Einführung in

Entwicklungsländerstudien

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23. Kernprobleme: Bevölkerung

3. Teil III


verfasst von Evi Hartmann

herausgegeben von Margarete Payer

mailto: payer@hdm-stuttgart.de


Zitierweise / cite as:

Entwicklungsländerstudien / hrsg. von Margarete Payer. -- Teil II: Kernprobleme. -- Kapitel 23: Bevölkerung / verfasst von Evi Hartmann. -- 3. Teil III. -- Fassung vom 2001-02-22. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/entwicklung/entw233.htm. -- [Stichwort].

Erstmals publiziert: 1999-12-14

Überarbeitungen:  2001-02-22 [Update]

Anlass: Lehrveranstaltung "Einführung in Entwicklungsländerstudien", HBI Stuttgart, 1998/99

Unterrichtsmaterialien (gemäß § 46 (1) UrhG)

©opyright: Dieser Text steht der Allgemeinheit zur Verfügung. Eine Verwertung in Publikationen, die über übliche Zitate hinausgeht, bedarf der ausdrücklichen Genehmigung der Herausgeberin.

Dieser Text ist Bestandteil der Abteilung Entwicklungsländer von Tüpfli's Global Village Library.


Skript, das von den Teilnehmern am Wahlpflichtfach "Entwicklungsländerstudien" an der HBI Stuttgart erarbeitet wird.


0. Übersicht



10. Wanderungen


Typen von Wanderung werden vor allem nach vier Kriterien unterschieden:


10.1. Interne Umsiedlungen: zum Beispiel Transmigrasi in Indonesien


In Indonesien sind die zentralen Inseln, besonders Java, sehr dicht bevölkert, während die Außeninseln (besonders Kalimantan und Irian Jaya) noch weitgehend tropischer Wald sind. Deshalb begann schon um die Jahrhundertwende die holländische Kolonialmacht mit Umsiedlungen. Das unabhängige Indonesien begann 1950 mit Transmigrasi, der Umsiedlung von Bewohnern des dicht besiedelten Java (in geringerem Maße Sumatra und Bali) in dünn besiedelte Außeninseln, besonders Kalimantan, später in den Osten (Besonders Irian Jaya). In der Folgezeit werden ca. 4,5 Millionen Personen umgesiedelt.

Abb.: Bevölkerungsverteilung in Indonesien

[Quelle der Abb.: http://www.ciesin.org/datasets/gpw/auoce.html. -- Zugriff am 1999-10-14]

Die Probleme, die man sich mit dieser Transmigrasi-Politik eingehandelt hat, schildert eindrücklich folgender Artikel aus Jakarta Post vom 6. April 1999 (also vor dem Referendum in Ost-Timor):

"In the mid-1980s, as Irian Jaya became the main destination of transmigrants, strong resentment from the local population was aroused.

The resentment of the local population toward the transmigrants, who mostly originated from Java, partly was due to the local people's perception of unfair treatment at the hands of the government. The local population believed the transmigrants received more help than the locals. Controversial issues, such as "Javanization", "internal colonization" and "Islamization" were raised by many foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 

The World Bank, the main financial supporter of the transmigration program, also was criticized by both foreign and Indonesian NGOs for supporting the destruction of indigenous peoples and tropical forests in the country.

Even though transmigration has been scaled back since the mid-1980s, the net migration to eastern provinces is positive, particularly to urban destinations. The shift of migration to urban areas has been particularly dramatic in provinces such as Irian Jaya, Maluku and East Timor. The shift of migration from rural areas to urban areas, a result of the scaled-back transmigration program, also reflects the elasticity of the urban economy, most notably in the informal sectors, in eastern Indonesia. Meanwhile, the labor surplus, particularly among the new working age cohorts, is increasing in western Indonesia. 

Java, in particular, could see a significant number of its young people search for economic opportunities by migrating to eastern provinces. It is likely that the bulk of migrants to urban areas will be engaged mainly in a number of activities in the informal sector. 

In this regard, migrants tend to be more enterprising than locals due to previous experience in their places of origin. The migrants generally also have more education than locals. 

Around 30 percent of the population of eastern Indonesia resides in South Sulawesi. Given its large population and its central location, South Sulawesi is a very important part of the migration system. South Sulawesi, with Ujungpandang harbor, the third largest seaport in the country, and the tendency of its people to migrate, plays a dominant role in the development of other eastern provinces, both economically and politically. 

South Sulawesi is the home of three ethnic groups which are well known for their tendency to migrate; namely the Buginese, the Butonese and the Makassarese. In eastern Indonesia, these three ethnic groups are popularly labeled as the BBM, an acronym for Bugis-Buton-Makassar. ...

In eastern Indonesia, most specifically in Irian Jaya and East Timor, the division of labor among ethnic groups is somewhat different as compared to other places. The upper-level economic sectors usually are controlled by Chinese-Indonesians, while middle and lower-level economic sectors are dominated by the Makassarese, the Buginese and the Butonese. The Javanese, as well as other migrant ethnic groups, usually occupy government jobs, such as public servants or members of the military. The Javanese domination of various governmental occupations is a by-product of the process of recruitment for such jobs, which is conducted by the central government in Java.

