Chronik Thailands

กาลานุกรมสยามประเทศไทย

von

Alois Payer

Chronik 1967 / B. E. 2510

Zitierweise / cite as:

Payer, Alois <1944 - >: Chronik Thailands = กาลานุกรมสยามประเทศไทย. -- Chronik 1967 / B. E. 2510. -- Fassung vom 2017-03-17. -- URL: http://www.payer.de/thailandchronik/chronik1967.htm

Erstmals publiziert: 2012-10-02

Überarbeitungen: 2017-03-17 [Ergänzungen] ; 2017-01-04 [Ergänzungen] ; 2016-12-19 [Ergänzungen] ; 2016-11-23 [Ergänzungen] ;  2016-08-31 [Ergänzungen] ;  2016-07-08 [Ergänzungen] ;  2016-05-30 [Ergänzungen] ;  2016-05-10 [Ergänzungen] ;  2016-04-25 [Ergänzungen] ;  2016-03-27 [Ergänzungen] ;  2016-02-20 [Ergänzungen] ; 2016-01-12 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-12-19 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-12-06 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-10-28 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-09-01 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-08-21 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-07-10 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-06-23 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-06-05 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-05-19 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-04-09 [Ergänzungen] ; 2015-02-15 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-11-25 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-11-05 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-10-30 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-10-19 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-09-29 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-09-15 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-08-23 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-04-05 [Ergänzungen] ; 2014-02-28 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-12-04 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-11-20 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-11-07 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-10-27 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-10-14 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-09-25 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-09-20 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-09-05 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-08-20 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-06-29 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-06-11 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-06-04 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-05-22 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-05-03 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-04-23 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-03-09 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-03-04 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-02-18 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-01-23 [Ergänzungen] ; 2013-01-12 [Ergänzungen]

©opyright: Dieser Text steht der Allgemeinheit zur Verfügung. Eine Verwertung in Publikationen, die über übliche Zitate hinausgeht, bedarf der ausdrücklichen Genehmigung des Herausgebers.

Dieser Text ist Teil der Abteilung Thailand von Tüpfli's Global Village Library

ช้างตายทั้งตัวเอาใบบัวปิดไม่มิด

 

 

Gewidmet meiner lieben Frau

Margarete Payer

die seit unserem ersten Besuch in Thailand 1974 mit mir die Liebe zu den und die Sorge um die Bewohner Thailands teilt.

 

Vorsicht bei den Statistikdiagrammen!

Bei thailändischen Statistiken muss man mit allen Fehlerquellen rechnen, die in folgendem Werk beschrieben sind:

Morgenstern, Oskar <1902 - 1977>: On the accuracy of economic observations. -- 2. ed. -- Princeton : Princeton Univ. Press, 1963. -- 322 S. ; 20 cm.

Die Statistikdiagramme geben also meistens eher qualitative als korrekte quantitative Beziehungen wieder.

 

2510 / 1967 undatiert

Statistik:

Durchschnittlicher Einkommenszuwachs 1961 - 1967: Zentralthailand: 40%

Durchschnittlicher Einkommenszuwachs 1961 - 1967: Nordostthailand und Südthailand: 20%

Klassenwiederholer in der Grundschule: 22%

Umsatz der Fischerei: 700.000 Tonnen Meeresfische und 100.000 Tonnen Süßwasserfische; Wert: 3 Milliarden Baht (200% mehr als 1966)

Export von Fisch nach Malaysia: 100 Mio Baht

Export von Hummer nach Japan: 500 - 600 Mio Baht

1967

Trockenheit und große Ernteausfälle in weiten Gebieten Nordostthailands.

1967


Abb.: Kalender für 2510 (1967) mit Whisky-Reklame
[Fair use]

1967

Seit 1942 hat sich die Einwohnerzahl verdoppelt, seit 1905 vervierfacht:


Abb.: Jahre seit 1905, in denen sich die Einwohnerzahl jeweils verdoppelt hat
1967[Datenquelle: Thailand in figures (2000), S. 34]

 

1967 - 1969

"In 1967-68, the guerrillas spread to the Northern region, mainly in the Nan [น่าน] and Chieng-Rai [เชียงราย / เจียงฮาย] area, and in the three-provinces area (Phitsanuloke [พิษณุโลก], Loei [เลย] and Petchabun [เพชรบูรณ์]), where the CPT [Communist Party of Thailand - พรรคคอมมิวนิสต์แห่งประเทศไทย] has established impregnable bases and its first "liberated areas" with "state power". Insurgency in the North first started among hill tribes, repressed by the Thai authorities who were often corrupt and who wanted to assimilate them. Communist infiltration had started in the late ’50’s among these impoverished, discriminated and uneducated tribes who, like the Meo (or Hmong [ม้ง]) people, were good warriors. The "red Meo war", as it was called in Bangkok, started in November 1967. The suppression campaign, with its violence, bombings, "off-limits" areas, and forced resettlement in "new villages" in the plains, drove about half of the hill tribes of the eastern Chieng-Rai and Nan provinces to the hills, where most of them had no choice but to join the CPT and fight against the central government. More refugees were generated in 1969. According to a Thai army project to evacuate Meo and Yao people from the Nan mountains, out of 18 villages, 5 were destroyed and 7 abandoned; the population under government control decreased from 4,759 to 3,205. In the North, the figures were 28 and 32 out of 101.

This probably explains why the war in this area is bloodier than in the North- East; the bloodiest incidents have always occurred there. Today, in Nan, most of the province is CPT controlled and, according to local sources, the CPT could overrun it or isolate it from the rest of the country in a few days. "They have more soldiers than we have", a local banker told me.

The tri-provinces area was where the first big anti-insurgency drive was conducted. It was a failure: few CPT casualties were sustained whereas there were big losses among Bangkok’s soldiers who were unfamiliar with counter-insurgency operations and unacclimatised to the hard terrain. Some important camps are located there, from where the CPT progresses slowly southwards. According to a letter received by a Thai from a friend in the jungle there, the camp has everything, including electricity and medical facilities; it is self-sufficient in food (probably scarce, though, and excluding rice), but it does not have a dentist, said the letter. So, the former student had to walk several days to town to see the local dentist, and then to walk back. The new trainees are divided into four groups, for training in agriculture production, warfare, cultural and political activities."

[Quelle: Patrice de Beer <1942 - >. -- In: Thailand, roots of conflict / edited by Andrew Turton <1938 - >, Jonathan Fast, Malcolm Caldwell. -- Nottingham : Spokesman Books, 1978. -- 196 S. ; 22 cm. -- ISBN 0851242383. -- S. 146f. -- Fair use]


Abb.: Lage der genannten Provinzen
[Bildquelle: CIA. -- Public domain]

1967

Inbetriebnahme des Radiosenders Station 909 (สถานีวิทยุ 909) bei Sakon Nakhon (สกลนคร), er wird von den USA finanziert und von USIS (United States Information System) und ab 1969 vom National Security Command betrieben


Abb.: Lage von Sakon Nakhon (สกลนคร)
[Bildquelel: CIA. -- Public domain]

1967

Das 3. Regiment des 1. Bataillon der Royal Thai Army in Sakhon Nakhon (สกลนคร) weigert sich, gegen kommunistische Guerillas vorzugehen, da der Monsun begonnen habe.


Abb.: Lage von  Sakhon Nakhon (สกลนคร)
[Bildquelel: CIA. -- Public domain]

1967

In Thailand werden folgende US-Truppen neu stationiert:

1967 - 1972

Ein Drittel des Bruttosozialprodukts von Nordostthailand stammt von den Ausgaben des dort stationierten US-Militärs

1959 - 1967


Abb.: North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam 1959 - 1967
[Bildquelle: USAF / Van Staaveren, Jacob: Interdiction in southern Laos, 1960-1968 : the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. -- Washington, D.C. : Center for Air Force History, 1993. -- 360 S. : Ill. ; 24 cm. -- S. 301. -- Public domain]

1967


Abb.: Südlaos: Ho-Chi-Minh-Pfad, 1967
[Bildquelle: USAF / Van Staaveren, Jacob: Interdiction in southern Laos, 1960-1968 : the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. -- Washington, D.C. : Center for Air Force History, 1993. -- 360 S. : Ill. ; 24 cm. -- S. 234. -- Public domain]

1967, Anfang

Festnahme von 80 in Thailand wohnhaften Vietnamesen, da sie kommunistische Kader seien.

1967

Es erscheint die 2. allgemeine Bodenkarte (general soil map) Thailands (erste: 1960), bearbeitet vom Niederländer Frans Rudolf Moormann und dem Thai Santhad Rojanasoonthorn.


Abb.: 2. General soil map, 1967
[Bildquelle: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GSP/docs/Presentation_china_feb2012/Potichan.pdf. -- Zugriff am 2013-112-02. -- Fair use]

1967 - 1979

Es erscheinen bodenkundliche Karten zu den einzelnen Provinzen, Maßstab 1 : 100.000


Abb.: Beispiel
[Bildquelle: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GSP/docs/Presentation_china_feb2012/Potichan.pdf. -- Zugriff am 2013-112-02. -- Fair use]

1947 - 1967

Künstlich bewässerte Ackerbaufläche:


Abb.: Künstlich bewässerte Ackerbaufläche (in Mio. Rai), 1947 - 1967
[Datenquelle: Ingram (1971), S. 276]


Abb.: Bewässerte Reisfelder, bei Wat Khao Chong Pran (วัดเขาช่องพราน), Provinz Ratchaburi (ราชบุรี), 2004
[Bildquelle: IRRI. -- http://www.flickr.com/photos/ricephotos/399439103/. -- Zugriff am 2012-01-25. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, keine kommerzielle Nutzung, share alike)]


Abb.: Lage von Ratchaburi (ราชบุรี)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1958 - 1967

Durchschnittlicher Bar-Ertrag in Baht pro Rai (1600m²):


Abb.: Durchschnittlicher jährlicher Bar-Ertrag in Baht pro Rai (1600m²) landwirtschaftlicher Fläche in Großhandelspreisen von Bangkok, 1958 - 1967
[Datenquelle: Ingram (1971), S. 264]

1950 - 1967

Andere landwirtschaftlich angebaute Pflanzen als Reis:


Abb.: Durchschnittliche landwirtschaftliche Fläche für andere Pflanzen als Reis, 1950 - 1967
[Datenquelle: Ingram (1971), S. 261]


Abb.: Cassava-Ernte bei Khorat (โคราช), 2009
[Bildquelle: Neil Palmer (CIAT). -- http://www.flickr.com/photos/ciat/4039212151/. -- Zugriff am 2012-01-25. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

 
Abb.: Lage von Khorat (โคราช)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1959 - 1967

Sozialleistungen des Staats:


Abb.: Sozialleistungen des Staats, 1959 - 1967
[Datenquelle: Thailand official year book 1968. -- S. 220]

1963 - 2011

Netto-Entwicklungshilfe Österreichs an Thailand


Abb.: Netto-Entwicklungshilfe Österreichs an Thailand 1963 - 2011 (in Tausend US$)
[Datenquelle: http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/thailand/net-bilateral-aid-flows-from-dac-donors#DC.DAC.CHEL.CD. -- Zugriff am 20114-04-05]

1967 - 1975

Thai-German Agricultural Development Project Saraburi (สระบุรี) (1967-1975)


Abb.: Lage von Saraburi (สระบุรี)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-Herbst

Feldstudie von Hans Ulrich Luther (1940 -) und einigen Studenten der Chulalongkorn University in Nordostthailand über die Situation der dortigen Bauern. Route der Feldforschungsreise:

Die Ergebnisse der Studie sind berichtet in:

Luther, Hans Ulrich <1940 - >: Reformer gegen Rebellen : Zur Situation der Bauern in Thailand. -- Hamburg : Inst. f. Asienkunde, 1970. -- 31 S. -- (Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg ; Nr. 32)


Abb.: Einbandtitel

Luther, Hans Ulrich <1940 - >: Peasants and state in contemporary Thailand : from regional revolt to national revolution?. -- Hamburg : Institut für Asienkunde, 1978. -- 109 S. ; 21 cm. -- (Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, Hamburg ; Nr. 98). -- ISBN 3-921469-49-X


Abb.: Einbandtitel

"We asked peasants who were interviewed by US research teams using Thai government interpreters "how they liked the interview" and some answered quickly: "mai sabai" [ไม่สบาย] which means that they felt very uncomfortable about it. In many cases, the interviewers - so we were told - became very "impatient" with the slow answers and the stubbornness of the rural people who were not always prepared to reveal their "problems". The teams had been assigned to do a certain amount of interviews per day and in quite a "rude" way rushed through their sometimes enormous questionnaires. Often the interpreter formulated already the "right" answer and only asked the peasants to agree who consequently did this quickly as a matter of politeness as well as to save time and get back to their field work.

The foreigners mostly interviewed heads of the family as so-called "key-informants',' seldom women or younger members of the family who might have articulated less "conservative" ideas. According to our observations (and our earlier interviews proved this) the majority of the peasants and other village people soon had developed a good sense of what the foreigners (and even Thais from Bangkok were a kind of "foreigners" to them) wanted to know and automatically answered accordingly. To the students accompanying me the peasants many times complained about the "chao-nai"-attitude of the research teams (chao-nai [เจ้านาย] means talking like masters or like "officials" which in this context seems to be quite similar). In most cases "ordinary interviewees" are in a quite precarious psychological situation.

They are not used "to speak out freely", to articulate their grievances or to criticize official policies, especially if they are surrounded by several government officials, e.g. interpreters, police, village headmen, etc. Due to a traditional social order resulting from unequal power and ownership relations, people are not used to "articulate" what they think but tend to be rather careful and suspicious bearing all possible repercussions in mind. Reliable answers can therefore only be expected if the informant remains anonymous and thus has no fear to express his opinion. Therefore in most villages, interviews are normally conducted with so-called "opinion leaders" (village headmen, rich peasant, teacher, policeman, abbot of the Buddhist temple, etc.) who in general support the government policy as they believe it is their duty, at least when confronted with foreigners. Nobody of the poorer folks dares to reject their statements or even to say something deviating because the majority of the villagers can hardly sidestep their general dependence of these people and in addition the arbitrary manners of the local powerful are well known to them.

[...]

For example, the government had decided to build a bridge near the village. It is now the duty of the village headman (pujai- ban [ผู้ใหญ่บ้าน]) who is normally appointed by the government to go from house to house and ask the villagers to support the plan and to volunteer manual help. In this case it is very difficult for a villager to refuse.

If he dislikes the road building scheme because he believes the roads are mainly used by military convois (as it is often the case in the Northeast) and refuses to take part in this kind of "corvée" (requisitioning of forced labour, as it was common in feudal times), he will most possibly be blamed for his "anti-government" attitude and be bullied by police and officials alike or even accused as a "procommunist" because he refuses to support "national development".

[...]

The "pet-question" of American and Japanese research groups which were mostly concerned with social intelligence gathering, i.e. the so-called "aspirations census", had always been to ask the peasants: "What would you do if you were elected to become the Prime Minister of Thailand? " Normally the answer was only stupefied surprise (at the complete ignorance of the interviewer who obviously did not know that this was a rather stupid question to ask as it was well-known that this job was not available for everybody). This "behaviour" was duly interpreted as "passiveness" of the peasants who allegedly did not know "how to improve their lot even if they had the means (becoming Prime Minister) to do so"

[a.a.O., S. 51ff. -- Fair use]
"The majority of the people inhabiting the Northeast of Thailand ("Isan" [อีสาน]) call themselves "Lao People". They account for more than five times as much as ethnic Lao tribes in Laos (in 1975 Laos had over 3 million, the Northeast over 15 million people). However, their loyalty is split. They say: "We are Laotian people but Thai citizens!" (pen phu lao tae sat thai! [เป็นผู้ลาวแต่ชาติไทย]). They still claim that Laos is the home country of their ancestors and that the Mekong river has never been a real "border" to separate them from their relatives on the other side. These people have a specific regional identity which is neither Lao nor Thai but genuinely "Northeastern" (khon pakh isan [คนภาคอีสาน]) and they say that they have other customs, other food (sticky rice, in Thai: khao niuw [ข้าวเหนียว]), wear different clothes and speak another language compared with the people in Bangkok and the Central Plains of Thailand.

Even by itself, the Northeast is ethnically quite a heterogenous region. For instance, in the area around Sakon Nakhon [สกลนคร] settle at least five different ethnical groups: Thai-Lao, Thai-Yaw, Thai-Yoi, Pu-Thai and Kalerng. In addition there are smaller minorities of Meo (H'mong), Khmer, Vietnamese, Chinese and Indians."

[a.a.O., S. 55. -- Fair use]
"Consequently many people were puzzled that they were suddenly taught "community development" by busy foreigners though mutual help and good neighbourship were long-established traditions of the rural people and were only disrupted by outside interference into the self-contained cycle of village life. And all these "miracles" happened, so the people were told by mobile propaganda units, "mainly to prevent the peasants from becoming communists". It was therefore no surprise that the rural folks became more and more curious about "communism" as even the powerful government was evidently so afraid of it. "Communism", as some older people told us most secretively, was probably something like the Phu Mi Bun movement, a revolt of dissatisfied peasants "in the North" who dared to challenge the authorities and prepared for liberating the whole Northeast from corrupt officials, brutal landlords and unscrupulous "loan sharks". Thus, the fierce anti-communist propaganda having for long alienated the peasants from the government helped to pave the way for communist ideas which soon circulated in the villages rather than containing them as it was originally intended."

[a.a.O., S. 60. -- Fair use]
"BASIC NEEDS AND PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

As we asked the peasants about their most urgent needs (kwarm tong kahn [ความต้องการ]) and most pressing problems (panha [ปัญหา]), we got the following answers which will be itemized here according to priority:

  • Water and irrigation for the rice-fields, drinking water, wells etc. (the Northeast often suffers from droughts in the dry seasons, the water for drinking is mostly unclean and brackish).
  • Land. The plots for farming are in general too small, tenancy rates are high, taxes are excessive, land ownership problems often remain unsettled. Government officials use unfair practices when they tax the land or distribute credits which go mostly to the rich and not to those in need.
  • Roads, bridges and means of transport to eliminate the power of local middlemen, traders etc. and give the producers a chance to market their products themselves.
  • Protection against landlords, bandits, cattle thieves and corrupt officials including the police. Often armed thugs raid smaller hamlets and take the harvest and the water buffalos away, leaving the people behind in misery.
  • Medical supplies, small hospitals in the vicinity, a cheap public health system.
  • Fertilizer and pesticides, tools and water pumps to increase the productivity of the land provided by the government on the basis of cheap loans to avoid that the peasants get further into debts and hence lose their land.
  • Credits with low interests to buy back mortgaged land, thereby to secure a plot of land large enough for subsistence reproduction."

[a.a.O., S. 73f. -- Fair use]
"Already at the time of Field Marshal Sarit [สฤษดิ์ ธนะรัชต์, 1908 - 1963] and well before the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, "anti-communism" in Thailand had proved to be a convenient formula to suppress all kinds of opposition against the government and soon spread like hysteria down to the lower ranks of the provincial administration. Politicians of radical opposition parties who advocated land reform and social change were labeled as "communists" and could be detained for an unlimited period of time. A policeman in a distant village, who was able to "catch a communist" improved his chances for promotion. For that reason peasants in the Northeast get used to tell the police if their cattle was stolen by ordinary bandits, that this was done by "communists" only in order to speed up the chase for the culprits.

The more the government started to intensify its anticommunist propaganda campaign, the more the peasants became curious about that rare political animal which the government officials feared so much and which the rural people called respectfully "nai-communit" [นายคอมมิวนิสต์] (Mister Communist)."

[a.a.O., S. 82. -- Fair use]

1967

Chiang Mai (เชียงใหม่): Eröffnung der (dritten) Nawarat Brücke (สะพานนวรัฐ). Stahlbeton.


Abb.: Lage der Nawarat Brücke (สะพานนวรัฐ)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Nawarat Brücke (สะพานนวรัฐ), 2006
[Bildquelle: Moritz Schmaltz. -- http://www.flickr.com/photos/mschmaltz/297597603/. -- Zugriff am 2014-11-05. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967

Chiang Mai (เชียงใหม่): Eröffnung der Mengrai Anusorn Brücke (สะพานเม็งรายอนุสรณ์)


Abb.: Lage der Mengrai Anusorn Brücke (สะพานเม็งรายอนุสรณ์)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967

Einweihung des  Heroine's Monument in Tharua (ท่าเรือ) in Phuket (ภูเก็ต) für die Heldinnen Thao Thep Kasattri (ท้าวเทพกระษัตรี) and Thao Sri Sunthon (ท้าวศรีสุนทร)


Abb.: Lage von Phuket (ภูเก็ต)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Heroine's Monument, Phuket, 2008
[Bildquelle: Sumeet Moghe. -- http://www.flickr.com/photos/ciphertux/3294720166/. -- Zugriff am 2012-05-03. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, keine kommerzielle Nutzung, share alike)]

"Thao Thep Kasattri (ท้าวเทพกระษัตรี) and Thao Sri Sunthon (ท้าวศรีสุนทร) were styles awarded to Than Phuying Chan (ท่านผู้หญิงจัน), wife of the then recently deceased governor, and her sister, Khun Muk (คุณมุก), who defended Phuket Province (ภูเก็ต) in the late eighteenth century. According to popular belief, they repelled a five-week invasion by Burmese in 1785, by dressing up as male soldiers and rallying Siamese troops. Chan and Muk were later honored by King Rama I with the Thai honorific Thao, as Thao Thep Kasattri and Thao Sri Sunthon, respectively.

The "Heroine's Monument" honouring them is situated on the main highway (402) between the Phuket International Airport and Phuket town."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thao_Thep_Kasattri_and_Thao_Sri_Sunthon. -- Zugriff am 2012-05-03]

1967

Bau des ersten Strand-Resort auf Phuket (ภูเก็ต), des Phuket Islands Beach Resort in Laem Ka (แหลมกา), Rawai (ราไวย์)

1967

In Thailand gibt es folgende Tageszeitungen (mit einer Ausnahme erscheinen alle in Bangkok):

Sprache Name Übersetzung des Namens Geschätzte Auflage
Thai ชาวไทย (Chao Thai) Thai people 9.600
  ข่าวพาณิชย์ (Khao Panit) Trade news 8.000
  เกียรติศักดิ์ (Kiatisak) Fame 35.000
  คนเมือง (Kon Muang) <Chiang Mai> People of the North 5.000
  หลักเมือง (Lak Muang) Pillar of the city 14.000
  พิมพ์ไทย (Phim Thai) Thai press 65.000
  ประชาธิปไตย (Prachthipathai) Democracy 12.000
  สารเสรี (Sarn Seri) Free press 35.000
  สยามนิกร (Siam Nikorn) Siamese people 20.000
  สยามรัฐ (Siam Rath) Siam state 30.000
  เสียงอ่างทอง (Siang Angtong) Voice of Angtong 20.000
  ไทยรายวัน (Thai Raiwan) Thai daily 100.000
  ไทยรัฐ (Thai Rath) Thai state 120.000
Chinesisch สากล (Sakol) = Shieh Chieh Pao Universal daily 5.000
   星暹日報 (Siang Siang Yit Pao) Daily Siam star 45.000
  Siri Nakorn = Ching Hua Jih Pao Pride of the city 28.000
  Thong Hua = Chung Hua Pao China daily 25.000
Englisch The Bangkok Post   13.000
  The Bangkok World   13.000

[Datenquelle: Area handbook for Thailand / co-authors: Harvey H. Smith [1892 - ] [u. a.]. -- Washington : U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. -- 558 S. ; 24 cm. --  (American University foreign area studies). -- S. 287]

"Major Newspapers

There is no single outstanding Thai-language newspaper, but some have attained somewhat greater prominence than others either because of circulation or influence (see table 1). One of the most widely read newspaper is Phim Thai [พิมพ์ไทย] (Thai Press), a popular, morning newspaper specializing in sensationalism. Edited in 1967 by Chayong Chawalit [ชัยยงค์ ชวลิต], it devotes little attention to political developments, on which its position is neutral. Extensive space is given to scandal stories and crime reports. Owned by the Thai Commercial Company, Phim Thai moved to new quarters in 1963, equipped with modern rotary presses.

Siam Nikorn [สยามนิกร] (Siamese People) also owned by the Thai Commercial Company, has an estimated circulation of 20,000. Formerly a leftist newspaper, it has adopted a more moderate position and in 1967 was one of the leading dailies, popular with the better educated. Its coverage of international affairs is praised as complete and constructive.

Another important daily is Siam Rath [สยามรัฐ] (Siam state); royalist in orientation, it has considerable influence and is noted for high journalistic standards. Founded in 1950, it claims a circulation of about 30,000. Government officials and educated persons generally predominate among Siam Rath's readers.

Sarn Seri [สารเสรี] (Free Press) is another quite widely read Thai-language daily owned by the Dhana Karn Phim Company [ธนาคารพิมพ์] which is also the owner of the much larger newspaper, Thai Raiwan [ไทยรายวัน] (Thai Daily).

Kon Muang [คนเมือง] (People of the North), the only nonmetropolitan daily, is published in Chiengmai. Founded in 1961, it has modern printing facilities and has attracted many readers in the provinces of the Northern Region.

There are four Chinese-language dailies, all established after World War II and owned independently. They are usually pro-West in orientation and abstain from commenting on Thai political events. The standards of the two leading Chinese dailies, in respect to news coverage and presentation, are comparable to those of the better metropolitan dailies in the United States. They report extensively on international events and devote much space to commercial and financial information. Unlike their Thai counterparts, Chinese dailies publish both morning and evening editions and are distributed through circulation agents.

Sing Siang Yit Pao [星暹日報] (Daily Siam star) and Siri Nakorn (Pride of the City) are the most important among the Chinese dailies. With estimated circulations of about 45, 000 and 28, 000, respectively, they appeal mostly to educated readers.

Sakol [สากล] (Universal Daily) and Thong Hua (China Daily), with circulations of approximately 5, 000 and 25, 000, respectively, feature general news, interspersed with reports on crime and fiction items. They appeal mostly to readers in the middle and lower income groups.

The English-language daily, The Bangkok Post, reported a paid circulation of 13, 000 in 1967. started in 1946 as a commercial venture by a United States journalist, the controlling interest later was sold to Lord Thomson [Roy Herbert Thomson, 1st Baron Thomson of Fleet, 1894 – 1976], a Canadian newspaper publisher who continued the editorial policy of its founder. The Bangkok Post's format is essentially that of a United States small-town newspaper, and it gives extensive coverage to international news. It achieved recognition as an established institution in the foreign community and among the Western-educated Thai.

The other equally prominent English-language daily, noted for the feature articles contained in its Sunday supplement, is the Bangkok World with approximately the same circulation as the Post. The Bangkok World in 1967 was purchased by Lord Thomson, who already owned The Bangkok Post, and by Cowles Communications, Incorporated, of New York.

Among the nondailies published in the Bangkok-Thon Buri area, The Standard, an English-language weekly, is edited by Princess Ngamchitr Prem [งามจิตร เปรม]. Intended for “officials, diplomats and socialites... ” it features international news and publishes special articles on the cultures of countries represented by embassies in Bangkok.

Nakorn Thai [นครไทย] (Thai City) is a 5-day newspaper specializing in general news and lottery results.

The Weekly Bangkok Times, with a press run of 20, 000, is one of the most widely read nondaily newspapers in the metropolitan area. It concerns itself mainly with religious affairs and with Thai cultural and religious traditions.

Siang Chiengmai [เสียงเชียงใหม่] (Voice of Chiengmai) and Siang Rath [เสียงรัฐ] (Voice of the People)一the latter published in Nakhon Ratchasima [นครราชสีมา]—are the most popular nondaily newspapers in the Northern and Northeast regions, respectively.

Nakornsarn [นครสาร] (City Publication) serves the northeastern border province of Nakhon Phanom [นครพนม].

Thai Taksin [ไทยทักษิณ] (Southern Illustrated Newspapers) is a popular newspaper serving the Southern Region.

Periodicals

A variety of magazines are financially unstable and have small circulation. Some of them are of general interest, but many of them are specially devoted to sports, motion picture stars, television, fashion or other popular subjects.

Women’s magazines, patterned after those in the United States, include Satri Sarn [สตรีสาร] (Women’s Magazine) and an English-language publication, The Lady. The latter is edited by Princess Ngamchitr, who also is editor of The Standard.

Professional magazines are limited to a small group, including Chang Ahkas [ช้างอากาศ ?] (The Air Engineer's Digest), published by the Thai Air Force Engineering Department, and Vithya Sastr [วิทยาศาสตร์] (The Science Review), published by the Science Association of Thailand.

