Wichtigste: Die scheinbar unlösbaren Probleme wurden auf eine natürliche Weise lösbar.

Etwa zu gleicher Zeit fand mein Treffen mit Vertretern der wichtigsten Banken, Rohstoff- und Medienkonzerne statt, darunter Gussinski [Владимир Гусинский], Chodorkowski [Михаил Борисович Ходорковский], Potanin [Владимир Потанин], Beresowski [Борис Березовский] und Fridman [Михаил Маратович Фридман]. Es war ihre Initiative, der ich anfänglich recht zurückhaltend begegnete. Ich wusste, dass ihnen nichts anderes übrig blieb, als mich zu unterstützen, und ich glaubte, es würde um die Finanzierung meines Wahlkampfes gehen. Aber es ging um etwas ganz anderes. »Boris Nikolajewitsch [Борис Николаевич], was in Ihrem Stab passiert, spottet jeder Beschreibung. Dieser Zustand treibt einige Geschäftsleute dazu, mit den Kommunisten zu verhandeln, und andere, die Koffer zu packen. Wir haben keinen seriösen Ansprechpartner. Die Kommunisten werden uns an den Laternenpfählen aufhängen. Wenn wir jetzt die Situation nicht grundlegend ändern, wird es zu spät sein.«

Einen solchen Tonfall und eine so unverblümte Analyse hatte ich nicht erwartet. Doch dabei blieb es nicht, sondern sie boten mir sämtliche ihnen zur Verfügung stehenden Ressourcen an: Information, regionaler Einfluss, Geldmittel und, was das wichtigste war, Menschen. Sie wollten ihre besten Leute für den Stab freistellen: Igor Malaschenko, Sergej Swerew, Wassili Schachnowski, den unabhängigen Soziologen Alexander Oslon und andere junge, energische Fachleute. Was mich jedoch verwunderte und nachdenklich stimmte, war ihre einhellige Auffassung, Anatoli Tschubais  [Анатолий Чубайс] gehöre in mein Wahlkampfteam. Er war gerade erst zwei Monate zuvor aus der Regierung gefeuert worden. Die Gruppe um Korshakow und Soskowcz hatte es wieder einmal fertiggebracht, sich mit ihm zu überwerfen. Nun also wurde er zum Leiter der »Analytischen Gruppe« ernannt. Und sehr bald erkannte ich, dass Tanja sich in deren Arbeit bestens eingefügt hatte.

Erstmals seit langer Zeit spürte ich einen Anflug von Optimismus. Eigentlich, so dachte ich mir, könnte ich auf effektvolle Gesten und Machtdemonstrationen wie in früheren Jahren verzichten. Es gab andere Ressourcen: junge Menschen mit klarem Verstand, mit einer normalen Sprache, die die Last der Vergangenheit nicht zu tragen brauchen. Sie werden nicht die Interessen ihrer Gruppe, ihres Clans vertreten, sondern ganz einfach arbeiten, weil es sie interessiert und sie dabei etwas verdienen. Man bedenke, dass wir in einem Land mit einem hohen Bildungsniveau leben, wo es trotz aller Schwierigkeiten genug zu tun gibt für junge Leute, wo sie die Möglichkeit haben, sich selbst zu bestätigen, Geld zu verdienen und ihr eigenes Schicksal in die Hand zu nehmen. Auf solche Leute aus Tanjas Generation wollte ich mich stützen. Trotz meines Alters, trotz meiner Parteibiographie und obwohl sie gelegentlich über mich witzelten, war ich dennoch ihr Präsident. Und sie waren meine Wähler. Wenn sie ihre Lebensweise beibehalten wollten, mussten sie zur Wahl gehen. Sie waren meine Hoffnung."


"Im Prinzip war es ein ganz normaler Wahlkampf. Wir trafen uns mit allen einflussreichen Gruppen. Wollt ihr überleben? Dann helft mit. Wollt ihr eure Bankgeschäfte weiterführen? Dann helft mit. Wollt ihr Meinungsfreiheit und private Fernseh kanäle? Dann helft mit. Wollt ihr Freiheit der Künste und Freiheit von Zensur und roter Ideologie in der Kultur? Dann helft mit. Und als die »Elefanten« und »Wale« aus Wirtschaft und Kultur merkten, wie kraftvoll sich die junge Mannschaft auf allen Gebieten für Jelzin einsetzte, kamen sie bei uns an. Sie haben in mich »investiert«. Die einen mit Menschen, die anderen mit Dienstleistungen, die dritten mit ihrem Intellekt, wieder andere einfach mit Geld."


"Eigentlich hatte ich »Vetternwirtschaft« stets abgelehnt. Ein normaler Mensch unterscheidet doch zwischen Familie und Arbeit. Letztlich aber war diese Art von sterilem Funktionärsleben ein Erbe aus Sowjetzeiten, und vielleicht war meine Ansicht schlicht veraltet. Was war verwerflich an Tanjas Wunsch, mir zu helfen, mich zu schützen? Es waren die ganz normalen Gefühle einer Tochter. Warum sollte ich verpflichtet sein, sie zu missachten.


Abb.: Claude Chirac, geb. 1962
[Bildquelle. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1615455.stm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

Ich erinnerte mich an einen Präzedenzfall in Europa. Claude Chirac, die Tochter des französischen Präsidenten, war seine Beraterin im Wahlkampf. Ich rief also Jacques an und bat ihn, für Tanja einen Kontakt zu Claude herzustellen, als Erfahrungsaustausch sozusagen. Er reagierte sehr freundlich und meinte: »Boris Nikolajewitsch, Sie werden es nicht bereuen.«

Tanja und Claude trafen sich in der Residenz Chiracs. Sie waren fast gleichaltrig und verstanden sich sofort. Claude erzählte Tanja, wie sie im Rahmen der vorhandenen Strukturen für ihren Vater arbeitete, vor allem im PR-Bereich. Es waren die gleichen Probleme. Die gleichen Zweifel an ihrer Rolle. Auch Claude verspürte als die Tochter des Präsidenten die negative Reaktion der öffentlichen Meinung. Doch sie ermunterte Tanja: »Beachte das einfach nicht. Frauen, die in einer gewissen Nähe zum Präsidenten stehen, wird alles mögliche angehängt. Glaubst du, meine Mama hat es leicht? Sie werden sich daran gewöhnen müssen, Schluss, aus.«

Am Ende des Gesprächs sagte Claude plötzlich: »Gehen wir doch Papa guten Tag sagen.« Eine unerwartete Einladung zum französischen Präsidenten. Chirac empfing Tanja überaus herzlich und sprach von unserem bevorstehenden Treffen. Ihr fiel auf, mit welcher Sorgfalt er »Boris Nikolajewitsch« aussprach. (So hat er mich übrigens immer genannt, denn er wollte mich auf keinen Fall duzen. »Sie können mich ruhig Jacques nennen, ich bleibe bei Boris Nikolajewitsch.«)

»Lassen wir von uns dreien ein Foto machen«, schlug Chirac vor. Es ist eine sehr charmante Aufnahme: der lächelnde Chirac, eingerahmt von zwei heiteren blonden jungen Frauen.

Nach dieser Reise war Tanja überzeugt, dass wir alles richtig gemacht hatten. So ist sie zu meiner Beraterin geworden, zur »Image-Beraterin«, wie die Journalisten es zu ihrer Verwunderung nannten.

Ob ich heute diesen Schritt bereue? Keineswegs. Es war eine der besten Entscheidungen der letzten Jahre. Tanja hat mir mit ihrer unauffälligen Präsenz und ihrem klugen Rat tatsächlich sehr geholfen. Und ich glaube, dass erst das Phänomen Tanja mich dazu gebracht hat, darüber nachzudenken, ob in Russland nicht die Zeit der Frauen in der Politik gekommen sei. Die militanten Feministinnen brauchen sich darüber nicht zu freuen. Ich möchte, dass in Russland endlich eine ruhige, glückliche Zeit anbricht."

[Quelle: Jelzin, Boris <Ельцин, Борис Николаевич> <1931 - >: Mitternachtstagebuch : meine Jahre im Kreml. -- München : Ullstein, 2001. -- 384 S. : Ill. ; 18 cm. -- (Ullstein ; 36311). -- ISBN 3-548-36311-3. -- S. -- 22 - 25; 30; 35f. -- {Wenn Sie HIER klicken, können Sie dieses Buch  bei amazon.de bestellen}] 

5. Владимир Владимирович Путин (1952 - ) — Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin (Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin) — Владимир Владимирович Путин (1952 - ) — der Saubermann?

Abb.: Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin — Владимир Владимирович Путин

Webpräsenz: http://www.kremlin.ru/mainpage.shtml. -- Zugrif am 2005-12-06

"Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin  (russisch Владимир Владимирович Путин, wiss. Transliteration Vladimir Vladimirovič Putin; * 7. Oktober 1952 in Leningrad [Ленинград] (heute Sankt Petersburg [Санкт-Петербург]), russischer Politiker, übernahm am 31. Dezember 1999 vom zurückgetretenen Präsidenten Boris Jelzin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] verfassungsgemäß die Amtsgeschäfte. Putin ist seit dem 26. März 2000 der zweite gewählte Präsident der Russländischen Föderation [Российская Федерация].

Lebenslauf bis zur Präsidentschaft

Eltern, Jugend und Familie

Putins Vater, Wladimir Spiridonowitsch, war als Fabrikarbeiter in einem Werk für Waggonbau tätig und überzeugter Kommunist. Er war zum Grundwehrdienst in die Marine eingezogen worden und kämpfte im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die Mutter, Maria Iwanowna, war ebenfalls Werktätige und hatte ein Auskommen als Sanitäterin. Sie gehörte zu jenen Leningradern, welche die deutsche Belagerung der Stadt vom September 1941 bis Januar 1944 überlebt hatten. Ihr zweitgeborener Sohn starb in dieser Zeit an Diphtherie.

Sohn Wladimir war das dritte Kind der Familie. Zwei ältere, Mitte der 1930er Jahre zur Welt gekommene Söhne ereilte im Kindesalter der Tod. Die Erziehung durch den Vater war streng, während die dem russisch-orthodoxen Glauben anhängige Mutter Milde walten ließ. Die Arbeiterfamilie nannte eine 20 qm große Leningrader „Kommunalwohnung“ ihr Daheim, bei der Bad und Küche mit den Nachbarn geteilt werden mussten.

Als Hofkind prügelte sich der junge Wladimir sehr oft mit anderen in seinem Alter. Die kommunistische Pionierorganisation nahm ihn darum erst später in ihre Reihen auf. Um sich in den Rangeleien durchzusetzen, interessierte sich Putin früh für Kampfsportarten und brachte es im Judosport bis zum Leningrader Stadtmeister.

Patriotische Spionagefilme ließen den jungen Putin eine Agententätigkeit als Berufsziel attraktiv erscheinen. Als Schüler der neunten Klasse bewarb er sich nach eigenen Angaben in der Leningrader KGB-Zentrale um Aufnahme, erhielt aber den Rat, es zunächst mit einem Jurastudium zu versuchen.

Abb.: Familie Putin, 1989
[Bildquelle: http://vladimirputin.4u.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-09]

Er ist seit dem 28. Juli 1983 verheiratet mit Ljudmila Putina, einer Deutschlehrerin, und hat zwei Töchter, Jekaterina (*1985) und Maria (*1986 in Dresden). Die Töchter besuchten die Deutsche Schule Moskau und studieren an der Staatlichen Universität Sankt Petersburg.

Putins Mutter starb 1998, sein Vater am 2. August 1999, kurz vor der Ernennung seines Sohnes zum russischen Ministerpräsidenten. Seit einem lebensbedrohlichen Brand in seiner Datscha anfangs der 1990er Jahre ist Putin Mitglied der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche.

Abb.: Vladimir Putin und Frau Ljudmilla (Людмила) während des Ostergottesdienstes in der Erlöserkathedrale (Храм Христа Спасителя), Moskau, April 2001
[Bildquelle: http://vladimirputin.4u.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-09]

Putin beherrscht diverse Kampfsportarten wie Boxen, Sambo und Judo (Träger des "Schwarzen Gürtel"). Auch im Kreml trainiert er regelmäßig in einem Judoraum. Ferner gehört Skifahren zu seinen sportlichen Vorlieben.

Abb.: Putin bei Judo
[Bildquelle: http://vladimirputin.4u.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-09]

Berufliche Karriere

Putin absolvierte zunächst ein Jura-Studium an der Universität Leningrad. Von 1975 bis 1992 war er KGB [КГБ]-Offizier in der ersten Hauptabteilung (Auslandsspionage). Zu seinen frühen KGB-Pflichten zählte auch das Unterdrücken von Dissidenten-Tätigkeiten in seiner Heimatstadt. Von 1984-1985 besuchte er die KGB-Hochschule in Moskau. Putin war ab 1985 in der DDR, hauptsächlich in Dresden in nachgeordneter Funktion tätig, wo er seine erlernten guten Deutschkenntnisse vervollkommnete. Er avancierte vom Range eines Hauptmanns zum Major. 1989 hatte Putin den Dienstgrad eines Oberstleutnants, was auf eine Dienststellung als stellvertretender Abteilungsleiter in der KGB-Residentur hindeutet. Nach Angaben der Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik versuchte er im Jahre 1990, einen Spionagering aus ehemaligen Mitarbeitern des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit aufzubauen. Da aber dessen von Putin ausgewählte Zentralfigur schnell zum Verfassungsschutz überlief, flog der Ring auf.

Petersburger Jahre

Putin wurde im Februar 1990 in die UdSSR zurückbeordert. Wegen Personalüberkapazitäten beim Leningrader KGB ging er im Range eines Offiziers der Reserve als Assistent des Rektors für internationale Fragen an die dortige Hochschule.

Sein früherer Universitätslehrer und nunmehriger Chef des Leningrader Stadtparlaments, Anatoli Sobtschak [Анатолий Александрович Собчак] engagierte Putin im selben Jahr als Berater. 1991 wurde der Rückkehrer Leiter des städtischen Komitees für Außenbeziehungen. 1992 erhielt er ein Amt als Vizebürgermeister in der Verwaltung des St. Petersburger Bürgermeisters Anatoli Sobtschak. Im gleichen Jahr ging das Stadtparlament ergebnislos Gerüchten nach, Putin habe Unregelmäßigkeiten bei der Erteilung von Exportlizenzen begangen.

1994 stieg Putin zum Ersten Vize-Bürgermeister auf, vertrat in dieser Funktion Sobtschak und organisierte 1995 vor Ort den Duma [Дума]-Wahlkampf der Kreml-Partei „Unser Haus Russland“. Im Juni 1996 verlor Sobtschak seine angestrebte Wiederwahl als Stadtoberhaupt gegen Wladimir Anatoljewitsch Jakowlew [Владимир Анатольевич Яковлев]. Putin trat daraufhin von seinen kommunalen Ämtern zurück. Er half in der Folge im örtlichen Wahlkampfstab von Boris Jelzin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] für die russischen Präsidentenwahlen mit.

Aufstieg in Moskau

Im August 1996 bekam Putin den Posten als stellvertretender Leiter der Kreml [Кремль]-Liegenschaftsverwaltung. Im März 1997 arbeitete er als stellvertretender Kanzleileiter des Präsidenten Boris Jelzin. Im Mai 1998 rückte Putin zum stellvertretenden Chef der Präsidialverwaltung auf.

Vom 25. Juli 1998 bis August 1999 war er Direktor des russischen Inlandsgeheimdienstes FSB [ФСБ], ab 26. März 1999 außerdem Sekretär des Sicherheitsrates.

Russischer Ministerpräsident

Er wurde von Boris Jelzin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] am 9. August 1999 zum Ministerpräsidenten ernannt und von der Duma eine Woche später bestätigt. Putin reagierte auf die Bombenexplosion im Kreml-Einkaufszentrum und eine Serie von Bombenanschlägen auf Moskauer Wohnhäuser, welche tschetschenischen Kämpfern angelastet wurden, mit harter Hand. Am 1. Oktober 1999 überschritten russische Armeeeinheiten die Grenze zum tschetschenischen Landesteil zur Rebellenbekämpfung. Putin leitete die militärische Wiedereingliederung Tschetscheniens [Itschkeria] in die Russländische Förderation und erntete dafür gute Umfragewerte.

Als Jelzin am 31. Dezember 1999 überraschend sein Amt niederlegte, übernahm Putin verfassungsgemäß auch die Amtsgeschäfte des Präsidenten der Russländischen Föderation bis zur Wahl des Nachfolgers. Jelzin erklärte Putin zum Wunschkandidaten für seine Nachfolge.

Am gleichen Tag gewährte Putin per Dekret Jelzin Straffreiheit für seine Handlungen während der Amtszeit sowie auch künftiges Handeln und gewährte ihm und seiner Familie einige Privilegien. Vier Monate zuvor waren in westlichen Zeitungen Ermittlungen westlicher Behörden gegenüber der Jelzin-Familie wegen Geldwäscheverdachts publik geworden.

Am 10. Januar 2000 entließ Putin einige in Korruptionsverdacht geratene Kremlgrößen und nahm Umbesetzungen in der Regierung vor. Ende Januar kündigte eine Anhebung der Militärausgaben um 50 Prozent an, wohl im Hinblick auf die Lage im Nordkaukasus.

Der Ministerpräsident hatte im Volk mit seinem Vorgehen gegen die Tschetschenen hohe Sympathie erlangt. Ein Übriges taten die staatlich gelenkten Beiträge in Presse, Funk und Fernsehen. Am 26. März 2000 fanden Präsidentschaftswahlen statt, die Putin im ersten Wahlgang mit 52,9 Prozent der Stimmen gewann.

Erste Amtszeit als Präsident (2000-2004)

Siehe auch: Innenpolitik Russlands unter Präsident Putin, Russland

Nach Jahren der Skandale, erratischer Politikgestaltung und einem allgemeinen Gefühl nationaler Malaise unter dem alternden und kränklichen Präsidenten Jelzin erschien die Wahl Putins vielen Russen als Neubeginn in ihrer Nach-Sowjetära. Zugleich gab sich der innere Kreis um Jelzin der Hoffnung hin, eigene Machtpositionen und Privilegien zu behalten, da er Putin ausgewählt und unterstützt hatte. Ein radikales Revirement in der Administration blieb denn auch im ersten Jahr aus. Einige Mitglieder der Nomenklatura [номенклатура] aus der Jelzinzeit, wie Stabschef Alexander Woloschin und Ministerpräsident Michail Michailowitsch Kasjanow [Михаил Михайлович Касьянов], behielten Amt und Würde. Andererseits holte Putin sachkundige Weggefährten aus seiner Petersburger Zeit in die Regierung und konnte auf die Unterstützung seines Kurses durch Kräfte in den Spitzen der Sicherheitsdienste (Silowiki [силовики́]) zählen.

Nach seiner Wahl leitete Putin Maßnahmen ein, um den Vorrang des Kremls in der Innenpolitik wiederherzustellen. Russlands 89 Föderativsubjekte (Republiken, Bezirke, Gebiete sowie Moskau und Sankt Petersburg) hatten unter Jelzin eine zuvor ungekannte Autonomie erhalten. Sie ließ allmählich auch – gerade in Tschetschenien - separatistische Bestrebungen reifen und hatte den regionalen Gouverneuren allerlei Selbstherrlichkeiten gestattet. Putin strebte nun eine, wie er sagte, Machtvertikale an, die Föderativsubjekte sollten wieder auf die Zentrale hören (müssen).

Sein zweites Augenmerk galt den Oligarchen, der reich gewordenen Oberschicht. Im Wahlkampf hatten sie sich nach Putins Überzeugung durch finanzielle Unterstützung und Zulassen regimekritischer Beiträge in ihnen gehörende Medien unangemessen in die Politik eingemischt. Als erstes traf es Wladimir Gussinski, dessen Medienkonglomerat Media-MOST durch staatliche Eingriffe, Untersuchungen wegen Betrugs, Übernahme des kremlkritischen Privatsenders NTW durch den halbstaatlichen Gazprom-Konzern [Газпром] am 14. April 2001 sowie straf- und zivilrechtliche Gerichtsentscheidungen in wenigen Monaten dahinschwand. Gussinski selbst zog es vor, nach Spanien ins Exil zugehen. Der Superreiche Boris Abramowitsch Beresowski [Борис Абрамович Березовский] flüchtete aus Russland, als gegen ihn Untersuchungsverfahren eingeleitet wurden. Der ihm gehörende Fernsehsender ORT mit landesweiter Ausstrahlung und kritischen Beiträgen geriet unter staatliche Kontrolle.

Anders als sein Vorgänger, knüpfte Präsident Putin vielfach wieder an Russlands sowjetische Vergangenheit an. Er betonte, dass das kommunistische Regime trotz seiner Verbrechen ein wichtiger Teil der russischen Geschichte sei und einen wichtigen Einfluss auf die moderne russische Gesellschaft gehabt habe. In der Folge kehrten einige sowjetische Symbole nach Russland zurück, darunter die rote Militärflagge mit dem Sowjetstern und die sowjetische Nationalhymne mit anderem Text.

Russische Nationalhymne
1-й куплет:
Россия — священная наша держава,
Россия — любимая наша страна.
Могучая воля, великая слава —
Твоё достоянье на все времена!
Славься, Отечество наше свободное,
Братских народов союз вековой,
Предками данная мудрость народная!
Славься, страна! Мы гордимся тобой!
2-й куплет:
От южных морей до полярного края
Раскинулись наши леса и поля.
Одна ты на свете! Одна ты такая —
Хранимая Богом родная земля!
3-й куплет
Широкий простор для мечты и для жизни
Грядущие нам открывают года.
Нам силу даёт наша верность Отчизне.
Так было, так есть и так будет всегда!
Russland, unser heiliges Land
Russland, unser geliebtes Land
Gewaltiger Wille und großer Ruhm
Wird dir gehören für alle Zeit
Ruhm dir Vaterland, unser freies!
Uraltes Bündnis brüderlicher Völker
Von unseren Vorvätern überlieferte Weisheit
Ruhm dir Land, wir sind stolz auf dich!
Von südlichen Meeren zum Polarkreis
Erstrecken sich unsere Felder und Wälder
Du bist einzigartig in der Welt, so einzig,
Dass Gott dich beschützen wird, Heimatland
Ein weiter Raum für Träume und für das Leben
Wird sich uns in der Zukunft eröffnen
Die Treue zu unserem Vaterland gibt uns Kraft
So war es, so ist es, und so wird es immer sein


Wenn Sie hier klicken, hören Sie die Russische Nationalhymne

Quelle der mp3-Datei: http://www.gov.ru/main/symbols/gimn_rf_t3.mp3. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-05

Die Partei Putins „Einiges Russland“ [Единая Россия] erreichte bei den Parlamentswahlen am 7. Dezember 2003 einen erdrutschartigen Sieg und wurde mit 37,1 Prozent der Stimmen stärkste Fraktion in der Duma. Mit diesem Wahlergebnis wurde Putin, dessen Kreml-Regierung aus dem Einigen Russland, LDPR und Rodina besteht, massiv gestärkt. Die Wahl ist nach Auffassung der OSZE korrekt abgelaufen, doch Staatsapparat und Medien sind zur Unterstützung der Präsidentenpartei eingesetzt worden.

Innerhalb des Kremls operierten nach Beobachtern zwei Gruppen. Eine rekrutiert sich aus eher nationalistisch gesinnten Elementen aus Militär-, Sicherheits- und Geheimdienstkreisen. Die andere, genannt die Familie, besteht aus Leuten, die dem früheren Präsidenten Boris Jelzin nahe standen bzw. den so genannten Oligarchen, die von seiner Amtszeit profitierten. Die beiden Parteien waren oft gegensätzlicher Meinung, so auch bei der Verhaftung des russischen Ölmagnaten Michail Chodorkowski [Михаил Борисович Ходорковский]. Putin versuchte, zwischen den beiden Gruppen zu vermitteln. Als sein Stabschef Alexander Woloschin, welcher der Familie zugerechnet wird, aus Protest gegen die Verhaftung Chodorkowskis mit Rücktritt drohte, akzeptierte Putin seinen Rücktritt und ersetzte ihn durch Dimitri Medwedew [Дмитрий Анатольевич Медведев], den Geschäftsführer des staatlichen Gaskonzerns Gazprom [Газпром].

Am 24. Februar 2004, im Monat vor den Duma-Wahlen, entließ Putin Ministerpräsident Kasjanow samt dessen Kabinett und ernannte kommissarisch Wiktor Christenko zum Ministerpräsidenten. Eine Woche später, am 1. März, berief der Präsident jedoch Michail Jefimowitsch Fradkow [Михаил Ефимович Фрадков] in dieses Amt, der von der Duma bestätigt wurde.

Untergang der „Kursk“

Eine unglückliche Figur machte der Präsident im Drama um das Atomunterseeboot „Kursk“ [Курск; K-141]. Am 12. August 2000 ereigneten sich bei einer Manöverübung an Bord Explosionen, die das mit 118 Mann bestückte Wasserfahrzeug steuerungsunfähig auf den Grund der Barentssee sinken ließen. 23 Seeleute im hinteren Teil des U-Bootes hatten die Explosionen überstanden und machten durch Klopfzeichen auf sich aufmerksam. Den russischen Seestreitkräften gelang es aber nicht, die Rettungsluke zu öffnen und die Verunglückten zu bergen. Die Marineführung beschwichtigte in ihren Mitteilungen die wahre Lage.

Präsident Putin war, vermutlich unzureichend informiert, in seinen geplanten Urlaub nach Sotschi [Сочи] abgereist. Erst fünf Tage nach der Katastrophe trat er im Sommerhemd vor die Fernsehkameras, räumte eine kritische, aber angeblich beherrschbare Situation ein und versicherte, es werde alles zur Rettung der Matrosen getan. Einen Tag später brach er seinen Urlaub ab und kehrte in den Kreml zurück. Zwei Tage vorher hatte Putin erlaubt, angebotene ausländische Hilfe zu akzeptieren. Doch Geheimnistuerei der russischen Flotte und schlechte Kooperation der Behörden führte zu Verzögerungen. Am 21. August wurde die U-Boot-Besatzung von der Führung der Nordmeerflotte für tot erklärt.

Putin wurde während des Dramas, insbesondere von Angehörigen, Teilnahmslosigkeit am Schicksal der Seeleute vorgeworfen. Er sprach nach der Todesnachricht zu den Hinterbliebenen der Opfer im Hafen Widjajewo und stellte Entschädigungen in Aussicht. Putin war der erste russische Herrschende, der nach einer Katastrophe Angehörigen direkt vor Ort sein Beileid bekundete. Den angebotenen Rücktritt des Verteidigungsministers und des Flottenchefs lehnte der Präsident ab.


Siehe auch: Erster Tschetschenienkrieg, Zweiter Tschetschenienkrieg

Putins erste Reise als amtierender Präsident führte ihn noch in der Silvesternacht 1999 in die Kaukasus [Кавказ; კავკასიონი]-Republik Tschetschenien [Itschkeria, Чеченская Республика Российской Федерации] zu dort agierenden Truppeneinheiten. Das Fernsehen zeigte ihn beim Verteilen von Jagdmessern an Soldaten. Ihn trieb und treibt die Sorge um, dass bei einer Unabhängigkeit Tschetscheniens die staatliche Einheit ganz Russlands in Gefahr geriete und ein Bürgerkrieg wie im früheren Jugoslawien drohen könnte. Ein Loslösen der südlichen Teilrepubliken in der Russländischen Föderation unter islamischem Vorzeichen müsse verhindert werden. Feldzüge gegen die „Terroristen“ in Tschetschenien müssten, wie Putin in seinem Buch „Aus erster Hand“ ausführt, auch wenn sie Opfer kosteten, als das kleinere Übel hingenommen werden. Per Dekret übernahm er am 8. Juni 2000 die Regierungsgewalt in der nach Unabhängigkeit strebenden Teilrepublik.

In einem Ukas [указ] verordnete Putin seinen Soldaten Schonung der dortigen Zivilbevölkerung. Doch drangen Nachrichten über ein gegenteiliges Vorgehen einzelner Militärs zu den westlichen Medien. Deren Berichterstatter dürfen das Kampfgebiet nur in russischer Begleitung aufsuchen. Westliche Menschenrechtsgruppen sprachen von Vergewaltigungen und sexuellen Missbrauchshandlungen der Soldateska. Verschwinden von Menschen und illegale Exekutionen wurden den russischen Truppen vorgeworfen. Ermittlungen gegen die Verantwortlichen unterblieben, wurden nur halbherzig verfolgt oder umgehend eingestellt. Andererseits begingen auch die tschetschenischen Rebellen Grausamkeiten.

Wegen der Opfer in ihrer Armee tendierten im Sommer 2002 61 Prozent der Russen zu Verhandlungen mit den Tschetschenen. Diese Stimmung änderte sich abrupt (auch im Westen) als am 23. Oktober 2002 41 bewaffnete tschetschenische Kämpfer Besucher der Musical-Aufführung „Nord-Ost“ in Moskau als Geiseln nahmen. Etwa 800 Menschen, darunter 75 Ausländer, durchlitten eine tagelange Ungewissheit. Die Eindringlinge unter ihrem Anführer Mowsar Basajew montierten Sprengsätze im Theater und schwarz gekleidete Frauen eines angeblichen Bataillons "schwarzer Witwen“ mit angelegten Sprengstoffgürteln hielten die Besucher in Schach. Die Geiselnehmer verlangten den sofortigen Abzug der russischen Armee aus Tschetschenien. Putin war offenbar von Anfang an entschlossen, dieser Erpressung nicht nachzugeben.

Vier Tage später wurde ein in seiner Zusammensetzung geheimes Betäubungsgas in das Gebäude geleitet und das Theater gestürmt. 129 Geiseln ließen bei der Aktion ihr Leben. Die 41 Terroristen wurden von den russischen Eliteeinheiten getötet. Präsident Putin besuchte Überlebende im Krankenhaus und kündigte in einer Fernsehansprache den Tschetschenen Vergeltung an. Er setzte damit seine kompromisslose Linie in der Tschetschenienfrage fort. Alle seine Bemühungen, den Konflikt mit Gewalt oder in Verhandlungen zu lösen, scheiterten bisher.


In den Jahren seiner Amtszeit hat Putin versucht, die Beziehungen zu den unmittelbar an Russland angrenzenden Staaten zu stärken. Akzeptiert hat er die Annäherung der baltischen Staaten an die NATO. Das Näherrücken von EU und NATO ließ ihn insbesondere Kontakte zu Weißrussland [Беларусь] und der Ukraine [Україна/Ukrajina] als früheren Landesteilen der UdSSR intensiv pflegen.

Ihr Präsident überraschte viele russische Nationalisten und sogar seinen eigenen Verteidigungsminister, als er nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 in den USA zustimmte, vor und während der US-geführten Angriffe auf das Taliban- [طالبان] Regime in Afghanistan [افغانستان] Militärbasen in ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken in Zentralasien zu benutzen.

Putin wandte sich gegen den Irak [العراق]-Krieg 2003. Nach Kriegsende wollte US-Präsident George W. Bush bei den Vereinten Nationen eine Lockerung der Handelssanktionen gegen den Irak erwirken. Putin verlangte, dass zunächst die (nicht auffindbaren) Massenvernichtungswaffen im Irak zerstört werden müssten, bevor eine Lockerung der Sanktionen in Frage käme.

Zweite Amtszeit als Präsident (2004-2008)

Bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen am 14. März 2004 gewann Putin mit 71 Prozent der Stimmen und ging so in eine zweite Amtszeit. Wiederum warben die staatlichen Medien für Putin. Der Wahlablauf selbst war laut den Beobachtern jedoch fair. Gemäß der Verfassung ist es ihm nicht erlaubt, ein drittes Mal in Folge zur Präsidentschaftswahl anzutreten. Obwohl es seit der letzten Parlamentswahl eine ausreichende Mehrheit gäbe, um die Verfassung zu ändern, erklärte Putin bisher stets, dies nicht zu tun und keine dritte Amtszeit anzustreben.

Als Wladimir Putin im September 2004 zu deutsch-russischen Konsultationen in Hamburg erwartet wurde, sollte ihm die Ehrendoktorwürde der Universität Hamburg verliehen werden. Dutzende Professoren sprachen sich allerdings dagegen aus und eine deutschlandweite Diskussion wurde in Gang gesetzt. Gleichzeitig ereignete sich im nordkaukasischen Beslan [Беслан] ein Geiseldrama, das nun alle Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zog. Vom Streit um die Ehrendoktorwürde war nun keine Rede mehr; die Konsultationen wurden wegen der erschreckenden Ereignisse im Nordkaukasus abgesagt. Als der Präsident den Besuch in Hamburg am 20. Dezember 2004 nachholte, war von der Würdigung keine Rede mehr.

Am 13. September 2004 legte Putin einen Plan vor, dass die (bislang direkt gewählten) Gouverneure künftig von ihm allein vorgeschlagen und von den regionalen Parlamenten bestätigt oder abgelehnt werden sollten. Am selben Tag unterstütze er einen Vorschlag der zentralen Wahlkommission, die gesamten Duma-Mandate künftig ausschließlich nach den Listen im Verhältniswahlrecht zu bestimmen. Bisher war die Hälfte der Abgeordneten in Wahlkreisen direkt ins Parlament entsandt worden. Dies führte dazu, dass einige Abgeordnete, deren Partei an der Fünf-Prozent-Klausel scheiterte, den Einzug in die Duma schafften und dort für Meinungsvielfalt sorgen. Beides ist inzwischen für die Zukunft so beschlossen worden und hat einen weiteren Machtzuwachs für Putin gebracht.

Im November 2004 unterzeichnete Putin das Kyoto-Protokoll zum Klimaschutz und schloss damit den Ratifizierungsprozess in Russland ab. Dadurch machte er den Weg für das Inkrafttreten des Abkommens Anfang 2005 frei.

Nach dem Zusammenbruch der UdSSR 1991 verlor die Sowjetunion den Status einer Supermacht. In der von Wirren geprägten Amtszeit Jelzins erschien selbst der Erhalt des Status einer Großmacht fragwürdig.

Putin ist bestrebt, eben diesen Status Russlands als Großmacht zu erhalten beziehungsweise auszubauen. So beabsichtigt er, den russischen Einfluss in den ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken und sonstigen Staaten des ehemaligen Warschauer Vertrages zu stabilisieren oder sogar zu verstärken. Gleichzeitig soll der zunehmende westliche, insbesondere US-amerikanische Einfluss in dieser Region eingedämmt oder zurückgedrängt werden.