In Irian Jaya and East Timor, due to their political histories, the appointment of officials by the central government also is dictated by security and military considerations. The feeling of resentment among the local population toward migrants' domination of both the governmental and private sectors is obvious and easily perceived, even by casual observers.

Given their distinct sociopolitical circumstances, conflicts between migrants and the local populations in Irian Jaya and East Timor cannot be understood if they are viewed only from demographic and economic points of view.

In assessing these conflicts, the political histories of the provinces, in relation to the process of building the nation-state, should be given special consideration. Irian Jaya, called West Papua during Dutch colonialism, was integrated into Indonesian in 1963, after diplomatic negotiations and armed conflict between Indonesians and the Dutch. 

Irian Jaya was incorporated into Indonesia after the country won a referendum under the supervision of the United Nations. A group of West Papuans, however, rejected the outcome of the referendum and proclaimed their liberation organization (OPM) the legitimate owner of the province and took up armed struggle against Indonesia. 

East Timor was integrated into Indonesia in 1976 amid internal conflicts among political parties competing for the right to rule the former Portuguese colony. 

Similar to Irian Jaya, armed struggle in East Timor against Indonesia persists today. The role of the underground resistance movements should not be underestimated in assessing the conflicts between migrants and the local indigenous populations.

In East Timor, migrants often decide to leave the province in order to avoid harsh treatment by the East Timorese. The exodus of migrants, many of them BBM, from East Timor gained force after the Habibie government raised the possibility of independence for the province. 

After the downfall of Soeharto, the power equation between the central government and the regions was shattered as various groups protesting the central government's domination began to flourish. Demands for independence have been most clearly articulated by the East Timorese and the Irianese. The calls for referendum which were strongly suppressed during the Soeharto regime are now being loudly expressed. At the same time, demand for autonomy also is increasing in Irian Jaya. ...

Similar to the national migration pattern, in-migration has been declining since the mid-1980s. Since that time, migration to urban areas has been increasing. This is partly because the number of transmigrants, who mostly are resettled in rural areas, is declining as the government's capacity to finance the transmigration program has diminished. The migrants to urban areas in eastern provinces mostly take part in small-scale trade and informal sectors. Because the brightest local people have migrated to Java or other areas in western Indonesia, the majority of locals who are left are less educated and less skilled than the migrants. ..."

[Quelle: The impact of migration in eastern Indonesia. -- In: Jakarta Post. -- 6 Apr 1999. -- © 1999 Worldsources Oonline, Inc.]


10.2. Wanderarbeiter (Gastarbeiter): zum Beispiel Thailand


Wanderarbeiterbewegungen sind ein wichtiger ökonomischer, sozialer und demographischer Faktor. Statt einer weltweiten Übersicht über dieses Phänomen, soll dieser demographische Faktor ausführlich am Beispiel Thailands dargestellt werden.

1997 verfasste Aaron Stern für APEC eine Studie über Wanderungsbewegung aus und nach Thailand:

Stern, Aaron: Thailand's Migration Situation and its Relations with APEC Members and Other Countries in Southeast Asia. -- [9197]. -- APEC Document Number 97-HR-01.6. -- URL: http://www.chula.ac.th/INSTITUTE/ARCM/apec.htm. -- Zugriff am 1999-10-14

Die folgenden Zitate aus dieser Studie zeigen die Komplexität von Wanderarbeit:


10.2.1. Wanderarbeiter nach Thailand


"Low-Skilled or Unskilled Employment

"The largest group of labor migrants in Thailand are low-skilled or unskilled workers from Thailand's neighbors: Burma, Laos and Cambodia. As noted earlier, a recent study from Mahidol estimates that Thailand has at least 970,000 illegal labor migrants from Burma, Laos and Cambodia ... . The biggest contingent comes from Burma and majority are illegally employed. Though they initially enter Thailand at border provinces, significant numbers of these migrants work in non-border provinces. ... Bangkok has the greatest number of these labor migrants.

The unofficial but widely-cited estimate of the number of low-skilled and unskilled illegal labor migrants in Thailand is one million. This figure represents the stock of migrants, the estimated number of migrants in Thailand at the time this report was written. The flow figure for the current year (January - November 1997) - meaning the number of migrants who entered and worked in Thailand over the course of this time period - is probably much higher.

... these labor migrants work in a wide variety of jobs. Burmese workers are found in the widest array of jobs, from fishing boats to domestic house helpers. Cambodians in border areas are commonly wood workers, seasonal agricultural labor, and fishermen. The Cambodians who venture beyond the Thai-Cambodia border often end up as construction workers in Bangkok or fisheries industry workers. The occupations taken by Lao are more difficult to ascertain. This is because many Lao can assimilate more easily into Thailand than Cambodians or Burmese. The central Lao language is nearly the same as the dialect spoken in northeastern Thailand and internal migrants from the northeast are spread all over Thailand. The available data suggest that Lao labor migrants tend to be agricultural workers, service workers (e.g., restaurants), construction workers, and domestic workers.