Nine Chinese periodicals were published in Bangkok in 1966. Lien Yu (Friend Magazine) with a circulation of 4, 000 to 5, 000 is among the most popular ones. It is published monthly and features general pictorial news.

The rest of the Chinese periodicals一mostly weeklies—have estimated circulations of between 1, 000 and 3, 000; they feature motion picture news, serialized fiction and some current news items."

[Quelle: Area handbook for Thailand / co-authors: Harvey H. Smith [1892 - ] [u. a.]. -- Washington : U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. -- 558 S. ; 24 cm. --  (American University foreign area studies). -- S. 286ff.]

1967

In Thailand shaben 18 ausländische Presseagenturen und Zeitungen Berichterstatter:

1967

Es erscheint:

Chancha Suvannathat [จรรจา สุวรรณทัต]: A study of social influences on the development of children in the village of Napa. -- In: Summaries of three studies concerning the socialization of Thai children / [Hrsg.] Bangkok Institute for Child Study. -- Bangkok : Bangkok Institute for Child Study, 1967.  -- 16 S. ; 26 cm.
"Nach SUVANNATHAT (1967:7) wurden im Rahmen einer Sozialisationsstudie in einem Dorf in Südostthailand (Napa) aufgrund von Befragungen der Mütter folgende Erziehungsziele ermittelt:
  1. non-aggression,
  2. obedience and respect for authority and seniority,
  3. gratitude,
  4. kindness, generosity and sacrifice."

[Quelle: Liebig-Hundius, Ingrid <1947 - >: Thailands Lehrer zwischen "Tradition" und "Fortschritt" : eine empirische Untersuchung politisch-sozialer und pädagogischer Einstellungen thailändischer Lehrerstudenten des Jahres 1974. -- Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1984. -- 342 S. ; 24 cm. --  (Beiträge zur Südasienforschung ; Bd. 85). -- ISBN 3-515-04121-4. -- Zugl.: Hamburg, Univ., Diss., 1982. -- S. 54, Anm. 132]

1967

Es erscheint der Song:

ชินกร ไกรลาศ [Chinakon Krailat] <1946 - >: ยอยศพระลอ [Lob von Phra Lo]

Der Song auf Spotify:

URI: spotify:track:3ZrQb8HpkAOV1r4HfLdkey
URL: https://open.spotify.com/track/3ZrQb8HpkAOV1r4HfLdkey


Abb.: Hülle einer späteren VCD
[Fair use]

1967

Es erscheint der Song

ชาย เมืองสิงห์ [Chai Mueangsing] <1939 - >: ชาวนาหน้าดำ [Bauer mit schwarzem Gesicht]

Künstlerlink auf Spotify:

URI: spotify:artist:20EnS7wwsUtXbl9L39rNGp
URL: https://open.spotify.com/artist/20EnS7wwsUtXbl9L39rNGp

1967

Exell, F. K. (Frank Kingsley): In Siamese service. -- London : Cassell, 1967. -- 210 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Red lion readers ; 7). -- Der Autor war von 1922 bis 1936 in Siam und beschreibt diese Zeit

1967

Es erscheint:

Southeast Asian tribes, minorities, and nations / edited by Peter Kunstadter. -- Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1967. -- 2 Bde. ( 902 S. ) : Ill. ; 24 cm

Darin folgende auf Thailand bezogene Artikel:

  1. A minority and its government : the Thai-Lue of Northern Thailand / Michael Moerman
  2. The Thai Mobile Development Unit program / Lee W. Huff [1932 - 2015]
  3. The rural "Haw" (Yunnanese Chinese) of Northern Thailand / F.W. Mote
  4. The hill tribe program of the Public Welfare Department, Ministry of Interior, Thailand : research and socio-economic development / Hans Manndorff [1928 - ]
  5. The Tribal Research Centre, Thailand : an account of plans and activities / William R. Geddes [1916 - 1989]
  6. Autonomy and integration of social systems : the Iu Mien ("Yao" or "Man") mountain population and their neighbors / Peter Kandre
  7. The Luả (Lawa) and Skaw Karen of Maehongson Province, northwestern Thailand / Peter Kunstadter

1967

Es erscheint:

Stone, I.F. (Isidor Feinstein) <1907 - 1989>: In a time of torment . -- New York : Random, 1967. -- 463 S. ; 22 cm


Umschlagtitel einer britischen Ausgabe 1968

"In reading the military literature on guerrilla warfare now so fashionable at the Pentagon, one feels that these writers are like men watching a dance from outside through heavy plate glass windows. They see the motions but they can't hear the music. They put the mechanical gestures down on paper with pedantic fidelity. But what rarely comes through to them are the injured racial feelings, the misery, the rankling slights, the hatred, the devotion, the inspiration and the desperation. So they do not really understand what leads men to abandon wife, children, home, career, and friends; to take to the bush and live gun in hand like a hunted animal; to challenge overwhelming military odds rather than acquiesce any longer in humiliation, injustice, or poverty."

[a.a.O., S. 160f. -- Fair use]

1967

Es erscheint ein Grundtext der Guerilla-Taktik:

Debray, Régis <1940 - >: Révolution dans la révolution? lutte armée et lutte politique en Amérique latine. -- Paris : Maspero, 1967. -- 144 S. ; 20 cm. -- (Cahiers libres ; 98). -- Übersetzungen in zahlreiche Sprachen.

 
Abb.: Einbandtitel

1967

Tod von Kee Kirati Widyolar (Luang Kee Kirati), erster Lektor für Thai an der Universität Hamburg.

1967

Die US-Streitkräfte führen das Gewehr M16 als Ordonanzwaffe in.


Abb.: M16 gegen das eigene Volk: Thai-Soldat mit M16A2 sorgt für Grabesruhe nach dem Staatsstreich 2006, 2006-09-19
[Bildquelle: goshen / Wikimedia. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967

US-Leichtflugzeug mit Turboaufladung Cessna T337. Die Royal Thai Navy wird solche Flugzeuge in Dienst stellen.


Abb.: Cessna T337h-SP der Royal Thai Navy, 2008
[Bilkdquelle: Gerry Stegmeier / Wikimedia. -- GNU FDLicense]

1967

Seine Majestät der König betätigt sich als Waffenmechaniker: er repariert kaputte Sturmgewehre M-16 (AR-15) von Militär und Polizei. Seine Kenntnisse hatte er an einem M-16 erworben, das ihm amerikanische Militärs geschenkt hatten: er zerlegte es und studierte all seine Bestandteile aufmerksam.

Ihre Majestäten, der König und die Königin sind gute Schützen. Auch der Prinz und die Prinzessinnen werden an verschiedenen Gewehren ausgebildet.


Abb.: AR-15 (M-16), National Firearms Museum (USA)
[Bildquelle: Darkhelmet322 / Wikipedia. -- GNU FDLicense]

Zu den vielen Interessen des Königs gehört auch Amateurfunk.


Abb.: Tragbares Funkgerät, DDR, 1976
[Bildquelle: Deutsche Fotothek / Wikimedia. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967 - 1973

Auf der Korat (โคราช) Royal Thai Air Force Base sind 1967 ca. 6500 Militärs der US Air Force in 34 Einheiten stationiert. Daneben sind hier auch noch Einheiten der Royal Thai Air Force und eine Einheit Royal New Zealand Air Force mit Bristol Type 170 Freighters stationiert. Die Grundkosten für die Air Base betragen (Stand 1967) jährlich ca. 12 Mio. US$, die monatlichen (!) Kosten für Munition (Bomben usw.) 4,4 Mio. US$.

Von Korat aus sind bis 1973 u.a. im Einsatz


Abb.: Lage der Korat (โคราช) Royal Thai Air Force Base
[Bildquelle: CIA. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Bristol Type 170 Freighter der Royal New Zealand Air Force, Thailand, 1962-06
[Bildquelel: USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: McDonnell Douglas F-4D Phantom II
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II de Ägyptischen Luftwaffe, 1980
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: EF-105F Wild Weasel III mit ausgelegter Munition, 1964-08
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: North American F-100 Super Sabre schießt Raketen auf Südvietnam, 1967
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Ling-Temco-Vought A-7 Corsair II im Vietnamkrieg, 1971
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: General Dynamics F-111 "Aardvark" im Vietnamkrieg, 1968
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: ": Four U.S. Air Force McDonnell F-4C Phantom II fighters (s/n 63-7544, 63-7514, unknown, unknown) ot the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing release their 750 lb bombs over North Vietnam, led by a Douglas RB-66B-DL Destroyer (s/n 53-438)", 1966-08
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Ein Lockheed AC-130 Spectre setzt Fallschirmjäger über Südvietnam ab, ca. 1966
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Lockheed Constellation ("Connie"), 1943
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

1967


Abb.: Zwei Seiten aus "`Bangkok after dark", 1967
[Fair use]

ca. 1967

Reifenherstellung mit thailändischem Kautschuk:


Abb.: Reifenfabrikation mit einheimischem Kautschuk, ca. 1967

1967

Gründung der Thai Rung Union Car Public Company Limited (บริษัท ไทยรุ่งยูเนี่ยนคาร์ จำกัด มหาชน).


Abb.: ®Logo
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia]

"Thai Rung Union Car Public Company Limited (Thai: บริษัท ไทยรุ่งยูเนี่ยนคาร์ จำกัด มหาชน) ist Thailands einziger Automobilproduzent. Es werden dort Fahrzeuge unter eigenem Markenzeichen produziert. Ebenfalls produziert das Werk Automobile für die Marken Isuzu, Nissan, Chevrolet, Suzuki, Mitsubishi, Ford, Mazda und Toyota.

Die Thai-Rung-Automobile werden in Thailand oftmals mit TR abgekürzt.

Geschichte

1967 wurde die Thai Rung Union Car Public Company Limited von Vichien Phaoenchoke (วิเชียร เผอิญโชค, ursprünglich Vichien Sae Chung) mit staatlicher Hilfe gegründet. Mit Verhandlungen gelang es Lizenzen verschiedener Hersteller auszuhandeln. Und mit der Eintragung im SET Index an der Stock Exchange of Thailand stieg der Wert Thai Rungs enorm und entwickelte sich zum regional wichtigsten Automobilhersteller.

1999 expandierte Thai Rung nach Chile. Dort werden die Fahrzeuge jedoch nur mit mäßigem Erfolg vertrieben. Dennoch ist sich Thai Rung sicher dort ein größeres Händlernetzwerk aufbauen zu können.

Seit 2000 werden Thai-Rung-Fahrzeuge nach China und Iran als Kit Cars verkauft. Eine Ausweitung des Kit-Car-Vertriebes nach Ägypten, Kenia und den Philippinen soll demnächst stattfinden. Für dieses Ziel werden jedoch noch Werkstätten mit geschulten Fachkräften gesucht."

[Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thai_Rung_Union_Car. -- Zugriff am 2013-05-03]

1967

Schulbesuch:


Abb.: Schulbesuch nach Klassen (in Tausend Schülern), 1967
[Datenquelle: Ingram (1971), S. 278]

1967

Schulgebäude staatlicher Grundschulen:


Abb.: Art der Schulgebäude staatlicher Grundschulen, 1967
[Datenquelle: Thailand official year book 1968. -- S. 477]


Abb.: Schulhaus in einem Dorf in der Provinz Kanchanaburi (กาญจนบุรี), 2008 (!)
[Bildquelle: Mark Kempe. -- http://www.flickr.com/photos/mmkempe/2680914714/. -- Zugriff am 2012-01-25. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, keine kommerzielle Nutzung, keine Bearbeitung)]


Abb.: Lage der Provinz Kanchanaburi (กาญจนบุรี)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

ca. 1967

Handwerklicher Unterricht an der Suwannaram Witayakom Sekundarschule (โรงเรียนสุวรรณารามวิทยาคม):


Abb.: Handwerklicher Unterricht an der Suwannaram Witayakom Sekundarschule (โรงเรียนสุวรรณารามวิทยาคม), ca. 1967

ca. 1967

Pfadfinder bei der Arbeit:


Abb.: Pfadfinder bei der Arbeit, ca. 1967

ca. 1967

Arbeitsdienst von Lehramtsstudenten:


Abb.: Arbeitsdienst von Lehramtsstudenten, ca. 1967

1967

Das Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC) gründet ein mobiles Ausbildungsprogramm für Zivilisten in Kommunismus-gefährdeten Gegenden: People's Assistance Teams. Ziel ist bewaffneter Selbstschutz gegen Guerillas. Das Hauptquartier ist in Hua Hin (หัวหิน). Die Ausbildung zum Waffengebrauch geschieht in den Provinzen Sakon Nakhon (สกลนคร), Nakhon Phanom (นครพนม), Ubon Ratchathani (อุบลราชธานี) und Prachuap Khiri Khan (ประจวบคีรีขันธ์). Im Dezember 1964 wird es umbenannt in Village Defence Teams.

In Hua Hin (หัวหิน) werden auch die meisten der im Kampf gegen Aufständische gefallenen Militärs, Polizisten und Zivilisten unter königlicher Patronage kremiert.


Abb.: Lage von Hua Hin (หัวหิน)
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Lage der von People's Assistance Teams waffentüchtig gemachten Provinzen
[Bildquelle: CIA. -- Public domain]

1967

Mönche mit staatlichen Stipendien zum Studium im Ausland, bzw. ausländische Mönche mit staatlichen Studien-Stipendien in Thailand:


Abb.: Mönche mit staatlichen Stipendien: Thai-Mönche im Ausland, ausländische Mönche in Thailand, 1967
[Datenquelle: Thailand official year book 1968. -- S. 539]

1967

Beginn des Flora of Thailand Project, "the first and only systematic attempt to inventory, catalogue, describe and elucidate all plant life of Thailand." Der erste Band (hrsg. von Tem Smitinand and Kai Larsen) erscheint 1970:

Flora of Thailand / ed. Tem Smitinand and Kai Larsen.  -- Bangkok : Applied Scientific Research Corporation of Thailand [später: Forest Herbarium, Royal Forest Dept.], 1970 -


Abb.: Einbandtitel von Bd. 12,1. -- 2011

 

1967

Der katholische US-Priester Joseph (Joe) H. Maier, C.Ss. R. (1939 - ) kommt nach Thailand.

"Father Joseph (Joe) H. Maier, C.Ss. R., (born 31 October 1939) is an American Redemptorist priest who lives and works in the Klong Toey (คลองเตย) slums of Bangkok, Thailand, where he co-founded the Human Development Foundation (HDF-Mercy Centre) (ศูนย์เมอร์ซี่) with Sister Maria Chantavarodom (มาลินี ฉันทวโรดม) in 1973.[1] For over 35 years, he has administered to Bangkok's poorest, providing vulnerable children and families alternatives to and haven from drugs, violence, sex abuse and prostitution in the squatter slums.[2]

Early life

Joseph Maier was born at Cowlitz General in Longview, Washington in 1939, the son of a Catholic mother, Helen Childs Maier, and a German Lutheran, George Maier.[3] His parents separated when Maier was 5 years old, and later divorced. Thereafter, Maier was raised primarily by his uncle in Longview, Washington. Maier enrolled in a Redemptorist seminary in California as a high school freshman and was assigned to Bangkok upon completion of his studies.[3][4]

Father Joe first arrived in Thailand in 1967. He ministered in northern Isan and to the Hmong in Laos before settling permanently in Bangkok's "Slaughterhouse" slums, located next to the Chao Praya River in the Klong Toey district.[5]

HDF -Mercy Centre

The HDF began as a single one-baht-a-day preschool, and has since expanded into a network of over 30 schools all over Bangkok, which have graduated an estimated 35,000 children.[2] Today, in addition to schools, HDF operates orphanages and homes for street kids, assists children and adults living with AIDS, provides emergency assistance and home repair to slum families affected by crippling floods and fires, acts in cooperation with community members to mediate activities involving welfare organizations, housing authorities, governmental agencies and the Port Authority of Thailand.[6]

In 2000, a gift from Atlanta businessman and philanthropist John M. Cook allowed for the major physical expansion of Mercy facilities.[7][8] The multi-structure compound includes a 400-pupil kindergarten, a home for street kids, a home for mothers and children with AIDS, a 26-bed free AIDS hospice, a legal aid anti-trafficking unit, and various administrative offices that oversee operations ranging from a sponsor-a-child program, to community health and outreach services.[8] The Centre includes a house for Father Joe on Mercy grounds, the terms of the donation having stipulated that he move out of the Slaughterhouse slums and away from the ostensible health hazards of slum living.[4]

The Mercy Centre extended its humanitarian efforts to southern Thailand following the devastating 2004 Asian Tsunami, sending down relief teams to directly aid remote villages, from Satun to Ranong, hit hard by the disaster.[9]

Interfaith Dialogue

Father Joe has been both praised and criticized for his broad religious philosophy.[10] In a 2004 PBS documentary, he described himself as having been "converted" by Buddhists and Muslims, remarks that have stirred some controversy.[2] He made a similar comment in 2008, when he told CNN, "Buddhists and Muslims taught me how to be a Christian."[2]

Recognition

Mercy is regularly sought out by foreign dignitaries. Recent visitors have included Prince Alfred and Princess Raffaela of Lichtenstein in March 2003;[11] AIDS activist and American film actor Richard Gere (1949 - ) in July 2004;[12] and American president George W. Bush (1946 - ) in August 2008.[13][14]

Father Joe is the recipient of numerous awards and honors in recognition of his life's work.[15] In 2004, he was personally thanked by Queen Sirikit  (จอมพลหญิง จอมพลเรือหญิง จอมพลอากาศหญิง สมเด็จพระนางเจ้าสิริกิติ์ พระบรมราชินีนาถ, 1932 - ) as the foreigner who has made the most significant contribution to the protection of the women and children of Thailand.[16]

Writings

Welcome to the Bangkok Slaughterhouse is a collection of 24 short stories about the Mercy Centre children, written by Father Joe and published by Asia Books. All book proceeds go to the Human Development Foundation.[2][17] Father Joe was also a regular contributor to Sunday Perspective section of the Bangkok Post before the section's discontinuation in late 2008."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Maier. -- Zugriff am 2015-04-09]

1967

Es erscheint:

Attagara, Kingkeo (กิ่งแก้ว อัตถากร) <1938 - >: The folk religion of Ban Nai : a hamlet in Central Thailand. -- Indiana Univ. Bloomington, Diss., 1967. -- 597 S. : Ill.

Über Ban Nai, Tambol Na Pa (นาป่า), Amphoe Mueang (มืองชลบุรี), Provinz Cholburi (ชลบุรี).


Abb.: Lage von Tambol Na Pa (นาป่า)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967

Es erscheint der Roman

เพ็ญแข วงศ์สง่า [Phenkhae Wongsanga] <1940 - >: นางงามรอบสุดท้าย : ดอกไม้ของชาติ [Die Endrunde des Schönheitswettbewerbs : Blumen der Nation]


Abb.: Einbandtitel einer Ausgabe 1997

1967

Es erscheint

กามูว์, อาลแบร์  [Camus, Albert] <1913 - 1960>: คนนอก / übersetzt von อำพรรณ โอตระกูล. -- Originaltitel: L'Étranger (1942)


Abb.: Einbandtitel einer der Ausgaben

Der Roman ist ehr einflussreich bei Studierenden und Intelelktuellen.

1967 - 1977

Es erscheint

A.U.A. Language Center Thai course. -- Bangkok : The Amaerican University Alumni Association Language Center


Abb.: Einbandtitel

1967

Es erscheint

Davies, David Michael <1929 - >: Thailand : the rice bowl of Asia. -- London : Muller, 1967. -- 182 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- ISBN 058410314X


Abb.: Einbandtitel einer späteren Auflage

1967

Filmausschnitt über Bangkok 1967:

Klicken: Film über Bangkok 1967

[Quelle des .mp4-Filmausschnitts über Bangkok 1967: Propagandafilm zur US-Militärpräsenz in Thailand. -- http://www.archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.653174. -- Zugriff am 2012-03-13. --  Public domain]

1967

Vollendung des Sozialwohnungssiedlung "Khlong Chan" (คลองจัน) in Bangkok für 524 Familien mit niedrigem Einkommen. Von 1952 bis 1966 hat die Regierung ca. 282 Mio. Baht für Sozialwohnungsbau ausgegeben. In den Genuss der Maßnahmen sind fast 7000 Familien gekommen.


Abb.: Sozialwohnungssiedlung "Khlong Chan" (คลองจัน), ca. 1967


Abb.: Lage von  "Khlong Chan" (คลองจัน)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967

Esso erwirbt die Sri Racha Refinery, Si Racha (ศรีราชา), Provinz Chonburi (ชลบุรี).


Abb.: Lage von Si Racha  (ศรีราชา)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Erdölraffinerie Si Racha  (ศรีราชา), 1967

"History
  • 1967 - Esso acquired the refinery - Capacity 7,000 bpd
  • 1971 - Capacity increased to 35,000 bpd
  • 1985 - The refinery's capacity was raised to 63,000 bpd
  • 1999 - Construction of the aromatics plant was completed
  • 2001 - Capacity increased to 160,000 bpd
  • 2008 - Capacity increased to 170,000 bpd"

[Quelle: http://abarrelfull.wikidot.com/sri-racha-refinery. -- Zugriff am 2012-03-22. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967

Die Polizei nimmt in Bangkok 20 führende Persönlichkeiten der Kommunistischen Partei Thailands (CPT, พรรคคอมมิวนิสต์แห่งประเทศไทย, พคท) fest, darunter die Mitglieder des Zentralkomitees

Alle werden in den Dschungel zurückkehren und aktiv bleiben.

1967


Abb.: "U.S. Air Force McDonnell F-4D Phantom II fighters of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing in their revetments Ubon (อุบลราชธานี) Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. Note the 8th TFW's nickname -- the “Wolfpack” -- on the revetments."
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Lage der Ubon (อุบลราชธานี) Royal Thai Air Force Base
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

Klicken: Ausschnitte aus Propagandafilm

[Quelle der .mp4-Ausschnitte aus Propagandafilm zur US-Militärpräsenz in Thailand (1967):  -- http://www.archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.653174. -- Zugriff am 2012-03-13. --  Public domain]

1967


Abb.: Plattentitel von Sodsai Chaengkij (สดใส แจ้งกิจ

ca. 1967


Abb.: Geschäftskarte der bei Seefahrern und anderen Farang sehr beliebten Mosquito Bar, ca. 1967

1967

Eröffnung des Scala (สกาลา) Kino, Siam Square, Bangkok.

1967

Briefmarken:

1967

Es erscheint der Hindi-Musik-Film

Hamraaz (हमराज़) / von B. R. Chopra <1914 – 2008>


Abb.: Filmplakat

Original Soundtrack auf Spotify:
URI: spotify:album:0ZFh4CyXxe2uRd1HQ0EzKr
URL: https://open.spotify.com/album/0ZFh4CyXxe2uRd1HQ0EzKr

สรเพชร ภิญโญ [Soraphet Phinyo] <1950 - > wird 1986 den Song หลบหน้าที่มาเลย์ [Flucht nach Malaysia] daraus adaptieren

1967

Mailand (Italien): der italienische Chemiker Piero Sensi (1920 - 2013) isoliert Rifampicin aus Amycolatopsis rifamycinica. "Rifampicin wird vorwiegend bei Infektionen mit Mykobakterien, insbesondere bei Tuberkulose und Lepra, eingesetzt.[5] Auch bei der Therapie von Methicillin-resistenten Staphylokokken wird es angewandt. Außerdem wird es prophylaktisch bei Kontaktpersonen von Erkrankten an Meningokokken-Meningitis empfohlen.[5] Es wirkt zudem gegen Enterokokken und Legionella pneumophila und ist gut liquorgängig." (Wikipedia)


Abb.: In Thailand hergestelltes Rifampicin

1967

Das schon 1926 synthetisierte Phenylciclidin (PCP) taucht erstmals bei einem Rock-Festival in San Francisco in der Drogenszene auf. 2004 wird in Thailand PCP als Schmuggelware von Myanmar festgestellt.

"Phencyclidin (Abkürzung von Phenylcyclohexylpiperidin, kurz PCP), in der Drogenszene auch als Angel Dust (Engelsstaub), Londrea, Killerweed, Sherman Hemsley, TAC oder Peace Pill bekannt, ist ein missbräuchlich als Partydroge genutztes Dissoziativum. Die Firma Parke-Davis entwickelte es 1926 ursprünglich als Arzneistoff der Klasse der Anästhetika, seine Vermarktung wurde jedoch bald darauf auf Grund eines ungünstigen Nutzen-Risiko-Verhältnisses eingestellt. Insbesondere nach Langzeitgebrauch besteht die Gefahr einer psychischen Abhängigkeit. Im Tierversuch schädigt es das Hirngewebe. Phencyclidin unterliegt dem Betäubungsmittelgesetz und ist in Deutschland nicht verkehrsfähig.

[...]

Die Stammsubstanz Phencyclidin wurde 1926 erstmals durch Kötz und Merkel synthetisiert. Nachdem ihre ruhigstellende Wirkung an Affen erfolgreich erprobt war, wurde Phencyclidin 1956 in Deutschland unter dem Handelsnamen Sernylan als Tieranästhetikum auf den Markt gebracht. 1963 erfolgte die Zulassung als dissoziatives Anästhetikum unter dem Markennamen Sernyl zur Anwendung am Menschen, wurde jedoch wegen seiner starken psychischen Nebenwirkungen bereits vier Jahre später wieder vom Markt genommen.[6] Bis heute ist es in den USA für veterinärmedizinische Zwecke zugelassen.[6]

1967 tauchte es erstmals bei einem Rock-Festival in San Francisco in der Drogenszene auf und geriet wegen seiner falsch deklarierten Wirkung zunächst wieder in Vergessenheit. Aufgrund des Missbrauchspotentials wurde der Einsatz als Tieranästhetikum gleichzeitig verboten. 1977 tauchte die Substanz bei in Deutschland stationierten US-Streitkräften wieder auf und erfuhr von dort eine Verbreitung in Untergrundlaboratorien, die Abwandlungen am Molekülgerüst vornahmen, um die halluzinogene Wirkung zu verstärken. Derzeit sind mehr als 125 Phencyclidin-Derivate bekannt.

Angeblich spielte Phencyclidin auch bei dem Massaker an der Grover Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego (1979, bekannt durch den sich darauf beziehenden Bob-Geldof-Song I don't like Mondays) eine Rolle: Die Täterin Brenda Ann Spencer soll nach eigenen Angaben während ihrer Amok-Tat unter dem Einfluss von Phencyclidin gestanden haben. Laut Anklage war sie während der Tat nüchtern.[13][14]

In den Vereinigten Staaten[15] und Südafrika[16] wurde Phencyclidin als chemische Waffe (Psychokampfstoff) unter den Bezeichnungen Agent SN und EA 2148 hergestellt."

[Quelle: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phencyclidin#Geschichte. -- Zugriff am 2016-04-25]

1967

Cicely Mary Saunders (1918 - 2005) gründet in London das St. Christopher's Hospice. Es gilt als erstes modernes Hospiz zur Sterbebegleitung. In Thailand werden in der Folgezeit mehrere Hospize für AIDS-Kranke eröffnet.

2510 / 1967 datiert

1967-01

Französische Übersetzung der Worte des Vorsitzenden Mao Tsetung (毛主席语录, Rotes Buch), es folgen schnell Übersetzungen ins Italienische und Deutsche. Das Rote Buch wird zum Bestseller im Westen.


Abb.: Einbandtitel der deutschen Ausgabe

1967-01/02

Es erscheint:

Report of the United Nations Survey Team on the Economic and Social Needs of the Opium-Producing Areas in Thailand, January/February 1967. -- Bangkok : Government Printing Office, 1967. -- 144 S. : Ill. ; 26 cm

1967-01

Village Security Programm (09/10 Plan) der CSOC (Communist Suppression Operation Command)

"... 09/10 policies aimed at
  1. providing village-recruited and trained security forces for critical areas;
  2. improving communications between villagers and government authorities;
  3. increasing civic action programmes; and
  4. developing an information and psychological operations programme for the benefit of the rural population.

Direct military operations against the communist terrorists were, by contrast, only a secondary priority.

As the 09/10 Plan indicates, CSOC’s information and psychological operations effort is of basic importance. It is designed to inform the rural population and explain government programmes and policies to them. In other words, it seeks to narrow the gap in understanding between the people and the various military, civil and police authorities. In doing this we are using the media as fully as possible. There are now 82 hours of radio programming each week from 27 stations across the country devoted to these aims. We are producing numerous leaflets, posters and pamphlets printed by the Royal Thai Army Propaganda Platoon’s light mobile teams, at present attached to CSOC. We are also deploying in the field 13 fully trained and equipped military Mobile Audio-Visual Units or MAVU teams. Nine more civilian mobile information teams will be added later this year when medical equipment and vehicles being provided under SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organisation) support for the government’s counter-insurgency programme arrive."