So unterstützte Putin bei der ukrainischen Präsidentschaftswahl im November 2004 offen den von ihm favorisierten Kandidaten Wiktor Janukowytsch [Віктор Федорович Янукович]. Janukowytsch befürwortete eine engere Anbindung der Ukraine [Україна/Ukrajina] an Russland anstatt nach Westen. Nach einer von Manipulationen beider Seiten überschatteten Wahl gab die Ukraine Janukowytsch als Sieger bekannt. Daraufhin entluden sich wütende Proteste eines Teiles der ukrainischen Bevölkerung, der - von westlichen Staaten und von ihnen unterstützten Organisationen - saubere Neuwahlen ohne Manipulationen forderte. Putin versuchte, die Endgültigkeit des Wahlsiegs Janukowytschs zu sichern, indem er ihm als erster Staatschef zum vermeintlichen Sieg gratulierte. Die offizielle Anerkennung des Wahlergebnisses durch den russischen Präsidenten sollte Zweifel an der Legitimität des Wahlergebnisses ausräumen. Jedoch erzwangen die Proteste auf der Straße gegen den Ablauf der Wahl einen erneuten Urnengang, aus dem der als westlich orientierte und vom Westen unterstützte Wiktor Juschtschenko [Віктор Андрійович Ющенко] im Dezember 2004 als Sieger hervorging. Auch wenn Putin in Folge bekräftigte, mit Juschtschenko zusammenarbeiten zu wollen, werden die Niederlage des kremlnahen Kandidaten Janukowytsch und der Sieg des westlich orientierten Juschtschenko zugleich als außenpolitische Niederlage Putins gewertet.

Am 25. April 2005 sorgte Putin für Irritationen im Westen und bei Verbündeten, als er in einer landesweit vom Fernsehen übertragenen Rede vor der Duma den Fall der Sowjetunion als „die größte geopolitische Katastrophe des Jahrhunderts“ bezeichnete. Putin schwächte später diese Bemerkung als eine reine Verdeutlichung zu den aus diesem Ereignis entstandenen Folgen ab.

Als erster russischer Präsident warb Putin am 6. Juli 2005 in einer offiziellen Ansprache auf Englisch per Video für Moskau als Austragungsort der Olympischen Spiele 2012. Das IOC entschied sich später dafür, die Wettkämpfe in London zu veranstalten.

Am 8. September 2005 schloss Putin in Deutschland gemeinsam mit Gerhard Schröder einen Vertrag über die Nordeuropäische Gasleitung."

[Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-05]

[Quelle der Abb.: Angela Rustemeyer: Putins Oligarchenfeldzug und Demokratie. --  Moskau, 2004. --  http://www.fesmos.ru/Pubikat/18_Putins%20Oligarchenfeldzug2005/Putins%20Oligarchenfeldzug%20und%20Demokratie.pdf. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-03]

"Siloviki [силовики́]

Traditionally an informal name for the heads of “power” ministries (i.e. the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, etc.) and military or intelligence agencies, in recent years the word siloviki (rooted in a Russian term for power) is more commonly used to refer to a clan of former and present members of security or military services, often the KGB (and its post-Soviet successor the FSB), who came to power during the Yeltsin years and had significantly increased their influence after Vladimir Putin became President.

Promoters of a statist ideology, the siloviki, comprised of former FSB and military officers, are seen by many Russian and international commentators as the primary force behind some of the apparent withdrawals from democracy during the Putin years, including the curbing of independent media, the persecution of businesses, and the violations during regional and federal elections to government bodies. But if some consider the siloviki a threat to fragile Russian democracy, others regard their influence as a necessary counter-balance to Russia’s oligarchs.

International human rights groups have repeatedly voiced concern over President Putin’s allegedly increasing reliance on the security-intelligence apparatus to run Russia, resulting, in their opinion, in serious setbacks for civil liberties and democratic progress in Russia.

Among the developments attributed to siloviki’s influence are the criminal case against Yukos Oil Company and the related arrests of Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky and core shareholder Platon Lebedev; as well as a series of “spy trials”, whereby a number of academics and environmentalists have been accused of collaborating with Western intelligence agencies on the basis of questionable evidence and procedures. The latter include the case of Igor Sutyagin, a researcher from the U.S. and Canada Institute, recently sentenced by a Moscow court to 15 years in hard labor for “espionage”, and the case against physicist Valentin Danilov who was charged with high treason in 2003 and whose acquittal by a jury has been overturned by Russia’s Supreme Court.


Before becoming Russia’s prime minister, President Vladimir Putin served in the State Security Committee of the Soviet Union (KGB) for 15 years and later headed the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Security Council.

When Putin was elected President, the number of officials in Russian government posts with connections to the former KGB and other security agencies significantly increased. Some of these people also belong to the so-called clan of “Petersburgers” or the “clan of security people from St. Petersburg,” Vladimir Putin’s native city.

While the security and military agencies providing the background for the siloviki vary (for example, the current Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Fradkov once headed the Tax Police), the foundation is provided by the FSB, the organization President Putin himself used to belong to. The Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta once estimated the number of former intelligence officers currently holding state office in Russia as being over 6.000 people.

In Power

Defense minister Sergey Ivanov studied with Putin at the KGB Academy, where they became close personal friends. After working in the foreign intelligence service, Ivanov became Putin’s deputy in the National Security Council, and later its head. In March 2001, Ivanov was appointed Minister of Defense.

Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Viktor Ivanov is another close friend and ally of President Putin. Their relationship goes a long way back, when they served together in the KGB and later in St. Petersburg’s city administration, and also in the Federal Security Service. Ivanov was appointed deputy chief of Putin’s administration soon after Putin became acting president upon Boris Yeltsin’s resigning. Viktor Ivanov is considered to be the most influential of all Putin’s allies.

Nikolai Patrushev also served in the KGB with Vladimir Putin, becoming the head of the Federal Security Service after the latter was appointed prime minister. Several chiefs of regional FSB departments became governors after Patrushev’s appointment. Under Patrushev’s reign, the FSB has significantly increased its power.

Some of the other high-ranking former FSB men in the Presidential Administration include its Deputy Director, Igor Sechin, who during Soviet times worked undercover in Mozambique (officially as an interpreter), the head of the Presidential Personnel Directorate, Vladimir Osipov, who is an ex-officer of the central apparatus of the KGB, and the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, Vyacheslav Soltaganov, who served in the Border Troops of the Soviet KGB.

The regional leaders who belong to the siloviki include the President of Ingushetia, Murat Zyazikov (former deputy chief of the Astrakhan Regional Directorate of the FSB), Voronezh governor Vladimir Kulakov (former Chief of the Voronezh Regional Directorate of the FSB), and Smolensk governor Viktor Maslov (Chief of the Smolensk Regional Directorate of the FSB).

Updated: 23.09.2005 21:36 MSK"

[Quelle: http://mosnews.com/mn-files/siloviki.shtml#news. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

Weiterführende Ressource:

Abb.: Umschlagtitel

Rahr, Alexander <1959 - >: Wladimir Putin : Präsident Russlands - Partner Deutschlands. -- 3., überarb. und erg. Aufl. -- München : Universitas, 2002. -- 320 S. ; 23 cm. -- ISBN 3-8004-1408-2. -- {Wenn Sie HIER klicken, können Sie dieses Buch  bei amazon.de bestellen}

6. Александр Григорьевич Абрамов — Alexander G. Abramow (Alexander G. Abramov) (1959 - )

Abb.: Alexander Abramov — Александр Абрамов
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/1989.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

Webpräsenz von EvrazHolding [ЕвразХолдинг]: http://www.evrazholding.ru/en/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-13 

Zu EvrazHolding siehe:

Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 1. Russland  (Россия). -- 1. Firmen. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307011.htm

"Alexander G. Abramov [Александр Григорьевич Абрамов] | Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer

Born in 1959. Mr. Abramov has served in similar roles with Evraz or its predecessors since founding EvrazMetal, the predecessor of Evraz [Евраз] (the “’Original Group’”), in 1992, and was a member of the Original Group. Mr. Abramov is also a member of the boards of directors of NTMK and ZapSib. Mr. Abramov previously worked at the Institute of High Temperatures of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Mr. Abramov graduated from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology [Московский физико-технический институ] with a first-class honors degree in 1982, and he holds a Ph.D. in Physics and Mathematics [Кандидат физико-математических наук]. Mr. Abramov is a Bureau member of the Council of Entrepreneurs and a member of the Council of Entrepreneurs set up by the Government of the Russian Federation."

Abb.: Stahlträgerproduktion
(Pressefoto EvrazHolding)

[Quelle: http://www.evraz.com/about/board/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-13]

"Financial Times (UK)
August 27, 2003
The science of forging a steel empire:
Arkady Ostrovsky looks at Alexander Abramov, a former scientist who became an industrial magnate without political connections

There are no neon signs, big letters or corporate logos on the facade of the central Moscow headquarters of EvrazHolding [ЕвразХолдинг], Russia's largest steel producer. Alexander Abramov, who occupies the top office in the five-storey building, keeps an equally low profile.

He does not appear at society parties, does not like meeting journalists and is rarely spotted in the corridors of power. Apart from industry specialists, few have heard of him or his company. But over the past five years he has amassed the largest steel and iron empire in Russia, which employs 125,000 people, controls about 22 per cent of the country's total steel output and has an annual turnover of Dollars 2bn (Pounds 1.3bn).

EvrazHolding is a product of Russia's growth since the 1998 financial crisis and Mr Abramov is representative of the second wave of Russian magnates who went into business after the best assets had been taken.

Unlike the first wave of politically connected "oligarchs", such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky [Михаи́л Бори́сович Ходорко́вский] and Vladimir Potanin [Владимир Потанин], Mr Abramov had neither political leverage nor financial resources to help him benefit from Russia's chaotic privatisation of the 1990s: "I did not believe privatisation was irreversible in this country and did not want to be part of it."

But in recent years Evraz-Holding has emerged as one of the most aggressive vertically integrated business groups in Russia. Its assets include three large steel mills, three coalmines and several ore-enriching plants, as well as a large commercial port, Nakhodka [Находка], in the east of the country.

Abb.: Hafen von Nakhoda — Находка
[Bildquelle: http://www.nakhodkarussia.com/pictures.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-13]

Secrecy comes naturally to Mr Abramov, who initially seemed destined to become one of Russia's top scientists. He graduated from the elite Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Московский физико-технический институ] - Russia's answer to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By the age of 31 he was a deputy head of the Institute of High Temperatures, a research base for Russia's space and defence programme.

But state funding for research institutes dried up. "By 1990, it became clear that there (would) be no money for science in Russia. It was a simple choice - either I had to leave the country as many of my colleagues did, or to go into business," Mr Abramov says.

One option was to sell high technologies created by his institute. But he calculated it would take four to eight years to turn a scientific application into a commercial product: "The country was deteriorating so fast, I simply did not have time."

He used his contacts with Russia's steel mills, which used high-temperature technologies, and offered his services not as a scientist but as a metal trader. "We had good contacts with the directors of those plants. They knew me personally and this helped me to get my first trading contracts."

Trading was a popular and quick way to make money in Russia in the early 1990s. The economy was shrinking, non-payment was a chronic problem and any offer of cash from a trader was welcomed by factories.

"The early 1990s were the years of rich traders and poor factories," says Yakov Pappe [Яков Паппе], a leading Russian economist and author of a Russian study on oligarchs.

By 1997, trading was less profitable and many trading companies, including Mr Abramov's, were owed large sums by producers. "This was the time when either factories started to buy trading companies, or traders started to buy factories," Mr Pappe says. Mr Abramov chose the latter and swapped debt for equity in the Nizhny Tagil [Нижний Тагил] steel mill, while also buying stakes in its rail-producing plant from other shareholders.

While the first wave of Russian oligarchs grabbed whatever assets they could, Mr Abramov acquired them in a much more focused way. He decided to build a monopoly for rail and steel construction products and looked for factories that would give him synergies.

The only other big factories making these products were in the industrial region of Kemerovo [Кемерово], also home to Russia's largest coalmines. Using his old trading contacts with coalmine bosses, Mr Abramov was introduced to Aman Tuleev [Аман-Гельды Молдагазыевич Тулеев], populist governor of the region. "In the west these kind of contacts are made in a golf club. In Russia you meet these people at some national day of a steel worker, over a shot of vodka," Mr Abramov says.

The two factories Mr Abramov was interested in were in bankruptcy in 1998. Salaries had not been paid for up to eight months and strikes were breaking out.

Mr Tuleev needed good managers. Mr Abramov needed the two factories. A deal was made. As a state creditor, Mr Tuleev would help appoint external managers loyal to EvrazHolding to run the steel mills. Mr Abramov would pay salaries and taxes, guarantee jobs and support Mr Tuleev's social projects.

This pitched Mr Abramov against Alfa Group [Альфа-Групп], one of the most influential oligarch groups, which controlled one of the factories. "It was a tough battle for control and in the end we won. This was a non-core asset for Alfa and they had bigger fish to fry," he says. While groups such as Alfa were shedding non-core assets, Mr Abramov and his like were building empires. "Abramov managed to build his business from second-rate assets," says Mr Pappe."

[Quelle: Arkady Ostrovsky. -- http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7303-10.cfm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-13]

Zum 2006-01-01 gibt Abramov seinen Posten bei Evraz auf.

7. Роман Аркадьевич Абрамович — Roman Arkadjewitsch Abramowitsch (Roman Arkadievich Abramovich) (1966 - )

Abb.: Roman Arkadievich Abramovich — Рома́н Арка́дьевич Абрамо́вич
[Bildquelle: http://www.roman-abramovich.com/roman-abramovich-pictures.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-02]

Webpräsenz: http://www.roman-abramovich.com. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-03. -- [auf Russisch]

"Roman Arkadievich Abramovich (Russian: Рома́н Арка́дьевич Абрамо́вич) (born October 24, 1966 in Saratov [Сара́тов], Russian SFSR, USSR) is a Russian oil billionaire, referred to as one of the Russian oligarchs. In March 2005 he was listed by Forbes Magazine as the richest Russian and the 21st richest person in the world with an estimated fortune of $13.3 billion. (Everyone above him in the list was older than him; the only one of those within a decade of his age was computer magnate Michael Dell, 20 months older). Abramovich is most famous outside of Russia as the owner of Chelsea F.C., an English Premiership football club, his wider involvement in European football, and for his contributions to Jewish enterprises in Israel and elsewhere, reflecting his Jewish origins.

Early Life and Career

Abramovich lost his mother at the age of 18 months and his father, who was killed in a construction accident, at the age of four. Adopted by his paternal uncle and raised by his Jewish family of limited means in the harsh environment of Komi [Коми] in North West Russia, Abramovich has been able to transform hardship into significant success.

Abb.: Lage von Komi
[Bildquelle. Wikipedia]

Abramovich attended the Industrial Institute in the city of Ukhta [Ухта] before being drafted into the Soviet Army, the Soviet military ground force.

Post-Soviet Privatization, New Wealth and Political Career

Abramovich obtained his wealth by cheaply acquiring shares in newly-privatised industries after the fall of communism. He became the majority shareholder in Sibneft [Сибнефть] , a large oil company, and is also a major shareholder in RusAl, the world's second-largest aluminium producer, as well as various other companies.

Abb.: ®Logo

Abb.: Lage von Chukotka
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia]

In 1999 Abramovich was elected to the Russian Duma as the representative for the impoverished Far East region of Chukotka [Чукотка]. He started the charity Pole of Hope to help the people of Chukotka, especially children, and in December 2000 was elected governor of Chukotka, replacing the corrupt Alexander Nazarov. Since then he has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Chukotka, for example building a college and hotels in Anadyr [Ана́дырь] and renovating the airport. He has also used Chukotka as a tax haven for Sibneft and has been exploring for oil there. Abramovich said that he would not run for governor again after his term of office expires in 2005, as it is "too expensive" - and he rarely visits the region. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin [Влади́мир Влади́мирович Пу́тин] has changed the law to abolish elections for regional governors, and on 21 October 2005 Abramovich was reappointed governor for another term.

Abramovich and European Football

Abb.: Chelsea FC
[Pressebild Chelsea FC]


In 2003 he became the owner of the companies that control Chelsea Football Club in the United Kingdom. This immediately raised his profile in Britain where the tabloids noted the Russian connection by humorously dubbing the club Chelski. As soon as Abramovich took control, he poured massive investment into the Club, bringing to it the finest footballing and managerial talent that could be obtained, with money no object. The Club also embarked on an ambitious programme of commercial development, with the aim of making it a worldwide brand and not simply a local football club. The result was near-instant success: Chelsea finished its first season after the Abramovich takeover in second place in the Premiership. The following season they moved into first place and reached, also, the semi-finals of the Champions League. They are now the dominant force in English football.

Abb.: ЦСКА Москва́
(Pressebild CSKA)

In March 2004, Sibneft agreed a three-year sponsorship deal worth USD 58 million (approx. GBP 30 million, EUR 44.5 million, RUR 1.6 billion) with the Russian team CSKA Moscow [Профессиональный футбольный клуб ЦСКА Москва́]. Despite the company explaining that the decision was made at management level, some viewed the deal as an attempt by Abramovich to counter accusations of being unpatriotic which were made at the time of the Chelsea purchase. UEFA rules prevent one person owning more than one team participating in UEFA competitions, so Abramovich has no equity interest in CSKA. Nevertheless, he was named most influential person in Russian football in the Russian magazine Pro Sport at the end of June 2004. In May 2005, CSKA won the UEFA Cup, becoming the first Russian club ever to win a major European football competition.

Diversification and Distancing from Russia

The proposed merger of Sibneft with Yukos [ЮКОС] was seen by most as a distancing of himself from Russia, at a time when the Kremlin appears to have decided to bring at least some of the oligarchs to account for their colourful past business practices. Abramovich was a close associate of controversial Boris Berezovsky [Бори́с Абра́мович Березо́вский] who sold him his stake in Sibneft, although in July 2005 Berezovsky announced his intention to sue Abramovich in the British courts for pressuring him into selling most of his Russian assets cheaply to Abramovich after Berezovsky fled the country.

In 2005, he moved down to second place in the Sunday Times Rich List of UK residents, as the newspapers estimate of Lakshmi Mittal's wealth had more than quadrupled since the previous year. Abramovich is included in the list despite the fact that he retains residences in Moscow and Chukotka.

In September 2005 Abramovich sold 72.663% of Sibneft to the Russian-government controlled Gazprom [Газпром] for US$ 13.01 billion (euro 10.81 billion, GB£ 7.4 billion). The transaction is interpreted as indicating that he remains on good terms with President Vladimir Putin, unlike fellow-oligarch Mikhail Khodorkhovsky [Михаи́л Бори́сович Ходорко́вский] who was recently jailed for eight years. In addition the Kremlin press service recently confirmed that Abramovich's name has been sent for approval as governor for another term to Chukotka's local parliament, which confirmed his appointment on 21 October 2005.

Other interests and activities

Abramovich is known as a fan of Formula One and is often seen in the paddock at races; in 2004, after the sport's owner Bernie Ecclestone was seen giving Abramovich a tour of the pitlane at the Monaco Grand Prix, rumours circulated that he was considering investing in or purchasing an F1 team.

He owns his own private Boeing 767-300 known as "The Bandit" due to its paint scheme.


Of Jewish background, Abramovich is a firm supporter of Jewish causes, seen his funding of several projects in the Abramovich neighbourhood in Jerusalem, Israel and in Tel Aviv."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Abramovich. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-02]

Weiterführende Ressource:

Midgley, Dominic <1962 - > ; Hutchins, Chris <1941 - >: Der Milliardär aus dem Nichts — Roman Abramowitsch. -- Hamburg : Murmann, 2005. -- 317 S. : Ill. -- Originaltitel: Abramovich : the billionaire from nowhere (2004). --  ISBN 3-938017-30-9. -- {Wenn Sie HIER klicken, können Sie dieses Buch  bei amazon.de bestellen}

8. Вагит Юсуфович Алекперов — Vahid Yusif oğlu Ələkbərov — Wagit Alekperow (Vagit Alekperov) (1950 - )

Abb.: Vagit Alekperov — Вагит Алекперов
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/1930.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]


Webpräsenz von LUKOIL [ЛУКОЙЛ]: http://www.lukoil.com/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06

Zu LUKOIL siehe:

Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 1. Russland  (Россия). -- 1. Firmen. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307011.htm

"Vagit Alekperov (Вагит Юсуфович Алекперов in Russian, Vahid Yusif oğlu Ələkbərov in Azeri) (born September 1, 1950 in Baku [(Azeri: Bakı, Russian: Баку)], Azerbaijan [Azərbaycan]) is current President of the leading Russian oil company LUKOIL [ЛУКОЙЛ].

Abb.: Lage von Baku — Bakı
(©MS Encarta)

Vagit Alekperov, rated by Forbes magazine as Russia’s tenth richest person, and 122nd richest person worldwide with US $4.3 billion of net worth, was born in Baku, one of the earliest centers of the international petroleum industry. His father, who died when Vagit was a boy, worked in the oil fields all his life and inspired Alekperov to follow in his footsteps. He was 18 when he landed his first job in the industry.

Vagit Alekperov graduated in 1974 from the Azerbaijan Institute of Oil and Chemistry. As a student he also worked as a drilling operator in Kaspmorneft [Каспморнефт], a Caspian regional production company.

After graduation, he continued to work there, and by 1979 he had advanced from engineer to deputy head of a production unit. He had to work in extreme conditions on offshore oil rigs. On one occasion, an explosion on his rig threw him into the stormy Caspian sea [Каспийское море], and he had to swim for his life.

Alekperov moved to Western Siberia [Сибирь] in 1979 and worked at Surgutneftegaz [Сургутнефтегаз] between 1979 and 1985, earning his reputation as an industry expert. He was ascending positions and by 1985 became first deputy general director of Bashneft [Башнефт] production company. In 1987, he became general director of the newly created production company Kogalymneftegaz [Когалымнефтегаз].

In 1990, Alekperov was appointed deputy minister of the Oil and Gas Industry of the Soviet Union and became the youngest deputy energy minister in Soviet history. At that time, Alekperov promoted establishment of vertically integrated state-owned energy companies, which would bring together the wide range of organizations in the energy sector that were, at the time, reporting to different Soviet bureaucratic institutions.

Abb.: LUKOIL-Poster
[Bildquelle: http://natacat.ru/?p=design. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

As deputy minister of the oil and gas industry of the Soviet Union, Alekperov was engaged in the formation of the first vertically integrated state-owned energy company, Langepas-Urai-Kogalymneft [ЛангепасУрайКогалымнефть], which was established in late 1991 as a subsidiary of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. In April 1993, Langepas-Urai-Kogalymneft became LUKoil [ЛУКОЙЛ] Oil Company, with Alekperov as its president. He has remained president of LUKoil since that time. Employing more than 100,000 people, today LUKoil is among the world's most powerful oil companies, with reserves second only to Exxon. It's also the first Russian company to acquire an American company. In December 1998, Lukoil acquired Getty Petroleum Marketing and its 1,300 gas stations in the U.S.A. Like many other Russian oligarchs, Alekperov has also moved into banking and media."

Abb.: Umbenennung von Getty's ®Self in ®Lukoil, Mai 2003
[Bildquelle: http://www.getty.com/LUKOILRebrand.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vagit_Alekperov. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

9. Петр Авен — Pjotr Awen (Peter Aven)

Abb.: Peter Aven
Петр Авен
(Pressefoto Alfagroup)

Webpräsenz von Alfa Group Consortium [Консорциум Альфа-Групп]: http://www.alfagroup.org/104/about.aspx. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-05

Zu Alfa Group siehe:

Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 1. Russland  (Россия). -- 1. Firmen. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307011.htm

"Since 1994, Peter Aven [Петр Авен] has served as President of Alfa- Bank [Альфа-Банк], Russia’s largest and most highly rated privately owned bank. He is responsible for the Bank’s overall strategy and for relations with business and government leaders in Russia and abroad. He has played a central role in developing Alfa-Bank into a market leader in nearly every category of financial services. Alfa-Bank is routinely recognized as Russia’s best privately owned bank by publications such as Euromoney and Global Finance.

Abb.: Werbung für Alfa-Bank
[http://www.alfabank.ru/retail/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

Prior to joining the Bank, Peter Aven was Minister of Foreign Economic Relations for the Russian Federation in 1991-1992. In this role, he was the guiding force in the development of Russia’s economic and trade relations with the West, serving as Russia’s representative to the G-7, and conducting a number of high-level trade and economic missions to Western capitals. Aven was one of the most influential voices and figures in the reform circles of the early 1990’s. He was personally responsible for the establishing the convertibility of ruble and for the liberalization of foreign trade in the government of Yegor Gaidar [Егор Тимурович Гайдар].

Abb.: Speisesaal des International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schloss Laxenburg, Österreich
[Bildquelle: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PE/maps/all2.htm#. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]


An economist by training, Aven spent several years at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria (1989-1991) and prior to that was a senior researcher at the All-Union Institute for Systems Studies at the USSR Academy of Sciences. Aven holds a PhD in Economics from Moscow State University (1980).

Abb.: ®Logo von Golden Telecom

He is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Golden Telecom and Co-Chairman of the Board of Directors of CTC Media. He is also a trustee of the Board of the Russian Economic School and a member of the Board of the Bolshoi Theater [Большой Театр]. Aven is a member of the Board of the Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Council of the Russian Federation government and a trustee of the Board of the National Association for National Financial Reporting Standards.

Abb.: Zuschauerraum des Bolschoi Theaters — Большой Театр
[Bildquelle. Wikipedia]

Peter Aven is an author of numerous scientific papers and articles on Economic and Trade Issues and is widely quoted in the financial and trade press on matters related to the Russian economy and trade policy. He has received a number of international awards, most recently by Institutional Investor magazine, when he was named Russia’ Most Admired Executive in Financial Services. Aven is a frequent visitor to Western capitals where he often lectures on economic developments in Russia.

Peter Aven is a passionate supporter of the arts and theatre in Russia, and is a major collector of early twentieth century Russian Art."

[Quelle: http://www.alfa-bank.com/president/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

10. Борис Абрамович Березовский alias Platon Elenin/Yelenin — Boris Abramowitsch Beresowski (Boris Abramovich Berezovsky) (1946 - )

Abb.: Boris Abramowitsch Beresowski — Борис Абрамович Березовский alias Platon Elenin
(Foto: Radio Liberty)


"Boris Berezovsky

The most notorious of Russia’s oligarchs, Boris Berezovsky was one of the closest members of President Boris Yeltsin’s [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] inner-circle but fell out of favor when Vladimir Putin [Влади́мир Влади́мирович Пу́тин] came to power in 2000.

  • Full name: Boris Abramovich Berezovsky [Борис Абрамович Березовский]
  • Born: January 23, 1946 in Moscow [Москва]
  • In 1967, graduated from the Moscow Forestry Engineering Institute, majoring in electronics and computer science. Later Berezovsky was accepted to the Mechanics and Mathematics department of the Moscow State University [Московский Государственный Университет], earning his Ph.D. at the age of 37
  • In 1969, was employed as an engineer at the Scientific Research Center for Hydrometeorology
  • Between 1969 and 1987, advanced from an engineering to a management position at the Management Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences
  • In 1989, formed the Logovaz [ЛогоВаз] automotive company
  • In 1994 —1997, served as the chairman of the board of trustees of Logovaz [ЛогоВаз]
  • In 1994, became General Director of the All-Russian Automobile Alliance company (AVVA) [Автомобильный Всероссийский Альянс (AVVA)]
  • In 1995, became a member of the board of trustees of the Russian Public Television (ORT) [ОРТ — Общественное Российское Телевидение]
  • In 1996, elected a member of the board of trustees of Sibneft (Siberian Oil Company)  [Сибнефть]
  • In 1996-1997 served as Deputy Chairman of the Russian national Security Council
  • In 1997 became a member of the scientific council of the Security Council.
  • In 1998, elected Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Dismissed in 1999 by President Boris Yeltsin
  • On December 19, 1999, elected a member of the State Duma representing Karachayevo-Cherkessiya [Карачаево-Черкесская республика]
  • In 2000, left Russia
  • In 2003, granted political asylum in the UK

A mathematician and computer programmer by training, in 1989, Berezovsky left the world of academia to start a business, becoming one of the most successful entrepreneurs of the period, his interests including auto industry, oil, aluminium, and mass media. Berezovsky began his business career by buying and reselling automobiles from state manufacturer AutoVAZ [АВТОВАЗ]. During the lawlessness of the early 1990s Berezovsky survived several assassination attempts, including a 1994 car bomb attack when his driver was killed.

During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин], Berezovsky was one of the so-called oligarchs who gained access to the president, becoming a close member of Yeltsin’s inner-circle, unofficially known as the “Family”. He used this influence to acquire stakes in state companies including the car giant AutoVAZ, state airline Aeroflot [Аэрофлот], and several oil properties that he organized into Sibneft [Сибнефть]. He also founded a bank to finance his operations and acquired several news media holdings. These media provided essential support for Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996.

Already one of the most influential members of President Yeltsin’s entourage, in the mid-1990s Berezovsky openly entered politics and was appointed secretary of Russia’s National Security Council and head of the Executive Committee of the CIS. He was behind the creation of the pro-Kremlin Unity party that came second (after the Communists) in the 1999 parliamentary elections, as well as being chief negotiator of the peace treaty that ended the first Chechen war in 1996.

On July 8, 2000, Russia’s new president Vladimir Putin announced in his address that Russia would no longer tolerate ’’shady groups’’ that divert money abroad, establish their own ’’dubious’’ security services, and block the development of a liberal market economy.

Soon after Berezovsky voiced his plans to create an opposition party led by regional governors and other influential figures threatened by Putin’s drive for power. At the end of the year the prosecution declared Berezovsky the main suspect in the misappropriation of large sums from Aeroflot — Russia’s national airline in which he owned large stakes. A similar case against Berezovsky dealt with large-scale fraud in his Logovaz [ЛогоВаз] car company.

Berezovsky left Russia at the end of 2000. In March 2003, he was arrested in London but released on bail. In October of the same year he received political asylum in the United Kingdom. His stake in Russia’s major television company ORT (now First Channel) was sold, and his own TV6 channel was closed by a ruling of the Russian Arbitration Court. Still an active critic of President Putin, Boris Berezovsky is now living under the name of Platon Yelenin.

Updated: 19.10.2005 19:53 MSK"

[Quelle: http://mosnews.com/mn-files/berezovsky.shtml#news. -- Zugrif am 2005-12-06]

"Boris Abramowitsch Beresowski (russisch Борис Абрамович Березовский; * 23. Januar 1946 in Moskau) ist ein russischer Mathematiker, gehört zu den russischen Oligarchen. Berosowski ist mittlerweile in Russland in Ungnade gefallen.


Abb.:  Lomonossow-Universität
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia]

Beresowski studierte Elektrotechnik und mathematische Mechanik. Er schloss sein Studium 1973 an der Lomonossow-Universität [Московский Государственный Университет] in Moskau ab und absolvierte anschließend am Institut für Steuertechnik der Akademie der Wissenschaften seine Aspirantur. Seine Dissertation verteidigte er 1983 zum Thema Entscheidungstheorie.

Nach seinem Studium arbeitete Beresowski bis 1987 an verschiedenen Forschungsinstituten im Bereich Steuerung, Automatisierung und Managementsysteme. Seit 1973 arbeitete er mit dem Automobilkonzern AutoVAZ (Lada) zusammen, für den er in seinem Institut eine Software entwickelt hatte. Mit Beginn der Perestroika[Перестро́йка] in der Sowjetunion und deren anschließendem Zusammenbruch stieg er in die Privatwirtschaft ein und gründete gemeinsam mit Awtowas die Autohandelsfirma LogoVAZ (russisch ЛогоВАЗ). In den Zeiten der Hyperinflation in Russland baute er das größte Autohandelsnetz des Landes auf.

Im Oktober 1993 gründete er zusammen mit einigen AutoVAZ-Managern die Allrussische Automobil-Allianz AVVA (Автомобильный всероссийский альянс (AVVA)), mit deren Investorengeldern er wiederum bei der Privatisierung große Anteile von AutoVAZ für sich erwarb.

Seit 1994 beteiligte Beresowski sich als Hauptaktionär an der Fernsehgesellschaft ORTV, die den größten und flächendeckenden Sender Russlands ORT unterhielt. Im gleichen Jahr überlebte er in seinem Auto einen Bombenanschlag. Im darauffolgenden Jahr wurden im Zusammenhang mit der Ermordung des ORTV-Direktors Listjew Ermittlungen gegen ihn angestellt.

Im Wahlkampf 1996 unterstützte Boris Beresowski mit seinem Sender ORT und finanziellen Beiträgen massgeblich die Wiederwahl von Boris Jelzin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] zum Präsidenten Russlands. Im Anschluss daran wurde er Vizepräsident des Nationalen Sicherheitsrates. 1998 und [1999] war er Exekutiv-Sekretär der GUS [Содружество Независимых Государств (СНГ)]. Neben seinen politischen Kontakten hatte er auch persönlich großen Einfluss auf den in seiner zweiten Amtszeit geschwächten Jelzin. Westliche Medien bezeichneten ihn auch als Graue Eminenz hinter Jelzin.

Unter Jelzins Nachfolger Putin [Владимир Владимирович Путин] stellten sich Beresowski Probleme. Unter anderem führten die Berichterstattung zur Tschetschenienfrage und zum Untergang des U-Bootes Kursk zu Konflikten. Im Oktober 2001 wurde ein Haftbefehl gegen ihn ausgestellt, dem er sich durch Flucht ins Ausland entzog. Er wurde beschuldigt, bei seinen Finanztransaktionen mit Lada den Investoren 2.033 Autos im Wert von 13 Millionen US-Dollar unterschlagen zu haben.

Seitdem lebte er im Exil in London. Im Frühjahr 2003 traf er sich auf Vermittlung seines früheren Geschäftspartners Badri Patarkazischwili [ბადრი პატარკაციშვილი] mit dem georgischen Oppositionspolitiker und späteren Premierminister Surab Schwania [ზურაბ ჟვანია] in London. Es war das erste in einer Reihe, in denen Schwania erfolgreich finanzielle Mittel für die Unterstützung demokratischer Institutionen in der Ukraine und die Kampagne des ukrainischen Präsidentschaftskandidaten Wiktor Juschtschenko [Віктор Андрійович Ющенко] einwarb.

Im November 2003 nahm die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft Ermittlungen gegen Beresowski auf. Er wurde verdächtigt, sich der Geldwäsche schuldig gemacht zu haben und Mitglied einer kriminellen Vereinigung zu sein.


Nach den politischen Ereignissen in der Ukraine und der Wahl von Wiktor Juschtschenko zum Präsidenten verkündete Beresowski im Februar 2005, nach Kiew [Київ/Kyjiw] ziehen zu wollen, weil ihm die Ukraine kulturell und sprachlich näher sei als Großbritannien. Die Ukraine befand sich nun in einer politischen Zwickmühle, da einerseits ein bilaterales Auslieferungsabkommen mit Russland sie verpflichtete, Beresowski auszuliefern, sie andererseits aber auch die Genfer Konvention ratifiziert hatten, die sie verpflichtete, den von Großbritannien anerkannten politischen Flüchtling zu schützen.

[Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Abramowitsch_Beresowski. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-03]

"Boris Abramovich Berezovsky (Бори́с Абра́мович Березо́вский) (born January 23, 1946) (Note: Boris Berezovsky is now officially known as Platon Elenin by the British Home Office) is a Russian businessman. He was Russia's first billionaire.

Berezovsky was born to a Jewish family in Moscow [Москва́]. He studied forestry and then applied mathematics, receiving his doctorate in 1983 and becoming a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences [Росси́йская Акаде́мия Нау́к] in 1991 and a chair of a laboratory in the RAS Institute of Control Problems (Институт Проблем Управления).