Given the lack of data, it is impossible to see clear patterns in the lengths of time low-skilled and unskilled migrant workers stay in Thailand. The situation varies greatly between occupations, nationalities, and provinces. Many labor migrants only enter Thailand as day workers. At the Mae Sai - Tachileik border crossing, an estimated 2,000 - 5,000 Burmese workers enter Thailand to work during the day then return to Burma when the checkpoint is about to close .... Some workers stay for a few months at a time to complete a construction project, harvest a crop, or some other short-term employment. Some migrants, often at border areas, have lived and worked in Thailand for more than a decade illegally.

Low-skilled and unskilled labor migrants come to Thailand for many reasons, the most common being the desire for higher income than they can earn in their own countries. Following family members who have already migrated is another important motive for migration. In the case of Burma, the quest for higher income sometimes relates to human rights violations by the central government against ethnic minority groups and the economic hardship these violations produce ...

In 1996, the Thai Cabinet approved a policy to register illegal labor migrants in Thailand. Though the registered migrants are still technically illegal, the government has provided what is effectively a temporary amnesty. The policy only covers labor migrants from Burma, Laos and Cambodia. It allows employment in 43 of Thailand's 76 provinces and only in designated types of jobs. Employers were required to register their illegal migrant employees between 1 September and 30 November 1996. The cost was 2,500 baht: 500 baht for a health checkup, 1,000 baht for a guarantee payment to the Thai government, and 1,000 baht for a work permit. After the first year, the employer can request a work permit for one more year at an additional cost of 1,000 baht, assuming no violations of the work permit from the first year.

By the end of the registration process, 293,652 illegal migrants had received their work permits: 256,492 from Burma, 11,594 from Laos, and 25,566 from Cambodia. Another 20,290 migrants qualified for work permits but failed to pick them up from the Thai authorities. ...

Some provinces and industries rely highly on migrant labor. For example, the city of Ranong has more Burmese labor migrants than Thai residents. The Burmese work in the fisheries industry (i.e., fishing boats, dock work, processing), by far Ranong's most important industry. Without Burmese labor, the industry would suffer heavy losses. In 1996, Thailand hosted the annual Southeast Asian Games in Chiang Mai. Without the use of illegal Burmese workers, the main stadium would not have been completed on time for the opening ceremony.

Employers in Thailand have various reasons for hiring labor migrants from Burma, Laos and Cambodia. The three most commonly-cited reasons are: 1) Thai workers are unavailable; 2) the employer can pay migrants lower wages than Thai workers, offer them fewer benefits, and process less official paperwork; and 3) migrant workers are more disciplined and committed to their jobs than Thai workers.

Since many labor migrants work illegally and do not know the Thai language, employers sometimes take advantage of them. There is a substantial amount of anecdotal evidence about unfair treatment of migrant workers by Thai employers. In one common scenario, the employer promises his migrant workers that they will receive their pay after working for a certain period of time. At the time the wages come due, the employer pays less than the promised amount. In some cases, the employer makes arrangements for the local authorities to arrest the migrants before paying the wages. The full extent of this sort of behavior is unknown.

The data on the remittances labor migrants send home are minimal. Skilled labor migrants have ready access to modern methods of sending money abroad such as electronic transfers between bank accounts. Migrants from countries such as Burma either do not have access to these methods, do not understand how these methods work, or strongly distrust trust banks."

"Some of the impacts of using migrant labor are clear. The low wages employers pay to migrants reduces their production costs and increases their competitiveness. The crucial need for migrant labor in some sectors of the Thai economy - particularly the fisheries industry - demonstrates the role of migrant labor in maintaining the economic viability of these sectors. Despite the lack of good quantitative data, it is very unlikely that migrants are taking a significant number of jobs from Thai people, a claim made by some Thai politicians and labor union figures. The majority of migrant laborers readily accept the jobs that Thai people increasingly shun.

Other impacts of using migrant labor are not clear. There are not enough data to show whether the low wages paid to migrant labor affect the wage levels of Thai workers. Some people argue that Thailand's reliance on migrant labor for unskilled work allows companies to avoid investing in new technology, which will leave the Thai economy vulnerable to more efficient foreign companies that make these investments. Yet the cost of technology to replace migrant workers may be very high for Thailand and as cases from other countries demonstrate, few machines are as sophisticated as an unskilled migrant worker."

" The anecdotal information suggests that the cases of remittances from Burmese, Lao and Cambodian labor migrants in Thailand reflect the cases in other countries. Migrants and their families use the money to build better dwellings, open small shops, and pay debts."

Commercial Sex Trade

"While the majority of women working as CSWs [Commercial Sex Workers] in Thailand are probably Thai nationals, an increasing number of female CSWs in Thailand are migrants."