[Quelle: Saiyud Kerdphol [สายหยุด เกิดผล] <1922 -  >: The struggle for Thailand : counter-insurgency, 1965-1985. --  Bangkok : S. Research Center Co., 1986. -- 253 S. : Ill. ; 20 cm. -- S. 28. -- Fair use]

1967-01

Erstflug des US-Flugleit-Flugzeugs Cessna O-2 Skymaster. Solche Flugzeuge werden von Nakhon Phanom aus völkerrechtswidrig gegen Laos eingesetzt.


Abb.: Cessna O-2 Skymaster über Laos, 1970
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

1967-01


Abb.: Lage von Betong [เบตง]
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

"Late in January of 1967, Thai counter-insurgency troops raided a Communist camp deep in the jungles of Thailand, only twenty miles from the city of Betong [เบตง].

Even the Thai troops were shocked by what they discovered: the camp contained thatched huts for two hundred people; there was a more than ample supply of weaponry and other implements, indicating that the Communist campers had settled down to a village life of farming and insurgency. The camp was littered with Communist propaganda leaflets along with excerpts from the writings of Mao Tse-tung [毛泽东, 1893 - 1976] and handwritten manuals on guerrilla warfare. There were only two "white people" in camp; they were stuffed-dummy likenesses of Uncle Sam and John Bull, toys which the Communists used for playing darts in their spare time. Throwing darts at Uncle Sam is a readily believable pastime for the Communist insurgents in the northeast, but such hostility toward Great Britain is unheard of along the banks of the Mekong. Alas, the raided camp was not in northeast Thailand; rather, it was some one thousand miles from Nakornpanom [นครพนม], in the extreme southern end of Thailand, just across the border from Malaysia. With this discovery it became irrefutably clear that the Communist insurgents now have strong footholds along both the northeastern and southern tips of Thailand. Even the government in Bangkok, located in the precise middle of the country, admits they now have trouble on two fronts."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 42f. -- Fair use]

1967-01-03

Thailand entsendet 1000 Soldaten Bodentruppen nach Vietnam.

"On the morning of 3 January 1967 'the Thai government made official a speculation that had appeared in the press several days earlier; it announced that a reinforced Thai battalion would be sent to fight in South Vietnam. The following reasons for this decision were given:

Thailand is situated near Vietnam and it will be the next target of communists, as they have already proclaimed. This is why Thailand realizes the necessity to send Military units to help oppose communist aggression when it is still at a distance from our country. The government has therefore decided to send a combat unit, one battalion strong, to take an active part in the fighting in South Vietnam in the near future.

This combat unit, which will be composed of nearly 1,000 men, including infantry, heavy artillery, armored cars, and a quartermaster unit will be able to take part in the fighting independently with no need to depend on any other supporting units.

This decision can be said to show far-sightedness in a calm and thorough manner, and it is based on proper military principles. The time has come when we Thais must awake and take action to oppose aggression when it is still at a distance from our country. This being a practical way to reduce danger to the minimum, and to extinguish a fire that has already broken out before it reaches our home. Or it could be said to be the closing of sluice-gates to prevent the water from pouring out in torrents, torrents of red waves that would completely innundate our whole country.

Opposing aggression when it is still at a distance is a practical measure to prevent our own country being turned into a battlefield. It will protect our home from total destruction, and safeguard our crops from  any danger threatening. Our people will be able to continue enjoying normal peace and happiness m their daily life with no fear of any hardships, because the battlefield is still far away from our country.

Should we wait until the aggressors reach the gates of our homeland before we take any measures to oppose them, it would be no different from waiting for a conflagration to spread and reach our house, not taking any action to help put it out. That is why we must take action to help put out this conflagration, even being willing to run any risk to stave off disaster. We must not risk the lives of our people, including babies, or run the risk of having ~ to evacuate them from their homes, causing untold hardship to all the people, everywhere. Food will be scarce and very high-priced.

It is therefore most proper and suitable in every way for us to send combat forces to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with other countries in opposition to aggression, especially at a time when that aggression is still far away from our country. This is a decision reached that is most proper and suitable, when considered from a military, a political and an economic angle.

This decision led to a number of problems for the United States. The first was the amount of logistical support to be given Thailand. The United States assumed that the Thai unit would resemble the one proposed, that is, a group of about 1,000 men, organized into infantry, artillery, armored car, and quartermaster elements, and able to fight independently of other supporting forces. Assurances had been given to the Thai Prime Minister that support for the force would be in addition to support for the Thai forces in Thailand, and would be similar to that given the Thai forces already in South Vietnam. These assurances were an essential part of the Thai decision to deploy additional troops. Thus the Department of Defense authorized service funding support for equipment and facilities used by Thai units in South Vietnam, and for overseas allowances, within the guidelines established for support of the Koreans. Death gratuities were payable by the United States and no undue economic burden was to be imposed on the contributing nation.

With the Thai troop proposal now in motion, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, felt that U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, should begin discussions on organization, training, equipment, and other support problems pertaining to the deployment of the Thai unit. The US Embassy m Bangkok, however, was of a different mind. The ambassador pointed out that General Westmoreland had asked for a regimental combat team. This request had been seconded by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The ambassador said he still hoped to obtain a regimental-size unit but did not believe negotiations had reached the stage where detailed discussions as suggested by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, should be undertaken."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- ZUgriff am 2011-11-12]

1967-01-05

"In 1966, an ARPA [Advanced Research Projects Agency] project called the Rural Security Systems Program (RSSP became known in social science circles. The goal of the program was to

"assist the Royal Thai Government and the U.S. Mission in Thailand in their efforts to suppress the growing Communist insurgency in that country's northeast provinces."32

The RSSP's methodology was similar to the general methodology of ARPA and Project Agile: to gather data on geography, "way of life," and attitudes toward the government; to compile files on insurgent activities and government responses; and to analyze the effectiveness of government responses "to plan future Cl [counterinsurgency] programs." The program was a first for Agile, according to Congressional testimony:

This program will mark the first time that R&D has been given a major role in supporting a counterinsurgency in a comprehensive way, from the earliest stages of the conflict.

[...]

Several social scientists responded vocally to the RSSP program. Anthropologists

  • Charles Keyes [1937 - ] (University of Washington),
  • Michael Moerman (UCLA),
  • Herbert Phillips (University of Califomia-Berkeley), and 
  • Lauriston Sharp [1907 - 1993] (Cornell)

wrote to Seymour Deitchman [1923 - 2013], then director of Project Agile, requesting information on RSSP, citing its Project Camelot-like implications.34 ARPA's stated objectives in Thailand were very similar to those of Camelot in Latin and South America.

At Deitchman's invitation, the four anthropologists met with him in Washington on January 5, 1967. According to Deitchman's account of the meeting, the four anthropologists were concerned that RSSP was going to involve hundreds of social scientists descending on Thailand. They were told that this was not the case. However, they were also told that it was designed to "resolve the problems of insurgency" and to study how development might prevent insurgency. According to Deitchman, the anthropologists were worried about the pressure being exerted by the U.S. on Thailand for development. Some time after the meeting, Deitchman says, word reached him that Peter Kunstadter, another anthropologist then working in Thailand, was worried that a large ARPA social science project in his area would interfere with his research.

At the conclusion of his meeting with the four anthropologists, Deitchman gives the following account of their support or noninterference with ARPA's objectives (which varies with the accounts of the anthropologists):

I then asked whether, since they were among the recognized American experts on Thai culture and history, they would be willing to help us do a better job by helping in the research. The responses varied. One said that if the work were later to be criticized, he would not want to be associated with it but would rather be free to join the critics (although he later sent us a copy, which was very helpful, of his yet-to-be-published Ph.D. thesis on life in Thai village society). Others promised benevolent neutrality.

But one of the group decided that it was time to "put my money where my mouth is," and to help if he agreed with our objectives. This was Dr. Herbert Phillips of the University of California (Berkeley), who became an ARPA consultant and who in the course of the next two years was to provide much useful understanding of the background to the problems with which ARPA was involved in Thailand.36

According to Deitchman, that makes one paid consultant (Phillips); one who does not wish to be associated with ARPA if ARPA will later come under criticism, but who then sends a copy of his dissertation to help out (probably Moerman); and two for "benevolent neutrality" (probably Keyes and Sharp). No one voiced opposition to the program on the basis of its explicit intent to help the U.S. and Thai counterinsurgency effort.

Deitchman also writes that

as late as 1968 one anthropologist, who had earlier been concerned that he not come under attack by his colleagues for undertaking counterinsurgency research, nevertheless indicated his willingness to accept ARPA support for an overseas linguistic study he had in mind.38

Deitchman is probably referring to Moerman [...]"

[Quelle: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 87f.. -- Fair use]
"Moerman/Keyes's Account

Sometime between January and March 1967, Moerman and Keyes, writing for the group that met with Deitchman, issued a memorandum to "AACT [Academic Advisory Council for Thailand] members and [the] ad hoc committee on ARPA Northeastern Thailand Project," explaining their understanding of RSSP. They begin by being "worried that the ARPA scheme might be another 'Camelot',"42 but then provide reassurance:

Insofar as the social science component is concerned, the major objective is to study "rural security" in northeastern Thailand. The first efforts will be directed towards compiling an inventory on the locations and characteristics of the villages in an area of the project's interest. This information will be used to place in perspective subsequent knowledge about changes (including "security incidents") and the impact of government programs—both Thai and American—which occur in the villages of the area.43

One primary concern stated by Moerman and Keyes in the memo corresponds with Deitchman's account. In their two-and-a-half page memo, the authors state or allude to no less than three times that the number of researchers will not be as large as they had imagined. They describe the project as though the collection of specific data on villages and villagers was intended to be similar to a census rather than part of a counterinsurgency program.

To counteract the "danger that the project might become too purely military," the authors suggest the training of Thai personnel to eventually take over the project.44 Their argument here is that "without Thai participation the project (and, by implication, American social science) is open to the accusation of intellectual colonialism...."45 This is a strange assertion on two counts. First, the phrase "too purely military" implies that a "somewhat military" project might be acceptable. Second, Thais conducting an American project under American direction are hardly independent from "intellectual colonialism."

At the conclusion of the memorandum, the authors give a circuitous imprimatur ("benevolent neutrality" in action?) to the project:

Although the anticipated project is not the sort in which academic field workers usually participate, its scale and importance make it one of which all doing fieldwork in Thailand will have to take account. In addition, the size and complexity of programs of directed culture change in northeastern Thailand, ARPA's desire for accurate knowledge and ARPA's refusal to commit itself in advance to a single technique for social science research all will impinge upon and contribute to intellectual inquiries about the nature of Thai society and culture."

[Quelle: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 88f. -- Fair use]

1967-01-13

US General William Eugene DePuy (1919 - 1992), Kommandant 1st Division in Lai Khe (Vietnam):


Abb.: William Eugene DePuy, 1973
[Bildquelle: Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

"The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm . . . till the other side cracks and gives up.

We're making life unpleasant for the VC [Vietcong] ... at least I think we are. Finally, they'll say "Ho, we're smarter than they are—" [side comment by DePuy: "I don't have much faith in our brainpower, only in our firepower"]—"our cause is more just . . . but enough is enough. Let's lie low for a few years and get the U.S. to go home.

We're winning the war. We're killing VC, guerrillas, Main Forces, destroying their bases, destroying caches of food and weapons, we're getting more Chieu Hoi [defectors]. If people in Washington want to win fast—if they're in a hurry, because of elections or something—they could move five more divisions over here and get the job done faster. But if they're not in such a hurry, we can do the job with what we've got, i.e., including the 9th Division.

Pacification hasn't worked anywhere. But the 1st Division is doing one thing: killing guerrillas.

We have long-range programs now to destroy the Phu Loi Battalion. In general, to get the VC provincial battalions: keep probing, searching, harassing the areas where they take their leave, training, and rest, their bases. Keep bombing their base areas: we need a sensor that would signal to us when someone had entered that area, so we could bomb it.

You need fast reaction to contact: with air strikes. Even against a squad, or snipers, I'd use an air strike; artillery is no good when they have overhead cover."

[Zitiert in: Ellsberg, Daniel <1931 - >: Papers on the war. -- New York : Simon and Schuster, 1972. -- 309 S. ; 22 cm. -- ISBN 978-1-4391-9376-1. -- S. 234f. -- Fair use]

1967-01-17

Das schon 10. Großfeuer in Bangkok in diesem Monat: 2000 werden obdachlos.

1967-01-17 - 1967-01-26

Staatsbesuch des österreichischen Bundespräsidenten Franz Jonas (1899 - 1974) in Thailand. Österreich gewährt Thailand eine niedrigverzinste Anleihe von US-$ 1,5 Mio. für eine Wasserkraftwerk in der Provinz Loei (เลย). Österreich verspricht vermehrte technische Hilfe.


Abb.: Lage von Österreich
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Lage der Provinz Loei (เลย)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Franz Jonas, 1971
[Bildquelle: Kramar / Wikipedia. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-01-19

Literatur-Nobelpreisträger John Steinbeck (1902 - 1968) trifft in Bangkok ein. Er hat eine viermonatige "fact-finding mission" in Vietnam hinter sich. Er prophezeit einen amerikanischen Sieg im Vietnamkrieg und verurteilt die, die gegen den Vietnamkrieg protestieren. Diese sollten besser Spitäler bauen. "The war in Vietnam is one of the most important events in my time, and I'd hate to miss it."


Abb.: John Steinbeck (links) mit US-Präsident Lyndon B. Jonson, 1966
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

1967-01-27 - 1967-01-30

"In the meantime representatives of the Vietnam and the Thai military assistance commands met and held discussions during the period 27-30 January 1967 on various aspects of the pending deployment. In February the commitment of Thai troops was affirmed and on 13 March the unit began training. The Thai contingent would eventually be located with and under the operational control of the 9th US Infantry Division. On 15 March representatives of the Royal Thai Army and US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, met with the MACV staff to finalize the unit's tables of organization and equipment and allowances. Discussions were, held also on training, equipage, and deployment matters. The approved table of organization and equipment provided for a regimental combat team (minus certain elements) with a strength of 3,307, a 5 percent overstrength. The staff of the regimental combat team, with its augmentation, was capable of conducting field operations and of securing a base camp. Organizationally, the unit consisted of a headquarters company with a communications platoon, an aviation platoon, an M 113 platoon, a psychological operations platoon, a heavy weapons platoon with a machine gun section, and a four-tube 81-mm. mortar section; a service company consisting of a personnel and special services platoon and supply and transport, maintenance, and military police platoons; four rifle companies; a reinforced engineer combat company; a medical company; a cavalry reconnaissance troop of two reconnaissance platoons and an M 113 platoon; and a six-tube 105-mm. howitzer battery. On 18 March the approved table of organization and equipment was signed by representatives of MACV and the Royal Thai Army.

During the above discussions, the Royal Thai Army agreed to equip one of the two authorized M113 platoons with sixteen of the Thai Army's own armored personnel carriers (APC's) provided by the Military Assistance Program; the United States would furnish APC's for the remaining platoon. This was necessary because all APC's scheduled through the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1967 were programed to replace battle losses and fill the cyclic rebuild program for US forces. Subsequently, however, the Royal Thai Army re-evaluated its earlier proposal and decided to deploy only the platoon from headquarters company, which was to be equipped with APC's furnished from US project stocks. The platoon of APC's in the reconnaissance troop would not be deployed with Thai-owned APC's. The Royal Thai Army was agreeable to activating the platoon and using sixteen of its APC's for training, but insisted on picking up sixteen APC's to be supplied upon the platoon's arrival in South Vietnam. If this was not possible, the Thais did not plan to activate the reconnaissance platoon until the United States made a firm commitment on the availability of the equipment. In view of this circumstance, MACV recommended that an additional sixteen M113's be released from project stocks for training and subsequent deployment with the regiment."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]


Abb.: M113 Transportpanzer im Vietnamkrieg
[Bildquelle: Lieutenant General John H. Hay, Jr. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

1967-02

Erster bewaffneter Zusammenstoß zwischen kommunistischen Terroristen und der Armee in der Provinz Nan (น่าน). Danach herrscht Ruhe bis September


Abb.: Lage der Provinz Nan (น่าน)
[Bildquelle: CIA. -- Public domain]

1967-02

"Equipment problems were not limited to APC's and PGM's. The original plan of the joint Chiefs of Staff for allocation of the M 16 rifle for the period November 1966 through June 1967 provided 4,000 rifles for the Thais. A phased delivery of 1,000 weapons monthly was to begin in March. In February 1967, however, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, deferred further issue of the M16 rifle to other than US units. Complicating this decision was the fact that the Military Assistance Command, Thailand, had already informed the Royal Thai Army of the original delivery date. Plans had been made to arm the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment with the first weapons received, which would have permitted training before deployment. An acceptable alternative would have been to issue M 16's to the Thai regiment after it deployed to South Vietnam, had any weapons been available in Thailand for training; but all M 16 rifles in Thailand were in the hands of infantry and special forces elements already engaged with the insurgents in northeast Thailand. Failure to provide the rifles any later than April would, in the view of the commander of the Thai Military Assistance Command, have repercussions. Aware also of the sensitivity of the Koreans, who were being equipped after other Free World forces, the commander recommended that 900 of the M 16's be authorized to equip the Thai regiment and to support its pre-deployment training. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, concurred and recommended to the joint Chiefs that the 900 rifles be provided from the March production. Even with the special issue of M 16's, it was still necessary to make available another weapon to round out the issue. The logical choice was the M 14, and as a result 900 M 14's with spare parts were requested; two factors, however, dictated against this choice. The first was the demand for this weapon to support the training base in the continental United States, and the second was the fact that the Koreans were equipped with M 1's. Issuing M 14's to the Thais might have political consequences. As a compromise the Thais were issued the M2 carbine."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]


Abb.: M2 Karabiner
[Bildquelle: Joe Mabel / Wikimedia. -- GNU FDLicense]
 

1967-02-07

Die US-Luftwaffe versprüht über den Dschungelgebieten Südvietnams Chemikalien (Agent Orange) zur Entlaubung, um die Nachschubswege des Vietcong offen zu legen. Einsätze von B-52-Bombern werden von 60 auf 800 monatlich erhöht.


Abb.: Gebiete Südvietnams, über denen 1965 - 1971 Herbizide versprüht wurden
[Bildquelle: U.S. Department of the Army / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Versprühen des Entlaubungsmittels Agent Orange, 1969
[Bildquelle: Brian K. Grigsby, SPC5 / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Spätfolgen von Agent Orange: durch Agent Orange in ihrem Erbgut geschädigte, behinderte Kinder, Vietnam, 2004 (!!!)
[Bildquelle: Alexis Duclos / Wikipedia. -- GNU FDLicense]

"Agent Orange war die militärische Bezeichnung eines Entlaubungsmittels (CAS 39277-47-9), das die USA im Vietnamkrieg großflächig zur Entlaubung von Wäldern und zum Zerstören von Nutzpflanzen einsetzten. Die US-Streitkräfte setzten es im Januar 1965 erstmals im Rahmen der Operation „Ranch Hand“ ein. Da das Herbizid mit 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlordibenzodioxin verunreinigt war, erkrankten in Folge mehrere Hunderttausend Bewohner der betroffenen Gebiete, aber auch bis zu zweihunderttausend US-Soldaten.[1] Dioxine wirken fetotoxisch und fruchtschädigend (teratogen), zudem sind sie sehr persistent. Die Belastung der vietnamesischen Bevölkerung mit Dioxin wird in Zusammenhang mit dem - bis in die Gegenwart - erhöhten Auftreten von schweren Fehlbildungen bei Kindern, Krebserkrankungen, Immunschwächen und einer größeren Zahl weiterer Erkrankungen gebracht.[1] Während geschädigte ehemalige US-Soldaten nach gerichtlichen Auseinandersetzungen von den damaligen Herstellerfirmen finanziell entschädigt wurden, erhielten vietnamesische Opfer bis heute keine Entschädigung.

Der Name stammt von den orangefarbenen Streifen, mit denen die entsprechenden Fässer gekennzeichnet waren.[2] Das englische Wort agent bedeutet hier „Mittel“ oder „Wirkstoff“. Weitere, weniger bekannte Herbizide sind Agent Blue, Agent Purple, Agent Green, Agent Pink und Agent White.

Einsatz und Hersteller

Zwischen 1962 und 1971 wurden im Vietnamkrieg von der US-Luftwaffe bei der Operation „Ranch Hand“ („Landarbeiter“), die im Jahre 1961 von John F. Kennedy autorisiert wurde, mehr als 6.000 Einsätze mit verschiedenen Entlaubungsmitteln durchgeführt. Agent Orange wurde aus Flugzeugen oder Helikoptern von Januar 1965 bis April 1970 versprüht.[3] Das Ziel war die Entlaubung der Wälder, um einerseits Verstecke und Versorgungswege des Gegners aufzudecken (Ho-Chi-Minh-Pfad) und andererseits eigene Militärbasen und Flugplätze im dichten Dschungel erweitern zu können. Darüber hinaus wurden auch Ackerflächen besprüht, um dem Feind die Nahrungsgrundlage zu entziehen.

Agent Orange wurde unter anderem von den US-Firmen Dow Chemical und Monsanto hergestellt und geliefert. Wegen des enormen Bedarfs kam es bald zu Lieferschwierigkeiten. Zwischenprodukte für die Herstellung von Agent Orange wurden auch von der deutschen Firma Boehringer Ingelheim und vom tschechischen Unternehmen Spolana in Neratovice bezogen. Laut einem Artikel des Nachrichtenmagazins Der Spiegel von 1991 lieferte Boehringer Ingelheim 1967 eine Menge von 720 Tonnen Trichlorphenolatlauge an Dow Chemical.[1] Der Einsatz von Agent Orange erreichte seinen Höhepunkt in der intensivsten Phase des Krieges in den Jahren 1967 und 1968.

Die Hauptmenge des verwendeten Agent Orange bestand aus einer Mischung der n-Butyl-Ester der 2,4,5-Trichlorphenoxyessigsäure (2,4,5-T) und 2,4-Dichlorphenoxyessigsäure (2,4-D) zu gleichen Teilen. Der Wirkstoffgehalt lag bei 1033 Gramm pro Liter, angegeben als esterfreie 2,4,5-T und 2,4-D. Vermutlich ab 1968 wurde auch „Agent Orange II“ verwendet, das aus einer 50:50-Mischung des iso-Octylesters von 2,4,5-T und des n-Butylesters von 2,4-D bestand. Es hatte einen Wirkstoffgehalt von 910 Gramm pro Liter. Von „Agent Orange II“ wurden 3.591.000 Liter nach Vietnam geliefert. Die US-Streitkräfte versprühten während des Krieges insgesamt 45.677.937 Liter Agent Orange. Eine „Modified Orange“ genannte Mischung, die zusätzlich den Wirkstoff Picloram enthielt, wurde nur testweise verwendet.[4]

Das letzte Sprühflugzeug mit Agent Orange startete am 7. Januar 1971. Nach Ende des Vietnamkriegs hatte die U.S. Air Force noch einen Vorrat von 2.338.900 Gallonen (8.853.672 Liter), die einem Anschaffungswert von 16.540.000 $ entsprachen. In den USA war 1970 eine Anwendungsbeschränkung für 2,4,5-T ergangen, die von der EPA 1971 bestätigt wurde. Es gab Überlegungen, das überschüssige Agent Orange als Herbizid nach Südamerika zu verkaufen.[5] Die Vorräte an Agent Orange wurden auf Johnston Island und beim Naval Construction Battalion Center in Gulfport (Mississippi) gelagert. Erst jetzt begann man, Dioxingehalte zu bestimmen. Es stellte sich heraus, dass die Dioxinkonzentrationen von Fass zu Fass stark unterschiedlich sein konnten. In Gulfport fand man bei einer Untersuchung von 28 Proben TCDD-Konzentrationen zwischen 6,2 und 14,3 ppm, der Mittelwert lag bei 13,25 ppm. Bei einer weiteren Untersuchung lagen die TCDD-Gehalte zwischen 0,05 und 13,3 ppm, daraus wurde ein Mittelwert von 2,99 ppm (mgL-1) abgeleitet. Bei 200 Stichproben aus dem Lager auf Johnston Island ergab sich für Agent Orange ein Mittelwert von 1,91 ppm ± 20% TCDD. Dabei hatte man die vier Proben mit den höchsten Gehalten (17, 22, 33 und 47 ppm) aus der Auswertung genommen, weil es sich dabei möglicherweise um Agent Purple handelte. Die verbliebenen Bestände wurden schließlich 1977 an Bord des Verbrennungsschiffs Vulcanus auf hoher See verbrannt.[4] Die Schätzungen der insgesamt in Vietnam in Verbindung mit den eingesetzten Herbiziden freigesetzten Mengen Dioxin reichen von 106 bis über 300 kg.[6][7]

Probleme und Schäden bis zum heutigen Tag

Da Agent Orange mit TCDD verunreinigt war, führt es bis heute zu erheblichen irreversiblen gesundheitlichen Problemen bei der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen Einsatzgebiete.

Laut Angaben des Vietnamesischen Roten Kreuzes leiden zirka 500.000 Vietnamesen an den Spätfolgen von Agent Orange. Diese sind: Missbildungen (insbesondere Lippen-Kiefer-Gaumenspalten) und Immunschwächen. Viele vietnamesische Neugeborene kommen auch drei Generationen nach dem Einsatz von Agent Orange noch mit schweren Missbildungen zur Welt. Auch Krebs zählt zu den Spätfolgen.[1] Es gibt zwar bis heute keine Untersuchungen, die einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Exposition mit Agent Orange und der Tumorentstehung bestätigen, jedoch ist Dioxin als krebserregend bekannt.

Nach neuesten Forschungen versprühte die US-Armee während des Vietnamkrieges 80 Millionen Liter toxischer Chemikalien. Weil der vietnamesischen Regierung das Geld für großflächige Bodenversiegelungen fehlt, ist das Gift auch 30 Jahre nach Kriegsende noch im Nahrungskreislauf. Schätzungsweise zwei bis vier Millionen Menschen sind von den Spätfolgen betroffen.[2] Eine 2006 erschienene Zusammenfassung von Bodenuntersuchungen über 12 Jahre kommt zu dem Schluss, dass ein punktuelles Dioxinproblem in Vietnam besteht. Während der größte Teil des Landes nicht kontamiert ist oder der Grad der Verschmutzung unter internationalen Richtlinien liegt, stellen manche ehemalige Militärbasen und Flugfelder ein ernsthaftes Problem dar. Die Autoren empfehlen, internationale Hilfe hierauf zu konzentrieren.[8]

Noch immer werden auf schwerste Weise missgebildete und kranke Kinder geboren. Die meisten Opfer können gar nicht oder nicht angemessen medizinisch versorgt werden. Die vietnamesische Regierung investiert zur Zeit vorwiegend in die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Landes. Einzelne bauen mit Hilfe selbst gesammelter Spenden Heime und Gesundheitsstationen für die Opfer von Agent Orange. 1998 wurde das unter Mithilfe amerikanischer Kriegsveteranen aufgebaute Dorf der Freundschaft eröffnet, ein Behandlungszentrum für Opfer des Entlaubungsmittels. Dennoch sind auch dies Einzelaktionen, die nur einer Minderheit der Betroffenen zugute kommen.

Juristische Aufarbeitung

Auch im Vietnamkrieg eingesetzte US-Soldaten waren durch Schäden in Folge von Agent Orange betroffen. Als der Zusammenhang zwischen den Gesundheitsschädigungen und dem Dioxin anerkannt wurde, reichten betroffene Soldaten Sammelklagen gegen mehrere Herstellerfirmen ein. Am 7. Mai 1984 kam es zu einem vorläufigen außergerichtlichen Vergleich; im folgenden Jahr wurde von sieben Firmen ein Fonds über 180 Millionen Dollar für Entschädigungszahlungen eingerichtet, was bis dahin die höchste jemals in einem Vergleich gezahlte Summe war. Bis 1994 wurden an 52.000 Veteranen und Hinterbliebene 197 Millionen Dollar ausgezahlt.[9]

Eine Gruppe vietnamesischer Opfer hat gegen die amerikanischen Hersteller Klage eingereicht, die jedoch im März 2005 abgewiesen wurde. Nach Ansicht des Richters war der Einsatz von Agent Orange keine chemische Kriegsführung und deshalb kein Verstoß gegen internationales Recht.[10]

Sonstiges

In Vietnam ist seit 2009 der Orange Day (10. August) offizieller Gedenktag für die Opfer von Agent Orange.[11]

Agent Orange war immer wieder Thema von Liedern in der Pop- und Rockmusik. Eine kalifornische Punkband nennt sich Agent Orange. Auch die schwedische Melodic Death Metal Band Dimension Zero trug vor ihrer Umbenennung den Bandnamen Agent Orange und die deutsche Thrash Metal-Band Sodom veröffentlichte ein Album unter dem Titel Agent Orange. Der US-amerikanische Rapper R. A. The Rugged Man, dessen Vater durch Agent Orange geschädigt wurde, greift das Thema in dem Lied "Uncommon Valor (A Vietnam Story)" auf. In diesem Lied schreibt er, aus der Sicht seines Vaters, die Erfahrung des Krieges und die persönlichen Folgen, in Form von Behinderungen seiner Kinder, von Agent Orange nieder.