Berezovsky started in business in 1989 under perestroika [Перестро́йка] by buying and reselling automobiles from state manufacturer AutoVAZ [АВТОВАЗ]. Officially, Berezovsky was called upon as an expert in development of optimized system of management of the enterprize. In 1992 a new middleman company "Logovaz [ЛогоВаз]" [ЛогоВАЗ] was created with Berezovsky being its president. Logovaz [ЛогоВаз] became an exclusive consignment dealer of AutoVAZ.

During the lawlessness of the early 1990s Berezovsky, like many businessmen, was targeted by the Russian mafia for extortion, allegedly because of connections Berezovsky had with the Chechen mafia powerful in Moscow at that time. He survived several assassination attempts, including a 1994 car bomb attack. During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин], Berezovsky was one of the businessmen who gained access to the president. He used his political connections to acquire stakes in state companies including AutoVAZ itself, state airline Aeroflot [Аэрофлот], and several oil properties that he organized into Sibneft [Сибне́фть], paying a fraction of the companies' book values. Berezovsky organized a bank to finance his operations and acquired several news media holdings as well. These media provided essential support for Yeltsin's reelection in 1996.

Berezovsky is a leading proponent of political and economic liberalization in Russia. For this reason he has frequently entered into politics by investing in liberal media, financing liberal candidates, making political statements, and even seeking office himself. He was briefly secretary-general of the Commonwealth of Independent States [Содружество Независимых Государств (СНГ)]and later a member of the Duma [Ду́ма]. He strongly opposed the Second Chechen War but nonetheless supported Vladimir Putin's [Влади́мир Влади́мирович Пу́тин] 2000 presidential campaign. Putin did not welcome Berezovsky's views on Chechnya [Чечня́; Нохчичьо; Ichkeria] or his political clout and opened investigations into Berezovsky's business activities. Fearing arrest, Berezovsky escaped to London, where he was granted political asylum. Putin's government successfully pressured Berezovsky to sell many of his business holdings. He has been charged with fraud and political corruption, but the Russian government has not been able to extradite him.

Berezovsky's image among Russians is generally poor; many consider him the most unlawful and unethical of the oligarchs and blame him especially for the country's economic collapse. They believe that he, like other oligarchs, defrauded the government through Yeltsin's privatization program. Berezovsky maintains that he acted within the legal framework of the time, and that the privatization bidding was closed to prevent corruption rather than to allow it. A 1996 Forbes magazine article titled "Godfather of the Kremlin?", by Paul Klebnikov, portrayed Berezovsky as a mafia boss who had his rivals murdered. Berezovsky sued the magazine for libel, and the dispute was ultimately settled with the magazine retracting both claims. Klebnikov expanded the article into a book, Godfather of the Kremlin, that Berezovsky did not contest in court. Klebnikov subsequently became the editor of the Russian edition of Forbes and was murdered in Moscow on July 9, 2004.

In 2003 Boris Berezovsky formally changed his name to Platon Elenin ("Platon" being Russian for Plato, and Elena is the name of his wife) in the British courts. No reason has been given - but Platon is the name of the lead character in a film Tycoon based on his life. In December 2003 he was allowed to travel under his new name to Georgia [საქართველო], which provoked a row between Russia and Georgia.

In September 2005, soon after Ukrainian government led by the prime-minister Yulia Tymoshenko [Юлія Володимирівна Тимошенко] was dismissed by the president Viktor Yushchenko [Віктор Андрійович Ющенко], former president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk [Леонід Макарович Кравчук] has accused Berezovsky of financing Yushchenko's presidential election campaign, and provided copies of documents showing money transfers from companies he said are controlled by Berezovsky to companies controlled by Yuschenko's official backers. Berezovsky has confirmed that he met Yushchenko's representatives in London before the election, and that the money was transferred from his companies, but he refused to confirm or deny that the companies that received the money were used in Yushchenko's campaign. Financing of election campaigns by foreign citizens is illegal in Ukraine and might potentially lead to Yushchenko's impeachment."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Berezovsky. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-03]

Weiterführende Ressource:

Klebnikov, Paul <1963 - 2004>: Godfather of the Kremlin : Boris Berezovsky and the looting of Russia. -- New York : Harcourt, ©2000. -- xiv, 400 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. -- ISBN 0151006210

11. Владимир Леонидович Богданов — Wladimir Bogdanow (Vladimir Bogdanov) (1951 - )

Abb.: Владимир Леонидович Богданов — Wladimir Bogdanow
[Bildquelle: http://www.ge-prize.ru/ru/council_folder.php?itemId=2142. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

Webpräsenz von Surgutneftgas: http://www.surgutneftegas.ru/eng/index.xpml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14

"Vladimir Bogdanov [Владимир Леонидович Богданов] was born on May 28, 1951 in the village of Suerka [Суерка], the oblast of Tyumen [Тюменская область].

1973 – graduated from the Tyumen Industrial Institute [Тюменский индустриальный институт (ТИИ)] (specialized in “Drilling oil and gas chinks ", engineer).

1990 – graduated from the Academy of National Economy [Академию народного хозяйства (АНХ)] under the Ministerial Council of the USSR (now is Academy of National Economy under the Government of Russian Federation).

1973-1976 – worked for Nizhnevartovsk [Нижнева́ртовск] Drilling Administration as a driller assistant, driller, senior engineer, chief deputy of the technological department and chief of shift.

From 1976 to 1978 – chief, senior technologist, senior engineer of the Surgut [Сургут] Drilling Works Administration №2 of the Industrial Association «Surgutneftegas» [Сургутнефтегаз].

Abb.: ®Logo

1978-1980 – chief deputy of the Drilling Department, CEO deputy, head of the Drilling Department of the Industrial Association «Uganskneftegas» [Юганскнефтегаз].

1980-1983 – worked as CEO deputy for organization of works in Northern regions, CEO deputy, head of the Drilling Department of the Industrial Association «Surgutneftegas».

1983-1984 – drilling chief deputy, Industrial Association «Glavtyumenneftegas» [Главтюменнефтегаз].

Since 1984 – CEO, Industrial Association «Surgutneftegas».

1985-1990 – Delegate of the Tyumen Regional Council from Surgut. On March 18, 1990 Vladimir Bogdanov was elected the National Deputy of RSFSR on Kogalym territorial district №722 [Когалымскому территориальному округу №722] (now is Khanty-Mansyisk Independent District [Ханты-Мансийский автоно́мный округ]).

Since September, 1990 – Chairman of the Board of directors, «Surgutneftegasbank» [Сургутнефтегазбанк].

Since 1992 – CEO, OJSC «Surgutneftegas», established on the basis of the Industrial Association «Surgutneftegas».

Simultaneously from 1993 till June, 1996 Vladimir Bogdanov was the Chairman of Board of directors, and since June, 1996 – Chairman deputy of Board of directors, OJSC «Surgutneftegas».

Since 1993 – President, OJSC «Oil Company «Surgutneftegas».

Since 1994 – Board member of the following companies: OJSC «Kirishinefteproduct» [АООТ "Киришинефтепродукт"],  OJSC «Lennefteproduct» [ОАО "Леннефтепродукт"], OJSC «Bulk Plant Ruchi» [ОАО "Нефтебаза Ручьи"], OJSC «Red Oiler» («Krasnyi Neftyanik») [ОАО "Красный Нефтяник"] and OJSC «Onegoneft» [ОАО "Онегонефть"].

1994-August, 1996 – Board member, OJSC «Nefto Combi» [ОАО "Нефто Комби"].

In 1995 Vladimir Bogdanov became President and Chairman of the Board of the «Surgutneftegas» Nongovernmental Pensionary Fund.

Since April 1996 – Board member of the OJSC «Mosbusinessbank» [Мосбизнесбанк]. Since October, 1996 – Board member, ONEXIM Bank [ОНЭКСИМбанка].

Since May 1996 – Chairman of the Board, CJSC «Surgutfundinvest» [Сургутфондинвест] and CJSC «Oil Invest» [Нефть Инвест].

On October 27, 1996 Vladimir Bogdanov was elected Deputy of the Khanty-Mansyisk Independent District Duma of the second assembling on the Surgut  municipal electoral district.

Since April 1997 – Board member, OJSC «Nafta Moscow» [Нафта Москва].

On June 5, 1998 signed joint claim of leading Russian businessmen «Appeal of the Russian Business Representatives» ["Обращение представителей российского бизнеса"] because of the economic situation in Russian Federation.

In October 1998 Vladimir Bogdanov signed an appeal of several heads of Russian leading oil companies, which contained suggestion of avoiding economical crisis in Russian Federation.

Since April 1999 – member of the Issuer Council under the Federal Commission on the Securities Market.

Since October 2000 – member of the Industrial Council under the Government of Russian Federation.

On January 14, 2001 was elected Deputy of Khanty-Mansyisk Independent District Duma (Duma of the third assembling, electoral district № 17).

In April 2001 – became a member of the steering committee of the public association «Delovaya Rossiya» [Деловая Россия] [«Business Russia»].

Since June 2002 – AKB «Rosbank» [Росбанк] Board member.

Abb.: Rosbank
[Bildquelle: http://www.rosbank.ru/en/services/institutions/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

Vladimir Bogdanov is the full member of the Academy of Mining Sciences, full member of the Academy of Natural Sciences, corresponding member of the Academy  of Technological Sciences.

Awarded order «For Merits to the Motherland» of the IV degree and Byelorussian order of Pashana.

Was declared one of the best leaders of the Eastern European companies of 1998 according to the research of the «Wall Street Journal Europe».

In December 2000 was declared the Entrepreneur of the year by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.

Married. Has a daughter. "

[Quelle: http://nccg.ru/en/site.xp/050048050124.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

"Russlands mächtigste Männer

Wladimir Bogdanow [Владимир Леонидович Богданов] könnte mit Yukos [ЮКОС] zum größten Ölmagnaten des Landes aufsteigen

von Jens Hartmann

Moskau - So ganz wohl fühlten sich die Frau und der Mann nicht, die am Resopaltisch Nummer 1 saßen und mit einem Fingerzeig sieben Mrd. Euro ausgaben. War es Nervosität? Sie überboten, nachdem die Konkurrenz längst ausgestiegen war, ihr eigenes Gebot um 400 Mio. Euro. Durch den Hinterausgang verließen sie dann am vergangenen Sonntag als Sieger den Auktionssaal des Russischen Fonds für Föderales Vermögen, der die größte Versteigerung der russischen Geschichte organisiert hatte.

Baikal Finance Group, eine Firma mit der Postadresse eines Schnellimbisses in der Stadt Twer [Тверь], hatte das Herz des größten russischen Erdölkonzerns Yukos, die westsibirische Fördertochter Yuganskneftegaz [Юганскнефтегаз], gekauft.

Igor Minibajew und Valentina Komarowa heißt das Paar, wie die Zeitung "Vedomosti" [ВЕДОМОСТИ] herausfand. Beide arbeiten auf der Ebene des mittleren Managements im viertgrößten Erdölkonzern des Landes, Surgutneftegaz [Сургутнефтегаз]. Während sich Minibajew und Komarowa nach dem Milliardendeal irgendwo im Ausland erholen, spricht vieles dafür, dass Surgutneftegaz oder ein ihr nahestehendes Firmengebilde der neue Eigentümer von Yuganskneftegaz ist.

"Die neuen Eigentümer sind Privatpersonen, die viele Jahre im Energiegeschäft tätig sind, und beabsichtigen, Beziehungen zu anderen Energiekonzernen aufzubauen", beschrieb Präsident Wladimir Putin die Käufer und fügte hinzu: "Was die Möglichkeit von Staatsunternehmen anbelangt, diese Aktiva zu erwerben, haben sie dazu das Recht wie alle anderen Marktteilnehmer auch." Damit wird indirekt bestätigt, dass die Variante einer Tarnfirma gewählt wurde, um juristische Probleme auszuschließen.

"Der Fall hat die Reputation Russlands als einen Ort, wo man Geschäfte tätigen kann, schwer beschädigt", sagt der US-Außenamtssprecher Richard Boucher in Washington. Yukos-Vorstandschef Steven Theede sagt aus seinem Exil in London, die Ölförderung von Yukos sei bereits um etwa zwei Prozent zurückgegangen: "Jeder neue Eigner wird so schnell wie möglich Geld in den Konzern pumpen müssen, um die Produktion nicht einbrechen zu lassen."

Analysten spekulieren darüber, ob Surgutneftegaz einen Alleingang gewagt hat, hinter dem Gebot der Erdgasmonopolist Gazprom [Газпром] steht oder beide Konzerne als Team angetreten sind. Immerhin haben die Konzerne - die zusammen 63 Mrd. Euro an der Börse wert sind - vor, gemeinsam die Erdölreserven Ostsibiriens zu heben. Surgutneftegaz und Gazprom sind beides Konzerne, die dem Präsidenten wohlgesonnen sind.

Sollte Surgut alleine angetreten sein, würde das in Zahlen bedeuten: Zu den 58 Mio. Tonnen Jahresförderung kommen 51 Mio. hinzu. Damit wäre Surgutneftegaz die größte russische Erdölgesellschaft. Ihr Anteil an der Ölförderung des Landes läge bei rund einem Viertel.

Der Patron schweigt. Wladimir Bogdanow, Generaldirektor von Surgutneftegaz, sitzt in der westsibirischen Ölmetropole Surgut [Сургут], wo die Sonne bei minus 23 Grad scheint. Der 53jährige ist selten in Moskau. Wer bei ihm im Management etwas werden will, wohnt ebenfalls dort, wo das Öl aus dem Boden gepumpt wird, und fliegt nicht - wie so mancher russische Ölmanager - für eine Vier-Tage-Woche im Firmenjet aus der Hauptstadt ein.

Bogdanow ist ein stiller, ein vorsichtiger Oligarch. Er spricht am liebsten über die Petrochemie: Selbst auf Parties, die er ohnehin selten besucht, zieht er Gäste zum Beispiel ins Gespräch über die besten Möglichkeiten, um Öl von Wasser zu scheiden. Der Sibirier Bogdanow lernte das Ölgeschäft von der Pieke auf, begann als Bohrarbeiter, bis er noch zu Sowjetzeiten ins Management aufstieg. Wer in der Zurückhaltung Bogdanows Schwäche vermutet, täuscht sich. Dass er rücksichtslos sein kann, bewies er eindrucksvoll am 3. November 1995. Der Flughafen von Surgut war an diesem Tag gesperrt. Schwer bewaffnete Wachleute blockierten den Airport und alle Zufahrtsstraßen in die Stadt.

Abb.: Lage von Surgut — Сургут
(©MS Encarta)

Durch diese drastische Maßnahme hielt sich die Zahl der Bieter bei der öffentlichen Versteigerung von 40,12 Prozent der Aktien von Surgutneftegaz in Grenzen. 88,9 Mio. Dollar zahlten die Investoren um Generaldirektor Bogdanow für das Unternehmen - ein Schnäppchen. Heute ist Surgutneftegaz 17,8 Mrd. Euro wert und gemessen an der Marktkapitalisierung die teuerste Ölgesellschaft Russlands.

Transparenz ist nicht die Stärke des Unternehmens. Dennis Blank von der angesehenen Investmentgesellschaft Hermitage Capital Management spricht von einem "Mangel an Corporate Governance". So ist unklar, wer 62 Prozent der Surgutneftegaz-Aktien hält. Vieles spricht dafür, dass es das Management ist. Es veröffentlicht ohnehin keine Bilanzen nach internationalen Buchführungsstandards mehr.

Jedenfalls platzierte die russische Ausgabe des Wirtschaftsmagazins "Forbes" Ölbaron Bogdanow mit 2,2 Mrd. Dollar Privatvermögen auf Rang 13 der russischen Oligarchen-Liste. Trotzdem hält Analyst Blank viel von der geschäftlichen Leistung des Konzernlenkers. "Surgutneftegaz ist zugleich eine der erfolgreichsten und eine der am meisten unterbewerteten Erdölgesellschaft in Russland." Der Präsident versteht sich sehr gut mit Bogdanow, hatte dieser im Jahr 2000 in Westsibirien doch den Wahlkampf des Präsidentschaftskandidaten Putin gemanagt.

In Surgut erzählt man sich, dass sich Bogdanow in einen Hubschrauber setzte und über die Ölfelder seines Konkurrenten Michail Chodorkowski [Михаил Борисович Ходорковский] flog, kurz nachdem dieser verhaftet wurde.

Bogdanow musste nur über den sibirischen Strom Ob [Обь] fliegen. Die Ölfelder von Yuganskneftegaz und Surgutneftegaz liegen nebeneinander. Geld für den "Kauf des Jahrhunderts", wie Analyst Blank das Geschäft einschätzt, hätte Surgutneftegaz. Auf den Firmenkonten befanden sich zuletzt mehr als sechs Mrd. Euro.

Der Mann mit dem akkuraten Rechtsscheitel, der gern einen Trenchcoat trägt, riskiert allerdings eine Menge, sollte er der Käufer sein. US-Richterin Letitia Clark vom Konkursgericht in Houston/Texas hatte die Versteigerung des Yukos-Kerngeschäfts untersagt. Es drohen Schadenersatzforderungen in Milliardenhöhe. Die Richterin wird sich an diesem Mittwoch wieder zu Wort melden."

[Quelle: Jens Hartmann. -- In: Die Welt. -- 2004-12-22. -- http://www.welt.de/data/2004/12/22/378037.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

12. Герман Хан —  German Chan (German Khan) (1961 - )

Abb.: German Khan — Герман Хан
(Pressefoto Alfagroup)

Zu TNK-BP und Alfa Bank siehe:

Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 1. Russland  (Россия). -- 1. Firmen. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307011.htm

"German Khan [Герман Хан] is the Executive Director and a member of the TNK-BP Management Board [ТНК-ВР Менеджмент].

Mr. Khan is also a member of the Board of Directors of Alfa-Bank [Альфа-Банк] and Slavneft [НГК Славнефть].

[He was born in Kiev [], Ukraine on 24 October 1961.]

Mr. Khan is a graduate of the Moscow Steel and Alloys Institute [Московский институт стали и сплавов].

From 1992 to 1998, he held various managerial posts in the Alfa Group [Альфа-Групп], one of the largest financial-industrial conglomerates in Russia. From 1995 to 1998 he held the post of director of the department of commodity trading at Alfa-Eco [Альфа-Эко], a major trading company and a part of the Alfa Group.

In 2000, Mr. Khan was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Management Board of TNK [ТНК]."

[Quelle: http://www.tnk-bp.com/company/governance/management/khan/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]


Three People Own 77% of Alfa Bank [Альфа-банк]

As part of the road show for its junior Eurobond issue, Alfa Bank released a memorandum yesterday revealing that more than 75 percent of its capital is controlled by board members Mikhail Fridman [Михаил Фридман], German Khan [Герман Хан] and Alexey Kuzmichev [Алексей Кузьмичев]. Their exact shares were not specified, but it was stated that no one has more than 50 percent of shares and that the three main shareholder vote together. Mikhail Fridman's ownership of Alfa Bank was an open secret, although his share ownership in the bank has never been officially specified. It was commonly thought that he owned more than 50 percent of the shares in the bank. On the bank's website, AB Holding is listed as the owner of 99.7398 percent of the bank's shares. That holding company is in turn owned by the ABH Holding Corp., registered in the British Virgin Islands. Fridman, Khan and Kuzmichev own 77 percent of ABH Holding.
Alfa Bank is Russia's sixth largest bank by both capital (25.22 billion rubles) and net assets (217.51 billion rubles). It began its road show for ten-year junior Eurobonds in Asia and Europe yesterday. It hopes to borrow $200 million. It is not rare for Russian banks to hide the identities of their ultimate owners, but it is becoming increasingly common for that information to be made public. This new openness is related to the fact that it is easier for more transparent banks to receive credit and that that information is require by the Central Bank of Russia for admission to the deposit insurance system. MDM Bank [МДМ-банк] just revealed that 49.388 percent of its stock is owned by board members Andrey Melnichenko [Андрей Мельниченко] and Sergey Popov [Сергей Попов]. Last year, Globeks [Глобэкс]Bank revealed that it was owned by bank president Anatoly Motylev [Анатолий Мотылев]. The main stockholder in Konversbank [Конверсбанк] and Konversbank-Moscow [Конверсбанк-Москва] is head of Konvers Group [Конверс Групп] Vladimir Antonov [Владимир Антонов], and the controlling stock package in Soyuz [Союз] Bank belongs to Basic Element [Базэла] chief Oleg Deripaska [Олег Дерипаска]."

[Quelle: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=500&id=629185. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

13. Михаил Борисович Ходорковский — Michail Borissowitsch Chodorkowski (Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky) (1963 - )

Abb.: Michail Borissowitsch Chodorkowski — Михаил Борисович Ходорковский
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/1921.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

"Michail Borissowitsch Chodorkowski (russisch Михаил Борисович Ходорковский, wiss. Transliteration Michail Borisovič Chodorkovskij; * 26. Juni 1963 in Moskau [Москва]) ist der ehemalige Vorstandsvorsitzende des russischen Ölkonzerns Jukos [ЮКОС].

Chodorkowski wurde am 25. Oktober 2003 verhaftet. Am 16. Mai 2005 wurde er unter anderem wegen Betrugs, Steuerhinterziehung und der „Bildung einer kriminellen Vereinigung“ zunächst zu 9, in einem Revisionsverfahren dann zu 8 Jahren Haft verurteilt, die er seit Oktober 2005 in einem Straflager in Sibirien verbüßt.

Rascher Aufstieg vom Studentenfunktionär zum Multi-Milliardär

Chodorkowskis Aufstieg zu einem der reichsten Oligarchen Russlands ist in vieler Hinsicht typisch für die Karrieren der Finanz- und Industriemagnaten der Jelzin-Ära.

Abb.: Komsomol-Mitgliederabzeichen
[Bildquelle. Wikipedia]

Nach dem Studium der Chemie war der 24jährige Chodorkowski 1987 zunächst auf dem besten Weg zu einer klassischen sowjetischen Funktionärskarriere im Komsomol- [Комсомол-] und später im Parteiapparat. Dann nutzte er die Chancen, die die Liberalisierung der sowjetischen Gesellschaft unter Präsident Gorbatschow [Михаи́л Серге́евич Горбачёв] bot. Er übernahm die Leitung eines Komsomolbetriebes, den er später erwarb. Zur Finanzierung des Betriebes gründete er 1988 eine Bank, die in der Gründerphase nach dem Zerfall der UdSSR unter dem Namen Menatep-Bank rasch an Bedeutung gewann.

Dabei halfen Chodorkowski die politischen Beziehungen, die er zu Regierungskreisen und zum Umfeld Präsident Jelzins, zu knüpfen verstand. Die Nähe zur Politik verschaffte ihm Vorteile bei der Privatisierung von Staatsbetrieben. In weniger als einem Jahrzehnt konnte er ein Finanz- und Industrieimperium aufbauen.

1996, gerade 33 Jahre alt, war Chodorkowski bereits Vorstandsvorsitzender des Ölkonzerns Jukos und einer der Großaktionäre der Menatep-Gruppe. Die Mehrheit an Jukos hatte sich die Menatep-Gruppe im Jahr zuvor auf einer Privatisierungsauktion für 309 Millionen Dollar und damit, so die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, weit unter dem Marktwert des Unternehmens gesichert.

Wandel zum „Vorzeigekapitalisten“ mit politischem Engagement

Jukos wurde unter Chodorkowski zu einem Unternehmen mit Vorbildcharakter. Statt auf gerissene Winkelzüge setzte er zunehmend auf Grundsätze guter Unternehmensführung ("Corporate Governance"), forderte das neue russische Unternehmertum auf, mehr soziale Verantwortung zu übernehmen, und finanzierte gemeinnützige Vorhaben.

Zug um Zug mischte sich Chodorkowski aber auch in die Innenpolitik ein – allerdings auf der Seite der Gegner des neuen Präsidenten Putin. Er finanzierte Parteien, darunter liberale Kräfte. Schließlich verdächtigte er die Kremlbürokratie öffentlich der Anfälligkeit für Korruption. Immer deutlicher stilisierte sich Chodorkowski zudem als Mann des Westens, insbesondere Amerikas. Er versuchte, US-Unternehmen an Jukos zu beteiligen.

Konflikt mit der Staatsmacht, Verurteilung zu acht Jahren Haft

Mit seinem politischen Engagement geriet Chodorkowski in Konflikt mit dem neuen Präsidenten Putin, der den Oligarchen zwar mehr oder weniger offiziell zugesichert hatte, dass ihre zurückliegenden Gesetzesüberschreitungen während der „Raubritterphase“ der Jelzin-Ära nicht verfolgt würden – aber nur, wenn sie sich nicht in die Politik einmischten.

Chodorkowski wurde im Oktober 2003 verhaftet. Der Staatsanwalt forderte in einem Verfahren wegen Steuerhinterziehung, Betrug und Bildung einer kriminellen Vereinigung Freiheitsstrafen von zehn Jahren für beide. Neun Jahre Haft in einer Strafkolonie lautete im Mai 2005 das Urteil, das in einem Revisionsverfahren auf acht Jahre herabgesetzt wurde.

Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung meint zu diesem Urteil: „So wie man Chodorkowskij und Lebedew angeklagt hatte, hätte man viele Oligarchen vor Gericht bringen können, weil das Geschäftsgebaren der Jukos-Führung, beispielsweise zur Steuerminimierung, weit verbreitet war.“…

„Der Kreml, das wurde immer deutlicher, wollte mit dem Kampf gegen Chodorkowski einen politisch besonders gefährlich erscheinenden Gegner neutralisieren, dabei ein Exempel statuieren, um die übrigen Oligarchen, die einst Jelzin unterstützt hatten, von politischer Tätigkeit abzuschrecken. Zugleich ging es darum, sich die Ressourcen für eine eigenständige Politik im Inneren und nach außen verschaffen.“

Chronologischer Lebenslauf im Detail
  • 26. Juni 1963 – Geburt in Moskau als Sohn russischer Juden
  • 1986 – Abschluss der Hochschulausbildung als Chemiker am Chemisch-Technischen Institut Moskau
  • Während des Studiums arbeitete er als Zimmermann in einem sowjetischen Baukombinat. 1986–1987 war er Stellvertretender Komsomolsekretär des Mendelejew-Instituts.
  • 1987 übernahm er die Leitung des Zentrums für wissenschaftlich-technisches Schöpfertum der Jugend – Stiftung für Jugend-Initiative (NTTM), eines praktisch privatwirtschaftlichen Komsomol-Unternehmens. Die Gründung von NTTM war 1987 durch ein Gesetz möglich geworden, das privatwirtschaftliche Tätigkeit in Form von Genossenschaften zuließ.
  • 1988 – Abschluss in Volkswirtschaft am Moskauer Plechanow-Institut
  • Chodorkowski wollte eigentlich in die Rüstungsindustrie eintreten, aber wegen seiner jüdischen Herkunft konnte er sich diesen Wunsch nicht erfüllen. Er wird stattdessen Funktionär in der kommunistischen Jugendorganisation Komsomol. Staats- und Parteichef Michail Gorbatschow erlaubte dieser Organisation als erste kapitalistische Experimente.
  • 1989–1990 übernahm er den Vorsitz der Kommerziellen Innovationsbank für wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritt, die mit dem Ziel gegründet wurde, Geldmittel für NTTM zu beschaffen. Sie war eine der ersten Privatbanken Russlands.
  • 1990 kaufte die Kommerzielle Innovationsbank dem Exekutivkomitee des Moskauer Sowjets die Firma NTTM ab und benannte sich in MENATEP-Invest um. Chodorkowski war nun Generaldirektor von MENATEP und ab 1991 Vorstandvorsitzender.
  • 1992 – Mitglied im Beraterstab des russischen Premierministers
  • März 1993 – Stellvertretender Minister für Brennstoffe und Energie
  • 1993–1994 war er auch Mitglied des Rats für Industriepolitik bei der russischen Regierung.
  • 1993 – Mitfinanzierung und Organisation des Wahlkampfes für Präsident Boris Jelzin
  • Am 30. März 1995 nahm er an der Kabinettssitzung teil, auf der erstmals das loans for shares-Programm vorgeschlagen wurde. Im Rahmen dieses Privatisierungsprogrammes wurden in der Folge einige große Erdölunternehmen privatisiert. MENATEP konnte bei den Auktionen 1995/1996 45 % der Aktien des Mineralölunternehmens Jukos in seinen Besitz bringen.
  • Im September 1995 fasste MENATEP ihre Industriebeteiligungen in der Investment-Firma ROSPROM zusammen, deren Führung Chodorkowski übernahm.
  • Im April 1996 gab er den Vorstandsvorsitz der Bank MENATEP ab und wechselte in die Führung des zweitgrößten russischen Ölkonzern Jukos.
  • Bei den Präsidentenwahlen 1996 setzte sich Chodorkowski gemeinsam mit anderen Großunternehmern massiv für die Wiederwahl Jelzins ein.
  • Im Oktober 1996 wurde er Mitglied des Konsultativrats für Bankwesen bei der russischen Regierung.
  • Als sich ROSPROM und Jukos 1997 zu einer Holding vereinigten, übernahm Chodorkowski deren Führung als Vorstandvorsitzender. Eine weitere Fusion mit dem Ölkonzern Sibneft scheiterte 1998.
  • August 1998 – Russische Finanzkrise, die MENATEP-Bank meldete Insolvenz an und Jukos-Aktien stürzten radikal ab, wodurch westliche Investoren und Kreditgeber ihr Geld verloren.
  • Im November 1998 wurde Chodorkowski zum Mitglied des Kollegiums der Energieministeriums berufen.
  • Mit dem russischen Energieministerium, das die Verteilung der Erdölexportquote neu regelte, geriet er im Oktober 1999 in Konflikt. Nachdem er in der Zeitung Wedomosti [Ведомости] erklärt hatte, dass die Bildung eines Reservefonds für die Erdölexportquote den Diebstahl fördere und es auch erlaube, Exportrechte ohne Kontrolle zu verteilen, verklagte ihn das Ministerium wegen Beleidigung.
  • 2002 – Chodorkowski, der die Krise von 1998 überstanden hatte, sorgte für größere Transparenz bei Jukos und legte die Anteilseigner offen. Er führte westliche Standards bei der Buchführung ein und erklärte „Ehrlichkeit, Offenheit und Verantwortung“ zum Leitmotiv. Durch diese Reformen reduzierte er die Produktionskosten um zwei Drittel und erreichte damit eine niedrigere Kosten-pro-Barrel-Quote als alle anderen russischen Ölfirmen. Bald darauf galt er als reichster Mann Russlands, und sein Vermögen wurde zeitweise sogar auf bis zu acht Milliarden Dollar geschätzt.
  • 2002/2003 erreichte er erneut eine Steigerung der Förderungsleistungen von Jukos und erreichte nun die Fusion mit Sibneft. Zudem führte er Verhandlungen mit den US-Ölkonzernen Exxon Mobile und Chevron Texas über eine Beteiligung an dem Jukos-Konzern.
  • Juli 2003 – Verhaftung des MENATEP-Chefs Lebedew und Durchsuchung der Büros in der Jukos-Zentrale
  • 25. Oktober 2003 – Festnahme wegen Steuerhinterziehung und Betrugs, nachdem zahlreiche Untersuchungsverfahren der Finanz- und Justizbehörden gegen den Jukos-Konzern eröffnet wurden.
  • Am 3. November 2003 gab er in Haft bekannt, dass er seine Ämter bei Jukos niederlege.
  • 16. Mai 2005 – Verurteilung in neun Anklagepunkten zu insgesamt neun Jahren Haftstrafe.
  • 14. September 2005 – Aufnahme des Revisionsverfahrens.
  • 22. September 2005 – Das Revisionsgericht bestätigte das Urteil, reduzierte aber die Strafe wegen eines fallen gelassenen Anklagepunktes auf acht Jahre Haft. Chodorkowski musste die Lagerhaft umgehend antreten, hat jedoch noch die Möglichkeit, das Urteil vor dem Obersten Gerichtshof anzufechten.
  • 20. Oktober 2005 - Es wird bekannt, dass er seine Strafe in einem sibirischen Lager in Krasnokamensk nahe der chinesischen Grenze verbüßen muss.

[Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michail_Borissowitsch_Chodorkowski. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-03]

  The neutrality of this article is disputed.
Please see discussion on the talk page.

"Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky (Михаи́л Бори́сович Ходорко́вский born June 26, 1963) is a Russian businessman. As of 2004, Khodorkovsky was the wealthiest man in Russia, and was the 16th wealthiest man in the world, although much of his wealth evaporated due to the collapse in the value of his holding in the Russian petroleum company YUKOS [ЮКОС]. Until he was jailed, he was considered one of most powerful of the Russian business oligarchs.

On October 25, 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested at gunpoint on a Siberian airport runway by the Russian prosecutor general's office on charges of tax evasion. Shortly thereafter, on October 31, the government under Vladimir Putin further took the unprecedented step of freezing shares of Yukos due to tax charges. The Russian Government took further actions against Yukos, leading to a collapse in the share price. It purported to sell a major asset of Yukos in December 2004. Khodorkovsky's supporters see Putin's actions against him as retaliation for Khodorkovsky's support of political groups that oppose the government's policies, while opponents believe that he must answer for wrongdoing related to the privatization of state assets during the 1990s.

On May 31, 2005, Khodorkovsky was sentenced to nine years in prison. A wide variety of international journalists, politicians, and businessmen--both in Russia and internationally--consider this process to be political, and dispute the judgement process itself.

Abb.: Lage des Chita Oblast
[Bildquelle. Wikipedia]

In October 2005 he was moved into prison camp number 13 in the city of Krasnokamensk, Chita Oblast [Читинская область].

Entrepreneurship in Soviet Union

Khodorkovsky grew up in a typical Soviet environment in Moscow [Москва́] in a two-room communal apartment. The young Khodorkovsky worked hard, received excellent grades and was deputy head of Komsomol [Всесоюзный Ленинский Коммунистический Союз Молодёжи (ВЛКСМ)] (the Communist Youth League) at his university, the Mendeleev Institute of Chemical Technology.

With partners from Komsomol, and technically operating under its authority, Khodorkovsky opened his first business in 1986, a private café; an enterprise made possible by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's [Михаи́л Серге́евич Горбачёв] programme of perestroika [Перестро́йка] and glasnost [гла́сность]. Successful, they also imported computers, other technology, brandy and a wide range of goods to sell at a profit.

He proved himself a capable entrepreneur by building an import-export business with a turnover of 80 million rubles a year (about $10 million USD) by 1988.

Armed with cash from his business operations, Khodorkovsky and his partners bought a banking licence to create Bank Menatep in 1989. As one of Russia's first privately owned banks, Menatep expanded quickly, by using most of the deposits raised to finance Khodorkovsky's successful import-export operations.