"The dominant sources of these migrant CSWs are Thailand's neighboring countries. Most of Thailand's foreign CSWs are from Burma, particularly Shan and Tai Leu from the southeastern areas of Shan State. There are also significant numbers of Lao, Chinese (from Yunnan province) and Cambodian CSWs. ... Archavanitkul and Gertsawang estimate that Thailand has a minimum of 60,000 foreign women and girls in the sex trade. ...

Migrant CSWs enter the sex trade in a number of ways. 

  1. First, some women and girls are forced into the trade. In a few cases, they are abducted but usually, agents deceive them into believing they will go somewhere for travel or work unrelated to the sex trade. Once in Thailand, agents and/or owners of sex establishments force them to sleep with customers, often by using violence, threats of violence, or not allowing them to leave the establishment. 
  2. Second, some women and girls enter Thailand initially without intending to work as CSWs but financial problems or other circumstances compel them to become CSWs.
  3.  The last group of women and girls enter Thailand, knowingly and willingly accepting jobs as CSWs.

It is not clear how many women fall under each category. However, some form of deception is almost always part of the process. Before their arrival abroad, the women very rarely understand what kinds of working conditions they will face or how much they will earn.

Migrant CSWs work in border provinces and internal areas of Thailand. Bangkok, as Thailand's wealthiest and most densely populated province, draws in thousands of migrant CSWs. In a common pattern, a migrant CSW will first work at a border area before moving to Bangkok. ...

Many migrant CSWs work in lower-priced establishments where a low price can be as little as 40 baht per session. In many cases, they fill the places left by Thai women who have found more lucrative employment as CSWs in karaoke bars and more upscale establishments. Despite these low prices, many CSWs can earn much more than the migrant women in other occupations. As part of its 1996 survey work , the Institute of Social Research surveyed 33 migrant CSWs. The 33 CSWs sent back an average of 15,403 baht per year, more than twice as much as the average of 6,766 baht sent back by other migrant women not working as CSWs".

"Many migrant CSWs have very high levels of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, a product of their minimal knowledge of health care, lack of access to forms of prevention such as condoms, and inability to choose their clients or insist on clients behaving in certain ways such as using condoms."


10.2.2. Wanderarbeiter aus Thailand


Low-Skilled Employment

"There are two basic types of Thai low-skilled labor migration: legal and illegal. 

Thai migrant workers take a variety of jobs abroad ... It appears as though the majority of Thai male migrants engage in construction work, followed by manufacturing. It is unclear where the majority of Thai female migrants work. Other than women in the sex trade (treated in a later section) they find jobs as domestic helpers, factory workers, and construction workers.

Thai migrant workers find jobs in a variety of places, most of which are in the Asia-Pacific region. A number of the most important destinations are APEC member economies, as Table below indicates:"

Table: Estimated Numbers of Thai Workers Abroad, by Destination, 1994

 

1994

Saudi Arabia

10,000

Israel

7,000

Kuwait

3,000

Qatar

3,200

United Arab Emirates

2,500

Bahrain

3,500

Other Middle Eastern Nations

3,500

Libya

17,000

Other African Nations

1,500

Singapore

50,000

Brunei

25,000

Malaysia

38,000

Japan

80,000

Hong Kong

26,000

Chinese Taipei

150,000

Other Asian Nations

10,500

Totals

430,700

"The length of time a Thai worker stays abroad depends on many factors: the availability of work, income earned, state of health, legal status, etc. Some Thai migrants stay abroad for many years and only visit home infrequently, perhaps once per year. Others only go abroad for 1-2 years. The available information is not enough to calculate any sort of average length of stay abroad.

Thai people who wish to migrate for employment have a number of options for arranging travel and jobs. 

According to one estimate, in 1995 about 90% of Thai migrant labor found employment through private recruitment agencies. This figure probably includes migrants who used recruitment agencies but did not register with the Ministry of Labor. The official figures for registered migrants in 1995 indicate that only 50-60% used agencies.

Illegal labor migration associated with private recruitment agencies is significant. For illegal migration, the agencies are often connected with larger criminal enterprises that provide fake documents and other forms of assistance for entering and working in foreign countries. Of the estimated 50,000 Thai labor migrants in Singapore during 1995, the Thai Labor Office in Singapore indicated that employment for only an estimated 20,000 workers was acknowledged by or facilitated by the Thai Ministry of Labor.

Interviews with many Thai labor migrants show that the recruitment agencies frequently take advantage of the workers. Agents may take a worker's fees and disappear. Other Thai workers find that the jobs agencies promise them never existed. This sort of exploitation by the agencies leaves many workers in heavy debt.

The fees charged by private recruitment agencies vary, depending on the destination and type of work. One report concerning Japan said the agencies demanded 200,000 - 250,000 baht simply as an advance payment (Vanaspong, 1). For Chinese Taipei, the fees are approximately 100,000 - 120,000 baht. It is unclear how the current fall in the value of the Thai baht will affect these fees but it is likely they will rise. This prediction is based on the relative increase in the costs outside of Thailand, as well as an increase in the number of Thai people wishing to work abroad which will create a higher demand for the services of Thai recruitment agencies.