Im Sommer 2011 wurde ein Fall bekannt, bei dem in Brasilien vom Flugzeug aus Herbizide auf Regenwald gesprüht wurden. Dabei wurde auch 2,4-Dichlorphenoxyessigsäure eingesetzt, einer der in Agent Orange enthaltenen Wirkstoffe.[12]

Einzelnachweise
  1. Cordt Schnibben: Der Tod aus Ingelheim. In: Der Spiegel. Nr. 32, 1991, S. 102ff (online).
  2.  James Pastouna: http://www.phoenix.de/regen_der_vernichtung/2007/12/07/0/106916.1.htm Regen der Vernichtung – Das Erbe des Vietnamkrieges (Seite nicht mehr abrufbar), Fernsehdokumentation, ausgestrahlt bei Phoenix am 7. Dezember 2007, 22:15
  3.  US Department of Veterans Affairs - When and Where Agent Orange Was Used in Vietnam (englisch)
  4. Jeanne Mager Stellman, Steven D. Stellman, Richard Christian, Tracy Weber, Carrie Tomasallo: The extent and patterns of usage of Agent Orange and other herbicides in Vietnam. In: Nature. 422, Nr. 6933, 17. März 2003, S. 681–687, doi:10.1038/nature01537.
  5.  Deborah Shapley: Herbicides: Agent Orange Stockpile may go to the South Americans. Science 180 (1973), S. 43–45.
  6.  agentorangerecord.com: The Extent and Pattern of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam. Article by Stellman et al., from Nature, 17 April 2003. PDF (englisch).
  7.  AG Friedensforschung an der Universität Kassel.
  8.  agentorangerecord.com: “The Agent Orange Dioxin Issue in Viet Nam: A Manageable Problem.” - paper presented at Dioxin 2006, Oslo, Norway. PDF (englisch).
  9.  US Department of Veterans Affairs - What is the Agent Orange Class Action Lawsuit? (englisch).
  10.  Agent Orange Lawsuit filed by Vietnamese Victims (englisch).
  11.  derStandard.at: Gedenktag für "Agent Orange"-Opfer. Meldung vom 10. August 2009, abgerufen am 14. Februar 2010.
  12.  Climate Connections: 2,4 D-Based (Agent Orange-type) Herbicides Being Used on the Amazon?, 13. Juli 2011."

[Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent_Orange. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-10]

1967-02-12

Der Sangharaja (พระสังฆราช) von Thailand, Somdet Phra Ariyavangsagatanyana (สมเด็จพระอริยวงศาคตญาณ), trifft zum 8-tägigen Staatsbesuch in Ceylon ein.


Abb.: Lage von Ceylon (heute: Sri Lanka)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-02-13

Beginn der zweiwöchigen SEATO-Seeübung "Sea Rose".

1967-02-14

Zeitung คนสุพรรณ (Khon Suphan): Phat Bunyaratphan (บุณยรัตพันธุ์), 1957 - 1962 Gouverneur von Suphan Buri (สุพรรณบุรี), Direktor des Board of Communist Suppression in the Northeast Region, über den Zulauf zu den Kommunisten im ländlichen Thailand:

"Those who are easily deceived into joining the communists are mostly the people in remote backward areas or in places far away from developed societies. They are too stupid [เขลา] [khlao] to perceive imminent dangers around them. They don't feel all the changes taking place in the present world. Therefore, if somebody [a communist] lures them into doing something bad, they drift away [to that person], just as wax melts away with fire [เสมือนขี้ผึ้งที่ถูกร้อนด้วยไฟ] [samuen khi phueng thi thuuk ron duay fai]."

[Übersetzt in: Nishizaki, Yoshinori [訳吉武好孝, 西崎一郎]: Political authority and provincial identity in Thailand : the making of Banharn-buri. -- Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell, 2011. -- 254 S. :Ill. ; 26 cm. -- (Studies on Southeast Asia ; 53). -- ISBN 978-0-8772-7753-8. -- S. 41]

1967-02-22

Der indonesische Staatspräsident Sukarno (1901 - 1970) tritt zurück. Damit übernimmt Suharto (1921 - 2008) auch formell die volle Macht im Staat.

1967-03

Aus einer Rede von Prinz Norodom Sihanouk (នរោត្តម សីហនុ, 1922 – 2012)  von Kambodscha:

"Do not forget either, Messieurs les rouges - and this is a reminder to you and not a threat - that it is Sihanouk to whom you owe the privilege you enjoy at present of carrying out all your activities without fear of ending your days. Is there any need to remind you that in Indonesia there was no great difficulty in wiping out seven hundred thousand communists, and to point out that it is enough for me, not even to give the order but simply to remain silent and you, who are only a few hundred, will disappear even more quickly? [Laughter and applause] We do not lack our Suhartos [1921 - 2008] and Nasutions [Abdul Haris Nasution, 1918 - 2000] in Cambodia [more applause],

I would also inform you that I have other radical methods of destroying your illusions, namely if I leave the country - temporarily - and leave you face to face with our Suhartos and Nasutions [more laughter]. Leaving the country without anyone knowing is something I am also capable of, since I have tried it - successfully - by flying out two months ago without your knowledge [more laughter]."

[Quelle: Kiernan, Ben <1953 - >: How Pol Pot came to power : Colonialism, nationalism, and communism in Cambodia, 1930 - 1975. -- 2. ed. -- New Haven : Yale UP, 2004. -- 430 S. : Ill. ;21 cm. -- ISBN 978-0-300-10262-8. -- S. 252. -- Fair use]

1967-03

Der Kommandant der 5. Kuomintang-Armee [中國國民黨] im Goldenen Dreieck, Tuan Hsi-wen [Duan Xiwen, 段希文, 1900 - 1980], erklärt dem Weekend Telegraph <London>:

"We have to continue to fight the evil of Communism, and to fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium."

[Zitiert in: Gibson, Richard M. ; Chen, Wenhua [陳, 文華] <1944 - >: The secret army : Chiang Kai-Shek and the drug warlords of the golden triangle. -- Singapore : Wiley, 2011. -- 338 S. ;: Ill. ; 23 cm. -- ISBN 978-0-470-83018-5. -- S. 251. -- Fair use]

1967-03-01

Der israelische Außenminister, Abba Eban (1915 - 2002) (אבא אבן), mit Gattin kommt zu einem dreitägigen offiziellen Besuch nach Thailand.


Abb.: Lage von Israel
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.:  Abba Eban (אבא אבן), ca. 1959
[Bildquelle: Beit Itzhak Archive / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

1967-03-06/07

Der deutsche Bundespräsident Heinrich Lübke mit Gattin sind Privatgäste des Königspaars.


Abb.: Ehepaar Lübke, 1961
[Bildquelle: Wegmann, Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F010688-0028 / Wegmann, Ludwig / CC-BY-SA]

1967-03-08

Bürgermeister (ผู้ใหญ่บ้าน) Prasit Boonsom, 23, Provinz Nakhon Phanom (นครพนม) sagt, dass er in zwei Jahren 30 des Kommunismus verdächtige Personen getötet habe. Dafür erhält er eine goldene Anstecknadel und eine Pistole von Armeechef Gen Praphas Charusathien (ประภาส จารุเสถียร, 1912 -1997). Die Bürgermeister von 700 Dörfern in Nordostthailand haben Praphas um Schutz und Maschinenpistolen gebeten, sie haben stattdessen Pistolen und Gewehre bekommen.


Abb.: Lage der Provinz Nakhon Phanom (นครพนม)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-03-08 - 1967-03-21

SEATO Militärübung SIYASAT auf den Philippinen.


Abb.: Lage der Philippinen
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-03-10

Die USA bestätigen erstmals, dass sie von thailändischen Stützpunkten aus Bomberangriffe nach Nordvietnam fliegen. Heute seien einige F-105 Thunderbirds von Thakli (ตาคลี) aus geflogen und hätten Stahlwerke 30 Meilen nördlich von Hanoi bombardiert.


Abb.: Lage von Thakli (ตาคลี) und Hanoi
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: U.S. Air Force Republic F-105D Thunderchief fighters of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing at Takhli (ตาคลี) Royal Thai Air Force Base in 1966.
[Bildquelle: Spoongap / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

"The photo was taken in 1966 at Takhli, Nakhon Sawan Province, Thailand, (15 16' 40.08 N; 100 17' 44.49" E), a wartime operating base from which routine morning and then afternoon strikes on Hanoi were launched consisting of perhaps 48 fighters supported by Boeing KC-135A tankers and Douglas RB-66C stand-off jammers. The elevation of the camera suggests that I was in the EWO seat of an Wild Weasel F-105F taxing out for an afternoon mission. Note the relative size of the fighter vs the crew-chief walking away. The pictured "D" is loaded in the typical manner with two 450 gal. fuel tanks and five one-thousand-pound low drag bombs. The load and route distance is similar to that of B-17s London to Berlin. The defenses around Hanoi were also similar to Berlin."

Ca. 75% der Bombardierung Vietnams startet auf thailändischen Stützpunkten. In Thailand sind 35.000 US-Militärs stationiert.

1967-03-10

Weekend Telegraph >London>: Interview vom in Mae Salong (แม่สลอง) stationierten Kuomintang-General Duan Shi-wen (aka. Chiwan Khamlue):


Abb.: Lage von Mae Salong (แม่สลอง)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

"We have to continue to fight the evil of communism and to fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium."

[Zitiert in: Lintner, Bertil <1953 - >: Burma in revolt : opium and insurgency since 1948. -- 2. ed. -- Chiang Mai : Silkworm, 1999. -- 558 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- ISBN 974-7100-78-9. -- S. 236. -- Fair use]

1967-03-11

His Royal Highness The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, Earl of Merioneth, Baron Greenwich, Royal Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Grand Master and First and Principal Knight Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Member of the Order of Merit, Companion of the Order of Australia, Extra Companion of the Queen's Service Order, Royal Chief of the Order of Logohu, Canadian Forces Decoration, Lord of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Privy Councillor of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, Personal Aide-de-Camp to Her Majesty kommt zu einem einwöchigen Privatbesuch nach Thailand.


Abb.: His Royal Highness The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, Earl of Merioneth, Baron Greenwich, Royal Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Grand Master and First and Principal Knight Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Member of the Order of Merit, Companion of the Order of Australia, Extra Companion of the Queen's Service Order, Royal Chief of the Order of Logohu, Canadian Forces Decoration, Lord of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Privy Councillor of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, Personal Aide-de-Camp to Her Majesty, 1962
[Bilquelle: Tony French / Wikipedia. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-03-20

Es erscheint:

Braestrup, Peter <1929 - 1997>: Researchers aid Thai rebel fight. -- In: New York Times. -- 1967-03-20

"157 anthropologists, engineers, ordnance specialists and other researchers. They are part of Project Agile, the Pentagon's worldwide counterinsurgency research program."

[Zitiert in: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 90. -- Fair use]

1967-03-22

New York Times: Die Asia Foundation gibt zu, vom CIA mitfinanziert zu werden. Die Asia Foundation finanziert in Thailand u.a. die 1963 von Sulak Sivaraksa (สุลักษณ์ ศิวรักษ์, 1933 - ) gegründete sozialkritische Zeitschrift สังคมศาสตร์ปริทัศน์ = Social Science Review


Abb.: Einbandtitel von สังคมศาสตร์ปริทัศน์ = Social Science Review, 1974

"The Asia Foundation is a non-profit, non-governmental organization professing a commitment to the "development of a peaceful, prosperous, just, and open Asia-Pacific region." The Foundation supports Asian initiatives to improve governance, law, and civil society; women's empowerment; economic reform and development; sustainable development and the environment; and international relations. Founded in 1954,[1] The Foundation claims nearly 60 years of experience in Asia and works with private and public partners in the areas of leadership and institutional development, exchanges, and policy research. Starting January 1, 2011, David Arnold serves as president of the Foundation.[1] The Foundation is governed by an eminent and well-known group of private sector trustees.

Sources of funding for the organization have included the Central Intelligence Agency,[2][3] the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program, official development assistance agencies of Australia, Canada, Netherlands and the United Kingdom, an annual appropriation from the U.S. Congress, and contributions from private corporations and foundations."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Asia_Foundation. -- Zugriff am 2014-10-19]

1967-03-26

50-Jahr-Feier der Chulalongkorn University (จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย). Der König drückt auf einen Knopf, um rosa Rauch in die Luft zu blasen. Rosa symbolisiert den Dienstag, den Geburtstag König Chulalongkorns (Rama V.)


Abb.: Lage der Chulalongkorn University (จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย)
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-03-26

Jim Thompson (geb. 1906) verschwindet spurlos im Dschungel der Cameron Highlands Malaysias. Trotz großer Suchaktionen wird er nie gefunden.


Abb.: Lage der Cameron Highlands
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Jim-Thompson-Ecke, The TIME TUNNEL Museum, Cameron Highlands, Malaysia
[Bildquelle: Roysouza / Wikipedia. -- GNU FDLicense]

1967-03-27 - 1967-04-02

Ministerpräsident Thanom ist auf Staatsbesuch in der Republik China (Taiwan).


Abb.: Lage von Taiwan und Südkorea
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-04-02 - 1964-04-07

Ministerpräsident Thanom ist auf Staatsbesuch in Südkorea.

1967-04-02 - 1968-04-08

Kambodscha: Samlout (ស្រុកសំឡូត) Aufstand


Abb.: Lage von  Samlout (ស្រុកសំឡូត)
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

"The Samlaut Uprising, otherwise called the Samlaut Rebellion or Battambang Revolts, consists of two significant phases of revolts that first broke out near Samlaut (ស្រុកសំឡូត) in Battambang Province (បាត់ដំបង) and subsequently spread into surrounding Provinces in Cambodia during 1967-1968.The revolutionary movement was largely made up by the dissident rural peasantry led by a group of discontented leftist intellectuals against Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s (នរោត្តម សីហនុ, 1922 – 2012) political organization –the Sangkum regime (សង្គមរាស្ត្រនិយម).

The rebellion first erupted in early 1967 in the Samlaut subdistrict when hundreds of frustrated peasants who were fed up with the government policies, treatment by local military, land displacement, and other poor socio-economic conditions, revolted against the government, first killing two soldiers on the morning of April 2.[1] In the following weeks, the revolt quickly expanded with much more destruction brought upon government property and personnel. By June 1967, 4,000 or more villagers fled their homes in Southern Battambang Province into the marquis (forest) to join the growing group of rebels and escape the military troops sent by Sihanouk.[2] Following after in the early 1968, Cambodia experienced a more organized and matured second uprising that had expanded both geographically and politically through months of re-grouping, recruitment and propaganda processes, and was much more widespread and destructive than the first occurrence.[2]

According to some academics such as Ben Kiernan (1953 - ) and Donald Kirk (1938 - ), the Samlaut rebellion is seen as the initial beginnings of the Cambodian revolutionary movement (the Cambodian Civil War) that eventually led to victory of the Communist forces Khmer Rouge (ខ្មែរក្រហម) and the establishment of the Democratic Kampuchea (កម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ).

Kiernan says that the rebellion was the “baptism of fire for the small but steadily growing Cambodian revolutionary movement”[2] while Kirk mentions that it was “a prelude, in a microcosm, of the conflict that would sweep across the country three years later.”"

[Quelle: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samlaut_Uprising. -- Zugriff am 2016-05-19]

Die Parteichronik der Roten Khmer (ខ្មែរក្រហម) schreibt über den Aufstand:

"In February-March 1967 the enemy started the civil war in Battambang [បាត់ដំបង], forcing five thousand people to flee into the jungle. Then in March Lon Nol [លន់ នល់, 1913 – 1985] declared open war on our people. He brought in five thousand troops from Oddar Meanchey [ឧត្ដរមានជ័យ], Battambang, Pursat [ខេត្តពោធិ៍សាត់] and Phnom Penh [ភ្នំពេញ] to sow destruction with airplanes, artillery, tanks and infantry, commanded by Nhek Tioulong [ញឹក ជូឡុង, 1908 – 1996] with the French Lieutenant-Colonel Léon Leroy as adviser. By that time our Party was already properly organized with a good network from the bases to the Centre. It is quite true that our Party had not yet raised the principle of armed struggle, but in the face of this massive civil war by the enemy, our Party had to fight back with arms."

[Quelle: Kiernan, Ben <1953 - >: How Pol Pot came to power : Colonialism, nationalism, and communism in Cambodia, 1930 - 1975. -- 2. ed. -- New Haven : Yale UP, 2004. -- 430 S. : Ill. ;21 cm. -- ISBN 978-0-300-10262-8. -- S. 251. -- Fair use]

1967-04-04

Martin Luther King hält in in der interdenominational Riverside Church, New York seine Rede gegen den Vietnamkrieg "Beyond Vietnam : a time to break silence"


Abb.: Martin Luther King, 1964
[Bildquelle: DonkeyHotey. -- https://www.flickr.com/photos/donkeyhotey/12108540533/. -- Zugriff am 2014-08-23. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung)]

Auszug aus der Rede:

"And as I ponder the madness of Vietnam and search within myself for ways to understand and respond in compassion, my mind goes constantly to the people of that peninsula. I speak now not of the soldiers of each side, not of the ideologies of the Liberation Front, not of the junta in Saigon, but simply of the people who have been living under the curse of war for almost three continuous decades now. I think of them, too, because it is clear to me that there will be no meaningful solution there until some attempt is made to know them and hear their broken cries.

They must see Americans as strange liberators. The Vietnamese people proclaimed their own independence in 1954—in 1945 rather—after a combined French and Japanese occupation and before the communist revolution in China. They were led by Ho Chi Minh. Even though they quoted the American Declaration of Independence in their own document of freedom, we refused to recognize them. Instead, we decided to support France in its reconquest of her former colony. Our government felt then that the Vietnamese people were not ready for independence, and we again fell victim to the deadly Western arrogance that has poisoned the international atmosphere for so long. With that tragic decision we rejected a revolutionary government seeking self-determination and a government that had been established not by China—for whom the Vietnamese have no great love—but by clearly indigenous forces that included some communists. For the peasants this new government meant real land reform, one of the most important needs in their lives.

For nine years following 1945 we denied the people of Vietnam the right of independence. For nine years we vigorously supported the French in their abortive effort to recolonize Vietnam. Before the end of the war we were meeting eighty percent of the French war costs. Even before the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu, they began to despair of their reckless action, but we did not. We encouraged them with our huge financial and military supplies to continue the war even after they had lost the will. Soon we would be paying almost the full costs of this tragic attempt at recolonization.

After the French were defeated, it looked as if independence and land reform would come again through the Geneva Agreement. But instead there came the United States, determined that Ho should not unify the temporarily divided nation, and the peasants watched again as we supported one of the most vicious modern dictators, our chosen man, Premier Diem. The peasants watched and cringed and Diem ruthlessly rooted out all opposition, supported their extortionist landlords, and refused even to discuss reunification with the North. The peasants watched as all of this was presided over by United States influence and then by increasing numbers of United States troops who came to help quell the insurgency that Diem’s methods had aroused. When Diem was overthrown they may have been happy, but the long line of military dictators seemed to offer no real change, especially in terms of their need for land and peace.

The only change came from America as we increased our troop commitments in support of governments which were singularly corrupt, inept, and without popular support. All the while the people read our leaflets and received the regular promises of peace and democracy and land reform. Now they languish under our bombs and consider us, not their fellow Vietnamese, the real enemy. They move sadly and apathetically as we herd them off the land of their fathers into concentration camps where minimal social needs are rarely met. They know they must move on or be destroyed by our bombs.

So they go, primarily women and children and the aged. They watch as we poison their water, as we kill a million acres of their crops. They must weep as the bulldozers roar through their areas preparing to destroy the precious trees. They wander into the hospitals with at least twenty casualties from American firepower for one Vietcong-inflicted injury. So far we may have killed a million of them, mostly children. They wander into the towns and see thousands of the children, homeless, without clothes, running in packs on the streets like animals. They see the children degraded by our soldiers as they beg for food. They see the children selling their sisters to our soldiers, soliciting for their mothers.

What do the peasants think as we ally ourselves with the landlords and as we refuse to put any action into our many words concerning land reform? What do they think as we test out our latest weapons on them, just as the Germans tested out new medicine and new tortures in the concentration camps of Europe? Where are the roots of the independent Vietnam we claim to be building? Is it among these voiceless ones?

We have destroyed their two most cherished institutions: the family and the village. We have destroyed their land and their crops. We have cooperated in the crushing of the nation’s only noncommunist revolutionary political force, the unified Buddhist Church. We have supported the enemies of the peasants of Saigon. We have corrupted their women and children and killed their men.

Now there is little left to build on, save bitterness. Soon the only solid physical foundations remaining will be found at our military bases and in the concrete of the concentration camps we call “fortified hamlets.” The peasants may well wonder if we plan to build our new Vietnam on such grounds as these. Could we blame them for such thoughts? We must speak for them and raise the questions they cannot raise. These, too, are our brothers."

[Quelle: http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_beyond_vietnam/. -- Zugriff am 2014-08-20. -- Fair use]

1967-04-05 - 1973-05-11

Ellsworth F. Bunker (1894 - 1984) ist US-Botschafter in Südvietnam


Abb.: Ellsworth F. Bunker, 1965
[Bildquelle: USGov / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

1967-04-09

Erstflug der Boeing 737. Die Royal Thai Airforce wird u.a. ein Exemplar für den Privatgebrauch des Kronprinzen kaufen.


Abb.: Boeing 737 des Kronprinzen, gepfändet auf dem Flughafen München, 2011
[Bildquelle: M(e)ister Eiskalt / Wikimedia. -- GNU FDLicense]

1967-04-10

Stationierung der ersten B-52 Bomber in U Tapao (อู่ตะเภา)


Abb.: B-52 in U Tapao (อู่ตะเภา)
[Bildquelle: USGOV. -- Public domain]

1967-04-13

Songkran (สงกรานต์).


Abb.: Das Königspaar gibt an Songkran (สงกรานต์) Mönchen Almosenspeise, Bangkok, ca. 1967

1967-04-15

In New York größte Demonstration (400.000 Demonstranten) gegen Vietnamkrieg seit vier Jahren. Es spricht u. a. Martin Luther King (1929 - 1968).

Klicken: Video zur Demo

[Quelle des MPPEG4-Videos: http://www.archive.org/details/CEP531. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-10. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Martin Luther King  / von Dave McKeague, 2007
[Bildquelle: Dave McKeague. -- http://www.flickr.com/photos/dave_mckeague/362318943/. -- Zugriff am 2013-05-22. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung)] 

1967-04-20

Sieben-Nationen-Treffen zu Vietnam in Washington DC.

1967-04-20

Der belgische Prinz Albert Felix Humbert Theodor Christian Eugen Maria von Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha (1934 - ) kommt mit einer dreißigköpfigen Wirtschaftsdelegation nach Thailand, um die Handelsbeziehungen mit Thailand zu fördern.


Abb.: Lage von Belgien
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Prinz Albert Felix Humbert Theodor Christian Eugen Maria von Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha
[Bildquelle: Royalbelgium / Wikimedia. -- GNU FDLicense]

1967-04-23 - 1967-04-30

Staatsbesuch des Königspaars in Iran. Shah: Mohammad Reza Schah Pahlavi Schahanschah (‏محمدرضاشاه پهلوی‎) (1919 - 1918)


Abb.: Mohammad Reza Schah Pahlavi Schahanschah (‏محمدرضاشاه پهلوی‎) mit Gattin Frah Pahlavi, geb. Farah Diba (‏فرح پهلوی‎; geb.  ‏فرح دیبا‎) (1938 - ) und Kindern, 1967
[Bildquelle: Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

Der König unterzeichnet zusammen mit dem Shah einen Freundschaftsvertrag. Am 28. 4. feiert das Königspaar seinen 17. Hochzeitstag.


Abb.: Lage von Iran
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-04-27

Erstmals wollen mehr Universitätsabsolventen in den privaten Sektor gehen. Bisher suchten Universitätsabsolventen vor allem sichere Stellen beim Staat.

1967-04-12 - 1967-10-27

Weltausstellung (Exposition universelle et internationale Montréal 1967) in Montreal (Kanada). Das thailändische Königspaar wird die Ausstellung 1967-06-22  besuchen (siehe unten)


Abb.: Lage von Montreal
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Thailand-Pavillon, Expo 1967
[Bildquelle: RHTRAVELER. -- http://www.flickr.com/photos/rhtraveler/1033670587/. -- Zugriff am 2014-10-30. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, keine kommerzielle Nutzung)]

1967-05

Zum Beispiel Korruption:

In Ban Huai Chom Poo, Amphoe Thoeng (อำเภอ เทิง), Chiang Rai (เชียงราย) sagt ein Regierungsbeamter den Dorfbewohnern (Hmong / Meo, ชาวม้ง / แม้ว), das er die Brandrodung durchgehen lassen werde, wenn sie ihm Bestechungsgeld zahlen. Bald darauf kommt ein anderer Beamter und fordert das gleiche. Bald darauf kommt eine Gruppe Provinzpolizisten und fordert dasselbe. Diesmal waren aber alle Männer aus dem Dorf verschwunden. Als die Polizisten das Dorf verlassen, werden sie von den Männern aus einem Hinterhalt angegriffen: ein Polizist ist tot, drei werden verwundet, drei gefangen genommen. Am nächsten Tag überfällt die Polizei mit 64 Mann. Die Polizei brennt das Dorf nieder und tötet das Vieh.


Abb.: Lage von Amphoe Thoeng (อำเภอ เทิง)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-05-01

Tod von Direk Jayanama (ดิเรก ชัยนาม, geb. 1905).


Abb.: Direk Jayanama (ดิเรก ชัยนาม)
[Bildquelle: th.Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

"Direk Jayanama (Thai: ดิเรก ชัยนาม) (January 18, 1905 -1967-05-01)[1] was the founding member of the Thai Revolution that had instilled Democracy for all Thais, together with Field Marshal P Pibulsonggram (แปลก พิบูลสงคราม, 1897 - 1964) and Pridi Panomyong (ปรีดี พนมยงค์,1900 - 1983).

Notability

Jayanama served many important post in the Thai government during its infancy. During WWII when he held the post of Foreign Minister to become the Ambassador to Japan. Other posts held during his years in service for Thailand were Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister (on many occasions), Justice Minister, and Finance Minister. During this time, he also served as the Thai Ambassador to the Court of St. James (England), Germany, Finland, etc.

Jayanama also founded the Thammasat University Faculty of Political Science.

Family

Direk was the older brother of Pairote Jayanama, former Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs (who had 4 sons that eventually became ambassadors), and AM Jayanama, an Air Force General at the time.

Direk Jayanama was married to Khunying ML Pui (member of the aristocratic Nopawongse royal bloodline) with 4 sons. One of them, Wattana Jayanama, became an important figure during the establishment phase of the Bank of Thailand."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direk_Jayanama. -- Zugriff am 2012-06-07]

1967-05-02

Kambodschas Staatspräsident Norodom Sihanouk (នរោត្ដម សីហនុ)  setzt - auf drei Monate befristet - das parlamentarische System außer Kraft und bildet eine Notstandsregierung. In der Provinz Battambang (ក្រុងបាត់ដំបង) hat die kambodschanische Armee riesige Reislager des Vietcong entdeckt Kambodscha versucht im Vietnamkonflikt weiterhin neutral zu bleiben.


Abb.: Lage von Battambang (ក្រុងបាត់ដំបង)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-05-02 - 1967-05-10

Stockholm (Schweden): International War Crimes Tribunal (Russel Tribunal). Ziel des Tribunals ist die Untersuchung und Dokumentation US-amerikanischer Kriegsverbrechen im Vietnamkrieg nach 1954. Eines der Egebnisse der zweiten Sitzungsperiode:

"Is the Government of Thailand guilty of complicity in the aggression committed by the United States Government against Vietnam?
Yes (unanimously)."		 "Ist die Regierung von Thailand der Komplizenschaft an der von der US-Regierung gegen Vietnam ausgeübten Aggression schuldig? - Ja (einstimmig)"
[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell_Tribunal. -- Zugriff am 2013-11-07]]

1967-05-05

Time Magazine berichtet, dass Königin Sirikit jährlich ca. $500.000 beim Pariser Modeunternehmen Balmain S.A. ausgibt. Sirkit wird seit sechs Jahren zu den zehn bestgekleideten Frauen der Welt gerechnet.