Bank Menatap also got government business, awarded the right to manage funds allocated for the victims of the Chernobyl [Чорно́биль] nuclear accident. By 1990, critics suggest the bank was active in facilitating the large-scale theft of Soviet Treasury funds that went on at the time prior to and following the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

In a prophetic statement of the time, Khodorkovsky is quoted as saying:

"Many years later I talked with people and asked them, why didn't you start doing the same thing? Why didn't you go into it? Because any head of an institute had more possibilities than I had, by an order of magnitude. They explained that they had all gone through the period when the same system was allowed. And then, at best, people were unable to succeed in their career and, at worst, found themselves in jail. They were all sure that would be the case this time, and that is why they did not go into it. And I"--Khodorkovsky lets out a big, broad laugh at the memory--"I did not remember this! I was too young! And I went for it." (in David Hoffman, "The Oligarchs", PublicAffairs, 2002)
A fortune built on privatization

Boris Yeltsin's [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] elevation to power in 1991 meant an acceleration of the market reforms under Gorbachev and created a dynamic business environment in Russia for entrepreneurs like Khodorkovsky. By then Bank Menatep was by Russian standards a well-developed financial institution and became the first Russian business to issue stock to the public since the Russian Revolution in 1917.

The bank grew quickly, winning more and more valuable Government clients such as the Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Service, the Moscow municipal government and the Russian arms export agency, all of whom deposited their funds with Menatep, which Khodorkovsky mostly used to expand his burgeoning trading empire.

Bank Menatep provided the foundation for Khodorkovsky's bidding for Yukos in 1995. Yukos says that approximately $1.5 billion USD has been spent purchasing the assets that now make up Yukos, with a market capitalisation of $31 billion USD.

In 1995, the Yeltsin Government decided to privatise sclerotic state industries, including the state owned oil company Yukos. They appointed Khodorkovsky's bank Menatep to conduct a public auction process.

A higher bid from a group of rivals was ruled out of the process by Menatep on a technicality. Menatep paid $350 million USD for 78% of the company, which inferred a value of $450 million. When the company was listed two years later, it was valued at $9 billion. That transaction—and dozens like it—has led many Russians to believe, that the oligarchs like Khodorkovsky have stolen their fortunes from the state.

Foreign business partners complain

Abb.: ®Logo

Amoco—later taken over by British Petroleum—was an early partner with Yukos in a highly prospective Siberian oil field Priobskoye. Amoco spent $300 million developing the oil field before being completely squeezed out by Khodorkovsky, using methods that would be unlawful in most of the developed world. In 2003 Priobskoye oil production reached 129 million barrels.

Abb.: ®Logo

When the Russian ruble collapsed in 1998, Bank Menatep collapsed with it as many of it had borrowed money in foreign currencies. It lost its banking licence. Three banks, the Standard Bank of South Africa, Japanese Daiwa Bank and German West LB Bank, had lent $266 million to Menatep secured by Yukos shares. Khodorkovsky offered oil instead. They refused and took possession of the shares. They dumped the shares very quickly, collecting less than half of their loan, prompted in a panic sale by Khodorkovsky's public threats of massively diluting their stake with new shares. While lawful in Russia at the time, it would not have been so in most of the developed world. Yukos also sold shares in its main production subsidiaries to offshore shelf companies believed to be linked to Khodorkovsky. Daiwa and West LB, suspecting they would end up with nothing if they persisted, sold out to Standard Bank in mid-1999, which in turn exited Yukos at the end of 2000.

The two deals gave Khodorkovsky, Menatep and Yukos terrible notoriety in Western financial circles. Only in 2003 did it feel sufficiently confident to return to Western banks with loan proposals.

A new era of transparency

Khodorkovsky is considered one of the first of the oligarchs to realise that foreign investment was needed in order to build a global business. In order to attract foreign investment, investors would be motivated by both greed and fear. Khodorkovsky's tough treatment of some of the West's largest and most powerful businesses created a large amount of fear in most investors. His fellow oligarchs had acted similarly, if not more outrageously at times. Coupled with the collapse in the ruble in 1998, very few investors, oil companies or banks were interested in doing business with Russia.

Khodorkovsky introduced unprecedented transparency at Yukos. Having once denied owning any shares in Menatep and Yukos, he confessed his controlling stake. Yukos revealed the identity of its shareholders for the first time, published accounts following GAAP standards, and started paying taxes and issuing large dividends. Khodorkovsky hired many executives from large Western oil companies, placing them in senior roles and appointed respected non-executive directors to the board of directors of Yukos.

Bank Menatep—by this stage rebuilt around its St Petersburg subsidiary which remained solvent—even started lending money to non-Khodorkovsky businesses. The Bank now claims only 15% of its loans are advanced to Khodorkovsky group businesses.

As his foreign executives and consultants had predicted the effect of the new corporate governance principles was a soaring share price as foreign investors forgave past atrocities and bought into Yukos, which continues to be heavily discounted for sovereign risk.

When rival Alfa Bank was successful in attracting BP to invest billions in its oil subsidiary in 2003 many regarded this as a turning point in Western confidence in investing in Russia. President Putin [Влади́мир Влади́мирович Пу́тин] and Prime Minister Blair both attended the signing ceremony, signalling the growing respectability of business in Russia.

Political ambitions

Khodorkovsky also became a philanthropist, whose efforts include the provision of internet-training centres for teachers, a forum for the discussion by journalists of reform and democracy, and the establishment of foundations which finance archaeological digs, cultural exchanges and summer camps for children. Khodorkovsky's critics saw this as political posturing, in light of his funding of several political parties ahead of the elections for the State Duma [Государственная дума] to be held in late 2003.

He is openly critical of what he refers to as 'managed democracy' within Russia. Careful normally not to criticise the elected leadership, he says the military and security services exercise too much authority. He told The Times:

"It is the Singapore model, it is a term that people understand in Russia these days. It means that theoretically you have a free press, but in practice there is self-censorship. Theoretically you have courts; in practice the courts adopt decisions dictated from above. Theoretically there are civil rights enshrined in the constitution; in practice you are not able to exercise some of these rights."
The merger

In April 2003, Khodorkovsky announced that Yukos would merge with Sibneft, creating an oil company with reserves equal to those of Western petroleum multinationals. Khodorkovsky has been reported to be negotiating with ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco about them taking a large stake in Yukos. Sibneft was created in 1995, at the suggestion of Boris Berezovsky [Бори́с Абра́мович Березо́вский], comprising some of the most valuable assets of a state-owned oil company. In a controversial auction process, Berezovsky acquired 50% of the company at what most agree was a very low price.

When Berezovsky had a confrontation with Putin, and felt compelled to leave Russia for London (where he was granted asylum) he assigned his shares in Sibneft to Roman Abramovich [Рома́н Арка́дьевич Абрамо́вич]. Abramovich subsequently agreed to the merger.

With 19.5 billion barrels (3 km³) of oil and gas, the merged entity owns the second-largest oil and gas reserves in the world after ExxonMobil. YukosSibneft will be the fourth largest in the world in terms of production, pumping 2.3 million barrels (370,000 m³) of crude a day.

Khodorkovsky's prosecution

There is a widespread opinion that singling out Khodorkovsky for prosecution is related to his political ambitions.

The arrest in early July 2003 of Platon Lebedev, a Khodorkovsky partner and second largest shareholder in Yukos, on suspicion of illegally acquiring a stake in a state-owned fertiliser firm, Apatit, in 1994, was considered by observers a shot across the bows. The arrest was followed by investigations into taxation returns filed by Yukos, and a delay to the antitrust commission's approval for its merger with Sibneft.

The warning was not heeded, as Khodorkovsky continued his involvement in the political process in the lead-up to the presidential elections scheduled for 2004. Khodorkovsky has spoken out in favour of closer ties with the United States, was in favour of the U.S. toppling of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein [صدام حسين عبد المجيد التكريتي] and — paradoxically for an oil man — advocated lower but stable oil prices as being good for Yukos and the world economy. He cultivated close ties with government and business figures in the U.S.

Finally, Khodorkovsky was himself arrested in October, 2003, charged with fraud and tax evasion. The Russian Prosecutor General's Office claims Khodorkovsky and his associates cost the state more than $1 billion in lost revenues. Khodorkovsky's supporters say the arrest is politically-motivated and will have a devastating effect on Russia's nascent financial markets.

The spectacular and heavy-handed method of Khodorkovsky's arrest attracted as much attention as the fact he was charged with serious crimes. Many saw it as a sign that President Putin was favouring a very tough approach with prominent business leaders, regardless of how it was perceived by foreign investors. The received wisdom of Russian political circles is that tough, decisive leadership wins votes, particular if exercised against unpopular figures like the oligarchs.

Around 5 A.M. on October 23, 2003, Khodorkovsky's private jet landed at Novosibirsk Tolmachevo Airport [Новосиби́рск Аэропорт Толмачево] in transit to a Yukos refinery production centre in Angarsk [Ангарск], East Siberia. He had been making a series of visits to Yukos and Sibneft properties, which are in some of Russia's most remote territories. Forewarned to his arrival, FSB [ФСБ] (the domestic successor of the KGB [КГБ]) agents lay in wait. The plane needed refuelling and had some minor technical problems.

Then two vans with heavily tinted windows drove across the airport. Fifteen masked operatives wearing FSB issued black combat fatigues leapt out of the vans and stormed the plane. Several dozen more agents armed with assault rifles and pistols surrounded the jet.

Khodorkovsky was in the passenger compartment with several staff members and security guards, who were unarmed, as they were required to hand their weapons to the pilots while on board. He was arrested and immediately flown to Moscow and presented before the Basmanny Court, which ordered his detention pending further investigation and trial.

The impact of Khodorkovsky's arrest

Initially news of Khodorkovsky's arrest had a significant effect on the share price of Yukos. The Moscow stock market was closed for the first time ever for an hour in order to assure stable trading as prices collapsed. Russia's currency, the ruble [рубль], was also hit as some foreign investors questioned the stability of the Russian market. Media reaction in Moscow was almost universally negative in blanket coverage, some of the more enthusiastic pro-business press discussed the end of capitalism, while even the Government owned press criticised the "absurd" method of Khodorkovsky's arrest.

Yukos moved quickly to replace Khodorkovsky, replacing him as CEO of Yukos with Russian born U.S. citizen Simon Kukes, an experienced oil executive.

The U.S. State Department said the arrest "raised a number of concerns over the arbitrary use of the judicial system" and was likely to be very damaging to foreign investment in Russia, as it appeared there were "selective" prosecutions occurring against Yukos officials but not against others.

A week after the arrest, the Prosecutor-General froze Khodorkovsky's shares in Yukos to prevent Khodorkovsky from selling his shares although he retains all his rights to vote the shares and to receive dividends.

The move alarmed foreign investors and policymakers alike, though Russian citizens--who largely viewed all of Russia's oligarchs as having enriched themselves on the backs of a far less fortunate Russian people--were largely supportive of the arrest.

Supporters viewpoint

Khodorkovsky's supporters point to the Russian Prosecutor-General's summoning of the Khodorkovsky's lawyer on the lawyer's activities as evidence that Russian authorities are over-zealous, if not corrupt. President Putin denied that he had played an active role in the prosecution, saying that the prosecutors' move showed that no one was above the law. Some also question the impartiality of the Basmanny Court and one of its judges who approved Khodorkovsky's arrest, Andrei Rasnovsky who is a former employee of the Prosecutor-General's office. The Basmanny Court is in the same district as the investigative division of the Prosecutor-General's office, which is the official reason why it is generally the forum for hearing its cases. Some say it is because many of the judges in that court are former employees of the Prosecutor's office and remain loyal to it. One of Yukos' lawyers say there is not even an attempt to conceal their bias, with judges seen in private discussions with prosecutors prior to hearings.

President Putin's chief of staff Alexander Voloshin [Александр Стальевич Волошин], regarded as close to former President Yeltsin and to some of the oligarchs, disagreed that Putin had no role in the prosecution and tendered his resignation in protest at Khodorkovsky's arrest. The resignation of the pro-business Chief of Staff was said to augur a new era of the domination of military and security services figures within the Kremlin say some.

Khodorkovsky is not taking the arrest or the prosecution lying down, threatening to bring defamation lawsuits against the Prosecutor-General and his officials, which is not likely to be heard in the Basmanny Court. Those proceedings will display the resources Khodorkovsky is able to bring to bear to challenge the activities of the prosecution team. The Prosecutor-General is an influential factor throughout the Russian legal system but does not enjoy the same dominance in other courts as he does in the Basmanny Court.

Critics viewpoint

There is an obvious contradiction about Khodorkovsky protesting alleged process law violation by the prosecutors, and his own treatment of law during privatisation. In a broader sense, there is a dilemma facing Russian businesspeople who have made their fortunes during the 90s. On one hand today they support rule of law and protection of private property rights. On the other hand many of them are against enforcing this same law when applied to suspected cases of corruption and fraud in a very recent past.

As long as this contradiction remains, Russian business elite is vulnerable not only to government pressure, but to legal attacks from newcomers to the market. Khodorkovsky's case has little to do with his political views and a lot with some people's desire to re-distribute Russian property again, this time acting strictly within the law and using official law enforcement agencies as a tool.

The fact that the overwhelming majority of Russians are favorably disposed to the Government's belated enforcement of law in the case of Khodorkovsky is downplayed or ignored in the Western press. This phenomena is not unexpected, as it is an easy ploy to dismiss ordinary Russians as somehow uninformed, or ignorant, or biased.

Formal charges

Prosecutors say they operate independently of the elected government. The Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov was appointed by former President Yeltsin and is not seen as being particularly close to Putin who once tried to remove him. However, he is politically ambitious and prosecuting Russia's most prominent and successful oligarch is perceived as a boost to his political career and intended candidacy for the Duma.

The formal charges against Khodorkovsky read as follows:

"In 1994, while chairman of the board of the Menatep commercial bank in Moscow, M. B. Khodorkovsky created an organized group of individuals with the intention of taking control of the shares in Russian companies during the privatisation process through deceit and in the process of committing this crime managed the activities of this company."

He is charged with acting illegally in the privatisation process of the former state-owned mining and fertiliser company Apatit. It is alleged that the CEO of Bank Menatep and large shareholder in Yukos Platon Lebedev assisted Khodorkovsky. Lebedev was arrested and charged in July 2003.

According to the prosecution, all four companies that participated in the privatization tender for 20% of Apatit's stock in 1994 were shell companies controlled by Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, registered to create an illusion of competitive bidding that was required by the law. One of the shell companies that won that tender (AOZT Volna) was supposed to invest about US$280 million in Apatit during the next year, according to their winning bid. The investment wasn't made and Apatit sued to return their 20% of stock. At this point, Khodorkovsky et al. have transferred the required sum into Apatit's account at Khodorkovsky's bank Menatep and sent the financial documents to the court, so Apatit's lawsuit was thrown out. The very next day the money was transferred back from Apatit's account to Volna's account. After that the stock was sold off by Volna in small installments to several smaller shell companies, which were, in turn, owned by more Khodorkovsky-owned companies in a complicated web of relationships. Literally dozens of companies were registered for these purposes in Cyprus, Isle of Man, British Virgin Islands, Turks & Caicos and other offshore havens. Volna has actually settled the Apatit lawsuit in 2002 by paying $15 million to the privatization authorities, even though it didn't own Apatit stock anymore at the time. However, according to the prosecution, that $15 million sum was based on the incorrect valuation which was too low. Allegedly, at the time Apatit was selling off the fertilizers it was producing to multiple Khodorkovsky-owned shell companies below market value, and, therefore, Apatit formally didn't have much profit, lowering its valuation. Those shell companies then resold the fertilizer at the market value, generating pure profit for Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and others.

In addition, prosecutors are believed to be conducting extensive investigations into Yukos for offences that go beyond the financial and tax-related charges currently filed. They say there are three cases of murder and one of attempted murder that they believe are linked to Yukos, if not Khodorkovsky.

One area of interest to the Prosecutor-General includes the 1998 assassination of the mayor of Nefteyugansk in the Tyumen region [Тюме́нская о́бласть], Vladimir Petukhov. Nefteyugansk was the main centre of oil production within the Yukos empire. Suspicions arose in Nefteyugansk because Petukhov had publicly and frequently campaigned about Yukos' non-payment of local taxes.

President Putin himself commented on this aspect of the investigation while questioned about the investigation into Yukos in September 2003. President Putin said:

The case is about Yukos and the possible links of individuals to murders in the course of the merging and expansion of this company...the privatizations are the least of the reasons for it...in such a case, how can I interfere with prosecutors' work?
Jail time

On May 30, 2005 Mikhail Khodorkovsky was sentenced to 9 years of jail sentence in colony of general regime. He is kept in Moscow prison Matrosskaya Tishina.

Since 19 August 2005 Khodorkovsky is on a dry hunger strike (refuses food and drink) trying to protect his friend and associate Platon Lebedev from the punishment cell of the jail. According to Khodorkovsky, Lebedev has Diabetes mellitus and heart conditions and keeping him in the punishment cell is equivalent to murder.

On August 31 2005 , he announced to stand for parliament. The movement was based on the legal loophole: a convicted felon cannot vote or stand for a parliament, but if his case is lodged with the Court of Appeal he still has all the electroral rights. Usually it requires around a year to get somebody's appeal through the Appeal Court, so it should have been enough time for Khodorkovsky to be elected. To imprison a member of Russian parliament, the parliament should vote for stripping his or her immunity, that might be difficult in the case of Khodorkovsky. Thus, he had a hope to escape from his prosecution. But the plans were flawed, the Court of Appeal took only a couple of weeks to process Khodorkovsky's appeal, reduce his sentence by one year and invalidated any Khodorkovsky's electoral plans until the end of his sentence.

As reported on October 20, 2005 Khodorkovsky was delivered to the labor camp YaG-14/10 (Исправительное учреждение общего режима ЯГ-14/10) of Krasnokamensk town near Chita [Чита]. The labor camp is attached to Uranium mining and processing plant and during Soviet times had a reputation of a place from where nobody returned alive. According to the news-reports, currently the prisoners are not used on the Uranium mining and have much better chances of survival than in the past.

It is predicted that he might be out by the end of 2009.

An attempt at martyr creation

Khodorkovsky supporters are attempting to turn his conviction and imprisonment into status as a martyr. Irina Khakamada [Ирина Муцуовна Хакамада], a former leader of the Union of Right Forces party [Союз Правых Сил, СПС], claimed that Khodorkovsky's imprisonment was making the once hated oil billionaire into a political hero. She asserted:

"The longer he sits in jail, the more of a political figure he will become. Russians love martyrs. They will forget that he is an oligarch. "

Others pointed to his unpopularity and his Jewish background as insurmountable obstacles to his election in a country with a centuries-old tradition of anti-Semitism, and a long history of belief that honest work cannot make you rich."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Khodorkovsky. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-03]

14. Олег Владимирович Дерипаска — Oleg V. Deripaska (1968 - )

Abb.: Oleg Deripaska — Олег Дерипаска
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/1928.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

"Oleg V. Deripaska [Олег Владимирович Дерипаска] was born in the city of Dzerzhinsk [Дзержинск] in Nizhny Novgorod Region [Нижегородская область] on January 2, 1968.

Mr. Deripaska has two university degrees: he was an honor student at the Physics Department of the Moscow State University [Московский государственный университет им. М. В. Ломоносова], and the Plekhanov Economics Academy.

In 1994 the 24-year old university graduate became the head of one of Russia's largest aluminium plants in the eastern Siberian city of Sayanogorsk [Саяногорск] (Republic of Khakasia [Республика Хакасия]). Under the leadership of the youngest general director in Russia, the nation's third largest electrolysis factory came to be ranked as the best in the industry in terms of profit margins, technological development, product quality and environmental safety record.

Three years later, Oleg Deripaska became the driving force behind the first vertically integrated industrial concern in post-Soviet Russia, the Sibirsky Aluminium [Сибирский алюминий], the nucleus of which was the Sayan Aluminium Works. This holding structure subsequently came to include a number of Russia's leading aluminium plants, which continue to turn out a broad array of aluminium products and alloys ranging from rolled goods and semi-finished products to complex architectural constructions, parts and components for aeronautics, space, auto making and the ship-building industries. Other manufactured products include general-purpose containers, aluminium foil packaging, large-size railroad containers and custom-order freight platforms. Sibirsky Aluminium was ranked among the world's top 10 aluminium producers only three years after Mr. Deripaska took over the company's leadership. Oleg Deripaska is currently Chairman of the Board of Directors of Russian Aluminium [Русский алюминий], set up in the autumn of 2000. This aluminium company is rated number two in the wo rld in terms of output and equity. The company is 70% owned by Russian capital and produces over 10% of the world's total volume of aluminium products.

Mr. Deripaska is the Vice President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Chairman of the Executive Board of Russian National Committee of International Chamber of Commerce, the World Business Organization, and sits on the Trusteeship Council of the National Military Foundation, the member of the Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Council, chaired by the Prime minister of Russia, one of the founders of the charitable National Science Support Foundation.

Oleg Deripaska was the recipient of a special Friendship Award under a decree issued by Boris Yeltsin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] in 1999. He was named businessman of the year for his contribution to management in 1999 by Vedomosti [Ведомости], an authoritative Russian newspaper published in partnership with The Wall Street Journal and The Financial Times. In addition, he was named "Best Manager 2000" among Russia's metallurgical sector by Kompania [Компания], a weekly periodical."

[Quelle: http://www.sibal.ru/kbe/kbe.nsf/epages/epsd.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

"Oleg Deripaska [Олег Владимирович Дерипаска], born in 1968, is Russia's youngest billionaire at age 35. Deripaska accumulated a business empire through a series of ruthless and elaborate, though technically legal, takeover raids. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, he was a 23-year-old student at Moscow State University [Московский государственный университет им. М. В. Ломоносова]. He soon got a job in the fledgling metals trading market. By 1994, he was chief financial officer of Aluminprodukt. Through the company, he bought a stake in a Siberian smelter plant, beginning his ascent to the top of one of Russia's roughest industries. Deripaska became the plant's manager to protect it from a takeover by its former owner, who once threatened him with a grenade launcher. Later, Deripaska waged his own revolt to take over the shares of the London-based Transworld Group, then owned by controversial multimillionaire Mikhail Chernoi. Fellow oligarch Roman Abramovich [Роман Аркадьевич Абрамович] became Deripaska's partner; in early 2000, the two created a joint venture called Russian Aluminum (RusAl [РУСАЛ]). Today, RusAl has $4 billion in annual sales and is the world's second-largest aluminum producer. Deripaska owns 75 percent of the company. His other businesses include power stations, Russia's largest car and commercial vehicle manufacturer, and the country's largest insurance company.

Estimated Worth: $1.5 billion
Current Position: Chairman of the board of directors, Basic Element Company [Компания "Базовый Элемент]
Major Holdings: Russian Aluminum [РУСАЛ]
Other Interests: Ingosstrakh Insurance [Ингосстрах]; aircraft builder Aviacor [АВИАКОР]; the GAZ [ГАЗ] automobile company; several bus builders and paper and pulp interests.

Political Connections: Deripaska is married to Polina Yumashev, the daughter of former President Boris Yeltsin's chief of staff. Deripaska's father-in-law in turn married Yeltsin's daughter, which makes Deripaska a grandson of Yeltsin by marriage. In the current political climate of struggles between the Kremlin and oligarchs, Russian news media speculated in July 2003 that Deripaska would be "next in line" for investigations of his business practice by the Kremlin. One of Deripaska's deputies at Russian Aluminum, the executive in charge of contacts with state agencies, is running in the December 2003 election for the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian parliament) on the ticket of the center-right, ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

New Plays: In October 2003, Deripaska bought an additional 25 percent stake of Russian Aluminum for an estimated $2 billion from fellow oligarch Roman Abramovich.

Lifestyle: For more than a year, Deripaska has flown by private jet to London every week to improve his English. Yet, unlike his fellow oligarchs, Deripaska says he has no interest in leaving Russia. In addition to his home in Moscow, Deripaska owns a country house in the wild southern region of Khakassia.

Notoriety: In late 2000, a competitor filed a civil suit for racketeering against Deripaska and his company in a New York court, including charges of bribery, judicial corruption and armed force. The judge dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. Deripaska was barred from travel to the United States and from entrance to the Davos economic summit in Switzerland. Deripaska has also become an outspoken opponent of Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, clashing on the issue with U.S. ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow."

[Quelle: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/moscow/deripaska.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

"Beteiligungen von Deripaska 2001 (Angaben der Weltbank):

[Hier stellvertretend für die Verflechtungen der anderen Oligarchen dargestellt. Für die anderen siehe: The list of 22 largest private owners. -- http://ns.worldbank.org.ru/cem/eng/listlarge.asp. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

Type: Group of owners
Total sales of all controlled enterprises in 2001: 62 610 695 thousand rub.
Total employment of all controlled enterprises in 2001: 165 625
Basic Element (100%)
Abakanvagonmash (100%)
Agenstvo "Rasprostanenie, obrabotka, sbor pechati" (51%)
Express (51%)
Aviakor-Aviacionniy zavod (100%)
Chelyabinskugol (25%)
Kontinental Management FC (70%)
Baikalsky CPP (100%)
Belomorsky FIC (100%)
Dvinskiye Lesopromyshlenniki (100%)
Krasnoyarsky CPP (100%)
Lesozavod-2 (100%)
Omsk board faсtory (100%)
Selenginsky CBP (100%)
Sibirsky CPP (100%)
Solombalsky CPP (25%)
Troickaya bumazhnaya fabrica (100%)
Yartsevsky FIC (100%)
Krasnayarsky GES (25%)
Luzskiy lesopromishleniy kombinat (50%)
Maintenance for transport and road organisations enterprize (100%)
RusAl, JSC (50%)
Achinsk alumina refinery (100%)
Belaya Kalitva metallurgical plant (100%)
Bratsk aluminium smelter (100%)
Dmitrovskiy opitniy zavod aluminevoi konservnoi lenti (50%)
Irkutskenergo (40%)
Krasnoyarsk aluminium smelter (100%)
Krasnoyarsk metallurgical plant (50%)
Novokuznetsk aluminium smelter (100%)
Saibirskiy aluminiy (50%)
Samara metallurgical plant (100%)
Sayansk aluminium smelter (100%)
Ruspromauto (70%)
Iveko-Uralaz (50%)
Rusavtobusprom (100%)
Golitsinsky autobus factory (100%)
Kanashsky car equipment plant (90%)
Kurgansky autobus factory (80%)
Likinsky autobus (100%)
Pavlovsky autobus (100%)
Ruspromauto-Motors (100%)
Autodisel (80%)
Tutaevsky motor factory (100%)
Yaroslavl disel equipment factory (100%)
Yaroslavl fuel equipment factory (100%)
Ruspromauto-Nizhegorod cars (100%)
Arzamassky mashine-building factory (100%)
GAZ (100%)
Torgoviy dom "Nizhegorodskie Avtomobili" (50%)
Saransk dump-body truck factory (75%)
Volzhskie motory (80%)
Zavolzhsky caterpillar tractor plant (100%)
Ruspromauto-road buildings mashines (100%)
Bryansky arsenal (80%)
Bryansky Arsenal, trading house (50%)
Chelyabinsk road-buildings mashines (100%)
TvEx (80%)
Ural car factory (100%)
Uralskiy avtomobilniy zavod (25%)
Ingosstrah-sojuz (75%)

[Quelle: http://ns.worldbank.org.ru/cem/eng/tree.asp?id=105. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

15. Михаил Маратович Фридман —  Michail Fridman (Mikhail Fridman) (1964 - )

Abb.: Mikhail Fridman —Михаи́л Мара́тович Фри́дман
(Pressefoto Alfagroup)

Mikhail Fridman [Михаил Маратович Фридман](born 26 June 1963) is a Russian businessman. He is one of the youngest of Russian oligarchs (Roman Abramovich [ома́н Арка́дьевич Абрамо́вич] is younger).

Along with Peter Aven, Fridman founded the Alfa Group Consortium [Консорциум Альфа-Групп], a holding company which today controls Alfa Bank (opened in 1991), Alfa Capital [Альфа-Банк], Tyumen Oil and several construction material firms (cement, timber, glass) as well as food processing businesses and a supermarket chain. The two are also major holders of tea and sugar plant processors.

Fridman in 2003 sold half of his Alfa group's oil subsidiary Tyumen Oil to BP for $6.15 billion, so far the biggest foreign investment ever in a Russian company.

In July 2005 he was involved in a privatization scandal. Two luxury houses formerly owned by the government were sold in 2003 for a price significantly below market value to two companies, one of which is owned by Fridman and another by the former Russian prime-minister, Mikhail Kasyanov [Михаи́л Миха́йлович Касья́нов] and Kasyanov's wife Irina. Fridman has said that he wasn't surprised at the low price of the house he bought because another company held a 49-year lease for that house at the time (however, that lease was bought out very cheaply a week after the auction for the houses), and that he's not aware of the details of the sale as it was handled by his corporation's legal department. According to later allegations made by the State Duma member and journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein [Александр Хинштеин], Kasyanov bought the company that owns one of the houses using a loan given to him by Fridman, and one of Fridman's companies won the government-conducted tender to manage the Sheremetyevo [Шереметьево] International Airport a week after the houses auction, allegedly with some Kasyanov's involvement."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Fridman. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

"Mikhail Fridman

Chairman of the Board of Directors of Alfa-Bank

Mikhail Fridman is Chairman of the Board of Directors and principal founder of the Alfa Group Consortium [Альфа-Групп], one of the leading business enterprises in Russia. He has built the Alfa Group into a market leader in Banking, Energy, Telecommunications and Retail sales. Fridman chairs the Board of Directors of two of the groups leading companies — Alfa-Bank, which is Russia’s largest privately owned bank, and TNK-BP [ТНК-BP], formed by the historic joint venture between British Petroleum and Tyumen Oil Company, completed in 2003.

Mikhail Fridman is one of Russia’s most influential and successful business leaders. His strategies of acquisition, growth and integration have made the Alfa Group among the most attractive partners for international investment in Russia. The historic joint venture with British Petroleum, announced in the summer of 2003 was, at that time, the largest foreign investment deal in Russian history, valued at over US$7 billion. The agreement was made possible by historic cooperation between Russian President Putin and British Prime Minister Blair in addition to the work of the two companies.

Along with its previous position in Vimpelcom, Russia’s number two mobile telephone operator, Alfa has recently acquired a blocking stake in Megafon [Мегафон], making the consortium co-owners of the two of three major market leaders in the Russia’s rapidly growing mobile communications market.

Mikhail Fridman started out in business while still a student at the Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys. He graduated in 1986 and two years later founded Alfa Eco [Альфа-Эко], a trading company out of which Alfa Group Consortium developed. During the tumultuous period of the 1990’s Fridman was close adviser to President Boris Yeltsin and helped lay the foundation for the modern Russian economy that has emerged in the new millennium. Fridman was born in Lvov [Львів], Ukraine on 21 April 1964.

Fridman is a Member of the International Advisory Board of the Council on Foreign Relations, and his achievements have been recognised by prestigious international publications and organisations in the world of finance and business. He was named to the list of “Europe’s Power 25” by FORTUNE in 2004, as well as the Financial Times list of the “2004 Leaders of the New Europe.” In 2003 Mikhail Fridman was honored with the Golden Plate Award of the International Academy of Achievement in Washington, presented personally by former US President Bill Clinton."

[Quelle: http://www.alfabank.com/board/fridman/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

16. Владимир Гусинский — Wladimir Gussinski (Vladimir Gusinsky) (1952 - )

Abb.: Wladimir Gussinski — Владимир Гусинский
[Bildquelle: http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/05/19/gusinsky.shtml.  -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

Vladimir Gusinksy [Владимир Гусинский], 51, emerged from the underground economy of the era of the Soviet Union, like many of Russia's oligarchs. But among this group, Gusinsky was unique: Much of his wealth was created from scratch instead of from taking over former state properties. Born in 1952, he was the only child of a family who experienced the pain of Soviet repression firsthand. Gusinksy's maternal grandfather was shot during Stalin's purges, and his grandmother spent 10 years in a Soviet-style labor camp. He lived with his parents in a one-room flat in Moscow, but Gusinksy "grew up on the street," as he later put it. He attended the Gubkin Institute of Petrochemicals and Natural Gas but failed his classes, so he joined the army. Later, Gusinsky attended Gitis [ГИТИС], a school for theatrical directors, and became a theatrical producer in the provinces. He also drove a cab and traded on Moscow's black-market street scene.

In 1987, with just $1,000, he opened a women's clothing cooperative, one of Russia's first state-approved cooperatives. Two years later, he opened MOST, a consulting co-op for foreign investors in Russia, which gradually branched out into media, ultimately becoming Media-MOST. In 1993, Gusinsky launched his first independent newspaper, Sevodnya, which put him on his way to becoming "Russia's Rupert Murdoch." Using connections from his earlier days, Gusinsky called upon Deputy Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov for help in gaining control of the television station Channel 4. With Russia's war in Chechnya just beginning, Gusinsky's station was critical of President Boris Yeltsin and his policies. In 1996, however, when a Communist Party presidential candidate presented a real threat to Yeltsin's reelection, the rising media magnate suspended all criticism. After Yeltsin won the reelection, Gusinsky was awarded the country's first private television network, NTV, and his media conglomerate, Media-MOST, expanded to include a satellite communications network, a series of radio stations and magazines, such as Itogi, jointly published with Newsweek. By 1999, Gusinsky reverted to his critical attitude toward the Yeltsin government and carried on his network a series of reports about the Yeltsin family and friends running the Kremlin. Yeltsin did nothing to force Gusinsky off air, but President Vladimir Putin was another story. Putin waged a string of attacks against Gusinsky, who now lives in exile.

Estimated Worth: Unknown

Major Holdings:  While Gusinsky was in exile, the state gas monopoly Gazprom seized control of Gusinsky's NTV, valued at $1 billion. A Russian court also ordered the liquidation of Media-MOST and gave the gas giant 25 percent plus one share of all companies once owned by Media-MOST. Gazprom also took control of and closed Gusinsky's first newspaper Sevodnya and fired and locked out the staff of news magazine Igoti.

Political Connections: Gusinsky was connected to Moscow's former deputy mayor, Yuri Luzhkov [Юрий Михайлович Лужков], who helped Gusinsky grow his MOST Bank and gain control of key media enterprises. Gusinsky knew Luzhkov when the former deputy mayor was in charge of handling Moscow's cooperative licenses. The two became friends and even toured the United States together, courting corporate giants who wanted to enter the emerging Russian market.

Despite Gusinsky's critically daring media coverage of the Kremlin, for a time he was considered part of Yeltsin's [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] inner circle. He was a member of the Big Seven, a group of oligarchs who backed Yeltsin's reelection campaign, and he even lent Yeltsin his chief aide to handle the president's media efforts.

New Plays: Since leaving Russia, Gusinsky has been active in religious and humanitarian causes within and outside Russia, including the Russian Jewish Congress [Российский еврейский конгресс] and the World Jewish Congress.




Lifestyle: Previous to his exile, Gusinsky lived in Moscow and owned a villa in the southern Spanish province of Cadiz. Today, he lives in Tel Aviv [תל אביב-יפו], Israel, and in Greenwich, Connecticut.

Notoriety: On his NTV network, Gusinsky broadcast a satiric puppet show, Kukly, that ridiculed the Russian political and business establishment. Putin tried to terminate the program, but Gusinsky persisted. When NTV was critical first of Putin's slow reaction to the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk, then of the government's inability to provide heat and electricity for freezing residents in Russia's Far East, Putin stepped up his anti-Gusinsky campaign. Media-MOST's headquarters and offices were raided more than 30 times by everyone from masked tax police to deputies of the prosecutor general. In June 2000, Gusinsky was arrested on charges of embezzlement and spent three days in a Moscow jail. In 2001, before a Spanish high court threw out the case, he was confined to house arrest in his Spanish villa for several months, on fraud charges brought by the Russia government. This year, Gusinsky has been arrested again, this time in Athens on an international warrant for similar charges. Gusinsky was released, and a Greek court rejected Russia's request for extradition."