The income Thai labor migrants earn varies widely. In nearly all cases, they will earn less than native workers receive for similar tasks, regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. In some cases, they receive less than other foreign labor migrants in the same country. In Singapore's construction industry, Thai migrants receive lower wages on average than both their Singapore and Malaysian co-workers. Since the migrants wish to earn as much as possible in a short period of time, they will nearly always take advantage of any chance to work overtime.

Much of the income Thai migrant workers earn abroad ends up as remittances sent to Thailand."

The characteristics of Thai migrant workers vary widely but there are some patterns. In recent years, the largest proportion of Thai labor migrants has come from the northeastern region of Thailand. Official figures indicate that the majority of the migrants are male but there is much variance in gender distribution between different destinations and forms of employment. Migrants tend to be younger, in their 20s and 30s. Many are married and have children. It is very rare for spouses to work abroad together, or for migrants to bring their children with them.

There are many factors that determine where Thai labor migrants go. One common phenomenon is that people from the same village migrate to the same country and sometimes the same employer. In some cases, an initial "pioneer" migrant or small group of migrants goes abroad. If they succeed, others follow. The kinds of agents who recruit migrants in their villages are also a factor. Agents that have connections with particular countries or types of work will tend to funnel the recruits into similar areas and/or job sectors. ...Thai people frequently see a trend and decide to follow it without fully considering their actions. For example, when large numbers of people decide to migrate to Japan, the trend created by the first wave of migrants can quickly pick up momentum as other people decide that work in Japan can fulfill their needs because "so many other people are going there."

When Thai migrant workers go abroad, they tend to mix little with local populations. The general policy by governments of countries that accept low-skilled Thai migrant labor is to treat this labor as temporary and control the inflows and activities of these workers as strictly as possible. The vast majority of foreign governments do not want labor migration to lead towards any sort of permanent settlement. For example, Singapore issues work permits to foreign workers for 2 years but allows only one extension. There are also limitations on marriage with residents of Singapore and making a Singapore resident pregnant. Other strong regulations designed to limit the opportunities for permanent migration exist in Japan, Malaysia, and Chinese Taipei, some of the largest hosts of Thai migrant workers."

The Thai government has made some efforts to promote Thai labor migration. The government's promotion efforts mainly aim to increase foreign exchange earnings and reduce unemployment pressure."

"The impacts of Thai labor migration abroad can be divided into three broad categories: 

Many Thai migrant workers do not fully understand the conditions they will face abroad, their legal rights, and how they can obtain help. They endure various difficulties not of their own making including: long work hours; Sudden Nocturnal Death Syndrome (SUNDS; dying in one's sleep for unknown reasons); unsafe working conditions; and a lack of adequate access to medical facilities. There are documented cases of these problems in nearly all the areas that have significant numbers of Thai migrant workers. ...

Yet the difficulties migrants face abroad may be no more troublesome than the problems they leave behind in Thailand. ...

Various studies of the villages from which Thai workers migrate provide some information about the impacts in Thailand. The most important repercussions of low-skilled labor migration relate to remittances. While the amount of money migrants send home is obviously important, the ways in which this money is used are the key to understanding the impact of remittances.

Remittances from labor migration affect the physical structure of the areas from which the migrants originate. Thai migrants and their families often use their earnings to build houses or improve existing dwellings. In some Thai villages, the differences between the houses built with remittances and those of non-migrant families appear very clearly. In addition, remittances have contributed to the "urbanization" of rural areas. Some rural villages with significant numbers of labor migrants abroad have characteristics found more in cities, e.g., elaborate cement houses, large numbers of motor vehicles, and gasoline stations. However, due to Thailand's rapid economic growth over the past 10-15 years (a period of high labor migration abroad), it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the physical changes created by remittances and those stemming from other factors such as foreign investment.

The impacts of labor migration on social structure are significant but reveal themselves less obviously than the physical impacts. The social impacts of migration depend on many factors and it would be a mistake to assume that the impacts noted below affect all or even most Thai villages with significant numbers of labor migrants.

In one study of Thai villages, the author wrote that: "Largely stemming from international labour migration, influence in the village is now built on money and contacts, not on the charisma or kinship positions that formerly distinguished leaders" (Singhanetra-Renard 1992, 202). The same author made an additional observation: "Exchange labour (farm families helping each other out during busy agricultural periods) and even religious obligations can now be fulfilled by monetary payments instead of the traditional personal services" (Singhanetra-Renard 1992, 202). Other surveys have found that returned migrants with large earnings gain social status, tend to use their earnings more for religious donations that general development of the community, and invest more in their children's education than previously (Social Research Institute, 304-307).

In addition, since most migrants must borrow funds to pay for the costs of going abroad, a large proportion of remittances goes towards repaying loans. Some older studies of Thai labor migration show that remittances were used to purchase consumer goods (stereos, televisions, bicycles, etc.) much more than other "investment goods" such as farm vehicles. It is not clear whether this preference for consumer goods over investment goods still prevails.