1967-05-09

Die USA schaffen zur Pazifikation Vietnams Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).

Ein Produkt von CORDS ist:

Revolutionary Development Cadres' Eleven Criteria and Ninety-Eight Works for Pacification

Die elf Kriterien sind:

  1. Annihilation of the Communist Underground Cadres
  2. Annihilation of the Wicked Village Dignitaries
  3. Abolishing Hatred and Building Up a New Spirit
  4. The Administration and People's Democratic Organizations
  5. To Organize the Struggle Against VC [Vietcong]
  6. Illiteracy Campaign
  7. Health
  8. Land Reform
  9. Development of Agriculture and Handicraft
  10. Development of a Communications System
  11. A Meritorious Treatment of the Combatants

[Quelle: http://www.angelfire.com/ca5/yourturf3/98works.html. -- Zugriff am 2016-03-27. -- Dort vollständiger Text]

1967-05-13

Zakir Hussain (ذاکِر حسین‎, 1897 - 1969) wird als erster Muslim Präsident Indiens.


Abb.: Zakir Hussain (ذاکِر حسین‎)
[Bildquelle: http://bharatmatamandir.in/blog/2008/05/10/dr-zakir-husain/. -- Zugriff am 2013-01-23. -- Fair use]

1967-05-15 - 1967-05-27

Der buddhistische Sangharaja (สังฆราช) von Laos besucht Thailand.

1967-05-19

Draft Memorandum von US Verteidigungsminister Robert McNamara an den US Präsidenten Johnson:

"SUBJECT
  • Future Actions in Vietnam

General Westmoreland [1914 - 2005] and Admiral Sharp [1906 - 2001] have requested 200,000 additional men (100,000 as soon as possible with the remainder probably required in FY [Financial Year] 1969) and 13 additional tactical air squadrons for South Vietnam. The program they propose would require Congressional action authorizing a call-up of the Reserves, the addition of approximately 500,000 men to our military forces, and an increase of approximately $10 billion in the FY 68 Defense budget. It would involve the virtual certainty of irresistible pressures for ground actions against “sanctuaries” in Cambodia and Laos; for intensification of the air campaign against North Vietnam; for the blockage of rail, road, and sea imports into North Vietnam; and ultimately for invasion of North Vietnam to control infiltration routes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that these operations may cause the Soviet Union and/or Red China to apply military pressure against us in other places of the world, such as in Korea or Western Europe. They therefore believe it essential that we also take steps to prepare to face such hostile military pressures. The purpose of this paper is to examine the recommendations of our military commanders and to consider alternative courses of action.

This memorandum is written at a time when there appears to be no attractive course of action. The probabilities are that Hanoi has decided not to negotiate until the American electorate has been heard in November 1968. Continuation of our present moderate policy, while avoiding a larger war, will not change Hanoi's mind, so is not enough to satisfy the American people; increased force levels and actions against the North are likewise unlikely to change Hanoi's mind, and are likely to get us in even deeper in Southeast Asia and into a serious confrontation, if not war, with China and Russia; and we are not willing to yield. So we must choose among imperfect alternatives.

[...]

CHAPTER FOUR. RECOMMENDATIONS

The war in Vietnam is acquiring a momentum of its own that must be stopped. Dramatic increases in US troop deployments, in attacks on the North, or in ground actions in Laos or Cambodia are not necessary and are not the answer. The enemy can absorb them or counter them, bogging us down further and risking even more serious escalation of the war.

Course A [der Vorschlag von Westmoreland und Sharp] could lead to a major national disaster; it would not win the Vietnam war, but only submerge it in a larger one. Course B likewise will not win the Vietnam war in a military sense in a short time; it does avoid the larger war, however, and it is part of a sound military-political/pacification-diplomatic package that gets things moving toward a successful outcome in a few years. More than that cannot be expected. No plan can be fashioned that will give a better chance of success by 1968 or later. Attempts to do so not only produce dangerous plans but also are counterproductive in that they make us look overeager to Hanoi.

We recommend Course B because it has the combined advantages of being a lever toward negotiations and toward ending the war on satisfactory terms, of helping our general position with the Soviets, of improving our image in the eyes of international opinion, of reducing the danger of confrontation with China and with the Soviet Union, and of reducing US losses."

[Quelle: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d177. -- Zugriff am 2016-08-30]

1967-05-15

Beginn der SEATO-Übung AURORA in Bangkok.

1967-05-23

Wisakha Bucha (วิสาขบูชา).


Abb.: Die königliche Familie an Wisakha Bucha (วิสาขบูชา), Wat Phra Mahathat Woromaha Vihan  (วัดพระมหาธาตุวรมหาวิหาร), Nakhon Si Thammarat (นครศรีธรรมราช), ca. 1967


Abb.: Lage von Nakhon Si Thammarat (นครศรีธรรมราช)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-05-29

Von 23.000 Schülern, die schriftliche Universitätszugangsprüfungen machen, bestehen über 8.000. 70% von ihnen hatten die Prüfung das erste Mal gemacht, der Rest war bei früheren Tests durchgefallen und wiederholte. Als nächstes haben die Erfolgreichen mündliche Zulassungsbefragungen zu bestehen. Erst dann werden sie zu einer Universität oder Hochschule zugelassen.

1967-05

"Thai naval assistance was also sought. In the latter part of May, MACV decided that the South Vietnamese Navy would be unable to utilize effectively the motor gunboat (PGM) 107 scheduled for completion in July. It was then recommended that the boat be diverted to the Royal Thai Navy and used as a Free World contribution. The Military Assistance Command, Thailand, objected, however, and preferred that the boat be transferred to the Thai Navy under the Military Assistance Program as a requirement for a later year. Since the Thai Navy was already operating two ships in South Vietnam, a request by the United States to operate a third might be considered inappropriate, particularly in view of the personnel problems confronting the Thais, and the ever-present insurgency threat facing Thailand from the sea. Since Thailand wanted to improve its Navy, the Thais saw no advantage in manning a ship that was not their own. In addition, the US Navy advisory group in Thailand had been continuously stressing the need for modernization of the Thai Navy. To suggest that the Thais contribute another Free World ship would appear contradictory. A more acceptable approach, the US Navy group reasoned, would be to offer the PGM-107 as a grant in aid of a future year, and then request Thai assistance in the coastal effort, known as MARKET TIME, by relieving the other PGM when it was due for maintenance and crew rotation in Thailand. This approach would give additional Royal Thai Navy crews training in coastal warfare, increase the prestige of the Thai navy, and meet the continuing need for a Thai presence in South Vietnam. Overtures to the Thai government confirmed the validity of the Navy group's reasoning. The Thais did not wish to man the new PGM-107 as an additional Free World contribution."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]

1967-06

Ein fünfzigjähriger Lehrer wird zum Nationalhelden erklärt, weil er im Nordosten zwei Guerillas getötet hat.

1967-06

Ministerpräsident Thanom:

"Thai Premier Thanom Kittikachorn openly made the same point in June of 1967. "We have definitely decided to evacuate the North Vietnamese," he said, "and we have been in negotiations with the South Vietnamese government on this subject. We don’t yet know if the Saigon government will accept them." But on the same day Premier Thanom made his views known, the Saigon embassy in Bangkok announced that the South Vietnam government would not allow the refugees in its territory because the refugees are committed to, and under the control of, Hanoi."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 38. -- Fair use]

1967-06

Es erscheint:

Sawai Pradit [ไสว ประดิษฐ]: Summary of village attitudes and conditions in relation to rural security in Northeast Thailand : an intensive resident study of Yang Kham Village, Tambon Duesikanchai [เดื่อศรีคันไชย], Amphur Wanon-Niwat [วานรนิวาส], Changwad Sakon Nakorn [สกลนคร]. -- Bangkok : Research Division, USOM/Thailand, [1967]. -- 32 S. ; 27 cm

Sawai Pradit [ไสว ประดิษฐ]: Sawai Pradit: Summary of village attitudes and conditions in relation to rural security in Northeast Thailand : an intensive resident study of Nam Thieng Village, Tambon Kok Pra [โคกพระ], Amphur Kantarawichai [กันทรวิชัย], Changwad Mahasarakam [มหาสารคาม]. -- Bangkok : Research Division, USOM/Thailand, [1967]. -- 22 S. ; 27 cm

"Because of the communist threat in Thailand's northeastern Changwad [จังหวัด] (provinces), it is important to assess the social, economic and political climate of villages like Nam Thieng. This data will help to mould development and security programs for villagers who might otherwise be misled by communist propaganda."

[a.a.O., S. 1. -- Zitiert in: Luther, Hans Ulrich <1940 - >: Peasants and state in contemporary Thailand : from regional revolt to national revolution?. -- Hamburg : Institut für Asienkunde, 1978. -- 109 S. ; 21 cm. -- (Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, Hamburg ; Nr. 98). -- ISBN 3-921469-49-X. -- S. 89, Anm. 40. -- Fair use]

1967-06-01

Großbritannien: es erscheint das Album Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band der britischen Band The Beatles. Thai: Sgt พริกไทยวังเวงหัวใจคลับ


Abb.: ©Plattenhülle
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia. -- Fair use]

Das Album auf Spotify:

URI: spotify:album:1PULmKbHeOqlkIwcDMNwD4
URL: https://open.spotify.com/album/1PULmKbHeOqlkIwcDMNwD4

1967-06-06 - 1967-06-29

Staatsbesuche des Königspaars in den USA und Kanada


Abb.: Lage von Kanada, USA und Hawaii (USA)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

Das Königspaar besucht die USA 3 Wochen lang. Präsident: Lyndon Baines Johnson (1908 - 1973). Was der König mit dem US-Präsidenten am 1967-06-27 bespricht, ist auch 2014 noch geheim: die entsprechenden Dokumente gibt die US-Regierung wegen ihres brisanten Inhalts immer noch nicht frei.


Abb.: Lyndon Baines Johnson im Kreise seiner Familie, 1968
[Bildquelle: Frank Wolfe / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

In New York (USA) muss der Jazz-Klarinettist Benny Goodman (1909 - 1968)   für das Königspaar auftreten


Abb.: Benny Goodman, 1971
[Bildquelle: Hans Bernhard (Schnobby) / Wikipedia. -- GNU FDLicense]

Künstlerlink auf Spotify:

URI: spotify:artist:1pBuKaLHJlIlqYxQQaflve
URL: https://open.spotify.com/artist/1pBuKaLHJlIlqYxQQaflve


Abb.: Pavillon im East-West Center (Honolulu), den das Königspaar bei ihrem Besuch in Hawaii stifteten
[Bildquelle: Joel Bradshaw / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

Am 1967-06-13 erklärt der König gegenüber der New York Times über die Anti-Vietnamkriegsbewegung in den USA

"There is another kind of war going on the United States, the King said.

"It is a kind of war of brainwashing - mass brainwashing", he said.

"A soldier fighting wants support from the home front, he added. "This is sapping his efforts and it is not very nice for him."

Der König erklärt auch, dass Musik für ein wichtiger Teil seines Lebens bleibe, dass Kunst, Politik, Sport und Wissenschaft ebenso Teile seines Lebens seien. Er habe nun in der Philosophie einen bisher fehlenden Teil seines Selbst gefunden.

1967-06-19 - 1967-07-06

Summerstudy "The Thailand Study Group" des Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).

"The June 19 to July 6 sessions have been described variously as

"a secret review of counterinsurgency research in Thailand"; an undertaking "to explore policy questions" and "to learn what was known to Americans about Thai society, and to assess the impact of American aid and policy on Thai society"; and as an attempt "to explore the usefulness of creating a 'SS' [social science] Jason." [JASON Defense Advisory Group, kurz JASON, ist eine unabhängige Gruppe von Universitätswissenschaftlern in den USA, die die Regierung in technologischen Fragen der nationalen Sicherheit beraten. (Wikipedia)]

The minutes of IDA's Thailand Study Group are replete with discussions about the advisability of setting up a social science Jason to mirror the physical science Jason already in existence. The social scientists present also freely contributed opinions and recommendations to a dialogue that included such topics as insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics, U.S. policy objectives in Thailand, the nature of U.S.-Thai relations, and the problems of rural government.

Participants in the Thailand Study Group were aware that further consulting fees would follow the creation of a social science Jason, with benefits accruing to both the U.S. government and themselves. While discussing the advantages of this, there were frank exchanges as to whom IDA served and what function Thailand would have in all of this. As one social scientist put it:

"Thailand is a good place to study because there are things going on there that can be studied which are not going on elsewhere. It is like a laboratory [emphasis added].""

[Quelle: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 45f. -- Fair use]
"In a letter to the AAA [American Anthropological Association] Newsletter [Januar 1971], Moerman recounted the formation of the Study Group as follows:

In 1967, a representative of Jason, a group of physical scientists who consult for the government, asked me to help arrange a summer seminar on US policy to Thailand in which representatives of government agencies would brief and listen to a floating group of social scientists specializing in Thailand. Jason's purpose was to experiment with the possibility of adding a social science component. This interest in Thailand was an accidental compromise, but I (along with the co-organizer) felt that the social scientists could alert the government to the dangers of directing its aid, "Occupant, Thailand," with no knowledge or concern for how that aid benefitted some kinds of persons and consequently deprived other—frequently better—ones. The conference failed on both grounds. Jason decided, wisely I feel, that it would be a mistake to add a social science component. I learned that every single American agency that spoke to us took counterinsurgency as its main policy rationale. They were therefore unconcerned with the harm their programs might be doing the Thai people. I was unwilling to consult for the government, and so ceased in September 1967."

[Zitiert in: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 53. -- Fair use]
"PARTICIPANTS IN THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES’ THAILAND STUDY GROUP: JUNE-JULY 1967
 
NAME AFFILIATION
J. E. Barmack City University of New York, psychologist
James E. Cross Secretary of the Institute for Defense Analyses
Seymour Deitchman [1923 - 2013] Director of Project Agile for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
G. Farrar AID [Agency for International Development], "responsibility for all of AID planning"
J. Fitzgerald "in ISA [Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs] concerned with policy planning on V.N. [Vietnam]—assistant for COIN [counterinsurgency] planning"
P. Franklin ARPA
Murray Gell-Mann [1929 - ] California Institute of Technology, physicist, conference organizer
Robert Gomer [1924 - ] University of Chicago, chemist
James Hoath United States Operations Mission/Thailand (AID), chief of Research and Evaluation Division
Howard Kaufman Cornell Aeronautics Laboratory
Louis Lomax [1922 - 1970] author of Thailand: The War That Is, The War That Will Be
Millard F. Long University of Chicago, economist
Michael Moerman UCLA, anthropologist
Jesse Orlansky Founder of Dunlap and Associates, a behavioral research firm; psychologist
Herbert Phillips University of Califomia-Berkeley, anthropologist
Steven Piker [1937 - ]] Swarthmore College, anthropologist
Gary Quinn ARPA
Lauriston Sharp [1907 - 1993] Cornell University, anthropologist
General Maxwell Taylor [1901 - 1987] President of IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] as of 1966
M. Ladd Thomas Northern Illinois University, political scientist

Other individuals present at the conference were two people whose affiliation was identified only as "Jason" (Henry W. Kendall and Louis Mayer), at least two who seem to be government officials judging from their statements at the Summer Study (L. Carter, Carl Nelson), and W. Bell, P. Gyorgy, Robinette Kirk ("works for Mr. Lomax"), Don Marshall; H. Moskowitz, W. Stark (apparently connected with ARPA), S. York, and S. Young."

[Quelle: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 54f.. -- Fair use]
"Farrar of USAID weighed in with what AID thought would be a useful function for social scientists working with the police and intelligence services:

We ought to sensitize the Thais to the need for this kind of information [attitudinal and behavioral indices] and encourage them to get it. The question is how to get the Soc. Sci. community to infiltrate the police and intelligence group and let them obtain the information."

[Zitiert in: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 58. -- Fair use]

1967-06-22 - 1967-06-26

Der König und die Königin macht einen Staatsbesuch in den Kanada. Königin: Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith / Elizabeth Deux, par la grâce de Dieu Reine du Royaume-Uni, du Canada et de ses autres royaumes et territoires, Chef du Commonwealth, Défenseur de la Foi (1926 - ). Ministerpräsident: Lester Bowles "Mike" Pearson (1897 - 1972).

Das Königspaar besucht u.a. die Weltausstellung in Montreal (siehe oben)


Abb.: Lester Bowles "Mike" Pearson, 1957
[Bildquelle: Nobel Foundation / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Weltausstellung Montreal 1967
[Bildquelle: DJ Berson. -- http://www.flickr.com/photos/berson/87037651. -- Zugriff am 2014-10-30. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, keine kommerzielle Nutzung, keine Bearbeitung)]

Auf der Rückreise besucht das Königspaar in Großbritannien privat den Kronprinzen, der dort die Schule besucht.


Abb.: Seaford, East Sussex, der Schulort des Kronprinzen
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-06-23

Gesetz über die einheitliche Schreibung von Thai-Ortsnamen in lateinischer Schrift.

1967-06-24

Erstmals versuchsweise Farb-Fernsehen.


Abb.: Inserat für Siera-Farbfernseher

1967-06-27

Look (US-Zeitschrift): "A visit with the King and Queen of Thailand" / von Gereon Zimmermen:

Der König sieht sich als gewählten König:

"I am really an elected king. If the people do not want me, they can throw me out, eh? Then I will be out of a job."

Der König über die chinesische Gefahr:

"When I asked the king about Chinese communism, he was painfully specific: "It means three things, really. There are the Chinese, there are Chinese communists, and there are communists. The Chinese have always been a threat to Southeast Asia, because they are an expansive people. It depends on the time and the place for them. In Thailand, there are many of them, and it is hard to absorb them.

"Thailand is threatened. In the northeast villages, the communists are either Thai Chinese or North Vietnamese. These communist agents work villages that are remote and without modern communications. They are quite active. Generally, the people do not believe them, but in the remote areas, if the people do not cooperate, the communists kill them. It is the same old story as the Chicago gangsters in your country. If the peasants do not pay, their homes are burgled or they get killed. Sometimes, they are ‘enlisted to liberate the country.’ Now, of course, some government officials upcountry do not do their jobs properly, so the peasants have a reason to become bitter and rebel. But their bitterness is not against Thailand, it is against the officials.

"Thai people are not communists. For example, if you consider our religion [Theravada Buddhism] and consider all of its rules, it is democratic. Thus, the monks. They all have their rights, and they operate in a manner similar to that of a parliament. Each has the right to say what he thinks. We in Thailand have, then, a basis for democracy and good living.

"Communism is impractical. Life is not each to his needs. The one who works today should get the money and the goods, not the one who doesn’t work. Communism can be worse than the Nazis or the Fascists. In practice, it is more terrible than a dictatorship. If, however, a dictator is a good man, he can do many things for the people. For a short while, Mussolini did many good things for the Italian people. But once he was bitten by the ‘bug of empire,’ he was finished."

[Fair use]

 

1967-07 - 1971

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland unterstützt den Aufbau des Public Health Research Institute (PHRI)

"Within the framework of Thai-German technical cooperation four German experts were dispatched in Thailand to support the departments of bacteriology/serology, parasitology, pharmacology and pharmacognosy at the Public Health Research Institute in Bangkok. Their activities included the installation of the respective laboratories as well as training of laboratory personnel.
The project significantly improved the working conditions at the central laboratory of the PHRI and its branches in Phitsanulok [พิษณุโลก], Haad Yai [หาดใหญ่], and Songkhla [สงขลา] resulting in improved reliability of the test results. At the end of the project the production of serum, which formerly had to be imported from abroad, was possible at the institute."

[Quelle: http://www.thai-german-cooperation.info/project/content/28. -- Zugriff am 2015-12-29]


Abb.: Standorte des Public Health Research Institute (PHRI)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-07

Kampf zwischen dem Kuomintang ( 中國國民黨), dem Drogenkönig Khun Sa (ခွန်ဆာ / 張奇夫, 1934 - 2007) und Truppen des laotischen Generals Ouane Rattikone (1912 - 1978) um die Kontrolle des Heroinzentrums im Goldenen Dreieck.


Abb.: Lage des Goldenen Dreiecks
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

"Ouane Rattikone (Ouan Rathikoun; Uan Rāttikun; * 1912 in Luang Prabang; † Oktober 1978) war General der laotischen Luftwaffe, später Oberkommandierender der Force Armée. Diese Stellungen nutzte er, um bis 1975 zum bedeutendsten Heroinproduzenten Indochinas zu werden, der seine eigene Heroinmarke vertrieb.
Lebensweg

Ouane Rattikone ging in seiner Geburtsstadt zu Schule und trat 1941 der Polizeitruppe Garde indigène bei. 1945 desertierte er, um sich der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Lao Issara anzuschließen. 1946-49 war er an Guerillaaktivitäten im südlichen Laos beteiligt.

Nach einer Amnestie trat er 1949 in die neugegründete laotische Armee (Kôngthap Haeng Xāt), die anfangs 1200 Mann stark war, ein. Nach der Unabhängigkeit des Königreichs Laos (22. Oktober 1953, bestätigt 21. Juli 1954) erfolgte seine rasche Beförderung zum Brigadier innerhalb der - vollständig aus amerikanischen Mitteln - rapide ausgebauten Armee.

Seit 1958 war er Mitglied des „Komitees zur Verteidigung nationaler Interessen“ (Khana Kammakān Pônghan Phoyphanyot) Im Jahre 1959 wurde er Chef des Generalstabes. Nach dem Staatsstreich 1960 wurde er als Außen- und Verteidigungsminister Mitglied im Kabinett von Suvanna Phūmā. Er wechselte bald die Seiten zum rechtsgerichteten Phoumi Nosavan.

Rattikone hielt engste Verbindungen zum amerikanischen Botschafter William H. Sullivan und dem CIA-station chief Ted Shackley. Mit deren Unterstützung rebellierte er im April 1964 gegen Phoumi. Endgültig wurde dieser im Februar 1965 ins Exil nach Thailand gezwungen. In den Jahren 1965-69 war Rattikone Oberkommandierender der Streitkräfte und in Bezug auf die nördliche Militärregion ein warlord. Darin war er ein Verbündeter von Vang Pao.

Offiziell wurde Rattikone im Juni 1971 als Kommandeur verabschiedet.[1] 1973 wurde er in die Nationalversammlung (Saphāa Haeng Xāt) gewählt.

Nach der Befreiung des Landes am 2. Dezember 1975 wurde Rattikone zur Umerziehung in das nord-östliche Laos verbracht, wo er vor der erfolgreichen Beendigung der Maßnahme im Oktober 1978 verstarb.

Drogenhändler

Offiziell hatte Laos das aus französischer Zeit übernommene Opiummonopol (Opium Régie du Laos) 1961 abgeschafft und den Handel fürderhin unter Strafe gestellt. Anbau und Export, die ursprünglich zur Finanzierung der GCMA bis 1954 massiv ausgeweitet worden waren, gingen jedoch weiter.

Unter General Phoumi war er ab 1962 beauftragt, die Opiumgeschäfte der Regierung zu leiten, wofür er ein monatliches Salär von US$ 200 erhielt und Kontakte zu den Shan und KMT in Birma als Lieferanten aufbaute. Zu dieser Zeit wurden monatlich etwa 1 t Opium an die Kumpanen von Nguyen Kao Ky in Südvietnam geliefert.[2] Die Exporte verdreifachten sich bis 1964.[3]

Nachdem Rattikone 1965 den Premier Phoumi Novasan vertrieben hatte, übernahm er den Opiumhandel besonders im Nord-Westen selbst. Zunächst schaltete er als Transporteur die Air Laos Commerciale aus, wodurch sich zunächst logistische Probleme ergaben. Er plante künftig nur noch die T-28 Flugzeuge der Royal Lao Airforce einzusetzen. Seine amerikanischen Freunde befürchteten jedoch, dass dadurch die Fähigkeiten der Luftwaffe im secret war beeinträchtigt würden. Sie beschafften daher die Mittel zum Kauf von zwei Douglas-C-47-Dakota-Transportern aus dem amerikanischen Entwicklungshilfeprogramm USAID. Diese Maschinen wurden unter dem Tarnnamen Xieng Khoung Air betrieben und bildete zusammen mit der Air America die ultimative Air Opium.

Rattikone betrieb ein Heroin-Labor in Ban Houi Sai (= Ban Houayxay), ein weiteres in der Hauptstadt. Mit seinem Partner, dem chinesischen Geschäftsmann Huu Tim-heng, hatte er eine Fabrik, in der ab 1965 ebenfalls Heroin der Marke Double-U-O Globe produziert wurde. Die meisten Konsumenten waren die Angehörigen der US-Truppen in Vietnam, bei denen der Durchseuchungsgrad bei den Fronttruppen 15-22% erreichte. Um die nötigen Chemikalien (Äther und Essigsäureanhydrid) zur Produktion bekommen zu können, hatte Huu zusammen mit dem Sohn des Premierministers, das Pepsi-Cola-Franchise für Laos erworben. Die Fabrik hatte auch nach 5 Jahren noch keine einzige Flasche abgefüllt. Nguyen Thi Ly, die ältere Schwester des vietnamesischen Premiers koordinierte direkt den Export (über Pakxé und Phnom Phen, von dort mit Maschinen der Luftwaffe - Operation Haylift[4]), bis sie 1967 nach Saigon zurückkehrte. [5]

Aus einem Überfall der KMT mit 1400 Mann, Ende Juli 1967, auf eine große Opiumkarawane Khun Sas im laotischen Grenzort Ban Khwan entwickelte sich ein sechstägiges Gefecht. Der laotische General forderte beide Seiten auf, das Land zu verlassen. Als die SNA $ 500000 und die KMT $ 250000 forderten, ergriff er die Gelegenheit beim Schopf und ließ sechs Flugzeuge der Luftwaffe die Kämpfer bombardieren. Den 1800 Mann der vorrückenden laotischen Armee fielen 200 Leichen und 16 t Opium in die Hände. Rattikone stieg in den Folgejahren endgültig zum bedeutendsten Heroinproduzenten der Region auf.[6][7]

Literatur
  • Alfred McCoy: The Politics of Heroin. New York 1991 (rev. ed.; Orig. 1972); ISBN 1-55652-126-X; S 331-: General Ouane Rattikone
  • Historical Dictionary of Laos. 2. Auflage, Plymouth UK 2008, ISBN 978-0-8108-5624-0, "Ouan Rathikoun"
Einzelnachweise
  1. ↑ McCoy (1991), Foto nach S. 300
  2. ↑ Cockburn, Alexander; St. Clair, Jeffery; Whiteout; London, New York 1998, ISBN 1-85984-897-4, S 247
  3. ↑ McCoy (1991), S. 302, detaillierte Aufstellung, Fn 64
  4. ↑ New York Times, 30. August 1971, S. 1; McCoy, S. 206
  5. ↑ ganzer Abschnitt nach: McCoy (1991), S. xiv, 227f, 302-7
  6. ↑ Whiteout (1998), S 228-30
  7. ↑ McCoy (1991), S. 332f"

[Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ouane_Rattikone. -- Zugriff am 2012-02-21]

1967-07

Auf Betreiben von US-Botschafter Graham Martin [1912 - 1990] wird General Richard Giles Stilwell (1917 – 1991) als Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) abgelöst.

1967-07

Im Juli-Heft der Zeitschrift National Geographic, S. 76 - 125 erscheint ein Artikel von Peter T. White mit Fotografien von Dean Congar: Hopes and fears in booming Thailand.  National Geographic erreicht in den USA ein Millionenpublikum.


Abb.: ®Logo

1967-07

Es erscheint intern:

United States Operations Mission to Thailand: Meeting with village leaders and residents of Ban Don-Du [บ้านดอนดู่], Tambon Khwao [เขวา], Amphur Muang [อำเภอเมือง], Mahasarakam Province [มหาสารคาม], February 10, 1967. -- Bangkok : Research Division, USOM, 1967-07. -- 30 S. ; 27 cm. -- (Village changes and problems)
"[villager:] What is your purpose in coming here, and what kinds of questions are you going to ask us?

[interviewer:] We came here to study how people feel towards certain things, what people think about certain things; and we also want to study the effectiveness of certain development programs.

[villager:] I mean, tonight, what do you want to ask us about tonight? You are not going to take the names of villagers and tell the police that we are communists, are you? We would die, if you did....

[villager:] The reason that I ask you about communists is that I really want to know the reason why your research team is here, in our village. We are very much afraid of communists here; we don't know what they look like because we have never seen them. So many people have cautioned us about them. We have heard that, elsewhere, they send their agents in to recruit villagers, and sometimes they come in helicopters, to take away those whom they have recruited. If they come to take us away, in that manner, it will surely kill us, because we are opposed to communists here.