[Quelle: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/moscow/gusinsky.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14]

17. Борис Иванишвили — Boris Iwanischwili (Boris Ivanishvili)

Abb.: Борис Иванишвили — Boris Iwanischwili
[Bildquelle: http://www.compromat.ru/main/ivanishvili/nedumal.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

"07 November, 2005

The quiet oligarch

It was a dramatic end to a meteoric rise. Mr Ivanishvili [Борис Иванишвили] is one of Russia’s lowest-profile oligarchs who grew rich during the era of president Boris Yeltsin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин]. He is RKB’s [Российский кредит, Rossisky Kredit Bank] majority shareholder along with his partner Vitaly Malkin [Виталы Малкин], who holds a minority share in the bank but was its public face.

The two men were academics and met in the 1980s at the state railway institute, where Mr Ivanishvili was studying for a post-graduate degree in physics and Mr Malkin was a PhD candidate in Latin. As perestroika [Перестро́йка] rolled back the state controls, they made their first fortune importing cheap computers and video recorders from China. With hard currency in their pockets, their next venture was to found five banks in the early 1990s selling dollars in the midst of hyperinflation.

“You could make extraordinary profits from the wholesale of hard currency in those days. If you could get hold of banknotes and deliver them to cash offices then you could earn 20% a day. The people were not hungry, but they were trying to protect their life savings by buying dollars and holding on to them,” says Mr Eropkin.

By the middle of the 1990s, Mr Ivanishvili was a multimillionaire and began snapping up privatisation vouchers as Russia’s industrial jewels were put under the gavel by a cash-strapped state. He shied away from the politically-charged scrum over the oil and metal companies, preferring to buy up the biggest iron ore mines, known as GOKs [ГОК] in Russian, which have only recently come into their own.

RKB was on the verge of moving into the big league in the months before the crisis. Mr Malkin was invited to Mr Yeltsin’s [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] so-called oligarch meetings in the months leading up to devaluation, as the sick president called on Russia’s captains of industry to bail out the state. But it was too little, too late. After the collapse of the currency, both Mr Ivanishvili and Mr Malkin dropped off the radar until last year.

Sticking it back together

In the winter of 1998, the government began to pick up the pieces. A law on restructuring banks was passed and state agency ARCO [Agency for Restructuring Credit Institutions, Агентства по реструктуризации кредитных организаций (АРКО)] was set up to organise it. Most of the big banks went belly up but RKB was one of the few that was placed in ARCO’s care. Mr Ivanishvili offered to put his industrial holding into the pot and hired KPMG to thrash out a realistic restructuring plan.

RKB had $2bn of liabilities on its balance sheet when it closed its doors, but no cash. The international creditors accepted a $1bn restructuring deal but insisted on a 10% down payment.

“Ivanishvili was forced to sell his biggest and best iron ore mine, Lebedansky GOK, which fetched a mere $50m. Compare this with the sale of Mikhailovsky GOK last year [the second biggest iron ore mine and also part of the group], which was the deal of the year and raised over $1bn,” says Mr Eropkin, who negotiated the agreement with the creditors.

As Russia’s economy began to grow strongly in 2000, the task became easier. Depositors were paid off two years ago and the bank has been meeting scheduled payments on the rest.

Back in black

Mr Ivanishvili is bucking the trend: while the other oligarchs are consolidating their industrial holdings and expanding overseas, he has changed tack and is in the process of dumping his industrial holdings in favour of finance. He has invested about $3bn from recent assets sales into the Russian blue-chip utilities company United Energy Systems, oil major Lukoil [ЛУКОЙЛ]and gas monopoly Gazprom [Газпром] through his financial holding company Unicor [УНИКОР] (formerly Metaloinvest).

Last year, he hired London-based Daiwa Securities to look at the Russian banking sector and decide if there was a future for a medium-sized Russian bank in the market. They decided there was. Mr Ivanishvili has begun to build up RKB [Российский кредит, Rossisky Kredit Bank]  and at the start of this year he pumped another $25m into the capital of Impexbank [Импэксбанк], which targets retail and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

Abb.: Kreditkarten der Impexbank
[Bildquelle: http://www.impexbank.ru/rus/services/private/bank_cards/index.wbp. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

Impexbank survived the 1998 crisis and is now flourishing by going into 43 of the more sparsely serviced Russian regions, which now account for 80% of its loan portfolio. Impexbank chairman Pavel Lysenko says profits from the regional business are so high that capital invested to open regional offices can be earned back in less than 18 months. The bank already ranks 12th in terms of household deposits and sixth in terms of SME loans.

“There is enough for everyone. Despite the 1300-odd licensed banks, Russia is actually under-banked. The nominal rates of loans are high and still we are growing very fast. We finished 2004 with $87m in retail loans. Now we have $270m [by the middle of 2005] and the forecast for the end of this year is $500m,” says Mr Lysenko.

“The ratio of household deposits to GDP in Russia is less than 20%. Even in Serbia it is 40% and in countries like Hungary and Poland, it is 80%-90%. We have a lot of potential.”

[Quelle: http://www.thebanker.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/3538/Rossisky_resurrection.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

Beteiligungen von Boris Iwanischwili im Jahr 2001 (Angaben der Weltbank):

Type: Private owner
Total sales of all controlled enterprises in 2001: 7 614 620 thousand rub.
Total employment of all controlled enterprises in 2001: 18 924
Member of group: Gindin/Ivanishvili

Ivanishvili Boris  
ERKA-F (45%)
Otechestvennye Lekarstva, OJSC (100%)
Krasfarma (Krasnoyarsk), OJSC (100%)
Novosibkhimfarm (Novosibirsk), OJSC (100%)
Shchyolkovsky Vitamin Plant (Moscow), OJSC (100%)
Metalloinvest (50%)
Erkofarm (100%)
Impexbank (100%)
Kauchuk Plast (0%)
Lipecky metallurgical plant "Svobodny sokol" (40%)
Mihailovsky FOEP (100%)
Zheleznogorskiy Kirpichniiy Zavod (100%)
Moscow metallurgical plant "Serp i molot" (40%)
Moskovsciy zavod "Fizpribor" (100%)
Ospaz (100%)
Ospaz-instrument (100%)
Ospaz-Krepezh (100%)
Ospaz-Metollokard (100%)
Ospaz-Pres (100%)
Ospaz-Snab (100%)
Ospaz-Stal-Kanat (100%)
Ospaz-Steklo (100%)
Trubostal (100%)
Rti-Kauchuk (100%)
Rumo (40%)
Stoilensky FOEP (75%)
Pererabativauchiy komplex "Stoilenskiy" (100%)
Bread kombinat "Starooskolskiy" (100%)
Tulachermet (15%)
464 kombinat nerudoiskopaemih (33%)
Barsukovskoe rudoupravlenie (33%)
Chermetholding (33%)
Stroimateriali-Tularchermet (33%)
Tulskiy zavod stroimaterialov (0%)
Uralsky Zavod Reziniovih Technicheskih iazlekiy (50%)
Rossiysky Kredit (50%)

[Quelle: http://ns.worldbank.org.ru/cem/eng/tree.asp?id=1217. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

18. Владимир Евтушенков — Wladimir Jewtuschenko (Vladimir Evtushenkov) (1948 - )

Abb.: Vladimir Evtushenkov — Владимир Евтушенков
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/2058.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]


Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 1. Russland  (Россия). -- 1. Firmen. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307011.htm

"Vladimir Evtushenkov [Владимир Евтушенков] President and Director [of СИСТЕМА — SISTEMA]

Vladimir Evtushenkov was born on September 25, 1948 in the Smolensk region [Смоленская область].

He graduated from the D. Mendeleev Moscow Chemical Engineering Institute in 1973 and in 1980 from the School of Economics of the Moscow State University where he earned a Doctorate in Economics.

From 1975 to 1982, Mr. Evtushenkov worked as shop superintendent, Deputy Director and Chief Engineer at the Karacharovo Plastics Works. From 1982 until 1987 he was Chief Engineer and subsequently first Deputy General Director of the Polymerbyt Scientific and Production Association. He was appointed head of the Technical Administration of the Moscow City Executive Committee in 1987 and in 1988 became head of the Central Administration on Science and Engineering of the Moscow City Executive Committee. In 1990 Mr. Evtushenkov moved to chair the Moscow City Committee on Science and Engineering.

He has been a member of the Bureau of the Board of Directors of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs since 2000. In 2001, he became head of the Union’s Committee on industrial Policy. He has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry since 2002. Mr. Evtushenkov is also a member of the Government Commission on Science and Innovation Policy and a member of the Council on Science and High Technologies with the President of the Russian Federation and the National Council on Corporate Management. In March 2004, he was elected Chairman of the Council of Trustees of the Development Fund for the State Russian Museum [Русский музей] "Friends of Russian Museum" [Друзья Русского музея]. "

Abb.: Russisches Museum, St. Petersburg
[Bildquelle: http://www.vor.ru/SanktPeterburg/Russian_Museum.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

[Quelle: http://www.sistema.com/section.html?s=111&id=15. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-12]

Jewtuschenkow ist mit der Schwester von der Ehefrau des Moskauer Bürgermeisters Juri Michailowitsch Luschkow (Юрий Михайлович Лужков) verheiratet.

19. Сулейман Абусаидович Керимов — Suleiman Kerimow (Suleiman Kerimov) (1966 - )

Abb.: Сулейман Абусаидович Керимов — Suleiman Kerimow
[Bildquelle: http://www.duma.gov.ru/csecure/arc3/deputat/kerimov.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]


In a previous issue we dwelled at length on the background of a discreet oligarch, Suleiman Kerimov [Сулейман Абусаидович Керимов], a 39-year-old legislator in the federal Duma and owner of the Nafta Moskva company [нафта Москва] (RI N°14).

Abb.: Lage von Dagestan
(©MS Encarta)

Born in Dagestan [Дагестан], the self-effacing Kerimov was already one of the biggest individual shareholders in Gazprom [Газпром] with a 2.3% stake. In recent weeks he doubled his holding to 4.5%, which probably makes him the leading stakeholder in the gas giant. The holding will probably be worth a lot of money when Gazprom starts offering equity to foreign investors, a move all but sure to drive up the price of its shares.

But Kerimov doesn’t show any sign of stopping there. Some Russian financial sources indicate he recently laid out $900 million to acquire the Polymetal [Полиметалл] mining company which owns gold and silver mines. If that sale did take place (for the moment neither Kerimov nor Polymetal have confirmed it) the transaction is interesting from a number of standpoints. Polymetal, which has been controlled up to now by St. Petersburg interests headed by Alexande Nesis , is the second biggest Russian gold producer after Polyus, affiliate of Vladimir Potanin’s [Владимир Потанин] Norilsk Nickel group [Норильский никель].

The gold mining industry is the scene of a lot of manoeuvring at present in view of Russia’s large reserves of the metal (RI N° 18). Many foreign mining groups are lying in wait, such as Barrick Gold and AngloGold, even though outsiders have had a rough ride in Russia in recent years. The arrival of a n ew kid on the block in the person of Kerimov confirms that Russian investors who had stood aloof from the industry up to now are also taking an interest, probably with a v i ew to the sale of the Sukhoi Log [Сухой Лог] deposit, the biggest ever discovered in Russia.

Abb.: Sukhoi Log — Сухой Лог
[Bildquelle: http://www.sukhoilog.com/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

Kerimov is linked to Mikhail Gutseriev [Михаил Сафарбекович Гуцериев, geb. 1958], a 47-year-old who had long operated in Chechnya [Russian: Чеченская Республика); Chechen: Нохчийн Республика] and Ingushetia [Russian: Респу́блика Ингуше́тия; Ingush: ГIалгIай Мохк)], served as president of Slavneft [Славнефть] and now owns the Russneft [РуссНефть] company and the BIN Bank [БИНБАНК].

Abb.:  Mikhail Gutseriev — Михаил Сафарбекович Гуцериев
[Bildquelle: http://www.peoples.ru/finans/manager/gutseriev/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

Among acquaintances of Kerimov also figures the Chechen businessman Umar Dzhabrailov [Умар Алиевич Джабраилов, geb. 1958], who deals in real estate in Moscow.

Abb.: Umar Dzhabrailov — Умар Алиевич Джабраилов
[Bildquelle: http://www.dzhabrailov.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

And Kerimov is equally a member of powerful lobby, the Russian Arab Business Council founded by ex prime minister Yevgeny Primakov [Евгений Максимович Примаков, geb. 1929].

Abb.: Yevgeny Primakov — Евгений Максимович Примаков
[Bildquelle: ru.wikipedia]

He is also said to be on good terms with Igor Shuvalov [Игорь Иванович Шувалов], deputy chief of the presidential administration (their dachas [дача] are a stone’s throw from one another). As a result, Kerimov is the man to watch in times ahead."

Abb.: Igor Shuvalov — Игорь Иванович Шувалов
[Bildquelle: http://www.kreml.org/media/62034074. -- Zuriff am 2005-12-15]

[Quelle: http://www.russia-intelligence.fr/uk/news00012641.asp#. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]


Независимый депутат Государственной думы РФ, член Комитета по безопасности.

До избрания депутатом ГД был вице-президентом некоммерческой организации «Международный институт корпораций».


Сулейман Керимов родился 12 марта 1966 года в г.Дербент (Дагестан). Лезгин. Женат, имеет двоих детей.

Отец - юрист, работал в уголовном розыске. Мать была бухгалтером в системе Сбербанка РФ.

Сулейман Абусаидович - младший в семье. Имеет родного брата, врача по профессии, и сестру, преподавателя русского языка и литературы. Родители и близкие - все проживают в Москве.

По окончанию средней школы в Дербенте в 1983 году (аттестат с отличием, любимый предмет - математика) склонность к точным наукам сначала привела на строительный факультет Дагестанского политехнического института. После первого курса был призван в армию (отсрочка для студентов дневных отделений ВУЗов тогда была отменена).

Служил в ракетных войсках стратегического назначения, старший сержант в должности начальника расчета. В немалой степени авторитет в воинской среде снискал благодаря сильным волевым качествам, которые проявились и в спорте — был чемпионом дивизии по гиревому спорту, увлекался дзю-до.

В 1986 году, вернувшись из армии, Керимов продолжил учебу, перевелся на факультет экономики Дагестанского Государственного университета. Повлияла не столько престижность высшего учебного заведения, сколько осознание того, что серьезные изменения в политическом климате страны делают перспективным профессию менеджера, знающего экономику. Проверкой организационных способностей в этот период стала общественная работа заместителем председателя профкома ДГУ.

За свою первую рабочую «пятилетку» с 1989 по 1995 год Сулейман Абусаидович делает заметные шаги в трудовой карьере, пройдя на одном из лучших предприятий оборонной отрасли - завод «Эльтав» Министерства электронной промышленности - путь от рядового экономиста до помощника генерального директора по экономическим вопросам. Общая ситуация в отрасли заставляла решать проблемы предприятия в столичных Главках. Резко расширяется круг деловых знакомств в Москве. Энергия молодого бизнесмена, профессионализм управленца, стремление к самостоятельности не остались без внимания. В 1995 году г-н Керимов принимает предложение стать заместителем генерального директора компании «Союз-финанс» в Москве. Сфера деятельности: отечественный авиационный бизнес, сырьевые отрасли, банковский сектор.

С апреля 1997 года научный сотрудник «Международного института корпораций» (г.Москва). С февраля 1999года становится вице-президентом этой автономной некоммерческой организации. В декабре 1999 года был уволен в связи с избранием депутатом ГД РФ третьего созыва 2000-2003 гг.

Свою законодательную работу в Государственной думе РФ 3-го созыва начал как независимый депутат."

[Quelle: http://www.duma.gov.ru/csecure/arc3/deputat/kerimov.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

20. Владимир Сергеевич Лисин — Wladimir Lissin (Vladimir Lisin) (1956 - )

Abb.: Владимир Сергеевич Лисин — Wladimir Lissin
[Bildquelle: http://scandaly.ru/print/news587.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

"Vladimir Lisin

Chairman of the Board, Novolipetsk Steel [Новолипецкий металлургический комбинат]

Abb.: ©Logo

Born on May 7, 1956 in Ivanovo [Иваново]

1975-1979 - Worked as a welder while attending university

1979 - graduated from the Siberian Metalurgical Institute


1979 - worked as an engineer at the Karaganda [Russian: Караганда; Kazak: Қарағанды]Steel Plant in Kazakhstan [Қазақстан]

1981 (?) - promoted to a senior position at Karaganda, reporting to future Soviet metals minister Oleg Soskovets; became a director of TSK-Steel, a private firm Soskovets set up.

1985 - 1991 worked as a deputy head engeneer then deputy director at Karaganda.

1992 - became a director of TransWorld Group, a metal commodity broker.

1992- 1997 he was a member and then a Chairman (1992- 1993) of the Board of Directors of AO Sayan Aluminum Plant .

1994 received a post-graduate degree in technical science from the Plekhanov Russian Economics Academy

1996 - appointed to the board of Novolipetsk [Новолипецкий металлургический комбинат]

1997 - left TransWorld; appointed to the Board of Directors of Magnitogorsky hardware-metallurgical plant.

2002 - after several years spent aquiring stock in Novolipetsk, Lisin managed to buy out Vladimir Potanin's [Владимир Потанин] share in the plant, making him the sole owner of the venture.

December, 2005 - Novolipetsk is listed on the London Stock Exchange, netting Lisin an additional $600 million.

According to Forbes 2005 list, he is the second richest man in Russia, worth an estimated $7 billion.

Married, with three children

[Quelle: http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/whoiswho/alphabet/l/lisin.wbp. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

21. Юрий Михайлович Лужков — Juri Michailowitsch Luschkow (Yuri Luzhkov) (1936 - )

Abb.: Juri Michailowitsch Luschkow — Юрий Михайлович Лужков
[Bildquelle: http://www.luzhkov.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-12]

Webpräsenz: http://www.luzhkov.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-12

"Yuri Mikhailovich Luzhkov (Юрий Михайлович Лужков) (born September 21, 1936 in Moscow [Москва], Russia, USSR) is a Russian political figure. He has served as mayor of Moscow since 1992.


His father, Mikhail Andreyevich Luzhkov, was a woodworker who moved to Moscow [Москва] from a small village in Tver Oblast [Тверская область] in the 1930s. His mother Anna Petrovna was originally from Bashkiria [Башкирия; Башҡортостан Республикаһы].

Professional career

From 1953 to 1958, Luzhkov studied at the Gubkin Moscow Petrochemical & Gas Industry Institute. From 1958 until 1964, he worked as a scientific researcher in the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Plastics. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU [КПСС]) in 1968. For the next 20 years he worked on automation initiatives in various sectors of the chemical industry (1964-1971: management automation department chief, State Chemistry Committee; 1971-1974: automated management systems department chief, Chemical Industry Ministry of the Soviet Union; 1974-1980: CEO, Experimental Design Office of Automation, Chemical Industry Ministry of the Soviet Union; 1980-1986: CEO, Scientific-Industrial Association "Petrochemautomation".)

Political career

He was first appointed as a member of the Moscow city council (Mossovet) in 1977, and in 1987 transferred to the executive branch of the Moscow city government (Mosgorispolkom). He held different positions, usually one level below the Mayor. In 1991, Gavriil Popov was elected Mayor of Moscow in the first open free elections. However, Popov was not an experienced administrator, but rather an university professor whose popularity stemmed from his pro-democracy speeches and articles. Popov was overwhelmed by the responsibilities of office and resigned in June 1992. Luzhkov, who held the position of Chairman of the Moscow city government at the time, was appointed Mayor by Boris Yeltsin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] on June 6, 1992. Luzhkov proved more skilled at managing the city than Popov, which earned him wide popular support among Muscovites. He was first elected as Mayor on June 16, 1996 (winning 95% of the vote), and re-elected on December 19, 1999 (69.9% of the votes) and again on December 7, 2003 (75% of the votes).

In 1998, as Boris Yeltsin's political troubles grew, Luzhkov formed his own national political faction, Otechestvo [Отечество] (Fatherland), to serve as his base for the upcoming presidential election. Otechestvo had the support of many powerful regional politicians, and its apparent supremacy was sealed when it merged with another party, Vsya Rossiya [Вся Россия] (All Russia) to form Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya. Luzhkov and his new ally, former prime minister Yevgeniy Primakov [Евгений Максимович Примаков], seemed likely to displace both Yeltsin and his inner circle in the parliamentary and presidential elections due to be held in late 1999 and mid-2000, respectively.

However, Luzhkov's fortunes turned when Boris Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin [Владимир Владимирович Путин] as Chairman of the Russian Government (predsedatel', or prime minister) in August 1999. While virtually an unknown when first appointed, Putin rapidly gained popular support thanks to a hard-line law and order image and the backing of powerful state-owned and state-allied media and economic interests. The hard-fought autumn 1999 Duma campaign inflicted a fatal blow against his larger political ambitions. So battered was Luzhkov's political capital that Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya ended up endorsing Putin in the 2000 presidential elections, which he won easily. After this crushing defeat, Luzhkov became less active in federal politics.

Registration controversy

In the Soviet Union every citizen required permission to settle in certain urban areas, such as Moscow, as the government wanted to limit the inflow into the big cities. The post-Soviet Russian constitution granted every Russian citizen freedom of movement. However, Luzhkov has restricted this right by maintaining an unconstitutional registration process. His rationale has been that Moscow's city infrastructure could not handle a rapidly growing population. Under Luzhkov's registration regime, unregistered residents have trouble getting legal employment and are regularly harassed by the police. Some of the most blatant limitations were removed by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court after a long fight with Luzhkov's lawyers, making the registration process somewhat simpler. Now a person can spend 90 days in Moscow without any registration.

Corruption accusations

Abb.: Elena Baturina — Елена Николаевна Батурина (geb. 1963), Ehefrau von Juri Luschkow
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/2385.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

Luzhkov was frequently accused of being too close to major businessmen, including billionaires Vladimir Gusinsky [Владимир Гусинский] and Vladimir Yevtushenkov [Владимир Петрович Евтушенков], and for conducting allegedly suspicious privatization deals for formerly city-owned property. Russian and foreign press have claimed that Mr. Luzhkov's wife Yelena Baturina [Елена Николаевна Батурина] is a billionaire, and have noted that the construction and furniture companies she owns receive a large number of lucrative municipal contracts. However, Luzhkov has never been charged with any corruption-related offences.


Luzhkov married his first wife, Marina Bashilova [Марина Башилова], in 1958, and had two sons with her, Mikhail and Aleksandr. Bashilova died from liver cancer in 1989. He married his second wife, Yelena Baturina [Елена Николаевна Батурина] in 1991. They have two daughters, Alyona (born 1992) and Olga (born 1994). Luzhkov frequently appears in public at different festivals and celebrations, and is an enthusiastic promoter of the city. His hobbies include tennis and apiary. His views on physical fitness are well known, with a statue of the mayor in tennis garb being erected recently in a Moscow park."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri_Luzhkov. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-12]

"Das spezielle Luschkow-System

Die Reformer um Tschubais und Gaidar wollten mit der Voucher-Privatisierung die staatlichen Konzerne zügig privatisieren. Tausende Firmen wurden im ganzen Land aus den staatlichen Händen entlassen. Im ganzen Land? Nicht überall, denn in der Hauptstadt leistete der Bürgermeister Luschkow erfolgreich Widerstand gegen die Privatisierungen in Moskau.

Luschkow beharrte auf einer größeren Kontrolle und auf höhere Einkommen für die Stadt, nicht zuletzt um seine großen Infrastrukturprojekte finanzieren zu können. In dem Machtkampf mit den Reformern ergriff Präsident Jelzin Partei für Luzkhov und blockierte die umfassende Privatisierung in Moskau.

Anders als im übrigen Land durften Arbeiter und Manager nur maximal 10% ihrer Firmen übernehmen (üblich waren bis 51%). Die Stadtverwaltung schuf eine Reihe von Holdings, in die die ertragreichsten Firmen und Werte der Stadt eingebracht wurden. Die Stadt behielt die Kontrolle, indem sie nur Lizenzen verteilte, das Eigentum jedoch behielt.

Moskau gilt als eine der korruptesten Städte der Welt. Die riesigen städtischen Holdings, die von Gefolgsleuten von Luschkow kontrolliert werden, erhalten bevorzugt Aufträge der Stadt. Insbesondere bei der SISTEMA-Holding [СИСТЕМА-Холдинг], die ein ein Milliardenimperium kontrolliert, ist die Grenze zwischen städtischen Interessen und Privatinteressen kaum noch auszumachen.

Luzkov profitiert auch persönlich von diesem Wirtschaftssystem. Seine Frau Jelena Baturina [Еле́на Никола́евна Бату́рина] stieg im Baubereich zur Milliardärin auf. Ihre Schwester ist mit dem Präsidenten der stadtnahen Sistema-Holding, Jewtuschenkow [Владимир Евтушенков], verheiratet, ebenfalls ein Milliardär.

Luschkow kontrolliert die privaten Firmen aufs Genaueste. Nicht-städtische Unternehmen erhalten bevorzugt Bewilligungen und Aufträge, wenn sie informelle Dienste für die Stadt leisten. Jeder, der Grundstücke oder Immobilien kaufen/bauen will, muß in irgendeiner Weise die Stadt beteiligen. Sogar ausländische Ketten mussten der Stadt Kontrollinteressen in den lokalen joint-ventures überlassen. "

Stand: 1.3.2005"

[Quelle: http://www.netstudien.de/Russland/luschkow.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-05]

22. Григорий Эммануилович Лучанский — Grigorij Loutchansky (Grigori Loutchansky) (1945 - )

Abb.: Григорий Эммануилович Лучанский — Grigorij Loutchansky
[Bildquelle: http://www.compromat.ru/main/luchanskiy/a.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-13


"Grigori Loutchansky [Григорий Эммануилович Лучанский]. Born in 1945. Student company commander in Latvia [Latvijas]. Leader of the Central Committee for the Young Communist League Department. Chairman of the Revision Commission for the Young Communist League of Latvia. Deputy Dean at the University of Latvia – the youngest deputy dean in the Soviet Union. He has a Phd in economics. Arrested in 1982. In 1983 sentenced to 7 years in prison for stealing furniture, four settees, a telephone and other Soviet property. Place of imprisonment – a prison in Jelgava, Latvia, or else – in Solikamsk [Соликамск], far north Russia. Director of the communications department in the Adazi [Ādaži] agro-company. Between 1989 and 1995 founder, owner of Nordex in Vienna. Recorded in the Guinness Book of Records as the fastest get-rich businessman. In 1993 he met with Bill Clinton, President of the USA. In 1994 the government of Great Britain bars entry into the country. In 1995 to 1997 he was a student of Israeli multimillionaire Shaul Aisenberg [Eisenberg] in Kazakhstan and China. Founder of a center for investment programs and projects, dealing with especially large investment projects in Eurasia."

[Quelle: http://www.baltkurs.com/english/archive/fall_2001/profile.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-13]

"Berliner Zeitung

Datum: 25.06.2002

Autor: Andreas Förster

Operation Spinnennetz

Grigorij Loutchansky [Григорий Эммануилович Лучанский] ist ein russischer Geschäftsmann, der mit seinen Firmen Milliarden umsetzt. Nun hat Italiens Antimafia-Kommission einen Haftbefehl gegen ihn ausgestellt


Abb.: Doch Polizeipräsident Heribert Pilch (dargestellt von Kurt Weinzierl) in der Kultserie "Kottan ermittelt" sorgt für Recht und Ordnung in der "Hauptstadt des Verbrechens"
[Bildquelle: http://kottan-ermittelt.at/darsteller/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-13]

BERLIN, im Juni. Sechs Jahre lang hatte es Grigorij Loutchansky an der schönen blauen Donau ausgehalten. In Wien residierte der legendenumwitterte Geschäftsmann aus Moskau bis 1996 in der Prinz-Eugen-Straße, wo er als Präsident der halbstaatlichen russischen Firmengruppe Nordex jährlich Milliarden-Umsätze machte. In all diesen Jahren musste Loutchansky stets gegen den Ruf ankämpfen, ein Pate der Russenmafia und Geldwäscher von KPdSU-Millionen zu sein. Immer, wenn ein Mafiamord die Wiener Schlagzeilen füllte, tauchte auch sein Bild in dem Artikel auf - ob Loutchansky das Opfer nun gekannt hatte oder nicht.

Geldwäsche und Menschenhandel

In den letzten Jahren war es still geworden um den Nordex-Chef, nachdem er mit seinem Konzern zurück nach Russland gegangen war, um etwas unbeobachteter agieren zu können. Jetzt aber ist Loutchanskys Name wieder aufgetaucht - im Zusammenhang mit internationalen Ermittlungen gegen die Russenmafia.

Noch 1996 konnte man in ganzseitigen Anzeigen in deutschen Tageszeitungen nachlesen, dass Grigorij Loutchansky ein ehrenwerter Mann sei, der nichts mit der Russenmafia zu tun habe und auch nicht in illegale Geschäfte mit Drogen und Waffen verstrickt sei. Die Anzeigen hatte ein Hamburger Verlag schalten müssen, weil Loutchansky in einem seiner Bücher einmal mehr als Pate der Russenmafia dargestellt worden war.

Ein Haftbefehl der Antimafia-Kommission im italienischen Bologna sagt jetzt aber anderes aus über den umtriebigen "bisnismen" [биснисмен], wie die neureichen Russen in Moskau genannt werden. Dieser Haftbefehl richtet sich gegen den Nordex-Chef und weitere einhundertneun Personen. Ihnen allen wird vorgeworfen, zwischen 1996 und 2001 die Tätigkeit russischer Mafiabanden begünstigt zu haben, indem sie dabei halfen, riesige Geldsummen aus dem Gebiet der ehemaligen Sowjetunion in westliche Staaten zu transferieren. Des Weiteren geht es um Betrug, Waffenschmuggel, Drogenhandel, Prostitution und Menschenhandel.

Der Haftbefehl ist Teil der Polizeioperation "Spinnennetz", die vor zwei Wochen in mehreren europäischen Ländern und Nordamerika anlief und zur Festnahme von vorerst sechzig mutmaßlichen Mitgliedern der Russenmafia führte. Weil auch Loutchanskys Name auftaucht, blühen nun die Spekulationen wieder auf um die Erfolgsgeschichte des armen Jungen aus Riga, um die Milliarden der KPdSU und den langen Arm des KGB.

Der kleine Grigorij war als Sohn mittelloser Eltern in Riga aufgewachsen und hatte nach dem Abitur ein Ökonomiestudium begonnen. Der Aufstieg des Beststudenten war rasant: Mit 29 Jahren wurde er Prorektor der Universität Riga. Dann verschwand Loutchansky aber von der Bildfläche: Er habe sich mit der Nomenklatura [номенклатура] angelegt und sei in ein Arbeitslager gesteckt worden, sagte er später.

Zu einem Karriereknick hatte das Intermezzo aber offenbar nicht geführt: Loutchansky wurde gleich nach dem Arbeitslager Kombinatsdirektor und Chefverkäufer im Agrochemiekombinat "Adazhi". Wenn man seinen späteren Erzählungen glaubt, dann hat ihn Gorbatschow [Михаи́л Серге́евич Горбачёв] 1989 persönlich auserwählt, ein Auslandsunternehmen aufzubauen, mit dessen Erträgen die russische Wirtschaft modernisiert werden sollte. In Wien gründete Loutchansky daraufhin die Nordex - und schuf daraus in kürzester Zeit einen Konzern mit 8 000 Mitarbeitern und 135 Tochtergesellschaften in Ost und West, der durch Handel mit Düngemitteln, Öl und Rohstoffen einen Jahresumsatz von vier Milliarden Mark machte.

Doch die westlichen Geheimdienste misstrauten der Erfolgsgeschichte des Milliardenjongleurs von Anfang an. Sie vermuteten hinter der Nordex eine Geldwaschmaschine, die das verschwundene KPdSU-Vermögen in Höhe von geschätzten zwanzig Milliarden Dollar legalisieren sollte. Westliche Geheimdienste von der CIA über den britischen MI-6 bis zum deutschen Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) hielten das Firmennetz Loutchanskys jahrelang unter ständiger Kontrolle; Interpol-Experten befassten sich auf einer Tagung im Frühjahr 1997 in Lyon einzig und allein mit dem Nordex-Geflecht. Der BND bezeichnete 1995 die Nordex in einem internen Bericht als Spionageeinrichtung, "die harte Devisen für den KGB-Nachfolger verdienen muss". Doch Beweise, die der Überprüfung durch ein Gericht standhalten würden, konnten weder die Geheimdienstler noch die Ermittler von Interpol jemals vorlegen.

Die anhaltenden Verdächtigungen kratzten an Loutchanskys Image, seine Geschäfte aber brachten sie nicht in Gefahr. Zwar hatte der Nordex-Chef Einreiseverbot in Großbritannien, Kanada und Hongkong; und auch Israel wollte eine Zeit lang seinen Pass nicht verlängern. Einflussreiche Politiker ließen sich aber gern von ihm unterstützen. So soll Loutchansky sowohl den Wahlkampf des späteren israelischen Regierungschefs Netanjahu [בנימין נתניהו] als auch den von US-Präsident Bill Clinton finanziell gefördert haben.

Dienst für die CIA

Doch Loutchansky war der US-Führung auch anderweitig zu Diensten, wenn man amerikanischen Presseberichten Glauben schenken darf. Demnach soll seine weißrussische Firma Beltechexport [БелТехЭкспорт] den Amerikanern ein Exemplar des russischen Luftabwehrsystems SS-300 besorgt habe, um das sich die CIA jahrelang vergeblich bemüht hatte. Ob auch dies nur eine Legende ist oder doch zutrifft, bleibt wie so vieles bei Loutchansky im Nebel der Ungewissheit.

Möglicherweise wird dieser Nebel aber dank der italienischen Mafiajäger jetzt etwas lichter. Wie zu erfahren war, laufen die Ermittlungen der Behörden in Bologna weiter auf Hochtouren. An mehrere Länder, darunter an Deutschland, seien Rechtshilfeersuchen gerichtet worden. Auch an Russland - ob Moskau aber Grigorij Loutchansky herausrücken wird, bleibt abzuwarten."

[Quelle: Andreas Förster. -- http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2002/0625/blickpunkt/0010/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-13]

23. Искандер Кахрамонович Махмудов — Iskander Machmudow (Iskander Makhmudov)  (1963 - )

Abb.: Iskander Makhmudov — Искандер Махмудов
(Pressefoto Vanady)


"Iskander Kakhramonovich Makhmudov [Искандер Кахрамонович Махмудов] was born in Bukhara [بُخارا ] in 1963.