For remittances in the Asia-Pacific region, "no unequivocal conclusions on their role in international migration and development have emerged" (Skeldon 1992, 53). The same is true of Thailand. In an economic sense, remittances have had a positive impact, increasing the wealth of Thai people. However, the ways in which Thai people spend their remittances are not always optimal for the long-term health of the economy in the sense that purchasing consumer goods may not create as many benefits as investing in a child's education. Yet the purchases made using remittances indirectly create jobs and other forms of economic activity so their overall impact remains ambiguous.

For the areas that accept Thai labor migrants, the most significant impact is economic. Thai migrant labor provides a relatively inexpensive source of employees that employers can hire temporarily. Thai migrant workers build major infrastructure and buildings, help to produce a range of manufactured products, and take care of children and house chores. All of these contribute to the economic health of the areas that employ them because Thai workers nearly always fill labor shortages instead of taking away jobs from natives.

Other than the economic contribution, the impact of Thai migrant workers on the people in the areas that host them is probably very limited. Thai migrants, particularly illegal migrants, tend to live in communities detached from mainstream society. The host countries normally make little or no effort to integrate these migrants into mainstream society and sometimes design policies intended to keep the migrants separate. For example, housing for Thai migrants is often in non-public zones under the supervision of the employers. In addition, few Thai migrant workers report having close relationships with host country nationals."

Commercial Sex Trade

"In addition to the large number of migrants in Thailand who are commercial sex workers (CSWs), there are many Thai women who are CSWs abroad.

Thai women work as CSWs in a variety of countries. The data are very incomplete and fragmented because the movements of the women are clandestine and often hidden behind a variety of legal pretexts for migration such as tourism. Most reports indicate that Japan has the largest number of Thai migrant CSWs, though it difficult to estimate their numbers due to the diverse legal and illegal methods they use to enter Japan. A similar problem exists when trying to calculate the number of CSWs in other countries...

Among the APEC member economies, Chinese Taipei, Singapore, Malaysia, and the US all have recent confirmed reports of Thai CSWs within their borders. ... Outside of APEC, Germany, England, and Switzerland also presently have Thai CSWs.

Thai migrant CSWs enter the sex trade abroad in ways that mirror those of the foreign migrant women who are CSWs in Thailand. 

It is not clear how many women fall under each category. However, some form of deception is almost always part of the process. Before their arrival abroad, the women often do not understand what kinds of working conditions they will face or how much they will earn. In the majority of cases, the agents and employers tell the women that they have incurred a large debt for various costs such as airfare, finding employment, and lodging. The debt is nearly always artificially high and the employers use it as a kind of threat against the women to make them work harder in the sometimes oppressive environments of the sex establishments. Some of the highest debts have been noted for Japan where some Thai migrants had to repay amounts ranging from 700,000 to 1,000,000 baht in 1995 (Singhanetra-Renard 1996, 62).

There are a variety of ways that Thai women go abroad for commercial sex work.

The major reason for willingly entering the sex trade (as opposed to other forms of labor migration) is the potential for earning very high income. The income a Thai CSW can earn depends on many factors, including her level of debt to agents or her employer, the type of establishment where she works, and her skills at pleasing her clients. The information about the income Thai commercial sex workers generate is scanty and mainly anecdotal. One rough calculation estimated that around 1995, Thai CSWs in Japan sent over US$50 million to Thailand (Singhanetra-Renard, 61). Since remittance data from 1995 for Japan is not available from the Bank of Thailand, it is difficult to judge the accuracy of this figure. Estimates for the income generated by Thai CSWs in other areas were not available."

"The key impacts of commercial sex work by Thai people abroad arise from remittances. The impacts are essentially the same as those discussed in the above Section Low-Skilled Employment.

The social and psychological impacts on Thai society are very complex and the subject of much research, often by non-governmental organizations such as the Foundation for Women, academic researchers, and international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration. The one impact worth mentioning here is that the high earnings of many Thai CSWs abroad have stimulated a growing interest in going abroad to work in the sex trade. As more information becomes available about the opportunities for commercial sex work in places like Japan and Europe, increasing numbers of Thai women are seeking out agents to help them go abroad and work illegally. The interest is growing despite the many reports in the Thai press about harsh working conditions abroad."

[Stern, Aaron: Thailand's Migration Situation and its Relations with APEC Members and Other Countries in Southeast Asia. -- [9197]. -- APEC Document Number 97-HR-01.6. -- URL: http://www.chula.ac.th/INSTITUTE/ARCM/apec.htm. -- Zugriff am 1999-10-14]


10.3. Auswanderung und Brain drain


Ein spezielles Wanderungsproblem von Entwicklungsländern ist die Abwanderung hochqualifizierter Personen in hochdotierte Posten in Industrienationen, besonders den USA, bzw. das Bleiben von Studierenden und Stipendiaten nach ihrer Ausbildung bzw. Weiterbildung in den hochindustrialisierten Gastländern. Dieseser "brain drain" genannte Vorgang führt zu einem erheblichen Verlust an menschlichen Ressourcen in Entwicklungsländern. 