All of us are Buddhist devotees, and are of unshakable Buddhist faith.

[interviewer:] (explains to Dr. TY [Toshio Yatsushiro {1917–2015}].) He says that he doesn't even know what communists are; he has only heard about them and what they do.

[Yatsushiro:] If you don't know about communists, why are you afraid of them?"

[Zitiert in: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 138f.]

1967-07

"The liaison arrangements and groundwork for deployment of the Thai unit were completed in July. Following a liaison visit by members of the 9th US Infantry Division, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment was invited to send liaison men and observers to the 9th Division. As part of the training program in preparation for the scheduled September deployment, five groups of key men from the Thai regiment visited the 9th Infantry Division between 6 and 21 July 1967. Numbering between thirty-four and thirty-eight men, each group was composed of squad leaders, platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, company executive officers, company commanders, and selected staff officers. Each group stayed six days while the men worked with and observed their counterparts. During the period 12 to 14 July, the commander of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, accompanied by three staff officers, visited the 9th US Division headquarters."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]

1967-07-03

US-Präsident Johnson spricht mit König Bhumibol darüber, dass Thailand seine Truppenstärke in Südvietnam erhöht:

"Thailand was considered a possibility with the thought that it might come through with an additional 3-5,000 over the next six months, but it would, in Bundy's words, "take very careful handling." In fact, earlier on 3 July the President had had a conversation with the King of Thailand on just this very subject. The President had posed the problem raised for the United States by the need to respond to General Westmoreland's request for an additional 200,000 troops. He said that it would be impossible for him, President Johnson, to get support for such additional forces unless the troop-contributing allies also put in more troops on a proportional basis. Thanat [Außenminister Thanat Khoman - ถนัด คอมันตร์, 1914 - ] pointed out that when the Thai government asked for 2,500 volunteers in Vietnam, 50,000 had come forward, but the King pointed out the problem was not men willing to fight, but training and weapons. The President said that we could help with training and equipment. The problem was to get a distribution of the 200,000 which was fair and equitable. The President then asked Mr. Rostow [Nationaler Sicherheitsberater Walt Rostow,  1916 - 2003] on the basis of population how might the extra 200,000 be distributed? Rostow had replied that it came out to something like 125,000 and 75,000, with Thailand required to put up about 20,000 as its share. The King then cited three problems: the quality of recruits, to which the President had said we also had to draw on and train men of lower IQ and physical quality than we might wish; the training and equipment of additional troops and the improved equipment of the forces left behind in Thailand. The King elaborated at some length on the psychological and political problems posed by the latter element, saying it was very hard for the military to accept sending troops abroad well equipped when they themselves were lacking in modern equipment. After discussing the specific equipment, the President telephoned Secretary McNamara [Verteidigungsminister Robert McNamara, 1916 - 2009] and informed him of the King's response to which McNamara said that it would not be worth our while to train and equip a few thousand more Thais for Vietnam but if Thailand could furnish 10,000 he could guarantee their training and equipment."

[Quelle: Pentagon Papers. -- https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent10.htm. -- Zugriff am 2013-12-04]

1967-07-05

"Debate over the date of deployment of Thai troops to Vietnam arose when on 5 July the Thai government announced a plan to commit the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment against the Communist insurgents in northeast Thailand. The purpose of this move was to build up the regiment's morale and give it combat experience before it went to South Vietnam. At MACV headquarters the plan was viewed with disfavor for several reasons. An operation in northeast Thailand would delay deployment of the regiment in Vietnam from one week to two months. The additional use of the equipment would increase the probability that replacement or extensive maintenance would be necessary prior to deployment. Further, the bulk of the equipment programed for the Thai regiment had been taken from contingency stocks, thus giving the Thais priority over other Free World forces, and in some instances over US forces, in order to insure early deployment of the regiment. The Thai regiment was dependent, moreover, on the 9th Division for logistical support; therefore supplies and equipment scheduled to arrive after 15 August had been ordered to Bearcat where the 9th Division was providing storage and security. Delay in the arrival of the Thai regiment would only further complicate problems attendant in the existing arrangements. Finally, several operations had been planned around the Thai unit and delay would cause cancellation, rescheduling, and extensive replanning. Logistical, training, and operational requirements in South Vietnam had been planned in great detail to accommodate the Thai force on the agreed deployment dates, and any delay in that deployment would result in a waste of efforts and resources.

The weight of these arguments apparently had its effect, for on 27 July the Military Assistance Command, Thailand, reported that the Thai government had canceled its plans to deploy the regiment to the northeastern part of the country."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]

1967-07-06

Beginn der Einrichtung des The Infiltration Surveillance Center in Nakhon Phanom (นครพนม): "The Infiltration Surveillance Center, also known as ISC or as Task Force Alpha was the monitoring location for the sensors placed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail as part of Projects IGLOO WHITE and MUSCLE SHOALS."


Abb.: The Infiltration Surveillance Center in Nakhon Phanom (นครพนม)
[Bildquelle: USGOV. -- Public domain]

1967-07

US Soldaten auf Urlaub aus Süd-Vietnam sollen auf Wunsch der Thai-Regierung nach Australien statt nach Thailand geschickt werden. Offiziell "because of the prostitution and the decline of Thai morality", vor allem aber wohl wegen der Befürchtung von Guerilla-Anschläge auf die Urlauber. Kommunisten sollen des Betrieb eines Teils der Bordelle in US-Stützpunkten in Thailand besitzen.

1967-07-07

Eröffnung der Sarasin Bridge (สะพานสารสิน), die die Insel Phuket (เกาะภูเก็ต) mit dem Festland verbindet. Die Tourism Organisation of Thailand plant, Phuket für den Tourismus zu erschließen.


Abb.: Lage der Sarasin Bridge (สะพานสารสิน)
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Sarasin Bridge (สะพานสารสิน)
[Bildquelle: ©GoogleEarth. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-16]

 

1967-07-10

SEATO See-Übung SEA DOG vor Manila.


Abb.: Lage von Manila
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-07-10

Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen mit Deutschland. Tritt 1968-12-04 in Kraft.

1967-07-15

"The deployment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (the Queen's Cobras) to South Vietnam was divided into four phases. Acting as the regiment's quartering party, the engineer company left Bangkok by Royal Thai Navy LST on I I July 1967 and arrived at Newport Army Terminal on 15 July. After unloading its equipment the company traveled by convoy to Bearcat, where it began work on the base camp. The advance party traveled by air to Bearcat on 20 August. The main body of the Queen's Cobras Regiment arrived during the period 19-23 September 1967. The last unit to reach Vietnam was the APC platoon, which had completed its training on 25 September and was airlifted to South Vietnam on 28 November."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]

1967-07-18

Bericht des scheidenden britischen Botschafters Sir Anthony Rumbold, 10th Baronet (1911 - 1983) an das britische Außenministerium:


Abb.: Titelblatt

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

THAILAND 18 July. 1967 Section I

GOODBYE TO THAILAND

Sir Anthony Rumbold to Mr. Brown. (Received 18 July)

SUMMARY

  • The Thais are as difficult to understand as other orientals. (Paragraph 1.)
  • The domination of Bangkok. (Paragraph 2.)
  • General contentment and lethargy. (Paragraph 3.)
  • The rigid structure of society and the rules which govern it. Unwillingness to assume responsibility and endemic corruption. (Paragraphs 4-6.)
  • The country is governed by a benevolent dictatorship without a dictator. A description of some of the leading personalities. (Paragraphs 7-11.)
  • If there are constitutional developments it will be because the Thais like to be thought up to date. (Paragraph 12.)
  • Boom conditions and prospects of indefinite economic progress. (Paragraph 13.)
  • Importance of not over-estimating the terrorist movement in the north-east. (Paragraph 14.)
  • The Thais are afraid of China and although they do not like to be dependent on foreigners they will tolerate the American presence as long as they feel that it keeps danger at a distance. If the Americans let go in Viet-Nam the Thais might change course. There is not likely to be a sudden revulsion against the Americans. (Paragraphs 15-16.)
  • Our stake in Thailand is the same as that of other West European countries. Our membership of SEATO makes no difference. Our export performance could be better. (Paragraph 17.)
  • The Thai tradition of sending children to England to be educated gives us a certain advantage. The best way we can help the Thais is in the field of education. (Paragraph 18.)
  • The pleasures of living in Thailand, the virtues of the Thais and a tribute to the Embassy staff. (Paragraphs 19-20.)

Sir, 13 July, 1967.

I am on the point of leaving Bangkok after a stay of two and a half years and have the honour to set down some thoughts about Thailand which I hope may be of some interest to my successor. They are thoughts rather than convictions. There is a theory that the Thais are rather easier for Europeans to understand than are other oriental people. I do not believe this theory. It seems to me that Sino/Indian/Malay/ Thai ways of thought are so alien to ours that analogies between events in South-East Asia and events in Europe are nearly always misleading, that forecasts based on such analogies are bound to be wrong, that the motives of Asians are impossible for us to estimate with any exactness, and that Thailand and the Thais offer no exception to these precepts. The general level of intelligence of the Thais is rather low, a good deal lower than ours and much lower than that of the Chinese. But there are a few very intelligent and articulate ones and I have often tried to get some of these with whom I believe myself to be on close terms to come clean with me and to describe their national characteristics as they see them themselves and to explain why they behave in this way rather than in that way. The result has never been satisfactory. Something always seems to be held back. Perhaps I am not on such close terms with them as I think I am. Perhaps they do not expect that I will believe them or even understand them if they were to be entirely frank. It may be that they are just determined for reasons unknown to retain a last barrier of reserve. There is also a small handful of foreigners in Bangkok who have lived here for a long time and whose opinions about the Thais are worth listening to. But most of these confess to there being great areas of Thai mentality which they have long ago given up attempting to penetrate. My own thoughts about the character of the Thais and about the things they are likely to be up to next therefore have a strictly limited value.

2. There is one thing that nevertheless seems to me to be quite certain and that is that Bangkok dominates Thailand in the same way in which for centuries Paris dominated France. Events outside Thailand can obviously have an effect inside the capital and in some circumstances provincial developments might have a limited influence. But all political, economic and social changes of any importance in Thailand are the result of calculations and decisions taken by men in Bangkok and reflect the development of relationships between men or groups of men in Bangkok. There are historical reasons for this. Until recently it was the King who decided everything. It was only by being attached to the King’s court that anyone could hope to acquire influence or money. The great courtiers and officers of state lived at the capital wherever it might be. Ayudhya or Bangkok. They might be sent out to govern provinces or lead armies but although they received rewards in the form of land they never thought of living on their estates any more than did the courtiers of Louis XIV. There are no great country houses in Thailand and although the Princes of Chiengmai, Lampang and Nan still conduct a shadowy existence there is no provincial aristocracy. The Chinese merchants and money-lenders can make small fortunes in the provincial towns but if they want to get into the big league they must move into the city. There is no other city. Bangkok now has a population of 2 ½ million (it will be 6 or 7 million by 1980). The next largest town has a population of 100,000. Bangkok is the only real port for ocean-going vessels and when they build a new port they will build it near at hand. Industrial development is centred in the neighbourhood of the capital. A civil servant sent out to work in the provinces feels as if he had been exiled. Medical services in Bangkok are quite good, but in some provinces they scarcely exist at all, so reluctant are doctors and nurses to take up appointments outside the city and so small are the financial inducements to do so. There are some new provincial universities but the authorities are having great difficulty in getting them properly staffed. Bangkok sucks everything to itself. It is moreover extraordinary how little the average citizen of Bangkok knows at first hand about the rest of his country. Those who can afford to travel for pleasure go to Europe and America. Apart from occasional visits to nearby seaside resorts or to Chiengmai which has a certain snob appeal they do not dream of travelling in any other part of the country. They are simply not interested.

3. The Government is conscious of the dangers of this top-heaviness and with the help of foreign loans and advice is trying to open up the country as fast as it can. The construction of roads and the expansion of agriculture are the top priorities in its national development plans. But if we except the limited areas, chiefly in the north-east, in which years of neglect have contributed to the growth of a small and primitive Viet Cong type revolutionary movement, it is fair to say that in spite of Bangkok the peasants, who constitute more than three-quarters of the population, seem for the most part to be happy and by Asian standards prosperous. They suffer from plenty of illnesses such as tuberculosis and liver-fluke which combine with the climate in draining their energy. But there is little malnutrition except in some places, as the result of ignorance, among infants. The average peasant owns his own holding. He can grow enough rice to sell to the local Chinese middle-man, he owns a bullock or two and he is showing himself to be quite quick at learning how to grow other crops, though he is not generally very energetic or ambitious. Some of the new wealth created in the capital by industry and trade percolates down to him although he gets less than his fair share of it. He even looks better dressed than he did two years ago. New roads and irrigation schemes bring him unlooked-for benefits however slowly. He is not interested in ideas and does not care much one way or the other about what happens in Bangkok. He has a vague feeling of loyalty to the King. He is almost impervious to political propaganda. For the next few years at least the foreigner who wants to follow what is going on in Thailand had best keep his attention fixed on Bangkok. Let him by all means travel around for his own pleasure to visit some of the 40,000 villages and to see the background against which the action in Bangkok is being played out. But let him concentrate on watching the actors in the front of the stage and dismiss from his mind the idea that they may suddenly be thrust aside by the incursion of a crowd of fresh actors from the wings. I do not believe that any such thing is likely to happen, at least not in the time of my successor for whose benefit I am writing this despatch.

4. The outward aspect of Bangkok has undergone some regrettable changes during the last few years. When I caught a glimpse of it in 1955 it was a pretty place of canals and trees and scarlet-and-gold temples. It is now fast becoming one of the ugliest towns in the world, indistinguishable from the meaner parts of Tokyo or Los Angeles. But there have been no corresponding changes in the habits or attitudes of the inhabitants though there are of course many more of them. The traveller Henri Mouhot described the whole of Siamese society in the mid-19th century as being "in a state of permanent prostration, every inferior receiving his orders from his superior with signs of abject submission and respect ". This is metaphorically still true of Bangkok and in some details still literally true. But I would go so far as to make the unfashionable assertion that the most steadying feature in the body politic of Thailand, irritating and even repulsive though it may be, is precisely this sense of his place in society possessed and accepted by each and every individual. The god-like position of the King is questioned by nobody, not even by the handful of Thai exiles who compose seditious propaganda (at least not openly) Foreigners get sickened by the unctuous servility with which the local Press reports the daily doings of His Majesty; and conversely even Europeanised Thais are quick to resent any off-hand references to the King or the Queen in the foreign Press however well intentioned these may be. Below the King, very far below him, the individuals who control the nation are ranged in their respective places each one knowing exactly how he or she stands in relation to each other. These relationships are perfectly clear to the Thais themselves and are on the whole accepted as part of the natural order of things. The foreigner must not try to unravel and define them in all their complexity because the task is too difficult. The best he can do is to try to understand the general rules by which they seem to be established.

5. Since the revolution of 1932 which put an end to the absolute monarchy, though scarcely affecting the veneration owed to the monarch, proximity to the source of military power has been the most important factor in assuring influence and position. In that year there was a sort of cataclysm in the Siamese universe producing a new magnetic field and setting the stars on new courses. The shock-waves are still felt to-day although their force has diminished since the death of Field-Marshal Sarit in 1963. Money is another important factor. All Thais love money and the possession of it is regarded as a sign of virtue or merit. They call it vitamin M. The amount of it and the use made of it is of more significance in their eyes than the method by which it has been acquired. Family connections are very important. Even good birth is still a factor to be reckoned with, for weight is still given to titles and honorifics and the rules of social precedence continue to be strictly regarded. Nearly all those who have handles to their names are descended from one or other or both of the great 19th century Kings, Mongkut or his son Chulalongkorn, each of whom had about 100 children. Moreover until 1932 the State was almost entirely administered by this royal nobility with the result that the public service came to be regarded and is still regarded not just as respectable but as the most honourable of all possible careers. On great State occasions when everyone is dressed up as though he were at the court of King Babar the senior civil servants wear the same white uniforms as the courtiers and are indistinguishable from them. And the tradition of obsequiousness which might be proper or at least understandable in a royal court has been carried over into the Civil Service. Independence of mind is frowned upon and willingness to take responsibility is firmly discouraged. But the making of money by the exploitation of official position is accepted as normal provided certain understood limits are not exceeded. This has always been so and it is natural that it should continue to be so, so long as the public service confers more prestige than do other occupations and yet remains miserably paid.

6. At the end of the list of factors which determine the rules of relationship is that collection of human qualities or assets, intelligence, good education, hard work, single-mindedness and so forth which we ourselves pretend to prize. In Thailand these qualities count for a certain amount but they count for very much less than they do in Europe or America. As time goes on perhaps they will come to count for more. The affairs of the country become more complicated as it develops and the men who are called upon to regulate them have to have a certain equipment which is not necessarily possessed by a general however tough or a princeling however near the throne. Some of the top civil servants are men of ability, trained for the most part in Europe or the United States. But naturally gifted and hard-working and even honest as they may be they are still a long way from playing the part which we would think it proper for them to play. And they themselves are still too much affected by the rules which govern Thai society to claim such a part as their right or to feel any deep resentment about the handicaps under which they suffer. Many of them feel frustrated and they will talk about this frustration quite openly, but they are still a long way from contemplating any action to redress their complaints.

7. Thailand is governed by a benevolent dictatorship without a dictator. It is benevolent in the sense that it does its best according to its lights to promote the welfare of the people and that the rule of law prevails. Apart from minor changes made necessary by death or extreme old-age the composition of the Government is the same as it was four years ago. I can see no good reason for supposing that it will not be the same four years from now (though the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Industry are both getting a little doddery and the Minister of Economic Affairs may be sent abroad as an Ambassadors). The orbits in which members of this Government move are fixed by the rules to which I have referred.

8. The more important Thai leaders are worth considering individually. The one with whom I have had most to do has been the Foreign Minister, Colonel Thanat Khoman [ถนัด คอมันตร์, 1914 - ]. In spite of his prefix he is not a military man but a diplomat, the son of a judge and with Chinese blood in his veins. He is quite comfortably off and has a rich wife. He retains his position principally through the protection of the King, who began to take an interest in him a year or two ago, as well as through his unquestioned abilities. He is also on good terms with the Prime Minister. But he is vain, touchy and disputatious. Most of his colleagues in the Government dislike him for his intellectual arrogance and because he lets everybody including themselves know that he despises them. He keeps everything to himself and is beastly to his subordinates. He sees himself as the great anti-appeaser, the spiritual descendant of the opponents of Munich to the lessons of which he continually refers. Any allusion to peace talks in Viet-Nam makes him shiver. He is a strong adherent of the American alliance and supporter of American policies, though his attitude towards the United States is qualified by xenophobia and the Americans find him difficult to handle. He is a vigorous promoter of all forms of regional co-operation. I think he is ambitious and would like to be Prime Minister one day and I feel fairly confident that the King sees him in this light. But without the backing of the King, and for the time being at any rate of the Prime Minister, he would soon be cast aside. There are some who think that he has already steered his country too far away from the traditional Thai policy of non-involvement for his own future good and that retribution will one day overtake him. His obsessions about liberals , about the French and about Cambodia sometimes make one wonder whether he is altogether sane. But he is not entirely repulsive. He quite likes the British, indeed he worked with us in the war, but he regrets our present weakness and our tendency to appeasement as he sees it.

9. There are two other civilians worth mentioning who can be expected to play important parts in their country's future. One of these is Nai Pote Sarasin [พจน์ สารสิน, 1905 - 2000], a former Prime Minister and at present Minister of National Development. The other is Dr. Puey Ungpakorn [ป๋วย อึ๊งภากรณ์, 1916 - 1999], Governor of the Bank of Thailand. They are both outstandingly able and between them deserve to share most of the credit for their country’s present prosperity and for the prospects of undiminished growth which are plain for all to see. Pote who is almost pure Chinese is conventionally ambitious and would be willing to perform almost any political service which the military might ask of him. He is a very rich man but owes his position mainly to the good grace of the military and if ever some sort of political party life were to develop he might emerge as the leader of the Government party or even as Prime Minister again as the nominee of the military. Dr. Puey who incidentally has an English wife and a first-class war record is quite a different type. He is unique in seeming to owe nobody any favours. He has reached his position by sheer ability and by his well-deserved reputation for incorruptibility. The strength of the currency is his monument. He is known for his independence of mind and for his readiness even to criticise the Government in public if he really feels driven to doing so. But since he has no special link with the military and is neither well off nor well born I cannot see him succeeding to the leadership in present circumstances. He knows his place just as any other Thai does. But my successor will do well to cultivate him not only for his own sake but also because if there were some unpredictable convulsion leading to a further modification of the rules Dr. Puey might be brought forward as a sort of national saviour. He is the only individual about whom it is possible for this to be said and he must be conscious of it.

10. Brief mention must be made of Prince Dhani [พระวรวงศ์เธอ พระองค์เจ้าธานีนิวัต กรมหมื่นพิทยลาภพฤฒิยากร, 1885 - 1974], President of the Privy Council and one of the only scholars in this lowbrow country. Over 80 and of an amiability bordering on feeble-mindedness he is worth considering for what he represents. He is the guardian of arcane court lore and the regulator of royal custom and procedure. The military do not venture into the field over which he presides. They stand in awe of him without at all resenting him because he represents the royal principle which they also respect and feel the need of Prince Dhani will in due course be succeeded by some other old gentleman whose position will entitle him to the same consideration.

11. The dictatorship is embodied jointly in the two military leaders, Field-Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn [ถนอม กิตติขจร, 1911 - 2004], Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, and General Prapass Charusathiana [ประภาส จารุเสถียร, 1912 - 1997], Minister of the Interior and Commander-in-chief of the Army. The main levers of power, that is to say the army and the police, are firmly in the hands of General Prapass. But Field-Marshal Thanom has the backing of the King and enjoys a greater degree of general popularity and goodwill than does General Prapass, although the latter also has the common touch. These in simple terms are the factors that for a number of years have made it convenient to this rather ill-assorted pair to work in harness. They are quite different one from the other. Thanom is benevolent, accommodating, cautious, not spectacularly rich, very Thai in appearance and manner. Prapass is a gambler, rough and decisive, he and his wife have accumulated a fortune (though not on the Sarit [สฤษดิ์ ธนะรัชต์, 1908 - 1963]scale) and he looks and would if necessary act like a Japanese war lord. Prapass does not carry quite enough general goodwill to topple Thanom and Thanom is not quite strong enough to dispense with Prapass. Their alliance of convenience was sealed some time ago by a marriage between their children. Stories of political plots to take over the Government used before my time to form one of the main subjects of Bangkok conversation. And when I first came here there were still some going around. They are never heard now. The fact is that there is no other officer or policeman in sight who can aspire to be the rival of either of these two. And anyway the days of the coup d'etat are probably over for good. Material considerations apart anyone who attempted a coup d’etat would certainly incur the displeasure of the King as well perhaps as being deterred by the fear of arousing the ridicule of foreigners. Changes at the top can now only be made by arrangement. Both Thanom and Prapass are in good health (Prapass’ eye trouble is no worse than General de Gaulle’s) and there is no reason why the duumvirate should not continue for a long time to come. It is not a vigorous administration and there are some who regret the days of Sarit. The machine works slowly. Few decisions of importance are taken below the level of the Cabinet for the reasons I have mentioned above. The Prime Minister takes a long time to make up his mind about anything and Cabinet meetings are bywords for tedium. But for all that the system administered by Thanom and Prapass seems to suit the present requirements of Bangkok fairly well and there is no obvious substitute at hand.

12. There is at present an interim Constitution in force of an openly authoritarian character. A constituent assembly was appointed in 1959 with the task of drafting a permanent Constitution and they have been at it ever since. The official theory is that the draft will be completed in time to be presented to the King on his 40th birthday next December. If this happens then the situation in the north-east or the international situation could still be used as an excuse for postponing the elections which should in theory follow the promulgation of the Constitution by the King at an interval of six or nine months. Elections would present a problem to Thanom and Prapass. There would presumably have to be a Government party to win them but this would have first to be got going and somebody would have to be appointed its leader. Attempts have been made during the last year or so to organise some sort of party life but they have run into the sand. And Thanom, Prapass and Pote have each of them at one time or another and with a greater or lesser degree of disingenuousness disclaimed any desire to be the leader of a Government party although there is no other very obvious person who could do it. The fact is that almost nobody in Thailand is interested in the idea of party politics in the sense in which these are understood in the West. There have been political parties as well as elections in the past in Thailand but they have been artificial affairs. I have only met two Thais, one a constitutional lawyer and the other the discredited leader of the defunct " democratic party " who have shown any signs of sincerity in expressing the hope for constitutional development. Some Thais pay lip-service to the idea in the hearing of foreigners because they think it is what they ought to do. But even the rather phoney elder statesman Prince Wan who is chairman of the constitutional commission occupied with drawing up the new Constitution, although greatly enjoying the intricate arguments which accompany his work, seems not to be remotely disturbed by the thought that it may never be completed or that if completed may never be put into use. He is quite cynical in his conversation on the subject and anyway he is himself on the side of the generals. One wonders therefore what all the fuss is about. If the Thais on the whole content with the present system why do the authorities continue to bother about a new Constitution in which nobody is interested? I think it is because they feel rightly or wrongly that the outside world and in particular the Americans expect them to modernise their political institutions as they are modernising their economic and (to a much lesser extent) their social institutions. I am sure that the King feels this strongly. Moreover, neighbouring countries, including even South Viet-Nam in the middle of its war, have parliaments and elections of a kind. The Thais must feel that comparisons are being drawn by foreigners to their disadvantage. They mind a great deal about what foreigners think of them, though they resent any interference by foreigners and I am sure that the United States Government has never put any direct pressure on them in this matter. Why should it want to? The Thais of course attach great importance to forms. They might therefore genuinely feel more comfortable if it could be made to appear that they were governed in what passes for an up-to-date way even though it might not really suit them and they had no genuine desire for it. Everybody who is not a manual labourer in Bangkok now possesses and often wears a dark European-style suit and tie when white clothes or even a panung would suit local requirements much better. The move towards a Constitution and elections is a similar phenomenon.

13. If progress consists in producing and consuming more goods then the progress made by the Thais during the last few years has been spectacular and there are no signs of the pace slowing down. During the period of the last Five-year Plan just ended the average annual rate of growth has been 7 per cent. During the period of the next Five-year Plan it is expected to be 8,5 per cent. Allowing for the growth in population at the current rate of 3,3 per cent (higher than the Indian rate) the average income per capita, so the planners calculate, will go up by about 35 per cent by the end of the period. Of course this will not be evenly shared since merchants will get more than civil servants and city dwellers will get more than peasants. But most will get some of it. Not only is the output of rice expected to increase considerably but so is that of almost every other crop including even that of rubber in spite of the low price it now fetches on the world market. The relative importance of agriculture will nevertheless decline. It is expected that by 1971 the value of Thailand’s industrial output will be more than half the value of its agricultural output. Twice as many ships now call at Bangkok as did 10 years ago. The foreign currency reserves are enough to pay for 14 months' imports. The Thais have no difficulty in attracting investment from abroad and foreign businessmen and investors need have no fear of being unable to remit their profits. The International Bank has described Thailand as "the perfect debtor ".

14. Against this background of political stability in Bangkok and of unremitting economic expansion it seems to me a mistake to make much of the acts of banditry and terrorism which continue to plague the inhabitants of some limited areas in the north-east and in the south, though these are what mostly interest foreign journalists. The " subversive threat " is on a very small scale. Even Prapass in whose interest it lies to exaggerate the threat has estimated the number of " terrorists " under arms as not more than 1,300 in the whole country (population 31 million rising to 37 million in 1971). The authorities are certainly slow in reducing the threat to entirely negligible proportions as with a little more energy, better organisation and some more special equipment including in particular helicopters and communications equipment they could quite easily do. The Americans are now providing much of the equipment that is needed. But the Thai authorities are lazy, they are not used to deploying soldiers and policemen in remote areas, the rival intelligence organisations are uncoordinated and jealous of each other, and the whole thing is expensive. And so it drags on and catches the headlines whenever a village headman is murdered or a forced propaganda meeting is held in a village, and the Americans with memories of Viet-Nam in 1958 get downcast. But so long as there is no collapse of the American position in the rest of Indo-China, and so long as the trained infiltrators from China, North Viet-Nam and Laos are numbered as they now are only in handfuls, it would be absurd to get too worried about this little rash on the healthy body of Thailand. The Thai Communist Party can scarcely be said to exist and such as it is is becoming more and more vulnerable to penetration. There is no indigenous Communist menace. The regime is more likely to be troubled in years to come by the discontent which normally beset a city that grows too fast, proletarianised country-boys and educated or semi-educated unemployed. But these troubles are a long way off and will have nothing directly to do with communism or China.