A graduate from the Tashkent [تاشکند] State University, he speaks fluent Arab and English. After the university, Makhmudov worked within the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Contacts of the USSR. He was a translator to Soviet military advisors and specialists in Libya [ليبيا,] between 1984 and 1986 (Makhmudov was assigned to the Main Engineering Directorate, an analog of Rosvooruzhenie) and to Soviet military advisors in Iraq [العراق] between 1986 and 1988 (assigned to the Directorate of Military Construction of the Iraqi General Staff). There is the widespread opinion that positions like that are only reserved for whoever is KGB.

Makhmudov worked for Uzbekintorg between 1988 and 1990. In 1996, he became general director of the Gai ore mining and processing enterprise in the Urals.

In 1999, Makhmudov with partners established the Urals Ore and Metals, a company he remains the president of even now. The list of his business partners and cronies is believed to include Oleg Deripaska [Олег Владимирович Дерипаска] (Russian Aluminium, Basic Element), Alexander Abramov [Александр Григорьевич Абрамов] (formerly TWG top manager, owner of Eurazholding, and West-Siberian and Kuznetsk metal combines), Alexander Mamut [Александр Леонидович Мамут], Mikhail Chernoy [Михаил Черной] (TWG co-founder), Vladimir Lisin [Владимир Сергеевич Лисин] (formerly TWG top manager, owner of the Novolipetsk Metal Combine).

There is no saying at this point in what capacity Makhmudov will return to Uzbekistan - as an advisor or actual politician. In any case, appearance of such a figure known to have pipelines into upper echelons of state power and businesses in Russia will mean economic rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia.


In fact, this whole hypothesis certainly rings a bell because Russian businesses are actively expanding into Central Asia nowadays. Deripaska [Олег Владимирович Дерипаска], for example, intends to invest almost $800 million in completion of construction of the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant in Tajikistan [Тоҷикистон] and in modernization of the Tajik Aluminium Factory. It will be followed by another major project - construction of an aluminium plant in Dangar, President Emomali Rakhmonov's [Эмомалӣ Раҳмонов] native town."

[Quelle: http://enews.ferghana.ru/4printer.php?id=1112. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15]

24. Алексей Александрович Мордашов — Alexej Mordaschow (Aleksey Mordashov) (1965 - )

Abb.: Aleksey Mordashov — Алексей Мордашов
(Pressefoto Severstal)

Webpräsenz der Severstal-Group — Северсталь-групп: http://www.severstal.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16

„Das Severstal-Kombinat wurde vom ganzen Land errichtet,
fiel aber einer kleinen Gruppe von Menschen in die Hände.
Es war ungerecht, aber zweckmäßig,
weil es jetzt auf ehrliche Weise geführt wird“.

Alexej Mordaschow

[Quelle des Zitats: http://www.aktuell.ru/rupol0022/morenews.php?iditem=118. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

"Mordashov Alexey [Алексей Александрович Мордашов]

Abb.: ®Logo

Severstal-Group [Северсталь-групп], CEO
Birthday: 26.09.1965
Education: Leningrad Engineering-Economical Institute [Ленинградский инженерно-экономический институт], Nothrumbia University Business School

Born on September 26, 1965 in Cherepovets [Череповец] in Vologda Region [Вологодская область].

Graduated magna cum laude from the engineering-construction departmentof the Leningrad Engineering-Economical Institute (since 2000 – Saint-Petersburg State Engineering-Economical University [Санкт-Петербургский государственный инженерно-экономический университет]).


Received an MBA degree in 2001 in Northumbia University Business School (Newcastle, Great Britain).

Upon graduation in 1988 Aleksey Mordashov worked at the Cherepovetskiy Metallurgical Plant [Череповецкий металлургический комбинат] (since 1993 – JSC Severstal [ОАО «Северсталь»]) as senior economist, head of the bureau of economics and labour organization of the service-mechanical mill №1, and as deputy head of planning department.


In 1990 he had a traineeship in Voest Alpine – a metallurgic company in Austria.

In 1992 Aleksey Mordashov was appointed financial and economical director of JSC Severstal, becoming the youngest director in the enterprise’s history. In April 1996 he became the CEO of JSC Severstal.

Abb.: Walzstraße bei Severstal
(Pressefoto Severstal)

In 2002 during the restructuring Severstal’s business he was appointed CEO of Severstal-Group. He is also the chairman of the board of directors in JSC Severstal, JSC Severstal-Auto [Северсталь-Авто], and JSC Severstal-Resource [Северсталь-ресурс].

Since November 2000 he is a member of the Presidium and Bureau of Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Enterpreuners (RSPP [РСПП]), since March 2001 he is the head of the RSPP workgroup responsible for Russia’s joining the WTO and reforming the customs policy. Since April 2002 Aleksey Mordashov is a member of the Russian-German workgroup responsible for strategic economic and financial questions. Since May 2003 he is a member of the Enterpreneurs Council of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Aleksey Mordashov is a member of Sponsorship Councils of the State Academic Bolshoi Theatre [Государственный Академический Большой театр] (since 2001), the State Tretyakov Gallery [Государственная Третьяковская галерея] (since December 2002), the Spaso-Preobrazhenskiy Valaamskiy monastery [Спасо-Преображенский Валаамский монастырь] (since May 2003), and the Russian Chess Federation [Российская шахматная федерация] (since April 2003).

Aleksey Mordashov was recognized as the most professional federal level manager by the «Expert RA» rating agency. He also became the winner in  the nomination «Municipal activity in the enterprise sphere» in the «Enterpreuner of the Year 2003» contest held by Ernst&Young. In 2003 Business Week included Aleksey Mordashov into the top 25 list of prominent European managers, enterpreuners, economists, politicians, and innovators in the top managers category. 

Aleksey Mordashov was awarded the Order of Service for Motherland [За заслуги перед Отечеством] 1st (1999) and 2nd degree and the Russian Orthodox Church Order of St Blessed Prince Daniil of Moscow [Святого благоверного князя Даниила Московского] 3rd (2003).

He is an honorary doctor of the Saint-Petersburg State Engineering-Economical University [Санкт-Петербургский Государственный Инженерно-Экономический Университет] (May 2001) and of the Northumbria University (July 2003).

Fluent in German and English.

Interests: poetry, art, winter sports.

Last Update: Jul 19, 2004"

[Quelle: http://www.severstalgroup.com/english/managment/qsp/subsect/5413/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

"HANDELSBLATT, Montag, 08. März 2004, 06:54 Uhr

Der Stahlbaron Alexej Mordaschow kauft sich inzwischen sogar in den USA ein

Putins gelehriger Bisnesmen

Von Mathias Brüggmann, Handelsblatt

Die Zeiten des blutroten Schnees sind vorbei. Zu Sowjetzeiten war die Stadt Tscherepowez [Череповец] eine der schmutzigsten des Riesenreichs. Seit jedoch das örtliche Stahlkombinat privatisiert und mit rund einer Milliarde Dollar modernisiert wurde, ist winters der Schnee nur noch grau; wie in allen Städten zwischen Petersburg und der Pazifikküste.

Abb.. Lage von Tscherepowez — Череповец
(©MS Encarta)

MOSKAU. Verantwortlich für diesen Fortschritt zeichnet Alexej Mordaschow [Алексей Александрович Мордашов], den sie in Russland schon einen „guten“ Oligarchen nennen. Vor allem ist der hoch gewachsene Mann mit der akkurat weggefönten Elvistolle ein Musterschüler: Schulabschluss mit lauter Einsern, Lenin- Stipendiat an der Hochschule, Komsomol-[Комсомол-]Aktivist, einer, der sich selbst im Nachhinein „einen korrekten Jungen“ nennt. Heute, im Reich des Kreml-Herrschers Putin [Влади́мир Влади́мирович Пу́тин], ist er Vorzeigeunternehmer. Einer ganz nach dem Geschmack des Staatschefs, der von seinen „Bisnesmeny“ mehr soziale Verantwortung, volle Steuerzahlung und vor allem politische Unterordnung verlangt.

Und so sagt der Chef des zweitgrößten russischen Stahlkonzerns Sätze wie: „Ohne Kontakt zur Politik geht es zwar nicht.“ Aber: „Geschäftsleute sollen sie nicht dominieren.“ Dabei spricht der „Putin- Oligarch“, wie ihn das Moskauer Magazin „Profil“ [Профил] nennt, so schnell, dass er ganze Worte verschluckt. Im Denken ist er immer schon eine Ecke weiter.

Vor allem aber provoziert der aus kleinen Verhältnissen in Tscherepowez stammende Manager weder die Kremlführung noch das verarmte Volk, indem er seinen Reichtum zur Schau stellt – im Gegensatz zu vielen seiner Milliardärskollegen. Zu tief sitzt dafür die Erinnerung an die Kindheit im russischen Norden: „400 Gramm Wurst und 200 Gramm Butter pro Kopf und Monat – das war die ganze Freude. Meine erste Jeans bekam ich in der 9. Klasse und habe sie sehr lange geschont.“ Der heute in dunkelblauen Nadelstreifen Gehüllte sagt das weder mit Sozialromantik noch mit Arroganz. Immerhin hat der Fan russischer Banja-Schwitzbäder große Teile der reichlich sprudelnden Gewinne in sein Severstal-Werk [Северсталь] reinvestiert. Das heißt schon etwas, stieg doch der Gruppenumsatz im vorigen Jahr um 36,2 Prozent auf 3,8 Milliarden Dollar, der Vorsteuerprofit sogar um 76,4 Prozent auf 995 Millionen.

Abb.: Severstal-Werk — Северсталь
(Pressefoto Severstal)

Mordaschow demonstriert soziale Wärme, statt in Tscherepowez alle Sozialobjekte des Kombinats zu verkaufen, finanziert er Kulturpaläste, Werkswohnungen und ein Erstliga-Eishockeyteam weiter, ganz wie einst das Kombinat. Das alles lässt das Putin-Russland gnädig darüber hinwegsehen, dass Mordaschow mit einem geschätzten Privatvermögen von 3,5 Milliarden Dollar nach der jüngsten Milliardärserhebung der Zeitschrift „Forbes“ der siebtreichste Russe ist.

Das Einzelkind eines Elektrikers und einer Angestellten des Tscherepowezer Stahlkombinats kam mit 23 Jahren in die Spur der Eltern – er ging ebenfalls ins „Werk“, wie der Schmelz- und Walzriese in der Stadt einfach genannt wird. Allerdings führte der Weg des jungen Alexej nicht an die Hochöfen, sondern in die Finanzabteilung. Dort mussten damals Lieferanten noch persönlich mit einer Schachtel Pralinen bei zwei alternden Buchhalterinnen gut Wetter machen. Mordaschow änderte das schnell. Mit 31 bereits ist er Generaldirektor und hält rund 80 Prozent der Aktien der Severstal-Gruppe [Северсталь-групп]. Zu ihr gehören außer dem Stahlwerk, einer Kohlegrube am Polarkreis und einem Erzaufbereiter auch der Jeep-Bauer UAZ, ein Motorenwerk und ein Maschinenbauer.

Statt sich wie andere aus der Zeit des Wild-Ost-Kapitalismus die Firma zur Beute zu machen, heuerte Mordaschow westliche Unternehmensberater an, die beim Umbau des Stahlwerks halfen. Einige wechselten ins Severstal-Management. Analysten sind deshalb voll des Lobes: „Mordaschow hat zügig die Mehrheit bei Severstal konsolidiert und dann viel schneller als die Konkurrenz eine Modernisierung durchgesetzt“, meint Alexander Puchajew, Metals & Mining-Spezialist des Moskauer Brokerhauses Vereinte Finanzgruppe (UFG).

Heimisch ist Mordaschow in Moskau, das er wie jeder Provinzrusse mit einer Mischung aus Bewunderung und Unverständnis sieht, noch nicht geworden: Ein großformatiger Fernseher dominiert sein Büro, die gemalte Birkenwaldromantik mit Zwiebeltürmchenkirchen ist noch nicht aufgehängt. Ist hier jemand noch nicht angekommen?

Mordaschow ist trotz seiner erst 38 Jahre und der Herkunft aus der Provinz eine Größe in Russlands Geschäftswelt: Vorstand im Industriellenverband RSPP und von Putin zum Ko-Vorsitzenden der Deutsch-Russischen Strategischen Arbeitsgruppe ernannt. Dabei kam ihm zugute, dass er – wie Putin – Deutsch spricht. Das half schon einmal: Gleich zu Beginn seiner Karriere durfte er zur Fortbildung nach Österreich – weil er sich als Einziger im Werk die fremde Sprache zutraute. Deutschland ist die Liebe des dreifachen Familienvaters, das Geschäft aber liegt in den USA: Kürzlich hat er den angeschlagenen US-Stahlproduzenten Rouge Industries geschluckt. Auch das so ganz nach dem Expansions-Geschmack von Kremlchef Putin."


[Quelle: Mathias Brüggmann. --  http://www.handelsblatt.de/pshb/fn/relhbi/sfn/cn_artikel_drucken/strucid/PAGE_200014/
pageid/PAGE_200811/docid/718463/SH/0/depot/0/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

25. Владимир Потанин — Wladimir Potanin (Vladimir Potanin) (1961 - )

Abb.: Vladimir Potanin — Владимир Потанин
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/1925.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

Webpräsenz von InterRos: http://www.interros.ru/eng/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06
Webpräsenz von Norilsk Nickel: http://www.nornik.ru/en/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06

Zu InterRos und Norilsk Nickel siehe:

Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 1. Russland  (Россия). -- 1. Firmen. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307011.htm

"Vladimir Potanin [Владимир Потанин]

Born: January 3, 1961
Office: President of the InterRos Holding Company [Интеррос]

Abb.: ®Logo

Estimated worth: US$ 5.4 billion

Vladimir Potanin, 43, was born into a high-ranking Communist official’s family. He attended the Moscow Institute for International Relations, an elite school that groomed students for diplomatic service, the KGB, and offices of the Kremlin. He then went to work for the Soviet Department of Trade, where his father had also worked.

In 1991, Potanin created InterRos Holding Company  [Интеррос], a foreign trade association that traded nonferrous metals, including aluminum, copper, and lead. With the capital that he accumulated from InterRos, he founded two banks, the Oneximbank [ОНЕКСИМ банк] and the MFK [МФК], to which many state enterprises transferred their accounts. Later, Potanin became one of the principal authors of the Loans for Shares program, in which the Russian government traded ownership in state industries for loans. The controversial program was administered through auctions, but only select bidders were invited to attend, usually at the discretion of President Boris Yeltsin’s daughter [Tatjana Djatschenko — Татьяна Борисовна Дьяченко]. Vladimir Potanin was among the invited bidders. During Russia’s transition to a market economy, he acquired control of more than 20 formerly state-owned enterprises.

To improve his image in the West, Vladimir Potanin became a leading donor to the Guggenheim Foundation. He gives more than $1 million annually and has a seat on the board of trustees of the Guggenheim Museum. Potanin also established a charity fund in Russia which implements projects in the field of education and participates in The Greater Hermitage Project. The fund’s scholarship program for talented students involves over 1,700 students from 60 leading Russian state higher educational institutions. In May 2002, Mr. Potanin donated personal funds for the purchase, by the Russian Ministry of Culture, of the famous Malevich painting The Black Square. The masterpiece was included State Hermitage’s permanent display.

Vladimir Potanin is a member of the Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and of the Russian Federation Governmental Council on Entrepreneurship. He maintains a stable position among the top 10 most influential Russian businessmen and is one of the few major oligarchs whose actions have not been subject to the Prosecutor’s Office scrutiny in the past few years.

Updated: 23.09.2005 21:36 MSK"

[Quelle: http://mosnews.com/mn-files/potanin.shtml#news. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

Vladimir Potanin (Владимир Потанин in Russian) (born in 1961), president and founder of Oneximbank (also Oneksimbank) [ОНЕКСИМ банк]. He is the owner of the Norilsk nickel-mining complex [Норильский никель], and widely considered one of the leading Business oligarchs in Russia.

Vladimir Potanin was born in 1961 into a high-ranking Communist family. He attended the Moscow Institute for International Relations, an elite school that groomed students for the KGB and offices of the Kremlin. He then went to work for the Soviet Department of Trade, where his father had also worked. In 1991, he created Interros [Интеррос], a foreign trade association that traded nonferrous metals, including aluminum, copper and lead. With the capital he accumulated from Interros, he started two banks, the Oneximbank and the MFK [МФК], to which many state enterprises transferred their accounts. Interros was a principal player in exchanging soft currency roubles for dollars, operations made possible by Potanin's government connections.

Later, Potanin became one of the principal authors of the Loans for Shares program, in which the Russian government traded ownership in state industries for loans. The controversial program was administered through auctions, but only select bidders were invited to attend, usually at the discretion of President Boris Yeltsin's daughter [Tatjana Djatschenko — Татьяна Борисовна Дьяченко]. Potanin was among the invited bidders. During Russia's transition to a market economy, he acquired control of more than 20 formerly state-owned enterprises. Potanin's business empire was considerably dented by Russia's 1998 economic crisis, but he managed to set up numerous companies to shelter his personal assets. Some speculate that he diverted considerable sums to his accounts outside of Russia. He reportedly threw a party at the height of the crash for more than 100 of his closest friends in a nightclub at the French ski resort Courchevel 1850.

Potanin is a controversial figure. He is one of the lower profile oligarchs, although he has appearantly changed his mind in recent years (he gave a candid interview to PBS for their 2002 documentary ,Commanding Heights). While he has amassed a personal fortune, he has also contributed significantly to the advancement of Russian society and the development of Russian industry."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Potanin. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]


How Potanin Became an Entrepreneur

INTERVIEWER: When was it that you decided to become a businessman, and how did that inspiration come about?
VLADIMIR POTANIN [Владимир Потанин]: Frankly speaking, I decided to become a businessman at the moment when I understood that it is possible, because I grew up in a country where it was not possible. There existed even a special article in the penal code of the Soviet Union which punished entrepreneurial activity. At the end of Gorbachev's time, it became clear that it was possible to make your own business, to create joint ventures with foreigners, and to open your own companies. I decided to try myself, in this field.

In that time, I worked in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In order to make something new and launch a new business, you should have a certain entrepreneurial drive, but also you should be prepared for this, and I had a certain advantage. Some say I had, for example, good links with the minister. Maybe that was the case, but the most important thing was that my father worked also at the same ministry, and I traveled a lot with him abroad. I saw a lot of foreigners, I spoke to them, and I saw foreign television. I knew from the very beginning, from childhood, that there were two points of view, and I had the ability to compare [them]. Despite the fact that I believed that everything which was done in our country at that time was right and I honestly tried to work within these conditions, I had the ability to compare, and when capitalism came to this country, when the openness came, I was maybe a little bit more prepared than my colleagues.

INTERVIEWER: At the time, did you think that the Soviet Union would be able to evolve socialism, or did you feel that it was finished and it was just a matter of time until full capitalism arrived?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: Now it's easy to say. At that time, nobody knew exactly. I mean, it was difficult to understand what was going wrong, but I felt that something was wrong; something was inefficient. And I tried to understand the reasons for that. At that time, it was the level of intuition. I always tried to start to organize things, and I always thought that it was easier for me to organize something than to execute some possibly interesting but very particular job. I always said to my bosses, "Look, pay me the same salary, but give me the possibility to make decisions, to do something, because I'm more efficient than this." No problem. People who are not likely to take the responsibility, if they are experienced and they are good, just pay them, let's say, the same big salary, but let's do it in a more efficient way.

Now I understand the reason for the inefficiency of our society under the Soviet Union, and I think that there were two major reasons. First of all, the lack of respect for human qualities, for leadership, for the possibility of the person to do something, and no stimulation, no recompensation for a good job, no, let's say, real guarantee that if you are smart and energetic, you are going to be successful. The second thing was the absence of private property, which removes the stimulus for people. It doesn't stimulate investments; it doesn't stimulate long-term plans for the family, for the future, because you can leave nothing to your children or grandchildren. That's why you live like everything is temporary, and when people educated under such circumstances come to power, they also feel that everything is very temporary. That is why it is very difficult to create something really stable with a long-term perspective and with good traditions.

INTERVIEWER: So when you decided to become a businessman, what did you do? I think I read that you started Interros [Интеррос] with $10,000.

VLADIMIR POTANIN: Yes, that's true. I had a certain choice. Of course, I wanted from the very beginning to be free in my decisions, especially after several years of working under circumstances where you are not really allowed to get a chance to do a lot of things on your own. But on the other hand, I did not like to start with something unclear, small, without any concept of development, et cetera. I had the possibility of starting in 1988 or 1987. But I started in 1990; I was trying to prepare myself to understand what kind of concept of development I would like to have. And then I created a small foreign trade association with the equivalent of $10,000. After I met my partner, Mr. Protherow, we decided to start a banking project, and at the same time we started to think already about a business on a bigger scale. At the very beginning we thought more about gaining money, to have a normal life with our families, etc. Then we wanted a certain freedom in our actions, in our decisions. After we managed to create our first small bank, we understood that we had a good prospect to develop because highly qualified services are required in all spheres of activity - in finance, in industrial management, in everything.

INTERVIEWER: Did you find the business environment in those early years easy to work in? Did you find it easy to find qualified staff, people you could trust, and people who were able to work efficiently?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: It was extremely difficult to find people who could work efficiently, because nobody knew about the market conditions. There was no experience at all. A big tragedy of our time, for Russia, was that there was no link between the elder generations and our generation. It was very bad, because during a two- or three-year period, the whole generation of people from the age of 50 to 70, people who could work, who should work, and who should share their experience with us, they disappeared immediately from active business life. That was a big problem for us. We made our own mistakes, and it was very painful. When people say now, "Look, you did such a thing and such a thing in the wrong way," they are right. But please understand that it was extremely difficult to find the way with no piece of advice from anybody. For me, my father was, and still is, a symbol of qualified persons in the Ministry of Foreign Trade under Soviet conditions. He was my teacher under that time. I could ask him questions and receive a lot of explanations. I thought I was prepared, maybe better than anyone else, for this kind of job in an international environment. But after 1990, he could not help me because he was not experienced at all in this field. Even for younger people it was easier because they have more energy; they have all their whole life in front of them. For those who are above 50, 55, above 60, it was like the finish of their whole active life.

The Radical Economic Reforms of 1991 and 1992: Potanin's Reaction

INTERVIEWER: What was your impression, at the time, of the radical reforms that Gaidar brought in, the shock therapy? Were you cheering from the sidelines, saying, "This is the way that we can go forward"? What was your thought at the time?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: Again, we should realize that the situation at that time was very difficult for those who started the reforms. First of all, in spite of the fact that Yeltsin won the first elections, Russia stopped being a communist country, etc., we must understand that the political support for changes, for reforms, was not strong enough. And after one year of reform, the government and even the president had lost almost all support from the society, almost all the confidence of the people. It was a huge problem. Of course there were certain mistakes, and maybe now we can understand that some things could have been done in another way, but the situation was that somebody should take responsibility, and I don't think that it was possible to avoid mistakes. From time to time, the situation in Russia is compared to the situation in the United States at the beginning of the century, or to other countries developing a democratic system. I partly share this point of view; it could be compared, but it's a different thing to undertake drastic changes in a whole society. Now everything is going faster, and that's why the reformers in Russia at the beginning of the '90s had to be more active, take more responsibility, and move more quickly than 50 or 80 years ago.

INTERVIEWER: On that point about 19th-century America and the great American industrial empires that were built at that time, when you started out, or even today, did you have a vision of your own role in Russian industry? Who were your models, people like J.P. Morgan and Rockefeller in the States?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: Everybody starts with creating or acquiring certain property in order to create the material to work with. When we started our business, we thought first of all about development, how to grow, and we managed to do this, even with all the difficulties and all the difficult rules that were implemented in Russia at that time. But now we understand that the only way to develop our businesses is to be integrated in the international market. It's the same thing for the whole economy of

Russia. I don't see our future as a country without integration in the international economic society. I'm not speaking about cultural, political views. I'm saying that we should be part of the international market, let's say, club, and to do so we must change a lot of things. We're trying to do this more or less successfully. We must change a lot of things on the level of the country, change legislation and establish certain traditions, have more transparency, etc., but we should also do the same thing on the level of companies. Several years ago, we didn't even think about what we are trying to do now, like corporate governance for example, certain corporate ethics, if you want. If we had started to think about the right methods of entrepreneurial activities, let's say five years ago, started to think that this is important, that acquisitions and growth are not everything. We also realize that we all must also know how to manage this and how to implement the right standards in our businesses. Back then, we bypassed such things as transparency and the development of relations with foreign partners. Now, eight years after we've started our business, we think not only about corporate governance, but corporate traditions, corporate ethical rules, etc., which is interesting for us, and we like this style.

Gaining Control of Norilsk Nickel [Норильский никель]

INTERVIEWER: How did you become interested in Norilsk Nickel? What was it that initially sparked your interest in it?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: Well, we first started to work with Norilsk Nickel when Nickel became a client of our bank. Our first knowledge about Norilsk came from that time. Working with them on a purely financial basis, we understood a lot of things. First of all, that the company was mismanaged. The financial problems they had were coming not because of the absence of prospects for the plant, but because of wrong methods of management. Maybe [it was] at that time that we understood that we could offer better management. We started to think for the first time about this possibility, because normally, up until then, we were never involved with the so-called real sector of the Russian economy, which means in the industrial, producing companies. It was assumed that we could not understand how to be a director of a big plant, for example. But when we saw how it works, when we saw the internal, let's say, kitchen of management in Norilsk, we understood that it could be done much better and much more efficiently. We saw that we could find better methods, better specialists to do that, and we started to think about it. And when we understood that we were ready for this kind of expansion into industry, we made a strategic decision to invest the money of our group in the industrial [sector], and we bought Norilsk Nickel and some other important industrial assets and started to restructure them.

Abb.: Palladium von Norilsk Nickel
(Pressefoto Norilsk Nickel)

INTERVIEWER: When you started thinking about acquiring it, I read that you talked to other businessmen who also had some considerable influence and, presenting a united front, made a proposal to the government. In those early days, how did that actually work? Were you talking to other businessmen like yourself?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: It worked the following way. By 1995, we already had a certain new business elite of managers and owners who, in my opinion, were efficient owners and qualified managers. But the interesting thing is that the distribution of property in the country was still in favor of the so-called Red Directors, because when the privatization started, in the first stage, all property came into the hands of the old managers, the so-called Red Directors, and it was clear that with their methods of management and their mentality, it would be very difficult to restructure the economy and to go forward with an integration into the international economy. So those who were efficient, who made their first money on financial operations, on trading operations, they were prepared to assume big management projects, but they had no property in their hands. That's why it was a certain struggle between the old nomenklatura and the new elite. And this struggle was different from struggles that have taken place in Europe or in the United States, because of lack of legislation and of other different things. The new businessmen were also, let's say, not angels. Anyway, generally speaking, without details, it was a struggle between the old Red Directors and old Communist Party, nomenklatura, and the new managers who had gained their money themselves under different and difficult rules, but by themselves. And as you can see now, the struggle was won by us, by those who were younger, who were more active and more prepared for competition.

Abb.: Tellur aus Norilsk Nickel
(Pressefoto Norilsk Nickel)

INTERVIEWER: With Norilsk in particular, I understand Anatoly Filatov was quite an important figure in the Soviet industry, and Norilsk was a real prize. But what made you think, as a young guy, that you could actually take on someone like that and win?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: That's exactly what we thought from the very beginning. There was a certain big respect for the so-called Red Directors because they really were big figures in public opinion, and we understood that we were leading something very big and important. And, you know, the openness is a very good thing when you do not know about the plant or the event or anything you cannot judge, and it seems to you like something that you could never understand. But when you start to understand what is inside, when you start to understand, as I said, the kitchen of making decisions, you start to understand that Filatov is a big guy, but he makes wrong things, and even if he did a very great job 10 years before, it doesn't mean that he can continue to do the right job. The conditions changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and he and his team were not prepared for the new conditions.

The methods of management which they had had spoiled the whole situation for Norilsk. 1994 was the worst year for Norilsk, the complete collapse. Only after three years, after we came to the plant, we managed to change the situation for the better. But our understanding that we could do this came from the analysis of what Filatov was doing. He was very great and big only on television or in an official atmosphere. When you know what he was doing in reality, you start to analyze your own possibilities and you start to believe in yourself.

Convincing Chubais [Анатолий Чубайс]

INTERVIEWER: When you took your idea that you had discussed with other businessmen, which eventually became known as loans-for-shares, to [Anatoly] Chubais, the deputy prime minister, I understand that at first he was skeptical and thought this wasn't the way he envisioned privatization. How did you bring him around to your way?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: Well, first of all, I came to Chubais with another idea. I told him to look, there is a large number of new businessmen who were ready to lead a really big project, and why do you leave the big state-owned properties in the hands of the Red Directors? Give the management to these entrepreneurs. Make some kind of auction for these [assets]. Let's make this move. The first stage of privatization led to the appearance of private property in the country, which was very good, because without private property it is not possible to develop market reforms. But this property was in the hands of inefficient owners. I proposed to Chubais to move the management of this property that was still state-owned to new businessmen. But politically it was very difficult, and afterward I understood why it was so difficult for Chubais, even if he agreed, generally speaking, with the idea that the management of this property was not as efficient as it should be. It was politically very difficult to withdraw this power from the Red Directors. It was not only the new businessmen who were not strong enough to struggle against Red Directors, but even the government and even Chubais were not strong enough to easily win this struggle. That's why the second idea, after I understood that the first one was very difficult to implement, was to sell this property. The initial idea of loans-for-shares auctions were proposed as a relatively transparent scheme with access for foreign investors. After a big struggle in the government, with the Red Directors, the property was transferred under a scheme which was, let's say, purely Russian. We were not against, from the beginning, the open auctions, to try to compete there.

We understood that the foreigners were not active enough, and were not prepared to invest before the second election of Mr. Yeltsin [Борис Николаевич Ельцин]i n 1996. We were ready to compete. But the problem was that the Red Directors were not prepared to compete, so they tried move the match, move the struggle to the territory of untransparent rules, where they considered they were stronger. But they were mistaken. We proved that we were more efficient even under such rules. And now, when I hear certain criticism from Western communities that the rules of this struggle were not transparent, I say, "Yes, they were not transparent, but they were rules which we were forced to play [by] because it was a struggle, not with foreign businessmen, it was a struggle with our Red Directors, and it was a struggle on their territory." And I remind everybody who is interested in this question that it was a game on their field. We played under their rules, and we won at their home. And now what we say is we are trying to invite everybody to play on our field, and now we are ready to respond to all kinds of criticism. But what we're doing now is not what we were forced to do before.

Abb.: Kobalt aus Norilsk Nickel
(Pressefoto Norilsk Nickel)

The Transfer to Democracy

INTERVIEWER: At the time before the presidential election, the political situation here was very volatile. Did you find that that was in the mind of Chubais and other people close to Yeltsin that yes, in fact, we need to support loans-for-shares? Was that really one of the driving forces in your thinking and the thinking of other businessmen, that you'd had to move quickly to start the economies?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: Well, I think that this reason existed, of course, because the decision was whether Russia will go toward the international society or [if] it will come back to the Communists. There was not only a question of political motives, but also there was a question of creating a group of supporters. Unfortunately it's very difficult to artificially create a wide group of supporters. And loan-for-shares, from a political point of view, could be considered an attempt to create a group of supporters who are for reforms, who are owners, who are supposed to be efficient owners. Of course it helped, the creation of owners of big industry, [owners] who have real influence on the economic development of the country; owners who have the mentality I described that is open to market reform and to international society and to democratic principles of life. It was, of course, very important. We can say that it was artificial. Yes, it was cheap, relatively cheap; it was not transparent, yes. But I think that it was difficult to avoid during this period that some should become big and important. And whether it was fair or unfair, we could use different methods of [measuring] this, but if these owners are efficient, if they manage now to deal with the problems of their enterprises, why not? I mean, maybe it was really the only way. Who knows now? But it was done, and, generally speaking, it was for the better.

And the support of Yeltsin, it was not just the choice between Zyuganov [Геннадий Андреевич Зюганов] and communism and Yeltsin and let's say his personality. I think that we should assume that Yeltsin was really a big democrat, and he really believed that the democratic way of development of Russia is a good way. He honestly believed in this, despite all the things that happened, and he had a lot of possibilities to show that he didn't want what it is, but he didn't. Everything he did proved that he is a democrat inside himself. And this was very important for our country, because when you pass very quickly from communism to a new era where democratic rules and traditions are very vulnerable, you must have a leader who is democratic inside himself. And Yeltsin was democratic. Look now at what has gone on in Yugoslavia. Milosevic was not prepared to respect the result of elections, and they created what's a really bad situation, a conflict situation. And Yeltsin, being a real democrat, despite the fact that everybody thought that maybe he would try to stay in power, he left the position. That, maybe, was the strongest move on his part during his whole life. He created the precedent of a normal transfer of power in Russia, and maybe after 10 or 20 or 50 years, we will remember this as the first precedent of nonrevolutionary transferral of power to a successor. That's very important.

Norilsk Nickel [Норильский никель]: Difficulties and Accomplishments

INTERVIEWER: When you were talking about going up against the Red Directors on their terms, as a young man against these titans of industry, and then winning on their terms, what did that feel like to win?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: First of all, it gave a great feeling of victory, because several years before, it was even difficult to think about struggling against such big figures like the Red Directors. And it was, if you want, some kind of pride that the young generation can compete. Many years later, it became a feeling of a great responsibility, because when you win, when you acquire something, when you come somewhere, you become responsible for everything that is going on. But that came a little bit later.

Abb.: Kirche in Norilsk
(Pressefoto Norilsk Nickel)

INTERVIEWER: When you first went to Norilsk, after you were victorious, when was that? What was it like?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: Three years after -- let's say, one year after the victory, it was a difficult time. I mean, it was just after a very difficult time because we came to Norilsk when the situation was really very difficult. There were a lot of debts, a reduction of production, no salaries for five months, etc. And we started as managers with demonstrations in the streets against us, because we hadn't paid the salaries, etc., which means we started from a very negative point. One year after, the situation changed already, and we had managed to pay all the salary debt, we restructured old debts, and we started a relatively successful crisis-management [process]. When I came for the first time, there was the feeling that people were very, let's say, they were playing cool with me. They were looking at me and trying to understand, because they had had a very bad feeling from the very beginning. They had some kind of hope, but it was very vulnerable. They tried to understand whether they could believe or not. And each time when I came to Norilsk, I felt the situation becoming warmer and warmer step by step from their part, and now it's quite a different situation.

Last February, I was ill, and I had a really high temperature. My physician told me to stay in bed for two weeks because it was really dangerous. And I said it was out of the question, that I had to go to Norilsk because people were waiting, and there was a program, and it's very important for us. And I went to Norilsk. It was minus-40 degrees, and I had a very hard program of meetings all day. And [when] I came back to Moscow, I felt practically not ill at all. I mean, several days of treatment, and that was all. That means it always gives me a lot of energy to go to Norilsk, because I feel it is very interesting. First of all, I see what we are trying to do, what we have tried to implement, and it works. It exists. It works, and it makes something. It makes something good, something important. And the second thing is the confidence of the people. When I come, I feel that people are asking me questions, and they really see that we're together. And they believe. They believe, and they are ready to share with me not only the plans for the future, not only the promises of higher salary, but what is important is that they are ready to share with me the problems.