Im Folgenden werden die wichtigsten Ergebnisse einer Studie der National Science Foundation der USA wiedergegeben:

Johnson, Jean M. ; Regets, Mark C. : International Mobility of Scientists and Engineers to the United States : Brain Drain or Brain Circulation? -- NSF 98-316. --   June 22, 1998. -- URL: http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/issuebrf/sib98316.htm. -- Zugriff am 1999-10-14

"Foreign-born scientists and engineers (S&Es) contribute significantly to the brain power of the United States. Considering the U.S. labor force with doctoral degrees in S&E fields, immigrants are 29 percent of those conducting R&D [Research & Development] (table 1)

Several decades ago, the emigration of such highly skilled personnel to the United States was considered one-way mobility, a permanent brain drain depriving the countries of origin of the "best and the brightest." More recently, however, the mobility of highly talented workers is referred to as "brain circulation," since a cycle of study and work abroad may be followed by a return to the home country to take advantage of high-level opportunities. What do the data tell us about foreign-born S&E personnel in the United States? Are we seeing brain drain or brain circulation? This issue brief discusses student flows into U.S. higher education, the stay rates of foreign doctoral recipients, and their short- and long-term employment in U.S. industry, universities, and Government.

U.S. higher education and foreign S&E graduate students

The large foreign component of U.S. human intellectual capital is linked to the ability of U.S. higher education to attract, support, and retain foreign S&E graduate students. Foreign students, particularly those from Asia, represent a large fraction of enrollment and degrees in S&E fields in U.S. graduate institutions. In 1995, of the 420,000 graduate students in S&E programs, roughly 100,000 were foreign students, mainly from a dozen countries of origin. In 1995, at the doctoral level, foreign students (including those with permanent and temporary visas) earned 39 percent of the natural science degrees, 50 percent of the mathematics and computer sciences degrees, and 58 percent of the engineering degrees. Students from China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan accounted for over half of these S&E doctorates.

Financial support available from academic research activities appears to be a major factor associated with attracting foreign students to U.S. doctoral programs. More than 75 percent of the 10,000 foreign doctoral recipients at U.S. universities in 1996 reported their universities as the primary source of support for their graduate training. Of those who did so, the majority reported that their primary support came in the form of research assistantships. Financial resources for research assistantships are provided to universities by Federal Government agencies, industry, and other non-Federal sources in the form of research grants. At the same time that academic research expenditures have been growing, the number of foreign doctoral students supported by university S&E departments has also been increasing. From 1985-96, academic research expenditures increased from $13 to $21 billion in constant (1992) dollars. During the same period, the number of foreign doctoral students primarily supported as research assistants more than tripled-from 2,000 in 1985 to 7,600 in 1996.

Between 1988 and 1996, foreign students from major Asian and European countries, Canada, and Mexico earned over 55,000 U.S. S&E doctoral degrees."

During this period, about 63 percent of these doctoral recipients planned to remain in the United States after completion of their studies, and about 39 percent had firm plans to do so. The proportion of foreign students who remain in the United States, referred to as the "stay rate," differs widely by country. In the last decade, approximately half of the foreign doctoral recipients from China and India have sought and received firm opportunities for further study and employment in the United States. In contrast, only 23 percent of the doctoral recipients from South Korea and 28 percent from Taiwan accepted firm offers to remain in the United States  (figure 1).

"A recent study of foreign doctoral recipients working and earning wages in the United States (Finn, 1997) shows that about 47 percent of the foreign students on temporary student visas who earned doctorates in 1990 and 1991 were working in the United States in 1995. The majority of the 1990-91 foreign doctoral recipients from India (79 percent) and China (88 percent) were still working in the United States in 1995. In contrast, only 11 percent of South Koreans who completed S&E doctorates from U.S. universities in 1990-91 were working in the United States in 1995 ."

"The same study looked at foreign doctoral recipients from 1970-72. Finn estimated that 47 percent were working in the United States in 1995, and that the stay rate for that group was around 50 percent during the 25 years leading up to 1995. There is no evidence of significant net return migration of these scientists and engineers after 10 or 20 years of work experience in the United States. The fairly constant stay rates indicate that any tendency of the 1970-72 cohorts to leave the United States after gaining work experience here has been largely offset by others from the same cohort returning to the United States after going abroad. Remaining in the United States does not represent a complete brain drain on their home country. Choi has shown extensive networking by Asian-born faculty and researchers working in the United States to advise, disseminate information, and assist in building their home-country S&T infrastructure.This is particularly true for the foreign-born faculty in S&E departments. In 1993, foreign-born faculty in U.S. higher education represented 37 percent of the engineering professors and over a quarter of the mathematics and computer science teachers."

"Data on mobility and stay rates of foreign-born S&Es working in the United States support the notion of brain circulation for some countries (Taiwan and South Korea) and somewhat more brain drain for other countries (China and India)."


10.4.  Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge , Asylanten


Abb.: "During the latter half of July 1994, nearly 1.5 million Rwandese fled to Zaire, giving rise to some of the largest refugee camps in the world. Kibumba camp, Goma region, Zaire."