15. Practically all Thais however genuinely feel menaced by China. Though they have successfully assimilated most of the Chinese in their midst their bones are chilled by the thought of this vast country almost on their doorstep outnumbering them by twenty times, soon to possess effective thermonuclear weapons and apparently gone quite mad. For as long as can be foreseen they will therefore cling to their American protectors. There is no division of opinion about the need to do this. There are only different degrees of regret that it should be necessary since it is contrary to their tradition to depend upon one ally and before the Japanese came in 1941 they had never for long willingly allowed a foreign Power to implant its presence among them. So they hope that the Americans will go away one day when the world is safer. But they are not likely to want to dispense with the American presence before that day comes, unless they decide that it attracts more perils that it averts. This they might be inclined to think if the American resolve to maintain South Viet-Nam in the American sphere of influence were to weaken. The Thais do not see their country as a forward bastion of the " free world ". They prefer to be well behind the battlements at a safe distance. They want the Americans to intensify the war in Viet-Nam and peace talk makes them nervous. Moreover the Viet-Namese are their old enemies as the Chinese are not. They are therefore quite glad to see North Viet-Nam being destroyed though they do not say so aloud. The horrors of the war do not move them. The fact that they are perpetrated by white men on Asians makes no difference. Thus I believe in the application of the domino theory to Thailand in the sense that the Thais would not willingly allow the Americans simply to fall back behind their borders. If there was any question of falling back the Thais would probably change course with alacrity and seek some new and less committed status. They would not "go Communist " whatever that means and it is quite possible that the same individuals, including even Thanat, might in such an event lead Thailand along a path very similar to the one followed by the much abused Prince Sihanouk [នរោត្តម សីហនុ, 1922 - 2012].

16. But none of this is likely to happen since the Americans are unlikely to relax their grip on Viet-Nam. Speculation on the subject is therefore perhaps rather pointless. What is more to the point is to try to estimate how long, assuming that there is no great change in circumstances outside Thailand, the Thais are going to tolerate the undoubted affront to their national self-respect represented by the presence of so many thousands of Americans sprawling all over the five great air bases, breathing down their necks in every corner of their Administration, pushing up the rents and corrupting the girls. There has been a faint murmur about this ever since I have been here and it has grown a little louder lately. In the course of their history the Thais have more than once suddenly rounded on the presumptuous foreigner. The idea of Thais being always gentle and patient is only valid up to a point. They are given to explosions of anger and the most appalling crimes of violence are recorded daily in the Press. My French colleague who has been here for eight years expects a sudden revulsion against the Americans at any moment. It is true that it was only with extreme reluctance that the Thai Government recently acknowledged what everyone knew about the use being made by the Americans of Thai bases for bombing Viet-Nam and that this was because it disliked admitting that the Americans were using Thai soil as a convenience and because it did not wish the record of its involvement with the Americans to be unambiguously clear. But I think M. Clarac’s [Achille Clarac, 1903 - 1999] judgment is due to wishful thinking. My own view is that the Thais will tolerate the American presence in its existing form for just as long as it seems necessary to keep the Chinese and Viet-Namese enemies as far away from Thailand as possible.

[...]

18. One of our assets here is that a large proportion of the ruling class has been educated in England. The tradition of English education goes back a long way and shows few signs of declining. The King is having his only son educated in England because he believes strongly that all Thai youth is in need of the kind of discipline which only our schools can provide. In terms of actual numbers more Thais now go to the United States than to England mainly because there is more money available for scholarships. But most Thais would send their children to England for preference.

[...]

19. I have very much enjoyed living for a while in Thailand. One would have to be very insensitive or puritanical to take the view that the Thais had nothing to offer. It is true that they have no literature, no painting and only a very odd kind of music, that their sculpture, their ceramics and their dancing are borrowed from others and that their architecture is monotonous and their interior decoration hideous. Nobody can deny that gambling and golf are the chief pleasures of the rich and that licentiousness is the main pleasure of them all. But it does a faded European good to spend some time among such a jolly, extrovert and antiintellectual people. And if anybody wants to know what their culture consists of the answer is that it consists of themselves, their excellent manners, their fastidious habits, their graceful gestures and their elegant persons. If we are elephants and oxen they are gazelles and butterflies. On the other hand I am glad not to be staying here longer because I am certain that the deterioration in my mental processes is due not only to the onset of old age but more particularly to the enervating effects of the climate which no amount of exercise and air-conditioning can nullify.

[...]

21. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Vientiane and to the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief Far East at Singapore.

I have, &c.

A. RUMBOLD."

[Quelle: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/radio4/transcripts/Sir-Anthony-Rumbold.pdf. -- Zugriff am 2013-11-17] 

1967-07-26

Der Boxer Chartchai Chionoi (ชาติชาย เชี่ยวน้อย, 1942 - ) erkämpft sich den Weltmeistertitel im Fliegengewicht. Unter den 35.000 Zuschauern sind König Bhumibol und Prinz Vajiralongkorn.


Abb.: Chartchai Chionoi (ชาติชาย เชี่ยวน้อย), ca. 2008
[Bildquelle: Scott Mallon / Far East Photos / Wikipedia. -- GNU FDLicense]

"Chartchai Chionoi a.k.a. Chartchai Laemfapha (Thai: ชาติชาย เชี่ยวน้อย; born October 10, 1942 in Pathum Wan (ปทุมวัน) District Bangkok, Thailand as Naris Chionoi) is a former professional Thai boxer and WBC World champion in Flyweight division.

Professional career

Chartchai Chionoi was the second ever World Champion from Thailand, following his Idol Pone Kingpetch (โผน กิ่งเพชร). Unlike most Thai fighters, Chartchai was never involved in Muay Thai (มวยไทย) unlike so many other professional boxers from Thailand.

Chartchai Chionoi turned pro on March 27, 1959 with a second round knockout victory over Somsak Kritsanasuwan. Chionoi would go 7-0-1 in his first 8 pro fights, a 6 round draw against Sala Kampuch the only blemish. In his 9th professional fight, Chionoi would lose a 6 round decision to Singtong Por Tor, Chionoi would avenge this lose 5 years later with a 10 round decision victory.

Chartchai travelled to Japan for his next 11 fights, going 8 and 3 in the process. All three of his loses were by 10 round decision, including a loss at the hands of the reigning OPBF Jr. Featherweight Champion Haruo Sakamoto. The other two fighters that defeat Chionoi during this time, Mitsunori Seki and Akira Oguchi, would go on to lose rematches to Chionoi in the future.

After fighting in Japan for a year, Chionoi returned to his native Thailand for his next 4 fights, winning 3 of 4, his only loss to Ernesto Miranda would later by avenged.

On September 22, 1962 in Quezon City in the Philippines, Chionoi would face Primo Famiro for the vacant OPBF Flyweight Title. Chionoi decisioned Famiro over 12 rounds to capture the vacant title. In July of the following year, Chionoi would lose the OPBF Flyweight Title in his first defence, dropping a decision to Tsuyoshi Nakamura in Osaka, Japan. Nakamura would go on to make 10 successful defences of the OPBF Title, before finally losing it in October 1969.

Chartchai Chionoi would go 19-2-1 over the next three years to earn his first World Title shot. During that stretch Chionoi won a 10 round decision over former WBA & WBC Flyweight Champion Salvatore Burruni. Burruni had captured his World Title's by defeating Chionoi's predecessor Pone Kingpetch in April 1965.

On December 30, 1966 Chartchai Chionoi challenged WBC Flyweight Champion Walter McGowan. Chionoi would stop McGowan in the 9th round to capture his first World Title. Chionoi would make four successful title defences during this first reign as champion, including victories over McGowan in their rematch, Efren Torres and future WBA Flyweight Champion Bernabe Villacampo.

On February 23, 1969 Chionoi would lose his title to Efren Torres in a rematch. The fight was stopped in the 8th round because Chionoi's left eye had swollen shut. Chionoi would win two out of three fights to earn a rematch with Efren Torres. In March 1970 in front of over 40,000 of his countrymen, Chionoi would win a 15 round unanimous decision over Torres in their rubber match, to once again claim the WBC Flyweight Title. Chionoi won by scores of 148-142, 147-144 and 145-141. The second title reign of Chartchai Chionoi would be short lived, in his first title defence Chionoi would be knocked out by Erbito Salavarria in the second round. Salavarria would go on to make several successful title defences before losing the WBC Flyweight Title, he would later reign as WBA Flyweight Champion as well.

Undeterred by losing the WBC Flyweight Title for a second time, Chionoi would go undefeated in his next 6 fights to secure a title shot against long time WBA Flyweight Champion Masao Ohba (大場 政夫). On January 2, 1973 Chionoi would face off against Ohba in a very memorable fight. Chionoi put Ohba on the canvas early, but the champion would rebound and stop Chionoi in the 12th round. Tragically Ohba would die in an auto accident 22 days after this fight. As a result of this tragic event, Chionoi would be paired against Fritz Chervet in May 1973 for the vacant title. Chionoi would knock out Chervet in the 5th round to capture his third World Flyweight Title.

Two successful defences of his WBA Flyweight Title would follow, before Chionoi would lose his title on the scales in October 1974. Despite being stripped of the title, Chartchai Chionoi would still fight Susumu Hanagata in a fight that was for the vacant WBA Flyweight Title, at least on Hanagata's part. Susumu Hanagata would stop Chionoi in the 6th round to walk away the WBA Flyweight Champion.

After losing his third World title, Chionoi would win a 10 round decision over Willie Asuncion, then suffer a knockout loss to Rodolfo Francis in August 1975. Chartchai Chionoi would retire from boxing after the loss to Francis, finishing with a career record of 61-18-3 (36).

 Retirement

Chionoi is now living a very comfortable life in retirement with his wife of over 45 years Oot, spending as much time as possible with their four children. Despite some lasting ill effects from his years as a boxer, Chionoi only has fond memories of his career, and lives with no regrets."

[Quelle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chartchai_Chionoi. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-16]

1967-08

Die USA setzen im Vietnamkrieg erstmals den Kampfhubschrauber Bell AH-1 Cobra ein. Bisher waren nur zu Kampfhubschraubern umgebaute Transporthubschrauber im Einsatz gewesen.


Abb.: Ein Bell AH-1 Cobra feuert Rakten über Südvietnam ab
[Bildquelle: US Military / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

1967-08 - 1971-03

Hans-Ulrich Scheske ist deutscher Botschafter in Thailand.

1967-08-02 - 1967-08-04

Der Präsident der Republik Malawi (Dziko la Malaŵi), Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda (gest. 1997), ist auf Staatsbesuch in Thailand.


Abb.: Lage von Malawi
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Denkmal für Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Lilongwe, 2009
[Bildquelle: Dr. Sonntag / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

1967-08-08

In Bangkok Gründung der ASEAN durch die Außenminister von


Abb.: Gründungsmitglieder der ASEAN
[Bildquelle: CIA. -- Public domain]

"Der Verband Südostasiatischer Nationen, kurz ASEAN (von engl. Association of Southeast Asian Nations), ist eine internationale Organisation südostasiatischer Staaten mit Sitz in Jakarta (Indonesien). Jedes Jahr im November findet ein Gipfeltreffen der ASEAN-Staaten statt.

Das ursprüngliche Ziel war die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen, politischen und sozialen Zusammenarbeit. Daneben traten später auch Sicherheits-, Kultur- und Umweltfragen. Im September 2009 beschlossen die Staats- und Regierungschefs der ASEAN-Mitglieder, einen gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraum nach europäischem Vorbild zu gründen.[2]

Im Laufe der Jahre wurden weitere Organisationen gegründet: das ASEAN-Regionalforum (ARF) für Sicherheitsfragen, die ASEAN-Freihandelszone (AFTA) zur Förderung des Handels, das ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) zur Förderung gegenseitiger Direktinvestitionen und andere mehr.

Vorläufer der ASEAN war die ASA (1961-1967).

Mitgliedstaaten [Bearbeiten]

Die ASEAN wurde 1967 von Thailand, Indonesien, Malaysia, den Philippinen und Singapur gegründet. Ziel war die Förderung des wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs, des sozialen Fortschritts und der politischen Stabilität. Erfolge der wirtschaftlichen Öffnungspolitik zeigten sich bald und so zählen die Mitgliedsländer heute zum Teil zu den sogenannten Tigerstaaten und Pantherstaaten.

Seit 1984 ist auch das Sultanat Brunei Mitglied. In den Neunziger Jahren kamen Vietnam (1995), Myanmar und Laos (1997) sowie Kambodscha (1999) dazu. Papua-Neuguinea hat seit 1984 den Status eines Beobachters. Osttimor, ebenfalls mit Beobachterstatus, hat 2006 einen Antrag auf Mitgliedschaft gestellt.[3][4]

Heute hat die ASEAN zehn Mitgliedstaaten mit rund 575 Millionen[1] Menschen (ca. acht Prozent der Weltbevölkerung). Im Jahre 2007 lag das gemeinsame Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) bei rund 1200 Milliarden[1] US-Dollar. Die durchschnittliche Zuwachsrate des Bruttoinlandsprodukts liegt bei vier Prozent pro Jahr (2003).

Geschichte und Verträge [Bearbeiten]

Die Gründung am 8. August 1967 in Bangkok war der erste außenpolitische Erfolg des damals neuen indonesischen Staatspräsidenten Suharto. Die ASEAN war eine Reaktion auf den Vietnamkrieg (1964–1975) und von Anfang an klar gegen den Ostblock und gegen die kommunistische Volksrepublik China angelegt. Die Präambel der Bangkoker Erklärung kann folgendermaßen zusammengefasst werden: "... die Staaten Südostasiens teilen eine grundlegende Verantwortung für die Stärkung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Stabilität der Region und für die Sicherung friedlicher Entwicklung der Länder, und sie sind entschlossen, ihre Stabilität und Sicherheit gegen äußere Einflüsse jeder Art oder Propaganda zu sichern..."[5].

Die 1954 gegründete SEATO (engl. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), ein Militärbündnis für den südostasiatischen Raum, erfüllte die von den USA gehegten Erwartungen kaum und führte bald nur noch eine Scheinexistenz, bis er 1977 aufgelöst wurde.[6] Der 1966 gegründete ASPAC (engl. Asian and Pacific Council) mit südost- und ostasiatischen Ländern sowie Australien und Neuseeland hatte kaum Auswirkungen und wurde 1973 wieder aufgelöst.

In den ersten Jahren war sie eher ein Ort des informellen Austausches, erst später kam ihr eine aktivere Rolle zu.

1971 gründete ASEAN die „Zone des Friedens, der Freiheit und der Neutralität“ (ZOPFAN). Der erste Bali-Gipfel stand unter dem Eindruck des Erfolges kommunistischer Gruppen in Südostasien. Es war daher wichtig, Solidarität und kollektives Bewusstsein zu zeigen, gerade nachdem ASEAN es über zehn Jahre nicht über wenig überzeugende Forderungen nach wirtschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Zusammenarbeit hinausgebracht hatte. Auf dem Gipfel wurde das ASEAN-Sekretariat (in Jakarta) eingerichtet und der „Vertrag über Freundschaft und Zusammenarbeit“ (TAC) geschlossen, der gegenseitige Konsultationen in Streitfragen vorsieht und eine gewisse Öffnung für weitere Staaten der Region bedeutete. Dies stellte ein Angebot an die revolutionären Staaten, wie Vietnam, dar, sich gemäß dem Völkerrecht zu verhalten. Anfangs fand der Vertrag wenig Interesse und erst, nachdem der Kalte Krieg überwunden war, bekundeten Staaten, wie Vietnam und Laos Interesse an einer Zusammenarbeit. In einer "Erklärung zur Eintracht von ASEAN" wurde als Ziel festgestellt, die Stabilität in den Mitgliedsländern und in Südostasien zu fördern, womit ZOPFAN erneut bestätigt wurde[7].

Mit dem Zusammenbruch des Ostblocks kam auch in Südostasien Bewegung in die erstarrte Situation. Ab 1986 führte Vietnam wirtschaftliche Reformen ein. 1995 bis 1999 wurden Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos und Kambodscha in ASEAN aufgenommen.

1994 wurde das ASEAN-Regionalforum (ARF) eingerichtet, in dem Sicherheitsfragen diskutiert werden sollen. Auf dem Bangkok-Gipfel im Dezember 1995 wurde beschlossen, bis 2003 die ASEAN-Freihandelszone (AFTA) einzurichten.

Am 15. Dezember 1995 wurde der „Vertrag über eine Atomwaffenfreie Zone in Südostasien“ (SEANWFZ) unterzeichnet. 2001 trat er nach der Unterschrift der Philippinen endgültig in Kraft.[8]

1997 wurden die ASEAN-Staaten schwer von der asiatischen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise getroffen. Die Bewältigung dieser Krise war Hauptthema des 6. Gipfels am 15. und 16. Dezember 1998 in Hanoi (Vietnam), auf dem auch beschlossen wurde, die Einrichtung der Freihandelszone AFTA zu beschleunigen.

2002 wurde ein Vertrag zur „Kontrolle der Luftverschmutzung in Südostasien“ geschlossen.[9] Kurz darauf kam es 2005 in Malaysia und 2006 in ganz Südostasien zum Ausbruch ausgedehnter Waldbrände mit enormer Luftverschmutzung.

Bei ihrem Treffen 2003 in Bali betonte die ASEAN, dass die Demokratie Frieden und Stabilität in der Region stärke. Auch die nicht-demokratischen Staaten stimmten zu.[10]

Der 10. Gipfel am 29. und 30. November 2004 in Vientiane (Laos) beschäftigte sich mit dem steigenden Ölpreis und den Gefahren des Terrorismus. Die Bedeutung der „Vision 2020“ wurde bekräftigt, die eine Entwicklung der ASEAN in Richtung der EU bis 2020 vorsieht.

Die ASEAN beschloss 2005 ein Netzwerk zum Schutz der Wildtiere[11] und eine Asien-Pazifik-Partnerschaft für saubere Entwicklung und Klima (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate).

2006 erhielt die ASEAN den Beobachterstatus bei der Vollversammlung der Vereinten Nationen (UN).[12]

Im November 2007 einigte sich die ASEAN auf den Entwurf einer grundlegenden Charta, die die einzelnen Mitgliederstaaten zur Wahrung von Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechten verpflichtet. Atomwaffen sind danach im ASEAN-Gebiet verboten. Am Prinzip der Nichteinmischung in die Angelegenheiten der anderen Mitglieder wird festgehalten. Diese Neutralität wurde im Fall von blutig niedergeschlagenen Demonstrationen in Myanmar heftig kritisiert.[13] Am 20. November 2007 wurde die Charta auf dem ASEAN-Gipfel in Singapur verabschiedet.[14]"

[Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asean. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-10]

1967-08-11

Leonard S. Unger (1917 - 2010) ist US-Botschafter in Thailand.

1967-08-11

Von Takhli (ตาคลี) aus fliegende F-105 Thunderchief US-Bomber bombardieren mit 3.000-Pfund-Bomben Ziele in Hanoi und Haiphong.


Abb.: Lage von Thakli, Hanoi, Haiphong
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: US-F-105 Thunderchiefs, dirigiert von einem B-66 Destroye,  bombardieren Nordvietnam, 1966-06-14
[Bildquelle: Lt. Col. Cecil J. Poss, 20th TRS on RF-101C, USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

1967-08-16

Thailands "Vater der modernen Landwirtschaft", Sithiporn Kridakara (สิทธิพร กฤดากร, 1883-1971) erhält in Manila den 1967 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public Service.


Abb.: ®Ramon Magsaysay Award
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia. -- Fair use]


Abb.: Lage von Manila
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Briefmarke zum 100. Geburtstag, 1983

"Progress in all countries, particularly the less developed, depends substantially upon examples set by traditional leaders; unless they show the way, change by ordinary farmers becomes doubly difficult. So often in Asia hereditary elite are content with the old order or simply leave the land to join the new urbanites. Mom Chao SITHIPORN, instead, chose to leave high position, devoting his life and fortune to introducing agricultural methods new to the then Kingdom of Siam.

A grandson of King Mongkut and nephew of King Chulalongkorn, Mom Chao SITHIPORN grew up at a time when these vigorous monarchs were opening Thailand to foreign contact. Sent to England for schooling, he studied engineering. Upon return to Bangkok he first engaged in private business and later joined the civil service, rising in 13 years to the highest rank.

To relieve the routine of his official position he began to study agriculture. Increasingly convinced that other crops than rice should be encouraged, he decided to engage in farming. Also, he had married a noble lady reared in the Royal Household and felt her frail health could only be remedied by life in the open. Family opposition was overcome when his cousin, King Vajiravadh, gave the couple permission to leave and make their own life.

At Bangberd (บางเบิด), some 400 kilometers south of Bangkok, Mom Chao SITHIPORN in 1921 acquired 40 hectares of uncultivated upland and set out to prove with scientific management that a farm could be both a place to produce and to live. Contouring, terracing, and green manuring of fields and interplanting of crops were first seen in Thailand on his farm. Watermelons, flue-cured Virginia tobacco and improved corn—now Thailand's third largest export—were among the new crops he promoted, demonstrating use of fertilizer and insecticides. The earliest Thai advocate of diversified farming, he was the first to breed and sell purebred swine and, with imported strains of high-yielding layers, to set up a commercial poultry operation. In his garden were vegetable-s uncommon to his country. His wife applied modern methods of preserving food. On no Thai farm before had records and cost accounts been kept. Experimenting with Thailand's first tractor and many other laborsaving devices, he was his own mechanic.

Educator and researcher more than simple farmer, he helped neighbors follow his practices and offered his seeds. Young agriculturists in government became his ardent admirers. To share more widely his findings he founded Kasikorn, still the only agricultural journal in Thailand. Associates in this venture were graduates of the College of Agriculture at Los Baños in the Philippines.

Recalled to Bangkok in 1932, Mom Chao SITHIPORN served briefly as Director General of the Department of Agriculture. A lasting contribution was establishment of the first three upland experiment stations. Deposed by the coup d'état ending absolute monarchy and imprisoned as a Royalist, he was incarcerated mainly on Taratao Island (ตะรุเตา) for 11 years. For fellow inmates he gave lectures on upland farming which were later incorporated in a book. Released near the end of World War II, he was elected to Parliament from his home province and served as Minister of Agriculture for a short period until he was again deposed by a coup. A notable achievement was his vigorous attack on rinderpest. As head of the Thai delegation, he was elected Chairman of the FAO Rice Commission for three successive sessions.

His fortune exhausted but his spirit unbroken, Mom Chao SITHIPORN and his wife returned to reopen their Bangberd farm. Finding it more than they could manage, it was sold in 1960 and a two hectare plot purchased near Hua Hin (หัวหิน). There the Prince continues to grow vegetables, grapes and other fruits. Now 84 years of age, he maintains an active correspondence with agriculturists. In articles to newspapers, he vigorously defends the interests of Thai farmers, critically challenging government policies with the pragmatism of a man who knows the soil.

In electing His Serene Highness, Prince SITHIPORN KRIDAKARA to receive the 1967 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public Service, the Board of Trustees recognizes his nearly half a century of pioneering experimentation and education devoted to advancement of Thai agriculture."

[Quelle: http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Citation/CitationKridakaraSit.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-16]

1967-08-30

Feierliche Verabschiedung auf dem Sanam Luang (สนามหลวง) in Bangkok von 1760 Freiwilligen für den Krieg in Vietnam.


Abb.: Lage des Sanam Luang (สนามหลวง)
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-09

Zur Rettung abgeschossner Flugzeuge der Bomberschwadrone nach Nordvietnam wird in Udorn das 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (40th ARRS) der USA stationiert. Es ist ausgestattet mit Sikorsky H-3 Sea King-Hubschraubern “Jolly Green Giants” bzw "Nitnoy" (นิดน้อย).


Abb.: Rettung eines angeschossenen Flugzeugpiloten über Vietnam durch einen Sikorsky H-3 Sea King-Hubschrauber, 1966
[Bildquelle: USAF / Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

1967-09-01

In Thailand werden 37 Personen festgenommen, die in Verdacht stehen, der Communist Party of Thailand (พรรคคอมมิวนิสต์แห่งประเทศไทย) anzugehören. Sie erwartet die Todesstrafe. Die meisten Festnahmen erfolgen in Bangkok, einige auch in Nordwestthailand.

1967-09-01

In Malaysia tritt das Sprachengesetz in Kraft. Danach ist Bahasa Malaysia (1967 - 1969, 1986 - 2007: Bahasa Melayu) die einzige Amts- und Nationalsprache Malaysias.


Abb.: Unterschiede zwischen Bahasa Malaysia und Bahasa Indonesia
[Bildquelle: https://www.facebook.com/ASEANCommunity/app_121671131257803?filter=1. -- Zugriff am 1014-04-02. -- Fair use]

1967-09-07

Operational Policy 110 zur Koordination von Village Security Teams (VST) und gemeinsamen Operationen von Volunteer Defence Corps (Or Sor) (อส. = กองอาสารักษาดินแดน) und lokalen Milizen (Village Security and Development Plan).

1967-09-08

Der König eröffnet das neue SEATO-Hauptquartier in der Si Ayutthaya Road (ถนนศรีอยุธยา) in Bangkok.


Abb.: Lage der Si Ayutthaya Road (ถนนศรีอยุธยา)
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: SEATO-Hauptquartier, 1967

1967-09-08

"Even before all elements of the Royal Thai Volunteer Regiment had arrived in Vietnam, efforts were being made to increase again the size of the Thai contribution. By mid-1967 the Thai government had unilaterally begun consideration of the deployment of additional forces to South Vietnam. On 8 September the Thai government submitted a request for extensive military assistance to the American Embassy at Bangkok. Specific items in the request were related directly to the provision of an additional army force for South Vietnam. The Thai Prime Minister proposed a one-brigade group at a strength of 10,800 men. This organization was to be composed of three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, one engineer battalion, and other supporting units as required.

In an apparently related move, meanwhile, the chairman of the joint Chiefs had requested the joint General Staff to assess the Thai military situation. This assessment was to include a review of the security situation in Thailand, the military organization, and the ability of the Thais to send additional troops to South Vietnam. In turn the joint General Staff asked for the views of the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, not later than 20 September 1967 concerning Thai capability. The Joint Staff wished to know how long it would take the Thai government to provide the following troop levels, including necessary supporting troops, to Vietnam: 5,000 troops (approximately two infantry battalions, reinforced); 15,000 troops (approximately four infantry battalions, reinforced); 20,000 or more troops (approximately eight infantry battalions, reinforced, or more). The staff also wanted to know the effect that furnishing troops at each level would have on Thai internal security.

The commander of the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, Major General Hal D. McCown, concluded that the Royal Thai Army could provide a 5,000-man force without incurring an unacceptable risk to Thailand's internal security. He also believed it possible for Thailand to deploy a 10,000-man (two-brigade) force, but the organization, training, and deployment had to be incremental to allow the Royal Thai Army to recover from the deployment of one brigade. In addition, he held that it was impractical to attempt to raise a force of 15,000 or larger because of the probable attrition of the training base. In forming the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, the Thai Army had drawn 97 percent of its men from existing units, despite the talk of maximizing the use of volunteers. There was every indication that it would follow the same pattern in providing additional forces to South Vietnam. Such a draw-down by the Royal Thai Army of its limited number of trained men was acceptable for a force of 5,000 and marginally acceptable for 10,000, but unacceptable for a force greater than 10,000.

With these comments as a basis, Admiral Sharp went back to the joint Chiefs with his recommendation, which stated:

Present negotiations with the Thais have centered around a deployment of a total 10,000 man force. CINCPAC concurs that this is probably the largest force the Thais could provide without incurring an unacceptable sacrifice in the trained base of the Thai Army and accepting more than undue risk insofar as the Thais' ability to effectively counter the present insurgency.

Concurrently, General Westmoreland was being queried on the ability of the United States to support the various troop levels under consideration. In making this appraisal he assumed that MACV would have to provide maintenance support for all new equipment not in the Thai Army inventory and all backup support above division and brigade level, including direct support units. Other maintenance requirements, such as organic support, including supply distribution, transportation, and service functions, the Thais would handle. In considering the various force levels he envisioned a brigade-size force (5,000 men) that would be attached to a US division for support. As such, the support command of the parent US division would require a minimum augmentation of 50 men to provide for the additional maintenance requirements. Attaching a force of 10,000 men or more to a US division would be impractical. A US support battalion-approximately 600 men, including a headquarters company, a maintenance and support company, a reinforced medical company, and a transportation truck company- would be required for direct support of a Thai force of that size. A Thai force of 15,000 to 20,000 would also need a special support command, including a headquarters company, a medical company, a supply and transport company, and a division maintenance battalion. The estimated strength of this command would be 1,000 to 1,200 men, requiring an increase in general support troops.