When we had problems this summer with the idea to deprivatize Norilsk Nickel, when I came to Norilsk, I felt a real support. It's not artificial or organized, but real support from people who are really anxious about their destiny. And I felt, maybe for the first time in my life with Norilsk, that we have really the same destiny. And they understand that we have the same destiny. They do not see me like an exploiter; they see in me a partner. And together we're going to solve the Norilsk problems. That was very important for me, and of course I asked them to work and not to be involved in all, let's say, political movements. But it was very important for me to know that I have 100 percent at Norilsk. And when I came to President Putin and said to him, "Look, I want this case to be considered in a normal transparent way, under the law," he asked me whether I was sure that I was right. I thought I remembered my meetings in Norilsk; I remembered everything, and I said, "Yes, I'm right." He said, "Okay, go and work." It was important for me. It gave me the internal strength.

Abb.: Silbergranulat aus Norilsk Nickel
(Pressefoto Norilsk Nickel)

Russia Under Putin [Владимир Владимирович Путин]

INTERVIEWER: So under President Putin now, are you worried that there might be a move to renationalize Norilsk? Based on your conversations with him, what do you think his vision of the economic future of Russia is?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: I think that Putin really believes that the only way for Russia is to join the international society, to join with Europe and the international society in terms of integration in the whole world system. And my strong opinion is that Putin is very anxious about the destiny of Russia, really anxious. He considers his post as not an award, but a big responsibility. And he wants Russia to be strong. But I'm 100 percent sure that he doesn't want to see Russia strong in isolation, among some restricted, narrow circle of countries or regimes or whatever. He wants a strong Russia in the international society. He wants his country to be a player in, let's say, the champion's league. He doesn't want to win in small competitions. And that is very important. Therefore, I'm not afraid that some nonliberal, undemocratic changes will take place in Russia, because that's not the target of his presidency.

And as a personality, I also think that he's not looking for quick and easy results. He really is ready to work on problems, to solve them in reality and not just make an artificial cover of the problem. That's why I think there's no danger that Russia could change its movement to the international society. On the contrary, with Putin, who is young, of our generation, has a modern mentality, a certain openness, a tolerance, and a 12- or 14-hour working day, it gives us a certain hope that it will be quicker and less painful for the country to make further movement toward the international society. That's the general idea, in spite of that fact there is a certain pressure, from time to time, on business and on regional politics. It's inevitable.

Abb.: Präsident Putin in Norilsk Nickel
(Pressefoto Norilsk Nickel)

INTERVIEWER: Do you feel that you and the other people who are called the oligarchs have the same political influence under Putin that you had under Yeltsin?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: I think that it's not possible to exert any influence on Putin. I think that even people who are very close to him have only the right to be listened to. Even those who are really close to Putin always say that his decisions are unpredictable. And unpredictable doesn't mean unprepared or impulsive. It means that it is very difficult to influence and to predict what his reaction. And by the way, I think that even Putin concentrates too much [on] certain questions. It's very difficult for him, because he has the good capacity to know a matter in detail. He doesn't like to make a decision when he doesn't know the details. That's why when he concentrates too much on each question and requires that it be solved with his participation, it makes a big problem. I think that in the future he must delegate more authority to his team. At present, he has really a lot of headaches and problems to solve. But influence, that's absolutely impossible.

And even with Yeltsin, by the way, it was very difficult to make any kind of influence directly on him, because he had a strong personality. But the difference is that, in my opinion, a lot of decisions which were made by Yeltsin were prepared artificially by restricting the generality of information and by creating, let's say, a certain environment. And this could affect a lot of particular decisions. As I told you, Yeltsin was always a big democrat. That is why the major decisions couldn't be changed, but the smaller particular decisions in the economic sphere, in the questions handled by staff people, in my opinion, they could be influenced. But with Putin, as I said, forget about this. In my opinion it's absolutely impossible.

Reacting to Criticisms of the New Russian Oligarchs

INTERVIEWER: What's your reaction to the criticism directed at you and the other oligarchs? We talked about transparency and the need to be a part of the global economy. What's your reaction when you read criticisms of large Russian businesses like Norilsk Nickel, and criticism of yourself, criticism that asserts you're not playing by the same rules that are required to be part of the global economy?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: There is criticism, and there is criticism. When we're criticized for the things in which we are really in the wrong, or not on time, or when people are anxious because of the fact that they are prepared to work with us but they do not understand our actions and they think that we are doing something wrong, my reaction to that sort of criticism is positive all the time. I will try to explain in my position if I feel that I am right, but I'm ready to accept that I'm wrong, and if I am, I will try to change what's wrong. This is good, and we need this as a company. We need this as a country. I think that it's a very wrong thing when people say do not criticize us. That's not right. We must know what people are thinking about us.

But on the other hand, there exists a criticism that is connected, in my view, with wrong and unfair opinions about Russia and about Russians, without understanding of our history, without understanding about our situation, forgetting that we are only 10 years into living in a democracy. When I see this kind of criticism, which is quite negative and unconstructive, and which is just explaining the absence of desire in people to understand us and to live together with us, of course I'm disappointed and it makes me sad. Frankly speaking, from time to time it's even difficult to respond. But I think that healthy criticism, which is inspired by the desire to see Russia among other countries in the international community, and the desire to see our companies, my companies, as part of the whole system under transparent and normal rules, I welcome this. And I'm trying to be very critical also toward myself. It's always a question whether I am successful in this or not, but I always am trying to make myself to be very attentive to this kind of criticism.

Russia's Future as a Capitalist Country

INTERVIEWER: Looking back now, 10 years ago, you were an official in the Ministry of Trade. Now you are a very influential and successful businessman. Look toward the future another 10, 20, 30 years. What do you think your role in the Russian economy will be down the line? Will you be remembered like Rockefeller or J.P. Morgan? And what kind of capitalism do you think Russia will have down the road in the long term?

VLADIMIR POTANIN: For the time being, there's a very big concentration of capital in our country, which is historical. Even before the October Revolution we had this in Russia, this high level of concentration of capital. During socialism, we made a lot of monopolies, big plants, exclusive plants that led toa high level of monopolization and high-level concentrations of capital. That's why several companies, several people leading these companies, are very influential. If you take the 12 or 15 biggest companies in the country, I think that they produce more than 50 percent of the GNP, which is not good. Together with the fact that 90 percent of GNP is being produced by so-called old business -- restructured, better managed, but old, old businesses -- and only 10, maybe 15 percent of GNP is produced by what we call new businesses created from nothing, it means that in order to have a more competitive system, and a more transparent and more market-oriented system, we need several things. First of all we need to raise the portion of new businesses, of smaller and average businesses, in the GNP, which will take place, I'm sure, within five or 10 years, that percentage will grow. The importance of big businessmen and the big businesses should be less, and they should become more numerous. If we have 100 or 200 big companies it's one thing, but when we have 20 it's quite another; the influence is bigger. We are starting to speak here about oligarchs and influence on politics, etc. To a large extent this is true, but this will change together with the extension of business in Russia. Our role now, because we are important from the point of view of Russian economy -- we are producing 4.5 percent of GNP for example, Interros Group, which is too much. I mean, our role is to produce this 4.5 percent efficiently and to think about the social problems that we're trying to solve, to have a certain social responsibility. As I said, when we come somewhere, we're responsible for everything, not only the profitability of the business. We are too big and too important to think only about pure management; we should also think about the environment. And now, when we are not numerous, those of us who have a really big influence should use that influence to create a new climate, more transparent and more fair. We should accept the idea that we need to become more numerous. We should invite people into the club, not to make restrictions on them, but to invite them.

This is more or less going on now. Now all businessmen are trying to create an organization where they all are represented, an organization that doesn't serve the interests of special groups, but is really for everybody, a representative organization of businessmen. And people have started to understand that the environment is no less important than their own businesses, and they are starting to pay lot of attention to this. This will make the situation in the economic life of the country healthier. I think that our role is not to stop this process. On the contrary, while we have the instruments of influence, our role is to use them to create a new atmosphere, in spite of the fact that our personal influence will be lower. But it's a normal process, and we should work for this. I think a lot of my colleagues really share this point of view. Of course, there is a lack of confidence between us and them. It's very difficult to leave some positions when you have them. But it's important to understand that it's really dangerous not to change the situation. It's really dangerous when there's no environment. It makes the situation very vulnerable when business is very nontransparent and public opinion is very hostile towards businessmen. And that's also a thing we think we should change. That's more or less what I think about our role."

[Quelle: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_vladimirpotanin.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

26. Михаил Дмитриевич Прохоров — Michail D. Prochorow (Mikhail D. Prokhorov) (1965 - )

Abb.: Michail D. Prochorow — Михаил Дмитриевич Прохоров
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/1924.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

Webpräsenz von Norilsk Nickel: http://www.nornik.ru/en/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06

Zu Norilsk Nickel siehe:

Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 1. Russland  (Россия). -- 1. Firmen. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307011.htm


"Mikhail D. Prokhorov [Михаил Дмитриевич Прохоров ]
General Director, Chairman, President [of Norilsk Nickel — Норильский никель]

Born on May 3, 1965.

In 1989 graduated with honors from the Moscow State Financial Institute [Московский государственный финансовый институт] (Department of Foreign Economic Relations).

In 1989 - 1992 – Head of department of the International Bank of Economic Cooperation (IBEC) [Международного банка экономического сотрудничества (МБЭС)].

In 1992 - 1993 – Chairman of the Board of the International Company for Finance and Investments (MFK Bank) [Международная финансовая компания].

In 1993 –1998 – Chairman of the Board of UNEXIM [ОНЭКСИМ] Bank.

In 1998 - 2000 – President and Chairman of the Board of UNEXIM Bank.

In 2000 - 2001 – President of Rosbank [РОСБАНК].

Since July 2001 - General Director and Chairman of the Management Board of MMC Norilsk Nickel [Норильский никель]. "

[Quelle: http://www.nornik.ru/about/management_structure/management_board/169/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

"However, the richest Russian metallurgist and the second richest Russian resident by official standards is Mikhail Prokhorov, general manager of Norilsk Nickel Metallurgical Combine, who owns 28.87% of the company’s shares. He was worth $1.162 billion in 2002 (the company’s capitalization as of the end of December 2002 was $4.27 billion). Owing to the fact that Nornikel’s capitalization nearly tripled in 2003 (to nearly $12 billion as of December 1), Mr. Prokhorov’s share capital reached nearly $3.5 billion. His dividend earnings for all of 2002 were $44.7 million; but in 2003, his earnings from interim dividend payments for the first nine months alone will be $86.6 million. "

[Quelle: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=465&id=439351. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

"Prawda, 13:23 2003-02-18

Norilsk Nickel [Норильский никель] officials offer no concessions to hunger strikers

Mikhail Prokhorov [Михаил Дмитриевич Прохоров ], CEO of Russian metals giant Norilsk Nickel, visited hunger-striking union leaders on Monday, but said the firm's management would not yield to pressure over a pay dispute, the company said. "The participants in the action have been told that a hunger strike is not a method to solve disputes, but is meant to exert pressure on the management," a Norilsk Nickel spokesman said. "They have been told there will be no concessions."

Union leaders at Norilsk's Arctic Division, which employs 60,000 and hosts the firm's main mines and plants, last month threatened a strike to press demands for more wages, more holiday and more information including on managers' salaries. They started a hunger strike on February 6 after more than two weeks of talks with management brought no results, the Russia Journal reported."

[Quelle: http://english.pravda.ru/comp/2003/02/18/43441.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

27. Виктор Рашников — Viktor Raschnikow (Viktor Rashnikov) (1948 - )

Abb.: Viktor Raschnikow — Виктор Рашников
[Bildquelle: http://mosnews.com/images/p/2169.shtml. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

Webpräsenz von MMK: http://www.mmk.ru. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16

Abb.: Lage von Magnitogorsk — Магнитого́рск
(©MS Encarta)

"Viktor Raschnikow [Виктор Рашников] - (56) [geb. 1948], geschätztes Vermögen: 2,6 Mrd. Dollar.

Abb.: ®Logo

Von der operativen Leitung des Stahlgiganten Magnitogorsk [агнитогорский металлургический комбинат] (MMK) hat Viktor Raschnikow genug. Der bisherige Generaldirektor zog sich nun auf den Posten des Aufsichtsratschefs zurück und will für die "Strategie" des Metallurgieriesen verantwortlich zeichnen. Raschnikow ist einer der einflussreichsten Unternehmer in Russland - Präsident Wladimir Putin [Владимир Владимирович Путин] lud er zum Skifahren in den Ural ein. Und dem Kremlchef gefiel es an der Seite des begeisterten Eishockeyspielers und Skifahrers Raschnikow. Im vergangenen Jahr siegte Raschnikow denn auch bei der Auktion des Staatsanteils von 17,8 Prozent an Magnitka. 790 Mio. Dollar bezahlte das Management bei der Auktion. Heute sind 99 Prozent der Magnitka-Aktien [Магнитка] in Händen des Managements konzentriert. Das Stahlwerk Magnitogorsk ist Ausdruck sowjetischer Gigantomanie. Erich Honecker baute in den dreißiger Jahren an dem Stahlgiganten mit. JH

Artikel erschienen am Fre, 8. April 2005"

[Quelle: http://www.welt.de/data/2005/04/08/660730.html?prx=1. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

"Виктор Рашников родился в 1948 г. в Магнитогорске. В 1974 г. окончил Магнитогорский горно-металлургический институт. На ММК пришел работать в 1967 г. слесарем цеха ремонта металлургического оборудования. Прошел все карьерные ступени: оператор, бригадир, мастер, начальник смены, начальник цеха, начальник управления по производству и поставкам продукции. В 1991 г. назначен главным инженером - первым заместителем гендиректора. В 1997 г. стал гендиректором комбината."

[Quelle. http://www.mmk.ru/rus/press/about/article.wbp?article-id=57192F0A-AC10-1004-002D-B1D4B2B7F972. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

"May 2000

Industry in Magnitogorsk [Магнитогорск] centers around the worlds largest single steel milling and shaping factory. The five mills at the plant produced the steel for half of all of the Russian tanks during WWII. This historically military emphasis is typical in the Stalin Era city and is commemorated in a statue of the personified Soviet Worker handing the sword that he has forged to the Soviet Soldier.

Abb.: Kolossalstatue in Magnitogorsk zur Erinnerung an die Bedeutung Magnitogorsks für die russische Rüstung im 2. Weltkrieg
[Bildquelle: ru.wikipedia]

This legacy of steel manufacturing lives on today in the massive amounts of raw steel, pig iron and finished products produced at the Magnitogorsk Metal Works. In 1996 the factory produced 7.5 million tons of steel, which is roughly equivalent to the entire steel output of Great Britain or Canada. This feat is made even more amazing by the fact that there are no naturally occurring resources currently within easy distance of the city. The once rich mine on Magnetic Mountain is now depleted and there never actually existed any coal for coking the iron on the site. Now all of the raw materials must be hauled in over the rails from various locations all over Russia. It may seem odd that a country with slightly more than half of the population of the United States would produce just as much steel and pig iron. This  discrepancy is due to several factors. During the crash industrialization of the Stalin Era a tremendous emphasis was placed on quantity of goods, tonnage of steel was in demand, rather than quality of steel. This push was an attempt to get the USSR cought up to the United States in industrial capacity. This push therefore required tremendous amounts of measurable goods, tonnage of steel for example, and in the command economy, what the government dictates is what the factories attempt to produce. A second factor was due in large part to the faulty infrastructure in the Soviet Union. Since manufacturers knew that their shipments of raw steel would not arrive on time, they ordered far more than they needed and ordered it far more frequently and kept tremendous inventories of steel on hand which, because of the large amount of time spent in poor storage conditions, would rust away and become useless. Thus, the cycle started over again.

Condidtions in the factory have always been far from pleasant.  At certain points during the construction of the factory injuries and deaths averaged over one per day.  Conditions improved as time went on, but they are still not up to snuff with Japanese or American steel production standards.  Injuries are still more common than in the US and conditions are worse.  A major factor in the increased hazard level in the Magnitogorsk Steel Works is the condition of the equipment and facilities.  The majority of equipment in the factory still relies on technology developed in the 1930s when the plant was built and in many places the machines themselves are the same ones installed in the origional factory at its inception.  The age of the machinery coupled with overuse and poor maintanence habits has resulted in the condition of the factory today.  Many of the machines have been continuously run over capacity and not given time for repair so that the factory would meet its quota.  The practice of "storming" also took its toll ont he machinery and workers.  Storming is a practice instituted under the planned economy the end of a production cycle.   If the plant had not yet reached it's quota of steel produced, then the plant would shift into overdrive and produce the remaining portion of the quota.  This often doubled or tripled the plant's normal output.  This degradation of machinery, coupled with its age and inefficiency have combined for a truly difficult working environment.  Workers in the factory have been reported to prefer the summer months to the winter because in the summer the factory allows its roof and skylight system to open which reduces the concentration of fumes.

These poor working conditions along with the age and quality of machinery combine to reduce the efficiency of the plant significantly.  Today the plant has a staff of 55,000 workers and produces only 30% of the steel it did only a decade ago.  As matters stand now, the plant is extremely inefficient compared to plants in Japan and the United States.  Workers in the Lenin Steelworks in Magnitogorsk produce an average of 183 tons of steel per year, while the Gary Works in Gary, Indiana produces an average of 1800 tons of steel per worker per year.

The Current state of the steel mill is rather up in the air.  While the mill is chugging along at less than a third of its regular capacity, it is still one of the more viable Russia industries.  Asian countries without their own steel manufacturing complexes have been relatively eager to buy the cheap steel from this Russian plant.  Foreign sales have resulted in an income of hard currency for the plant workers, each of whom is paid more than the national average.  In addition, American, Asian and European investors have all  been interested in refurbishing the plant with modern equipment and pollution reduction devices in hopes of revitializing the plant.  So far their efforts have come with moderate success, which often spurs more investment.  This said however, the plant still suffers from periodic shutdowns due to lack of materials and equipment breakdown."

[Quelle: Aaron Ritz. --  http://www.macalester.edu/COURSES/GEOG61/aritz/industry.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

28. Александр Павлович Смоленский — Alexander Pawlowitsch Smolenski (Alexander P. Smolensky) (1954 - )

Abb.: Александр Павлович Смоленский — Alexander Pawlowitsch Smolenski
[Bildquelle: http://www.nns.ru/archive/chronicle/1997/12/02.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]


"Alexander Smolensky [Александр Павлович Смоленский], media, oil, banking.

Like some of the other one time black market traders, Alexander P. Smolensky also prepared himself during the Soviet era for what ultimately was to become a market economy. Some might say he overprepared himself.

Born in 1954, Mr. Smolensky moonlighted on a second job in a bakery for which he lacked a permit and then he helped typeset and publish a Bible using government presses and ink to do so. For this he was arrested by the KGB in 1981 and charged with economic crimes. Today such initiatives would be applauded. Then he was sentenced to two years at hard labor although he only served one day.

A born risk-taker, he responded to Gorbachev's [Михаил Сергеевич Горбачёв] 1987 decree allowing the formation of cooperatives and private businesses by founding the Moscow No. 3 construction cooperative which quickly became an vital source of supplies to Moscow tradesmen.

He made money so fast it became a problem, so, rather than trust state banks which were not accustomed to dealing with large private accounts he decided to create his own bank, the Stolichny Bank [Столичный банк]. It has grown into one of Russia's largest, now known as SBS-AGRO [СБС-АГРО].

Unlike many of his fellow bankers Mr. Smolinsky has not actively sought to build up a large industrial empire. While his bank does control the newspaper Kommersant [Коммерса́нтъ] and Novaya Gazeta [НОВАЯ ГАЗЕТА] and he shares in the ownership of the Sibneft [Сибнефть] oil company and the television network ORT [ОРТ - Общественное Российское Телевидение] with Boris Berezovsky [Борис Абрамович Березо́вский], for the most part he has focused instead on developing a large network of bank branches.

Last Modified 2005-09-10"

[Quelle: Bjorn Hammarback. --  http://www.ulfsbo.nu/ussr/alexander_smolensky.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

"Skandale: Smolenski hatte schon 1989 die erste Privatbank Russlands gegründet und war Mitte der 90er Jahre durch teilweise illegale Spekulationen reich geworden. Doch bei der Finanzkrise 1998 hatte er sich selbst gründlich verspekuliert, die Anleger der Smolenski-Bank SBS-Agro [СБС-АГРО] verloren Millionen. In einem Interview mit dem Korrespondent des Wall Street Journal, Andrew Higgins, nennt Smolenski die Großinvestoren der SBS-Agro Idioten. Über die westlichen Kreditgeber der SBS-Agro sagt er: „Sie kriegen vom toten Esel die Ohren.“.

[Quelle: http://www.aktuell.ru/rupol0022/morenews.php?iditem=82. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

"Russia's youngest billionaire acquires British sports car maker TVR

07/28/2004 16:30

Russian oligarchs prefer to follow Roman Abramovich's [Роман Аркадьевич Абрамович] example

Abb.: Nikolai Smoloensky — Николай Смоленский
[Bildquelle: http://www.peoples.ru/family/children/smokenskiy/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

Twenty-three-year-old Russian oligarch Nikolai Smolensky [Николай Смоленский] is the new owner of the British sports car company TVR. Nikolai Smolensky is the son of the Russian banker Alexander Smolensky [Александр Смоленский].


Abb.: TVR 280i
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia]

The Blackpool-based company is one of the few private-owned car companies left in Great Britain. The company employs 400 people. According to media reports, the new owner promised the company would continue developing.

Former TVR owner Peter Wheeler and the new proprietor do not unveil the details of the transaction. According to the Financial Times, the British sports car maker's income in 2002 made up over $700 thousand. Peter Wheeler said he was very sorry to part with his company, although he added it was time to pass the business to the young generation.

The plans to produce Sagaris and Tuscan 2 models remain unchanged. First demo cars will appear in the dealers' network during the coming months.

Observers say, the new ownership of the British company may produce a sensation comparable to Roman Abramovich's acquiring of Chelsea.

Alexander Smolenski, the father of the new company owner, set up a savings bank in the middle of the 1990s. The businessman bought Agroprombank [Агропромбанк] and established the largest network of banks in Russia with more than a million of private depositors - SBS-Agro [СБС-Агро]. The bank went bankrupt after the financial crisis in Russia in 1998; it was abolished in 2003. Debts to private depositors were partially cleared, although the bank still owed about $1.2 billion to foreign clients.

Abb.: Kreditkarte von 1 O.B.K.

In 2003 Alexander Smolensky established a new network called The First Community of Mutual Credit [Банк Первое Общество Взаимного Кредита], known in Russia as 1O.V.K. [1 О.В.К.]  A part of new companies was housed in the offices of SBS-Agro. Alexander Smolensky's son Nikolai headed the board of directors of the new financial organization. In 2004 the banker sold his empire to Interros Group [Интеррос], which currently plans a merger between O.V.K. and Rosbank [Росбанк].

Abb.: Reklame für Visa-beebonus Rosbank

In February of 2004 Nikolai Smolensky was recognized Russia's youngest billionaire.

TVR is a small British car maker, which manufactures up to 2,000 cars a year. TVR ranks third among the world's sports cars makers. The range of company"s models includes Tuscan S, T350, T400R, T440R, Cerbera, Tamora, Sagalis. All cars are custom-made."

[Quelle: http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/13578_tvr.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

29. Анатолий Борисович Чубайс — Anatoli Borisowitsch Tschubais (Anatoly Borisovich Chubais)  (1955 - )

Abb.: Анатолий Борисович Чубайс — Anatoli Borisowitsch Tschubais (1955 - )
[Bildquelle: http://www.chubais.ru/show.cgi?/archives/a0.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

Webpräsenz: http://www.chubais.ru. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16

Webpräsenz von Unified Energy System: http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16

"Anatoly Chubais
  • Full Name: Anatoly Borisovich Chubais
  • Born: June 16, 1955 in Belarus [Беларусь]
  • Office: Chairman of the Board of the Unified Energy System of Russia
  • In 1990, appointed Deputy Mayor, then the First Deputy Mayor of Leningrad and Chief Economic Adviser to the City Mayor.
  • In November 1991, became Chairman of the State Property Committee of the Russian Federation, member of the Cabinet
  • In June 1992, appointed Vice-Premier of the Russian Government.
  • In June 1993, took part in establishing the liberal Vybor Rossii [Выбор России] (Choice of Russia) electoral block. Elected to the State Duma in 1993.
  • From November 1994 — January 1996, he was First Vice-Premier in charge of economy and finance
  • In July 1996, was appointed Chief of the Presidential Administration.
  • In March 1997, appointed First Vice-Premier and Minister of Finance.
  • In April 1997, appointed Director of the Russian Federation to the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
  • In 1998, appointed Chairman of the Board of the Unified Energy System of Russia [РАО "ЕЭС России"]
  • Married, has two children
  • Probably the most unpopular of all the Russian politicians, Anatoly Chubais is the head of the Unified Energy System of Russia and the mastermind behind the Russian privatization in early 1990s.

    Anatoly Chubais graduated in 1977 from the Leningrad Institute of Economics and Engineering with a Ph.D. in economics. He was an assistant lecturer from 1977 to 1982 and an assistant professor from 1982 to 1990 at his alma mater.

    From 1984-1987 Chubais was the leader of an informal ’circle of young economists,’ set up by graduates of the Leningrad economic institutes. In 1987, he took an active part in founding the Perestroika [Перестройка] (Restructuring) Club in Leningrad, which was aimed at promoting liberal ideas among intellectuals.

    In 1990, Anatoly Chubais began his political career as a deputy chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, and in 1991 became chief economic adviser to the mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak [Анатолий Александрович Собчак]. Chubais was part of a group of young economists who pushed for rapid economic reform toward a market-based system. A strong advocate of the privatization of state property, he was appointed deputy prime minister for the Ministry of Privatization in 1992, becoming a first deputy prime minister in 1994. As a member of the State Duma from 1994 to 1996, he served on the Committee for Property, Privatization, and Economics.

    Abb.: Im Kreis um Jeltsin
    [Bildquelle: http://www.chubais.ru/show.cgi?/archives/a5.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16] 

    In February 1996, he set up the Civil Society Fund, which formed the foundation for Boris Yeltsin’s [Борис Николаевич Ельцин] re-election headquarters’ research group. Guided by Chubais, the group played a key role in organizing the public support campaign in favor of reelecting Yeltsin as President of Russia.

    In March 1997, Anatoly Chubais was appointed first deputy prime minister of Russia and served in this position until March 1998.

    After his abrupt dismissal, along with the rest of the Russian Government in March 1998, Anatoly Chubais was first elected to the Board of Directors of the joint-stock company Unified Energy System of Russia and then appointed Chairman of the Board on April 30, 1998.

    Abb.: Structure of Russian Power Industry by Early 2004
    [Bildquelle: http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/reforming/reason/show.cgi?background.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

    Along with being one of the top managers in Russian business, Anatoly Chubais continues his political career. In 2001 he was elected Co-chairman of the SPS [Союз Правых Сил— СПС] (Union of Right Forces) political party and served as such until the aftermath of the parliamentary elections of 2003, when all of the party’s leaders resigned from their positions.

    Abb.: ®Logo der SPS-Partei

    Anatoly Chubais is perhaps the most unpopular of the Russian politicians because his name is associated in the minds of ordinary citizens with the voucher privatization that took place from October 1992 until July 1994. In the process of privatization, every Russian citizen received a voucher that was nominally worth 10,000 rubles (which was an equivalent of $5,000 by the black market rate). 10,000 rubles was a sum that was calculated to be an average share of the country’s wealth per capita.

    Officially the vouchers could be exchanged for shares in the newly privatized enterprises, but in reality only one tenth of all vouchers went through this kind of an exchange, because enterprises chose to sell shares to those close to the management. Most of the vouchers were invested by the people into voucher funds, which sprang up like mushrooms after the rain. The funds promised its shareholders that they would invest the vouchers and offered a promise of a handsome return. In reality, the owners of the vouchers were left with nothing but pieces of paper.

    In the minds of the ordinary people the voucher privatization failed, and the person responsible for the whole process was Anatoly Chubais, who became something of an enemy of the people. His future work in the government did not help his reputation, as the series of reforms initiated by Chubais and a team of “young reformers” proved to be highly unpopular measures.

    Updated: 04.11.2005 15:15 MSK"

    [Quelle: http://mosnews.com/mn-files/chubais.shtml#news. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-06]

    Анатолий Борисович Чубайс : Биография

      Родился 16 июня 1955 года в Белоруссии в г.Борисове в семье военного.

      В 1977 году окончил Ленинградский инженерно-экономический институт им.Пальмиро Тольятти (ЛИЭИ).

      В 1977 - 1982 годах - инженер, ассистент ЛИЭИ.

      В 1982 - 1990 годах - доцент Ленинградского инженерно-экономический института.

      В 1983 году защитил кандидатскую диссертацию на тему: "Исследование и разработка методов планирования совершенствования управления в отраслевых научно-технических организациях".

      В 1984 - 1987 года - лидер неформального кружка "молодых экономистов", который был создан группой выпускников экономических ВУЗов города.

      В 1987 году в Ленинграде при активном участии А. Чубайса был основан клуб "Перестройка", который с самого начала поставил своей целью продвижение демократических идей в широкие круги интеллигенции.

      В 1990 году Анатолий Чубайс назначен заместителем, затем первым заместителем председател исполкома Ленсовета, главным экономическим советником мэра г. Ленинграда А. Собчака.

      С ноября 1991 года - председатель Государственного Комитета Российской Федерации по управлению государственным имуществом.

      1 июня 1992 года - назначен Первым заместителем председателя Правительства России по вопросам экономической и финансовой политики. За 1992 год ГКИ под руководством А. Чубайса была разработана программа приватизации и осуществлена ее техническая подготовка.

      Июнь 1993 года - А. Чубайс принял участие в создании предвыборного блока "Выбор России".

      В декабре 1993 года избран депутатом Госдумы от избирательного объединения "Выбор России".

      Ноябрь 1994 - январь 1996 года - первый заместитель Председателя   Правительства РФ по вопросам экономической и финансовой политики.

      Апрель 1995 года - назначен управляющим от РФ в международных финансовых организациях.

      Февраль 1996 года - освобожден от должности управляющего от РФ в международных финансовых организациях.

      В феврале 1996 года создал "Фонд Гражданское Общество", на основе которого начала работу аналитическая группа предвыборного штаба Б.Н. Ельцина.

      В июне 1996 года создал Фонд "Центр защиты частной собственности".

      15 июля 1996 года назначен Руководителем Администрации Президента РФ.

      В 1996 году А.Б. Чубайсу был присвоен квалификационный разряд Действительный государственный советник 1 класса.

      7 марта 1997 году назначен Первым заместителем Председателя Правительства РФ и одновременно Министром финансов РФ.

      В 1997 году - признан журналом "Euromoney" на основе экспертного опроса ведущих финансистов мира - лучшим министром финансов года.

      Апрель 1997 года назначен управляющим от РФ в МБРР (Международный Банк Реконструкции и Развития) и многостороннем агентстве по гарантиям инвестиций.

      Май 1997 - май 1998 года - член Совета безопасности РФ.

      Ноябрь 1997 года освобожден от должности Министра финансов, сохранив за собой должность Первого заместителя Председателя Правительства РФ.

      23 марта 1998 года освобожден от должности Первого заместителя Председателя Правительства РФ.

      4 апреля 1998 года на внеочередном собрании акционеров РАО "ЕЭС России" избран в состав Совета директоров компании.

      30 апреля 1998 года назначен Председателем Правления РАО "ЕЭС России".

      17 июня 1998 года назначен Специальным представителем Президента РФ по связям с международными финансовыми организациями.

      28 августа 1998 года освобожден от должности Специального представителя Президента РФ по связям с международными финансовыми организациями.

      Декабрь 1998 года - А.Б. Чубайс вошел в состав Оргкомитета коалиции "Правое дело" и был избран в состав Координационного комитета Оргкомитета коалиции. Анатолий Чубайс возглавил комиссию по организационной работе Координационного совета.

      28 июля 1999 года - на заседании Совета Национальной Ассоциации участников фондового рынка (НАУФОР) по итогам опроса более 300 компаний – членов НАУФОР А.Б.Чубайсу было присвоено звание "Человек, внесший наибольший вклад в развитие российского фондового рынка".

      В феврале 2000 года на заседании Правительственной  комиссии Российской Федерации по сотрудничеству с  Европейским союзом назначен сопредседателем Круглого   стола промышленников России и ЕС с российской стороны.

      В мае 2000 года на учредительном съезде   Общероссийской политической организации "Союз правых  сил" избран сопредседателем Координационного совета.

      В июле 2000 года стал президентом  Электроэнергетического совета СНГ.  Переизбирался на этот пост в 2001, 2002, 2003 и 2004 гг.

      В октябре 2000 года избран в Правление Российского союза промышленников и предпринимателей (работодателей).

      26 мая 2001 года на учредительном съезде партии "Союз Правых Сил" избран Сопредседателем и членом Федерального политического совета.

      В декабре 2001 года был награжден Международным союзом экономистов почетным дипломом "Международное признание" за большой вклад в развитие России на основе применения передового международного опыта по внедрению современных методов организации управления, экономики, финансов и производственных процессов.

      В 2002 году закончил факультет повышения квалификации преподавателей и специалистов Московского энергетического института по направлению "Проблемы современной энергетики". Защитил итоговую работу на тему "Перспективы развития гидроэнергетики России".

      24 января 2004 года подал в отставку с поста Сопредседателя  партии "Союз Правых Сил". Избран в Федеральный политический совет партии.

      Имеет три благодарности Президента России (получены в 1995, 1997 и 1998 гг.).

      Владеет английским языком.

      Женат. Имеет сына и дочь от первого брака."

    [Quelle: http://www.chubais.ru/show.cgi?/personal/biography/biogr.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

    30. Алишер Бурханович Усманов — Alischer Burchanowitsch Usmanow (Alisher Usmanov) (1953 - )

    Abb.: Алишер Бурханович Усманов — Alischer Burchanowitsch Usmanow
    [Bildquelle: http://www.gazprominvestholding.ru/podrazd.php. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

    Webpräsenz von Gasprominvestholding: http://www.gazprominvestholding.ru. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16

    "Alischer Burchanowitsch Usmanow [Алишер Бурханович Усманов]

    Abb.: ®Logo

    Einer der erfolgreichsten und einflusreichsten Unternehmer Russlands, „Taschkenter Stahlmogul“ genannt. Generaldirektor der Gasprominvestholding [ГАЗПРОМИНВЕСТХОЛДИНГ].

    Zitat: „Ich möchte heute Geschäfte machen, die die gesamte Unternehmergemeinschaft berühren. Wenn du verlierst, so ein wenig an alle; wenn du gewinnst, so ein wenig von jedem“.

    Geboren: 9. September 1953 in Tschust (Usbekistan).

    Laufbahn: Abschluss der Moskauer Diplomatenhochschule. Finanzakademie der russischen Regierung im Fach „Bankenwesen“. Mitarbeiter der Akademie der sowjetischen Wissenschaften, Referent beim ZK des kommunistischen Jugendverbandes Komsomol von Usbekistan, in der Folgezeit Mitarbeit bei mehreren Privatbanken und Firmen in Moskau und Archangelsk [Архангельск]. Ab 2000 Generaldirektor der Gasprominvestholding. Bis Mitte 2001 Gasprom [Газпром]-Vorstandsmitglied.