[Quelle der Abb.: UNCHR. -- http://www.unhcr.ch/images/image07.htm. -- Zugriff am 1999-10-13]

Die folgenden Zahlen und Tabellen deuten das Ausmaß demographischer Bewegungen durch Flucht und Vertreibung an:


Menschen, die unter das Mandat der UNHCR fallen:

"The total number of people of concern to UNHCR rose from 17 million in 1991 to a record 27 million in 1995. In the last four years, however, the number dropped to 21.5 million as of 1 January 1999. Despite the overall fall, this figure still represents one out of every 280 people on earth. They include refugees, returnees and persons displaced within their own countries.

Worldwide, there are an estimated 30 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and UNHCR assists an estimated 5 million of them in various regions. Thus, the total number of people who have been forced to flee their home, whether refugees or IDPs, is around 50 million."

Estimated number of persons of concern
who fall under the mandate of UNHCR, by region

Region Total of concern
1 Jan. 1998
Total of concern
1 Jan. 1999
Africa 7,385,100 6,284,950
Asia 7,458,500 7,474,740
Europe 6,056,500 6,212,620
Latin America / Caribbean 103,300 102,400
North America 1,294,900 1,305,400
Oceania 78,000 79,510
TOTAL 22,376,300 21,459,620
Totals may not add up, due to rounding.

Flüchtlinge, Asylanten, intern Vertriebene:

 

Persons of concern to UNHCR, at 1 Jan 1999, by category

Region Refugees Asylum seekers Returnees IDPs & Others of concern TOTAL
1 Jan 1999
Africa 3,270,860 63,350 1,296,770 1,653,970 6,284,950
Asia 4,744,730 27,610 317,180 2,385,220 7,474,740
Europe 2,667,830 576,970 285,500 2,682,320 6,212,620
Latin America / Caribbean 74,180 360 7,860 20,000 102,400
North America 659,800 645,600 1,305,400
Oceania 74,310 5,200 79,510
TOTAL 11,491,710  1,319,090  1,907,310  6,741,510  21,459,620

Ursprungsländer der 10 größten Flüchtlinsgruppen

 

Origin of major refugee populations
(10 largest groups)(1)

Country of origin (2) Main countries of asylum Refugees
Afghanistan Iran / Pakistan / India 2,648,000
Iraq Iran / Syria / Saudi Arabia /
Western Europe

631,000

Bosnia & Herzegovina F.R. Yugoslavia / Germany / Croatia / Sweden / Switzerland

597,000

Somalia Ethiopia / Kenya / Yemen / Djibouti 

525,000

Burundi Tanzania / D.R. Congo / Rwanda / Zambia

517,000

Liberia Guinea / Côte d'Ivoire / Ghana /
Sierra Leone

487,000

Sudan Uganda / D. R. Congo / Ethiopia /
Kenya / Central African Republic

351,000

Croatia F.R. Yugoslavia / Bosnia & Herzegovina

342,000

Sierra Leone Guinea / Liberia / Gambia

328,000

Viet Nam China / France / Sweden / Switzerland

317,000

(1) An estimated 3.2 million Palestinians who are covered by a separate mandate of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) are not included in this table. However, Palestinians outside the UNWRA area of operations such as those in Iraq or Libya, are considered to be of concern to UNHCR.
(2) Statistics reflecting the countries of origin of a large number of refugees in more developed countries are not available. Also, many refugees have acquired the citizenship of the asylum country — for example Vietnamese in the USA — and therefore are not included in the refugee statistics.

Länder mit mehr als 100.000 Intern Vertriebenen: 

 

Estimates of major populations of IDPs of concern to UNHCR during 1998 
(groups over 100,000)

Country IDPs
Bosnia-Herzegovina

 836,400

Sierra Leone 670,000
Rwanda 625,000
Sri Lanka 603,000
Azerbaijan 576,300
Afghanistan 315,800
Georgia 277,000
Cyprus 265,000
F.R.Yugoslavia 225,000
Guinea-Bissau 195,600
Russian Federation 171,900
Note: The figures included here do not necessarily represent the total number of IDPs in the countries concerned.

Größere Repatriierungsunternehmungen:

 

Major voluntary repatriation movements in 1998, by destination (10 largest movements)

To (country of origin) From (country of asylum) Total
Liberia Côte d'Ivoire / Guinea / Ghana 236,200
Sierra Leone Guinea / Liberia 194,600
Bosnia-Herzegovina Germany / F.R. Yugoslavia / Switzerland 129,200
Afghanistan Pakistan / Iran 107,200
D.R.Congo Tanzania / Uganda / Burundi 66,200
Somalia Ethiopia / Yemen / Kenya 51,500
Mali Algeria / Niger / Burkina Faso 26,900
Croatia F.R. Yugoslavia / Various 24,900
Burundi Tanzania / D.R. Congo / Rwanda 23,800
Angola D.R. Congo / Zambia / Congo 21,800

[Quelle der Tabellen: UNHCR by numbers / UNHCR. -- URL: http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/numbers.htm. -- Zugriff am 1999-10-13]


Zu Kapitel 23, Teil IV