    Freunde: Oleg Deripaska [Олег Владимирович Дерипаска]. Usmanow ist einer der wenigen, die bei Gasprom unter Rem Wjachirew angefangen hatten und sich unter dem Putin-Vertrauten Alexej Miller [Алексей Борисович Миллер] behaupten konnten.

    Feinde: Offiziell keine bekannt.

    Skandale: Usmanow wurde 1980 wegen mehrerer Verbrechen zu acht Jahren Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt, kam wegen guter Führung 1986 auf Bewährung frei. Später behauptete Usmanow Opfer „politischer Repressionen“ zu sein. Als Geschäftsmann Anfang der 90er zahlreiche zwielichtige Valutageschäfte. Soll Geld für eine tschetschenische Gruppierung angelegt haben.

    Abb.: Irina Winer (Viner) — Ирина винер
    [Bildquelle: http://www.rol.ru/cgi-bin/slides/slideshow.cgi?id=Sport_izv&n=17. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

    Familie: Verheiratet. Seine Frau ist Irina Winer [Ирина винер], längjährige Trainerin der russischen Nationalmannschaft im Kunstturnen.

    Hobbies: Kunst und Sport. Usmanow sitzt im Beirat des Bolschoitheaters. Er ist Präsident des russischen Fechtverbandes [Федерация Фехтования России] und Aufsichtsratsmitglied des Dynamo-Fußballklubs [Динамо Москва]."

    Abb.: Dynamo Moskau — Динамо Москва
    (Pressefoto Dynamo Moskau)

    [Quelle: http://www.aktuell.ru/rupol0022/morenews.php?iditem=119. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

    "Биографическая справка

    УСМАНОВ Алишер Бурханович родился в 1953 году в городе Чуст Наманганской области Узбекской ССР. Образование высшее. В 1976 году окончил МГИМО МИД СССР по специальности "международное право", в 1997 году - Финансовую академию при Правительстве РФ по специальности банковское "дело".

    После окончания МГИМО работал научным сотрудником Академии Наук СССР, старшим референтом ЦК ЛКСМ Узбекистана, генеральным директором Внешнеэкономической ассоциации Советского комитета защиты мира (СКЗМ).

    В 1990-1994 годах - первый заместитель генерального директора ЗАО "Интеркросс". В 1994-1995 годах - советник генерального директора Московского авиационного производственного объединения (МАПО). В 1995-1997 годах - первый заместитель председателя правления МАПО-банка. С 1994-го по 1998 год - генеральный директор Межбанковской инвестиционно-финансовой компании "Интерфин" (ЗАО "МИФК "Интерфин"). С 1997-го по 2001 год был членом совета директоров ОАО "Архангельскгеолдобыча" (АГД).

    С ноября 1998 года по февраль 2000 года - первый заместитель генерального директора ООО "Газпроминвестхолдинг". С февраля 2000 года - генеральный директор ООО "Газпроминвестхолдинг". С ноября 2000 года по июль 2001 года исполнял обязанности советника председателя правления ОАО "Газпром".

    Мастер спорта по фехтованию, в 1970-е годы входил в сборную команду Узбекистана по сабельному фехтованию. Президентом Федерации фехтования России (ФФР) избран 2 марта 2001 года.

    Является также членом попечительского совета Большого театра и членом совета директоров футбольного клуба "Динамо"."

    [Quelle: http://www.gazprominvestholding.ru/biography.php. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

    31. Виктор Феликсович Вексельберг — Wiktor Wekselberg (Viktor Vekselberg) (1958 - )

    Abb.: Viktor Vekselberg — Виктор Феликсович Вексельберг
    [Bildquelle: Pressefoto SUAL]

    Viktor Vekselberg [Виктор Феликсович Вексельберг]

    Geburtsdatum: 1958-04-14

    Geburtsort: Ukraine (Russland).

    Webpräsenz von Renova: http://www.renova.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16

    Zu SUAL und  TNK-BP siehe:

    Payer, Margarete <1942 - >: Kulturen von Arbeit und Kapital. -- Teil 3: Kapitaleignerkulturen. -- 7. Postsowjetische Oligarchen. -- 1. Russland  (Россия). -- 1. Firmen. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/arbeitkapital/arbeitkapital0307011.htm

    "Kostbarkeiten für den Kreml

    Viktor Vekselberg [Виктор Феликсович Вексельберг], drittreichster Russe, holte neun der wertvollen Fabergé-Eier zurück in seine Heimat

    von Jens Hartmann

    Geduld ist nicht gerade seine Stärke. Viktor Vekselberg wollte nicht bei Sotheby's in New York im Publikum sitzen. Er wollte auch nicht jedes Mal ein Schildchen heben, wenn der Auktionator ein Ei nach dem anderen versteigerte. Weder bei den mit Rubinen und Smaragden besetzten Eiern noch bei denen mit Innereien wie Goldhennen oder Miniaturkutschen.

    Also ging er mit William F. Ruprecht, dem Chef von Sotheby's, zum Lunch. Ihm und den Erben des Zeitungsverlegers Malcolm S. Forbes bot er ein Geschäft an, das sie nicht ablehnen konnten. Rund 100 Millionen Dollar bezahlte der russische Industrielle für die neun Kleinodien des Hofjuweliers der Zaren, Carl Fabergé, die Forbes zusammengetragen hatte. Vekselberg unterschrieb den Scheck, die Auktion an der Upper East Side wurde abgesagt.

    Es war nicht das letzte Geld des Mannes. Die russische Ausgabe der Zeitschrift "Forbes" taxierte ihn im April auf 5,9 Milliarden Dollar. Dieser Tage kommt noch rund eine Milliarde hinzu, wenn er seine Anteile am Ölmulti BP versilbert.

    Damit nimmt Viktor Vekselberg Platz drei der russischen Geldrangliste ein - am reichsten ist der Oligarch Michail Chodorkowskij [Михаил Борисович Ходорковский]. Doch der sitzt im Untersuchungsgefängnis. Sein Erdölkonzern Yukos [ЮКОС] wird gegenwärtig zerschlagen. Chodorkowskij bleiben zwei Euro pro Tag, die er für den gefängniseigenen Fitnessklub ausgeben darf. Vor Gericht steht er in einer Jeanshose, die rutscht, da er keinen Gürtel tragen darf.

    Vekselberg sieht da eleganter aus. Die Fabergé-Eier werden nun auf Russland-Tournee gehen. Nach dem Moskauer Kreml werden sie in Jekaterinburg [Екатеринбург], der Stelle, wo die Familie des letzten Zaren ermordet wurde, ausgestellt. Danach soll der Zarenschatz nach St. Petersburg, wo die Gebeine der Romanows [Романовы] liegen.

    Abb.: Alexius II. — Алексий II
    [Bildquelle: ru.wikipedia]

    Patriarch Alexi II. [Алексий II], das Oberhaupt der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche, und der Kreml lobten zwar den 47-jährigen Vekselberg für die patriotische Tat. Dafür riskierte er jedoch einen Familienkrach, als er seinen Lebenstraum verwirklichte. Sohn Sascha, 16, beschwerte sich. "Ich muss jobben gehen, um mir 3000 Dollar für den Kart-Rennsport zu verdienen. Und du kaufst diese Eier!" Vekselberg antwortete dem Teenager, dass man eben nicht früh genug eine "richtige Beziehung zum Geld" aufbauen könne.

    Ungeduld ist die Triebfeder seines Handelns. "Er ruft dich in sein Büro. Nachdem du mehrere Monate auf den Termin warten musstest, hast du genau zwei Minuten. Du musst den Punkt finden, der ihn packt. Wenn nicht, hast du verloren", sagt ein ehemaliger Mitarbeiter. Gerade 100 Tage im Jahr, erzählt ein Angestellter, sei er in Moskau. Die andere Zeit jette er hin und her zwischen London, New York, Zürich und den Förderstätten seines Reichtums in Sibirien und Nordrussland.


    Gattin Marina und Sohn Sascha leben in New York, Tochter Irina macht ihren MBA in Yale.

    Lädt Präsident Wladimir Putin [Владимир Владимирович Путин], wie Anfang Juli, Russlands Unternehmer an den Runden Tisch im Katharinensaal, darf der Mann mit dem Rauschebart nicht fehlen. "Sehr geehrter Wladimir Wladimirowitsch! Bis zum gestrigen Tag dachten wir, dass wir in einem demokratischen Land leben. Heute sind uns ernste Zweifel gekommen." Diese Zeilen an Putin unterschrieb der Oligarch und mit ihm 13 andere im Jahr 2000. Der Medienzar Wladimir Gussinskij [Владимир Гусинский] war eingesperrt worden, die Geschäftswelt aufgebracht. Vier Jahre später ist Vekselberg vorsichtiger. Das Bild Chodorkowskijs hinter Gitterstäben ist für alle Oligarchen Russlands wie ein Menetekel an der Wand.

    So sehen manche Kritiker auch die Rückholaktion der Fabergé-Eier weniger als Tat eines überzeugten Patrioten denn als Versuch, Putin milde zu stimmen. "Es war die einzigartige Chance, meinem Land einen Schatz zurückzugeben", sagt Vekselberg. "Ich habe in mein Herz gesehen." Russische Unternehmer hätten heute andere Themen als die Länge ihrer Yacht oder den letzten Urlaub in Südfrankreich. Wer in einem weißen Mercedes durch Moskau flitze und eine Armbanduhr für 200 000 Dollar trage, müsse sich nicht wundern, wenn ihn das Volk verachte. "Wir sind anders als vor fünf Jahren. Wir haben uns zusammen mit dem Land gewandelt."

    Er sieht sich in der Tradition der russischen Mäzene wie Mamontow, Rjabuschinskij und Morosow, die Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts Geld für die Künste, Krankenhäuser und Universitäten übrig hatten. Die Bitten, die Fabergé-Sammlung dem russischen Staat zu schenken, hat Vekselberg jedoch abgelehnt. Es reiche, wenn sie ausgestellt und damit zugänglich sei.

    Renova [РЕНОВА] heißt die Investmentgesellschaft, die er 1990 gründete. Zu dem Industrieimperium gehören Ölkonzerne, Metallurgiebetriebe, Aluminiumschmelzen, Stromerzeuger, Maschinenbauer - zwei Dutzend Unternehmen mit mehr als 100 000 Mitarbeitern. Vekselberg ist Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender und Hauptaktionär. Seine Kronjuwelen sind Russlands viertgrößter Ölkonzern TNK-BP [ТНК-ВР] und der zweitgrößte Aluminiumproduzent des Landes, Sual [СУАЛ].

    Der russische Oligarch wurde 1957 an der ukrainisch-polnischen Grenze im galizischen Städtchen Drogobytsch [Дрогобич; דראָביטש] geboren. Der Ort hatte seine Karpaten-Ölgesellschaft, sein Keramikwerk. Und Drogobytsch hatte sein Schtetl. Die Nazis richteten dort ein Getto ein und ließen Zwangsarbeiter im Keramikwerk schuften. Hunderte, erinnert sich der Überlebende Ludwik Hoffman, wurden erschossen oder im Viehwaggon in Vernichtungslager transportiert.

    Vekselberg, der jüdischer Herkunft ist, studierte in Moskau Ingenieurwesen. Seinen Doktor machte er in Mathematik. Als Gorbatschow der Marktwirtschaft Raum gab, gründete er 1988 das Unternehmen KomVek (Kompanie Vekselberg), handelte mit Edelmetall und legte damit den Grundstock für sein Vermögen. Geschäfte macht er seit dieser Zeit gemeinsam mit seinem Studienkollegen Leonard Blavatnik. Der wanderte in die USA aus, Vekselberg blieb.

    In den wilden Neunzigern, als Russlands Reichtum unter einigen wenigen aufgeteilt wurde, war er mit von der Partie. Man sagt ihm nach, er habe in Russland die feindliche Übernahme erfunden. Später stieg er in die Aluminiumindustrie ein, ein Geschäftsfeld, über das damals wegen zahlreicher Auftragsmorde berichtet wurde. 1996 reiste er in die Ölmetropole Nishnewartowsk. Ein Jahr darauf erwarben Renova und die Alfa Group [Альфа-Групп] seines Geschäftspartners Michail Friedman [Михаил Маратович Фридман] für 810 Millionen Dollar 40 Prozent am Ölkonzern TNK. Zwei Jahre später gehörte ihnen die Gesellschaft. TNK und die Alu-Holding Sual brachten Vekselberg in die Milliardärsliga.

    TNK-BP, der Ölkonzern, ist ein Novum - ein 50-50-Joint-Venture, in dem zwei Unternehmenskulturen, der europäische und russische Stil, aufeinander prallen. Hier die britische Gründlichkeit, lange Entscheidungswege und ausführliche Analysen. Dort das spontane Regieren, das einer wie Vekselberg perfektioniert hat. Ein Führungsstil, der in Russland, wo sich Wirtschaft im Zeitraffer abspielt, oft Vorteile bringt.

    Es gab Klagen vor US-Gerichten und Vorwürfe, er habe manchen Partner geprellt und manches Ölfeld an sich gerissen. Verurteilt wurde Vekselberg nie. Mit BP, das Ende der neunziger Jahre de facto enteignet wurde, einigte man sich außergerichtlich. Die Differenzen sind überwunden. Vor einem Jahr ließ es sich BP 7,7 Milliarden Dollar kosten, ins Joint Venture TNK-BP einzusteigen.

    "Er will ein Global Player werden, und er hat das Zeug dazu: das Hirn, die Aggressivität, den Willen", sagt ein Amerikaner, der eng mit Vekselberg zusammenarbeitete. Go global hat er längst umgesetzt. Mit BP ist er Partner im Ölgeschäft, mit Fleming Family & Partners im Aluminiumsektor.

    Vekselberg ist ein russischer Pionier, für den nichts unmöglich zu sein scheint. Seit dem 19. Jahrhundert hat niemand mehr eine private Eisenbahn in Russland gebaut. Vekselberg ließ einen 157 Kilometer langen Schienenstrang durch die Tundra verlegen. Was auf den ersten Blick wie der Geistesblitz eines Getriebenen wirkt, ein Strang von irgendwo nach nirgendwo, könnte der Beginn eines Milliardengeschäfts werden. Für zwei Milliarden Euro will er dort in der Komi-Republik [Республика Коми] eine Aluminiumhütte errichten. In der Region liegen die größten Bauxitvorkommen des eurasischen Kontinents. Das Geld für dieses Investment sollen ausländische Partner sowie der Börsengang von Sual, möglichst in London, einspielen.

    Die Fabergé-Geschichte wird eine Fortsetzung haben. Vekselberg hat Gefallen an der Rolle des Mäzens gefunden. Er wird über seinen Fonds "Verbindung der Zeiten" weitere Kunstwerke heimholen. 17 Kirchenglocken, die seit 75 Jahren in Harvard läuten, sollen 2005 wieder im Moskauer Danilow-Kloster [Данилов монастырь] zu hören sein. Die Glocken waren 1930 vom amerikanischen Diplomaten und Industriellen Charles Crane vor dem Einschmelzen durch die Bolschewiken gerettet und nach Harvard gebracht worden. Dort wurde für sie eigens ein Turm errichtet. An Sonn- und Feiertagen, bei Feiern oder wenn Harvard bei einem Sportereignis die Rivalen aus Yale besiegt hat, läuten die studentischen "Klappermeister" die russischen Glocken.

    Der Milliardiär bot der Elite-Uni an, Glocken im Ural gießen zu lassen und sie gegen die Glocken, die jahrhundertelang in Moskaus ältestem Kloster geläutet wurden, auszutauschen. "Wir sind bei den Gesprächen auf der Ziellinie", sagt er. Roman Ogriskow dürfte sich darüber besonders freuen. Der Glockenmeister aus dem Danilow-Kloster musste bislang immer ins Internet gehen, um dem Original-Glockenklang wenigstens auf der Harvard-Website [http://www.lowell.harvard.edu/Bells/Bells.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16] zu lauschen.

    Artikel erschienen am 1. August 2004"

    [Quelle: Jens Hartmann. -- http://www.wams.de/data/2004/08/01/312894.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

    Abb.: Satellitenaufnahme von Kamtschatka [Камчатка], 2001-12--12
    [Bildquelle: http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Newsroom/NewImages/images_topic.php3?topic=land&img_id=6757. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-08]

    Im August 2005 wurde bekannt, dass Wechselberg voraussichtlich 2007 zum Gouverneur der  Region Kamtschatka [Камчатская область] ernannt werden soll.

    32. Николай Цветков — Nikolai Zwetkow (Nikolay Tsvetkov) (1960 - )

    Abb.: Николай Цветков — Nikolai Zwetkow
    (Pressefoto Nikoil)

    Webpräsenz von Nikoil: http://www.nikoil.ru/. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16. -- [auch in Deutsch!]

    "Lebenslauf Nikolaj Alexandrowitsch Tswetkov ist am 12. Mai 1960 in der Siedlung Nowobratsevo [Новобратцево], Bezirk Krasnogorsk, im Moskauer Gebiet geboren. 1977 absolviert er die Ulianovere Mittelschule im Dorf Putilkovo [Путилково], Bezirk Krasnogorsk. Dann wurde er an der Offizierhochschule für Ingenieure der Luftstreitkräfte in Tambov [Тамбов] immatrikuliert, die er mit „Auszeichnung“ abschließt. 1988 ist Nikolaj Tswetkov schon Absolvent der Shukowski-Akademie der Luftstreitkräfte, die er auch mit „Auszeichnung“ und einer Goldmedaille absolviert.

    Den Dienst hat er im Afghanistan [افغانستان] und im Fernen Osten abgeleistet.

    Von Beginn der wirtschaftlichen Umwandlungen in Russland an in den 1990er Jahren wird der Finanzmarkt zur Tätigkeitssphäre von Nikolaj Tswetkov. Gleichzeitig studiert er an der Russian Economics Academy namend after G. Plekhanov, Fachbereich „Marketing“.

    Abb.: ®Logo

    Seit dem 1992 ist Nikolaj Tswetkov an der Investmentgesellschaft „Brokinvest“ [Брокинвест] tätig, und ein Jahr später gründet er die Erdöl-Investmentgesellschaft „NIKoil“ [НИКойл].

    1993-1994 schafft Nikolaj Alexandrowitsch eine Eintragungsgesellschaft, die die Rollen für Aktionäre in einigen Regionen Russlands führt, und auch die Management-Gesellschaft eines der größten im Lande Investment-Scheckfonds „LUKoil Fond“ [ЛУКОЙЛ Фонд], welcher später in die Investment-Anteilsfonds der Gruppe „LUKoil Fond“ umgewandelt wurde. 1994-1995 leitet Nikolaj Tswetkov in seiner Eigenschaft als „NIKoil“ - Präsident auch Departement für Wertpapiere der Erdölgesellschaft „LUKoil“. 1996-1997 ist er Vice-Präsident und Chef der Hauptverwaltung für Finanz- und Investitionstätigkeit von „LUKoil“. Seit 1997 beginnt Nikolaj Tswetkov die Entwicklung einer Finanzkörperschaft, zu deren Kern die Aktienbank „Die Investitions- und Bankengruppe NIKoil“ wird.

    Heute entwickelt sich das Business der Korporation „NIKoil“ in folgenden Hauptrichtungen: Investment Banking, Commercial Banking, Private Banking; es werden auch aktiv Dienstleistungen für den elektronischen Handel entwickelt. Der Träger ist die Aktienbank „Die Investitions- und Bankengruppe NIKoil“. Sie steht in der Liste der 30 größten russischen Banken.

    Die Positionen der Korporation am russischen Markt der Finanzdienstleistungen sind folgende:
    * Die 2.-3. Stelle nach dem Umfang im Russischen Handelssystem (RTS)
    * 70 % vom Factoring-Markt
    * 15 % des Umfangs am Zwischenbankenmarkt der Geschäfte mit Edelmetallen
    * die Verwahrung der Wertpapiere auf den Betrag von 1 Bio USD

    Heute leitet die Finanzkorporation „NIKoil“ drei Investment-Anteilsfonds der Gruppe „LUKoil Fond“, welchen 70 % der Aktiva von allen russischen Anteils-Investmentfonds gehören.

    Nach den Ergebnissen 2000 wurde die Finanzkorporation „NIKoil“ mit dem Nationalpreis im Bereich Business ausgezeichnet und als eine der besten Finanzkörperschaften dieses Jahres in Russland anerkannt. Nikolaj Tswetkov wurde zum Preisträger bei der Ausschreibung „Banker des Jahres 2000“ [Банкир года – 2000].

    Nikolaj Tswetkov ist Kandidat [кандидат]d er Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Das Thema seiner Dissertationsarbeit heißt: „Probleme der Heranziehung der in- und ausländischen Investitionen in die Erdöl- und Erdgasindustrie der russischen Wirtschaft“ [Проблемы привлечения отечественных и иностранных инвестиций в нефтегазовую отрасль российской экономики]. Er ist auch Mitautor von ca. 30 Artikeln und Monographien zur Problematik des Finanzmarktes und der Investitionen in den realen Sektoren der Wirtschaft."

    [Quelle: http://www.nikoil.ru/PORTAL.NSF/ShowLMenu.nikoil?Open&IDSP=27F4EC1DABCD4925C3256A950041C3C3&LNG=2. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16

    Russische Fassung obiger Biographie:

    "Биография Президента Николай Александрович Цветков родился 12 мая 1960 г. в поселке Новобратцево Красногорского района Московской области. В 1977 г. он оканчивает Ульяновскую среднюю школу в деревне Путилково Красногорского района. Затем поступает в Тамбовское высшее военное авиационное инженерное училище, которое заканчивает с отличием.

    Николай Цветков – выпускник Военно-воздушной инженерной академии им. Н.Е. Жуковского, которую в 1988 г. также заканчивает с отличием и золотой медалью. Служил в Афганистане и на Дальнем Востоке.

    С началом экономических преобразований в России в 1990–х годах сферой деятельности Николая Цветкова становится финансовый рынок. Одновременно с активной работой на рынке он одновременно обучается в Российской экономической академии им. Г.В. Плеханова по специальности “маркетинг”.

    С 1992 года Николай Цветков работает в Инвестиционной компании “Брокинвест”, а годом позже основывает Нефтяную инвестиционную компанию “НИКойл”.

    В 1993-1994 гг. Николай Александрович создает Регистрационную компанию, которая разворачивает свою деятельность по ведению реестров акционеров в ряде регионов России, и Управляющую компанию крупнейшего в стране чекового инвестиционного фонда “ЛУКойл Фонд”, который впоследствии был преобразован в паевые инвестиционные фонды группы “ЛУКОЙЛ Фонд”.

    В 1994-1995 гг. Николай Цветков, сохраняя пост Президента компании “НИКойл”, возглавляет Департамент ценных бумаг нефтяной компании “ЛУКОЙЛ”.

    В 1996-1997 гг. он – Вице-президент и начальник Главного управления по финансовой и инвестиционной деятельности “ЛУКОЙЛА”.

    С 1997 г. Н.А. Цветков начинает развивать Финансовую корпорацию "НИКойл", ядром которой становится Акционерный банк “Инвестиционно-банковская группа НИКойл”.

    В 2002 г. Корпорация взяла курс на построение бизнес-модели "Финансовый супермаркет", в рамках которой "НИКойл" приобрел страховой бизнес в лице Промышленно-страховой компании (нынешнее название - "Страховая группа "УралСиб") и розничный банковский бизнес в лице Автобанка (нынешнее название - "АВТОБАНК-НИКОЙЛ"). В 2003 г. Президент ФК "НИКойл" Николай Цветков по согласованию с Центральным банком РФ занял пост Председателя АКБ "АВТОБАНК-НИКОЙЛ".

    В 2004 г. ФК "НИКойл" заключила соглашение о стратегическом партнерстве с Банковской группой УРАЛСИБ, в рамках которого планируется осуществить обмен технологиями и использовать интегрированную филиальную сеть обеих структур для совместных продаж финансовых и страховых продуктов и услуг.

    По итогам 2000 года Финансовая корпорация “НИКойл” названа Лауреатом Национальной премии в области бизнеса и признана лучшей финансовой корпорацией года в России. Николай Цветков стал лауреатом конкурса “Банкир года – 2000”.

    Цветков кандидат экономических наук. Тема диссертации - “Проблемы привлечения отечественных и иностранных инвестиций в нефтегазовую отрасль российской экономики”. Он автор более 30 статей и ряда монографий по проблематике финансового рынка и инвестиций в реальный сектор экономики."

    [Quelle: http://www.nikoil.ru/PORTAL.NSF/ShowLMenu.nikoil?Open&IDSP=638A3A75C5577363C3256A48004AA851. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-169

    "War Vet Turns Billionaire

    by Natalya Alyakrinskaya The Moscow News

    Within the space of one decade, Nikolai Tsvetkov [Николай Цветков] has risen from Air Force lieutenant colonel to billionaire. This year the Afghan [افغانستان] war veteran has made it onto the Forbes list 
    Recently, yet another individual joined the ranks of Russian oligarchs. Meet Nikolai Tsvetkov, 43, the president of Nikoil [НИКойл], a finance and investment corporation. First, in a sensational twist in his business career, he made it onto the Forbes list of the worlds richest people: The newcomers net worth was estimated at $1.3 billion. Then, as if to confirm this estimate, he disclosed Nikoils shareholder structure. This was followed by reports of Tsvetkovs royal present to his wife: Galina Tsvetkova got a 75% stake in the Lomonosov porcelain factory [Императорский (Ломоносовский) фарфоровый завод].

    Abb.: Lomonossow-Porzelan

    Cinderella, Prince Charming & Co.

    "Mr. Tsvetkov does not give interviews. He has a heavy schedule," Nikoils press service said in response to my attempts to get first-hand information. Unlike other oligarchs, Tsvetkov appears to be publicity-shy. His military background is another thing that makes him stand out in this milieu.

    Tsvetkov graduated from the Zhukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy with top honors. He served in Tambov, Moscow, and Russias Far East. He fought in Afghanistan. By the early 1990s, Tsvetkov had attained the rank of lieutenant colonel and a near-penury status. He retired and got a job on the stock exchange. Before long he realized that he lacked specialist training. So he did a course in business management at the Plekhanov Academy of National Economy.

    Tsvetkovs life story recalls that of Cinderella: Both worked hard and then met their Prince Charming. Tsvetkov was certainly lucky with the prince. Vagit Alekperov [Вагит Юсуфович Алекперов], the incumbent president of Lukoil, was highly instrumental in propelling the retired lieutenant colonel into business.

    They met in 1992. At the time, Tsvetkov was working at Brokinvest, a small brokerage company he had established, while Lukoil was looking for business partners. A lucky chance? Perhaps. But Tsvetkov should be given his due, too: They say the retired lieutenant colonel has always been a can-do man. Thus his obscure company became an investment and financial adviser to Lukoil, then still a state-controlled concern.

    Alekperov and Tsvetkov have been together ever since. A year after their first meeting, they founded Nikoil, an investment vehicle - a first on the domestic stock market. Tsvetkov placed his bet on oil, landing a trump and hitting the big time. The oil market was up for grabs, and Nikoil got closely involved in the process, buying up oil company vouchers, or investment checks, for Lukoil, taking part in the privatization of oil enterprises, and rendering them financial services.

    In return, Lukoil transferred to Nikoil for trustee administration its check-investment fund - in fact, a financial pyramid scheme. As everybody knows, those pyramid schemes collapsed overnight, wiping out peoples savings. But the Nikoil owner found a way out by reorganizing his check investment fund (ChIF) into a unit investment fund (PIF). As a result, shareholders were able to swap their shares for money while Tsvetkov avoided legal unpleasantness. By revealing recently his firms shareholder makeup Tsvetkov only confirmed what the business community have known all along: Alekperov is Nikoils co-owner.

    Private Life

    Very little is known about Tsvetkovs private life. Only a few years ago, Nikoils president beamed from glossy magazine covers, making small revelations, but today his life is absolutely off limits to the public. It is known that Tsvetkov has a family - a loving wife and two daughters. The younger is still at school while the elder is in her final year at the Plekhanov Academy.

    Galina Tsvetkova once admitted that since Nikolai Tsvetkov became the head of a successful business corporation very little had changed in her own life. The couple have been together for 20 years. They say it was Nikolais military tours of duty that cemented the Tsvetkovs union. It is not ruled out that Galina in fact was the one who prompted the retired lieutenant colonel to go into business: As head of a post office, she made more than her husband did. Rumor has it that he could not put up with the fact. When Nikoil needed start-up capital, a modest dacha [дача] that Galina had inherited from her parents was contributed to the incorporation capital. True, later on the house was withdrawn.

    At present, Galina Tsvetkova heads Nikoils corporate family club: Her duties include organizing parties for corporate staff. Judging by Nikolai Tsvetkovs official comments, family values hold pride of place in Nikoil. The president makes a point of spending at least one day-off a week with his family. But it is "business performance" that he puts first, without any provisos.

    Abb.: Ivan Okhlobystin — Иван Охлобыстин
    [Bildquelle: http://old.versiasovsek.ru/2003/36/goodbad/4760.html. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-17]

    This must be why, in line with the current trend toward business "purity," about a year ago Nikoil wanted to hire Father Ioann, better known under his lay name of Ivan Okhlobystin [Иван Охлобыстин], author and former movie personality, as the companys full-time psychologist. Unfortunately, it did not work out in the end. According to Father Ioann, he inadvertently mentioned his upcoming appointment with Nikoil in a newspaper interview, whereupon company management gave him to understand that his employment was a non-starter. "We had discussed my work schedule and program in detail," Father Joann complained. "I was quite happy with the compensation package, too: I have five children to support, and I hate to accept money from the church as it has to find its feet yet. I am disenchanted with businessmen."

    Judging by this story, Tsvetkov puts corporate image above all else.

    Buying Up Everything that Moves

    Today Nikoil is a real financial octopus, and omnivorous at that. Whereas before 1997 it fed exclusively on oil, now the corporation, by its own admission, is in a leading position on the credit market, controlling over 30% of unit investment funds (about 80,000 inves-tors), 10% of the voluntary insurance market, and 7.5% of the precious metals market.

    The octopuss head is the IBG Nikoil joint-stock bank, which is among Russias top 20 banks. Tsvetkov himself, judging by the National Managers Association ratings, is among the top 10 financial market managers in Russia. Experts attribute Nikoils success to, among other things, the corporations structure - a horizontal model wherein powers and responsibilities are delegated to its subdivisions. Incidentally, only two companies in Russia follow this model - Nikoil and the no less successful MDM group.

    According to Andrei Kolyagin, executive director of the Guild of Investment and Finance Analysts, it is also important that right from the outset the corporation has been in the charge of just one person, which minimized the risks involved in changing top executives.

    Military Bearing

    Although he has become part of the business elite, Tsvetkov never forgets about his military background: His corporation employs a large number of ex-servicemen, in particular those who fought in Afghanistan. One of Nikoils subdivisions is especially "militarized" - the Law Enforcement Insurance Company, most of whose top executives are former law enforcement officers.

    Tsvetkovs tactics are quite aggressive - well in line with his military past. Today he is actively promoting an idea that is new to Russia - that of a financial supermarket for the rich, a one-stop center for banking, insurance, and investment services. To this end, Nikoil took over Avtobank [автобанк] (a leader in the number of private depositors in Russia) and the Promyshlenno-strakhovaya kompaniya industrial-insurance company. Furthermore, recently it took control of UralSib [УРАЛСИБ], a major regional bank. According to some sources, this latest acquisition came as part of an arcane tradeoff ahead of presidential elections in Bashkiria [Республика Башкортостан]: In return for his assured victory, Murtaza Rakhimov [Мортаҙа Ғөбәйдулла улы Рәхимов], the incumbent head of the republic, promised Moscow a number of key regional assets, including UralSib, his pocket bank. In addition, Nikoil signed with the Bashkortostan government an agreement whereby, for the next five years, the corporation will be defining investment priorities in the region. The UralSib case is further evidence of the fact that Tsvetkov enjoys the trust of the federal authorities.

    Abb.: Lage von Noworossijsk — Новороссийск
    (©MS Encarta)

    Nikoil also has a hand in the Novorossiysk [Новороссийск]merchant marine port: Tsvetkov is chairman of the ports board of directors while his company holds a 30 percent stake in the port. Today, the port of Novorossiysk handles one-third of Russias entire oil and grain export, the port itself being of strategic importance. A well informed source in labor union circles described Tsvetkov as "master of the Black Sea," pointing out that as Nikoil strengthened its positions, the leadership of the ports labor union was replaced with someone more amenable and cooperative while the board of directors started meeting not in Novorossiysk but in Moscow, which made the presence of union representatives there all but impossible.

    Tsvetkov is actively taking on everything that moves - both at sea and on land. Recently, the federal government authorized his corporation (along with the Troika-Dialog company) to look for investors for reforming the railway monopoly. The Railways Ministry hopes that Tsvetkov and company will attract at least $1 billion in investment capital. One of Tsvetkovs latest acquisitions is a 50 percent stake in the Kopeika economy-class trading house that retails goods at wholesale prices, and an almost one-third of stock in OAO Ais-Fili [Айс-Фили], a major ice-cream producer. The buying of the Lomonosov porcelain factory [Императорский (Ломоносовский) фарфоровый завод] for his wife is also a long-term investment in the Tsvetkov empire: The factory with a 250-year history is today a highly profitable enterprise. They say that the factory management was a bit nervous of the new "mistress." Rumor has it, however, that with Galina Tsvetkovas advent, the factory has once again become an official china purveyor for the Kremlin.

    By expanding his empire and acquiring more and more new assets, the former lieutenant colonel was simply destined to emerge from the shadows into the public light. Even so, it is unlikely that Nikolai Tsvetkov, who has until recently shunned publicity, rejoices over his inclusion on the Forbes list of billionaires. Modern history shows that ending up on this list is a mixed blessing for a Russian billionaire, one possible outcome being banishment or even prison. It is unlikely that Nikolai Tsvetkov relishes such a dramatic turn in his career."

    [Quelle: Natalya Alyakrinskaya <Наталя Алякринская>. -- http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2004-12-20. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-16]

    33. Weiterführende Ressourcen

    Abb.: Einbandtitel

    Hoffman, David E. (David Emanuel): The oligarchs : wealth and power in the new Russia. --New York : PublicAffairs, ©2003.  -- VIII, 575 S. : Ill. ; 22 cm. -- ISBN 1586482025. -- {Wenn Sie HIER klicken, können Sie dieses Buch  bei amazon.de bestellen}

    Russisch Monopoly : Wie entstanden Russlands große Vermögen? / von Andreas Bornefeld. -- http://www.netstudien.de/Russland/index.htm. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-15. -- [ausführliche, informative Texte]

    Eine gute Übersicht über die Kapitalverflechtungen der Oligarchen im Jahr 2001 gibt die Weltbank:

    The list of 22 largest private owners. -- http://ns.worldbank.org.ru/cem/eng/listlarge.asp. -- Zugriff am 2005-12-14] 

    Zu Teil 2: Ukraine (Україна/Ukrajina)