At that time there were no US combat service support units available in Vietnam to meet such requirements. Alternate methods for obtaining additional support units were to readjust forces within approved force ceilings, to increase civilian substitution in military spaces, or to increase the US force ceiling. Any attempt to provide logistical support for the Thai forces within the existing troop ceiling would have to be at the expense of US combat troops. Thus, General Westmoreland considered an increase in the US force ceiling the only practical course of action."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]

1967-09-18

Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen mit der Dominikanischen Republik (República Dominicana).


Abb.: Lage der Dominikanische Republik
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-09-25

Abschluss der Verhandlungen über den erleichterten Transit durch Thailand von für Laos bestimmten Gütern.


Abb.: Transitwege durch Thailand nach Laos 1970
[Bildquelle: CIA. -- Public domain]

1967-09-26

Der Ministerpräsident von Japan, Eisaku Satō (佐藤 榮作, 1901 - 1975), mit Gattin Hiroko Satō kommt zu einem dreitägigen offiziellen Besuch nach Thailand.


Abb.: Japan
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Eisaku Satō (佐藤 榮作), 1965
[Bildquelle: Юрий Сомов / RIA Novosti archive, image #68289 / Wikimedia. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]
 

1967-09-26

Japan unterschreibt die "Blutschuld-Verträge": Japan will Malaysia und Singapur Wiedergutmachung leisten für deren Verluste unter japanischer Besatzung im Zweiten weltkrieg.

1967-10

Die Armee (Second Army - กองทัพภาคที่ 2) reißt putschartig die Kontrolle über alle Counterinsurgency-Tätigkeiten in Nordostthailand an sich, auch die von Polizei und Zivilverwaltung.

1967-10-01

"Following a series of small unilateral and larger combined operations with Vietnamese units, the Thai regiment launched Operation NARASUAN in October 1967. In this, their first large-scale separate operation, the Thai troops assisted in the pacification of the Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province and killed 145 of the enemy. The Thai soldier was found to be a resourceful and determined fighting man who displayed a great deal of pride in his profession. In addition to participating in combat operations, the Thai units were especially active in civic action projects within their area of responsibility. During Operation NARASUAN the Thais built a hospital, constructed 48 kilometers of new roads, and treated nearly 49,000 civilian patients through their medical units."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]


Abb.: Lage des Nhon Trach (Nhơn Trạch) District
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: "Soldiers of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (Queen's Cobras) conduct a search and sweep mission in Phuoc Tho.
[Bildquelle: National Archives. -- Public domain]

1967-10-07

Die Leichen der ersten zwei im Vietnamkrieg gefallenen Soldaten kehren heim.

1967-10-12

Frankreich: Premiere des Episodenfilms Loin du Vietnam (Fern von Vietnam)  von Joris Ivens (1898 - 1989, Niederlande), Claude Lelouch (1937 - ), Alain Resnais (1922 - ), Agnès Varda (1928 - ), Chris Marker (1921 - 2012), Jean-Luc Godard (1930 - ; alle Frankreich), William Klein (1928 - ; USA)


Abb.: ©Plakat
[Fair use]

1967-10-20

Eröffnung einer Telefonfernverbindung Thailand - Laos.

1967-10-21

Washington (DC): 50.000 Demonstranten marschieren zum Pentagon und rufen u.a. "Hey, hey LBJ [Präsident Lyndon Baines Johnson], how many kids did you kill today!"

1967-10-22

Ein Oberstleutnant der Thaiarmee investiert über 100.000 Baht, um in den USA zu beweisen, dass der Mensch eine Seele hat. Es misslingt ihm (und über 100 anderen). Wäre es ihm gelungen, hätte er nach dem Willen des früheren Besitzers, einen Gutshof in den USA im Wert von $230.000 als Preis erhalten.

1967-10-29

Der Generalgouverneur von Neuseeland, Sir Bernard Edward Fergusson, KT, GCMG, GCVO, DSO, OBE (1911 – 1980), mit Gattin sind Staatsgäste in Thailand.


Abb.: Lage von Neuseeland
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]


Abb.: Der Generalgouverneur von Neuseeland, Sir Bernard Edward Fergusson, KT, GCMG, GCVO, DSO, OBE
[Bildquelle: Courtesy of Horowhenua Historical Society / Wikipedia. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-11

James Dalton, Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) Adviser: The relationship of economic development to couterinsurgency:

"There is virtually no evidence available to support the commonly accepted theory that economic development can counter an insurgency....

The notion that one ought to attempt to satisfy the villagers’ expectations is probably sound, but are we justified in assuming that those expectations are primarily economic? I believe that the Thai villager is looking for a measure of security, of which economic security is just one aspect and is not necessarily at the top of the list."

[Zitiert in: Randolph, R. Sean: The United States and Thailand : alliance dynamics, 1950-1985. -- Berkeley : Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986. -- 245 S. ; 23 cm. -- (Research papers and policy studies, 12). -- ISBN 0-912966-92-0. -- S. 115]

1967-11-01 - 1967-11-05

In Bangkok findet erstmals die Multisportveranstaltung Thailand National Games (กีฬาแห่งชาติ) statt

1967-11-03

"In response to a request by Major General Hirunsiri Cholard, Director of Operations, Royal Thai Army, and with the backing of the American Ambassador in Bangkok, Graham Martin, bilateral discussions began on 3 November 1967 concerning the organization for the Thai add-on force. General Westmoreland gave the following guidance. The missions assigned to the force would be the same type as the missions being assigned to the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment. The area of employment would be generally the same. Reconnaissance elements should be heavy on long-range reconnaissance patrolling. Because of terrain limitations the units should not have tanks. Armored personnel carriers should be limited to the number required to lift the rifle elements of four rifle companies and should not exceed forty-eight. The use of organic medium artillery should be considered; 4.2-inch mortars are not recommended. An organic signal company should be included. The force should consist of at least six battalions of infantry with four companies each. There should be no organic airmobile companies; support will be provided by US aviation units. There should be one engineer company per brigade.

General Westmoreland's interest in whether the force would be two separate brigades or a single force was also brought up in the discussion that followed. On this point General Cholard replied that the guidance from his superiors was emphatic-the force should be a single self-sufficient force with one commander."

1967-11-08

Jacqueline Kennedy (1929 - 1994), Witwe des US-Präsidenten John F. Kennedy (1917 - 1963), macht einen dreitägigen Besuch Bangkoks als Gast von Ministerpräsident Thanom. Sie wird vom Königspaar mit einer Party geehrt.


Abb.: Jacqueline Kennedy
[Bildquelle: Wikimedia. -- Public domain]

1967-11-09

"The US Ambassador to Thailand, Mr. Martin, established additional guidelines. On 9 November 1967 he advised the Thai government by letter of the action the US government was prepared to take to assist in the deployment of additional Thai troops to South Vietnam and to improve the capability of the Royal Thai armed forces in Thailand. In substance the United States agreed to
  • Fully equip and provide logistical support for the forces going to South Vietnam. The equipment would be retained by the Royal Thai government upon final withdrawal of Thai forces from South Vietnam.
  • Assume the cost of overseas allowance at the rates now paid by the US government to the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment in South Vietnam.
  • Provide equipment and consumables for rotational training in an amount sufficient to meet the agreed requirements of forces in training for deployment; and undertake the repair and rehabilitation of facilities required for such rotational training. The equipment would be retained by the Royal Thai government following the final withdrawal of Thai forces from South Vietnam.
  • Assume additional costs associated with the preparation, training, maintenance, equipment transportation, supply and mustering out of the additional forces to be sent to South Vietnam.
  • Assist in maintaining the capability and in accelerating the modernization of the Royal Thai armed forces-including the additional helicopters and other key items-as well as increase to $75 million both the Military Assistance Program for fiscal year 1968 and the program planning for 1969.
  • Deploy to Thailand a Hawk battery manned by US personnel to participate in the training of Thai troops to man the battery. Provide the Thai government with equipment for the battery and assume certain costs associated with the battery's deployment.

Further discussion between US Military Assistance Command representatives of Vietnam and Thailand set a force size between 10,598 and 12,200 for consideration. As a result of suggestions from the commander of the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, General McCown, and General Westmoreland, the Thai representatives began to refer to the add-on force as a division. The Royal Thai Army asked for the following revisions to the US concept for the organization of the division: add a division artillery headquarters; revise the reconnaissance squadron to consist of three platoons of mechanized troops and one long-range reconnaissance platoon (the US concept was one mechanized troop and two reconnaissance platoons); add one antiaircraft battalion with eighteen M42's, organized for a ground security role; add a separate replacement company, which would carry the 5 percent overstrength of the division; upgrade the medical unit from a company to a battalion; and upgrade the support unit from a battalion to a group.

The last two requests were designed to upgrade ranks. General Westmoreland had two exceptions to the proposed revisions: first, three mechanized troops were acceptable but the total number of APC's should not exceed forty-eight; and second, MACV would provide the antiaircraft ground security support through each field force. The M42's would not be authorized.

As the conference in Bangkok continued, general agreement was reached on the training and deployment of the Thai division. The first of two increments would comprise 59 percent of the division and consist of one brigade headquarters, three infantry battalions, the engineer battalion minus one company, the reconnaissance squadron minus one mechanized troop, division artillery headquarters, one 105-mm. howitzer battalion, one 155mm. howitzer battery, and necessary support, including a slice of division headquarters. The cadre training was tentatively scheduled to begin on 22 January 1968 with deployment to begin on 15 July 1968. The second increment would then consist of the second brigade headquarters, three infantry battalions, one engineer company, one mechanized troop, the second 105-mm. howitzer battalion, the 155-mm. howitzer battalion minus one battery, and necessary support, including the remainder of the division headquarters. Assuming the dates for the first increment held true, the second increment would begin training on 5 August 1968 and deploy on 27 January 1969."

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]


Abb.: 55-mm. howitzer
[Bildquelle: DoDMedia / Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

1967-11-11

Auf Einladung der Buddhist Association of Thailand ist der XIV. Dalai Lama (བསྟན་འཛིན་རྒྱ་མཚོ་) eine Woche lang auf Besuch in Thailand. Er trifft den Sangharaja (พระสังฆราช), den Präsident des Privy Council (สภาองคมนตรีไทย) Prinz Dhani Nivat (พระวรวงศ์เธอ พระองค์เจ้าธานีนิวัต กรมหมื่นพิทยลาภพฤฒิยากร,1885 - 1974) und Ministerpräsident Thanom (ถนอม กิตติขจร). Im Unterschied zu Jacqueline Kennedy wird er vom König, dem "Verteidiger des Buddhismus", nicht empfangen.


Abb.: XIV. Dalai Lama (བསྟན་འཛིན་རྒྱ་མཚོ་) / von Murray Webb (1947 - ), 2007

"The Dalai Lama touches his sun cap in farewell to New Zealand commenting that the folk are nice and that he liked the range of hats. Behind him is the Beehive on top of which stand Helen Clark, Prime Minister, Leader of the National Party, John Key and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Winston Peters. All of them are waving goodbye."

[Quelle von Text und Bild: Dalai Lama. "Nice folk....lovely range of hats." 21 June, 2007.. Webb, Murray, 1947- :[Digital caricatures published from 29 July 2005 onwards (2006, 2007, 2008). Includes a selection of digital caricatures published from 2002 and up to July 2005.]. Ref: DCDL-0003484. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. http://natlib.govt.nz/records/22889822. -- Zugriff am 2013-03-09. -- "You can copy this item for personal use, share it, and post it on a blog or website. It cannot be used commercially without permission"]

1967-11-11

Im Grand Palace gibt das Königspar eine Party für Jacqueline Kennedy (1929 - 1994), die Witwe des ermordeten US-Präsidenten  John F. Kennedy (1917 - 1963).


Abb.: Jacqueline Kennedy / von Aaron Shikler (1922 - ), 1970
[Bildquelle: http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/photo/2012/04/jacqueline-kennedy. -- Zugriff am 2013-04-23. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung)]

1967-11-18

Großbritannien wertet das Pfund Sterling (£) um 14,3% ab. Thailand hält am Wechselkurs zum US-$ mit 20,80 Baht / US-$ fest, wertet aber gegenüber dem £ auf 49,92 Baht / £ auf.

1967-11-21

Rede von General William Westmoreland (1914 - 2005), Oberbefehlshaber in Vietnam, vor dem National Press Club:

"With 1968, a new phase is now starting. We have reached an important point when the end begins now to come into view.

What is this third phase we are about to enter? 

In Phase III, in 1968, we intend to do the following:

  • Help the Vietnamese Armed Forces to continue improving their effectiveness.

  • Decrease our advisers in training centers and other places where the professional competence of Vietnamese officers make this possible.

  • Increase our advisory effort with the younger brothers of the Vietnamese Army: the Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

  • Use U.S. and free-world forces to destroy North Vietnamese forays while we assist the Vietnamese to reorganize for territorial security.

  • Provide the new military equipment to revitalize the Vietnamese Army and prepare it to take on an ever-increasing share of the war.

  • Continue pressure on North to prevent rebuilding and to make infiltration more costly.

  • Turn a major share of frontline DMZ defense over to the Vietnamese Army.

  • Increase U.S. support in the rich and populated delta.

  • Help the Government of Viet-Nam single out and destroy the Communist shadow government.

  • Continue to isolate the guerrilla from the people.

  • Help the new Vietnamese government to respond to popular aspirations and to reduce and eliminate corruption.

  • Help the Vietnamese strengthen their policy forces to enhance law and order.

  • Open more roads and canals.

  • Continue to improve the Vietnamese economy and standard of living.

 Now for phase IV the final phase. That period will see the conclusion of our plan to weaken the enemy and strengthen our friends until we become progressively superfluous. The object will be to show the world that guerrilla warfare and invasion do not pay as a new means of Communist aggression.

I see phase IV happening as follows:

  • Infiltration will slow.

  • The Communist infrastructure will be cut up and near collapse.

  • The Vietnamese Government will prove its stability, and the Vietnamese Army will show that it can handle Viet Cong.

  • The Regional Forces and Popular Forces will reach a higher level of professional performance.

  • U.S. units can begin to phase down as the Vietnamese Army is modernized and develops its capacity to the fullest.

  • The military physical assets, bases and ports, will be progressively turned over to the Vietnamese.

  • The Vietnamese will take charge of the final mopping up of the Viet Cong (which will probably last several years).

  • The U.S., at the same time, will continue the developmental help envisaged by the President for the community of Southeast Asia.

You may ask how long phase III will take, before we reach the final phase. We have already entered part of phase III. Looking back on phases I and II, we can conclude that we have come a long way.

  • I see progress as I travel over Viet-Nam.

  • I see it in the attitudes of the Vietnamese.

  • I see it in the open roads and canals.

  • I see it in the new crops and the new purchasing power of the farmer.

  • I see it in the increasing willingness of the Vietnamese Army to fight North Vietnamese units and in the victories they are winning.

  • Parenthetically, I might say that the U.S. press tends to report U.S. actions, so you may not be as aware as I am of the victories won by South Vietnamese forces.

The enemy has many problems

  • He is losing control of the scattered population under his influence.

  • He is losing credibility with the population he still controls.

  • He is alienating the people by his increased demands and taxes, where he can impose them.

  • He sees the strength of his forces steadily declining.

  • He can no longer recruit in the South to any meaningful extent; he must plug the gap with North Vietnamese.

  • His monsoon offensives have been failures. . . .

  • Lastly, the Vietnamese Army is on the road to becoming a competent force . . . .

 We are making progress. We know you want an honorable and early transition to the fourth and last phase. So do your sons and so do I.

It lies within our grasp -- the enemy's hopes are bankrupt. With your support we will give you a success that will impact not only on South Viet-Nam but on every emerging nation in the world."

[Quelle: http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~ppennock/doc-Westmoreland.htm. -- Zugriff am 2016-08-30. -- Fair use]

1967-11-23

In den letzten 5 Jahren haben Geschlechtskrankheiten in Thailand um 50% zugenommen. Hauptsächlich betroffen sind professionelle Sexarbeiterinnen.

1967-11-28

"Work continued on the new Thai force structure and another goal was met when a briefing team from US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, presented on 28 November 1967 the proposed Thai augmentation force and advisory requirements to General Creighton B. Abrams, then Deputy Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The basic organization was approved and representatives from both MACV and US Army, Vietnam, returned to Thailand with the briefing team to assist in developing the new tables of organization and equipment and allowances. Concurrently, action was taken to initiate funding for table of organization and construction needs in order to meet the training and deployment dates agreed upon earlier. "

[Quelle: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch02.htm. -- Zugriff am 2011-11-12]

1967-11

USA: es erscheint der Anti-Vietnamkriegs-Song "The 'Fish' Cheer / I-Feel-Like-I'm-Fixin'-to-Die Rag" der US-Band "Country Joe and the Fish" auf dem gleichnamigen Album.


Abb.: ©Albumtitel
[Fair use]

Der Song auf Spotify:

URI: spotify:track:4ekhcmbinPu8eLHtxD2lav
URL: https://open.spotify.com/track/4ekhcmbinPu8eLHtxD2lav

"In textlicher Hinsicht handelt es sich um die ironisch gemeinte Aufforderung an die Männer des Landes, im Vietnamkrieg zu kämpfen. Für die Generäle sei nun endlich die Chance gekommen, Krieg zu führen, und die Geschäftsleute an der Wall Street könnten ein gutes Geschäft machen. Country Joes Sarkasmus gipfelt darin, dass er die amerikanischen Eltern ermuntert, ihre Söhne möglichst schnell in den Krieg zu schicken, um sich die Chance zu bewahren, die ersten im Wohnblock zu sein, deren Sohn „im Kasten“ (d.h. im Sarg) heimkehrt."

[Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/I-Feel-Like-I%E2%80%99m-Fixin%E2%80%99-to-Die_Rag. -- Zugriff am 2013-10-14]

1967-11

Thailand sendet 12.000 Freiwillige nach Vietnam, um dort die 2.300 Thai-Soldaten zu unterstützen, die in der von den USA ausgerüsteten Queen's Cobra-Einheit kämpfen. Die Truppen werden voll von den USA bezahlt aufgrund eines Geheimabkommens der USA mit Thailand vom 1967-11-01. Dies wird in einem Senatshearing Ende 1969-11 bekannt.


Abb.: Soldiers of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (Queen's Cobras) conduct a search and sweep mission in Phuoc Tho, 1967-11
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

 

1967-11

Es erscheint

Lomax, Louis E. (Emanuel) <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- "The first-hand report of another Viet Nam in the making". -- "Louis Emanuel Lomax (August 16, 1922 – July 30, 1970) was an African-American journalist and author. He was also the first African-American television journalist." "Lomax was a supporter of several civil rights organizations, including the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In 1968, he signed the "Writers and Editors War Tax Protest" pledge, vowing to refuse tax payments in protest against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War." (Wikipedia)


Abb.: Einbandtitel

"Overhead there was the almost constant chopping din of American helicopters. Some of them were ferrying I hai soldiers into the jungles; others were headed into North Viet Nam to rescue American flyers downed there. Frequently there was the whining roar of American jets.

Then, boom! The earth shook, the tables in the water- front cafe rattled,' almost upsetting my dinner.

What the hell was that!" I demanded. The Thais who had joined me for dinner were embarrassed; they nervously lingered their sticky rice and remained-silent.

' Boom!" Again the earth shook and the tables rattled. If you really want to know what that is," one of my Thai dinner companions said acidly, "ask the American flyboy you had dinner with hast night. He is doing it." My Thai interpreter motioned me to silence. Then he leaned toward me and quietly explained:

American bombers were returning to their bases in Thailand after a day of raids over North Viet Nam; oft-times the Americans were unable to drop all of their bombs, and rather than run the risk of landing with the

dangerous explosives still aboard, they were jettisoning them into the jungle belly of Laos. The people of Nakornpanom [นครพนม] always know when the American jets are returning; they see a small American plane take off and then circle high over Laos. The plane is piloted by the flyboy I had had dinner with; his job is to guide the returning jets to the spot where they are to unload their bombs.

"Is the area inhabited?" I asked Sing Korn, my interpreter.

"No," he snapped. "The people have been moved out. But it is hell on the animals!"

"Boom!" The earth shook, the tables rattled."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 31f.. -- Fair use]


Abb.: Lage von Nakhon Phanom [นครพนม]
[Bildquelle: CIA. -- Public domain]
"To the eternal embarrassment of the American government, which has committed men, money, and political fortune in the land of Siam, Thailand is a mean, military dictatorship, dedicated to the proposition that the function of the government is to let the people enjoy life so long as they don't express a desire to participate in the process of government. The people have no legal rights whatsoever; newspapers are censored and public gatherings for political purposes are outlawed. Agitation for free speech and political activity can-and will-get one jailed, or even shot.

"Your country must have lost all sense of moral commitment, " a well-educated Thai said to me privately, "to use Thailand as a base to send bombers aloft in order to bring freedom to Viet Nam. If America is really committed to bringing freedom to Southeast Asia, you should start by bombing Bangkok! "

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 52f. -- Fair use]
"Promptly at seven the following morning Cheon Rachivons knocked at my door.

"I must speak quickly, " he said, unfolding his prepared statement. "I must hurry to take a helicopter flight into the jungles. We have just now, a few minutes ago, received word of Communist activity." I started the tape recorder and handed Cheon the microphone. He read his statement in the dialect of the northeast:

"The summary of Communist activity in Nakornpanom [นครพนม] area: Nakornpanom is an important major city of northeast Thailand. Right on the border between Thailand and Laos, with over two hundred kilometers of common border between the two countries, Nakornpanom consists of eight amphurs [อำเภอ] [districts] and three hundred thousand people. The majority of the people are farmers and rice growers. The main crop of the region is tobacco.

"The people of this area share a common heritage, similar customs and language, with their Laotian neighbors. There has been steady and free exchange of trade, customs, and travel between the two peoples since time immemorial. The common trait of the people is their kindheartedness and a warm welcome extended to all visitors, foreign and otherwise. Everyone is welcome in the true, warm Thai hospitality.

"But now this honor toward others is beginning to undergo gradual change. This is due to the appearance of a group of people who are joining a foreign power and inducing young able-bodied men and women of this town to travel to North Viet Nam and China for indoctrination in Communist tactics and insurgency. This includes training in the use of weaponry. Then these Communist-indoctrinated people return to cause trouble and sabotage.

"In 1961, about five months before the coup of Kong Le [ກອງ​ແລ, 1932/34 - 2014] in Laos, there was an operation conducted here by a Lieutenant Kong Sin [alias Nai Kam], who operated an insurgency force on both sides of the Mekong River, between Laos and this town. He belongs to the Laotian Communist forces [the Pathet Lao] [ປະເທດລາວ]. They set up their headquarters in Thailand at Bang Nong He and Bankoot. This Nai [Mister] Kam set up business as a doctor, without the benefit of a license to practice. He used his doctor’s office as a front; his real job was to recruit Thai men in the villages and send them to Hanoi and China for Communist training. He recruited many men, but we caught him. He is now in jail in Bangkok and his case is before the Thai courts.

"Soon after Nai Kam was captured, one Nai Yod Phathisawata appeared on the scene. Nai Yod is now the leader of the Communist cell. This Nai Yod is a man from the city of Chacheont Sao [Chachoengsao - ฉะเชิงเทรา], near Bangkok. He attended a good school in Bangkok called Suan Khlab [โรงเรียนสวนกุหลาบวิทยาลัย]. He has been living in the Na Kae [นาแก] area district for about twenty years. He also lived in the Communist part of Laos, Viet Nam, and China. He once managed a sawmill, but now his business is in the jungles of the mountains where he directs the insurgents.

"The Communists are all around us, " he concluded. "We are afraid and concerned. "

Question: How long do you think it will take to end the insurgency?

Answer: At least five years, if then.

Question: How many men does Nai Yod have?

Answer: We are certain he has at least one hundred hard-core followers with him in the jungles. We don’t know how many silent supporters he has in the villages. They farm by day and shoot by night.

Question: How many men do you have?

Answer: That is classified information; it cannot be divulged.

The interview was over. Cheon Rachivons stood impatiently in the middle of the room. "Give him two hundred bahts [ten dollars], " my Thai interpreter whispered to me. I paid gladly; not only was the information valuable but I was well aware of Cheon’s plight: he risks his life daily, he is poorly paid. There are months when he is not paid at all."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 32ff. -- Fair use]
"I have examined documents and equipment captured by the Thai government during raids on the camps— some twenty-five hundred insurgents either surrendered or were captured last year. From interviews with some of these prisoners a sketchy composite of life inside their camps can be made.

The insurgents are organized into bands of about twenty persons. They live deep in the jungles of the mountains; they sleep on the ground under plastic tents. The camps are protected by a network of wooden cowbells strung along bushes about a hundred yards from the center of each operation. Once a government soldier brushes against these bushes an ungodly racket is set off, alerting the camp. The insurgents are armed with a mixture of weapons, from crude bows and arrows, French rifles left over from the Indo-China conflict, to American machine guns captured in Viet Nam, as well as guns made in China, in Russia, and in Czechoslovakia.

The leaders were trained in Communist countries. They returned to Thailand and set up the organizational structure, with the old Communist Party as a base. Their hardcore line is that the "American Imperialists" have taken over Thailand, that the American government is supporting the Thai government in its political and economic tyranny over the masses, particularly in the northeast. The ploy has worked: thousands of young Thais, men and women, have taken to the hills to join the insurgents.

There is a steady flow of money into their camps from Hanoi, Peking, and from the Communist underground in Thailand. The insurgents keep meticulous books; runners are dispatched into small villages to buy supplies and every purchase is itemized. The big items are transistor radios, batteries, and dogs. These captured expense accounts tell volumes:

Much of their time is spent listening to anti-Thai government diatribes from Radio Hanoi (three hours a day) and Radio Peking (seven hours each week). The purchase of dogs indicates that Vietnamese are involved; Vietnamese eat dogs, Thais don’t.

By day the young recruits are given courses in Marxism, Maoism, and guerrilla warfare. Their textbooks are simple tablets written in Thai by hand. They live mainly on rice stolen from or given by terrorized farmers. They are supplied by helicopters from the Pathet Lao [ປະເທດລາວ] in northern Laos, some fifty miles away.

By night the insurgents pour down from the mountains into sleeping villages. They rouse the villagers, set up loudspeakers, and at gunpoint, subject the peasants to a long lecture (in some instances for four hours) on the glories of Communism and the evils of the government in Bangkok. Then they pass out application forms for membership in the Communist Party (usually disguised as "The Farmers Progressive Union"). Immediate converts are taken to the camp in the jungles for training. Each farmer is asked, again at gunpoint, to contribute rice. If he doesn’t have the rice on hand, he is ordered to have it gathered by the next full moon and told that somebody will be there to collect it."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 13ff. -- Fair use]
"Inside the station twenty young Thai men were being photographed and fingerprinted. "We now have a local law," the officer in charge explained to me, "that every man in the village must be photographed and fingerprinted. He must carry his identification with him at all times. The law allows us to stop and question all males," he continued. "If we find a fellow without identification, We arrest him on suspicion that he is a Communist insurgent.""

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 19. -- Fair use]
"It must be remembered that the government in Bangkok was in dire straits at the time. Thailand had accepted a Japanese presence of sorts, and had actually declared war on the United States. Bangkok officialdom had little, if any, time to spend dealing with the flow of North Vietnamese refugees into northeast Thailand. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese came across the Mekong River in droves, some forty thousand of them.

The refugees took up squatter’s rights on land they carved from the edge of the jungles between Nakornpanom [นครพนม] and Na Kae [นาแก]. They set up village life, with their own police and their own government; they perpetuated the language and customs of North Viet Nam. A remarkably frugal people, they deliberately ate less than they should, eschewed entertainment, and saved their money. They never became Thai citizens.

"All the Vietnamese did, " a Thai official remarked to me, "was to till their fields and stay home and have babies. "

The refugees succeeded remarkably at both enterprises. They now rival the Chinese as businessmen in the northeast; their population has almost doubled. Shortly after World War Two the Vietnamese refugees were given a stout leg up when the International Red Cross flooded them with money, food, and clothing—while the equally poor Thais continued to live on the edge of starvation. Politicians from the northeast demanded that Bangkok clear the refugees from the territory. The matter wound up in the United Nations and an attempt was made at repatriating the refugees. The attempt failed because the North Vietnamese feigned ignorance of their background, To a man, they all swore they had no idea where they came from in Viet Nam; they insisted further that they did not wish to be caught in the hostilities between the French and Ho Chi Minh [1890 - 1969], and later Ho Chi Minh and the Americans.

Like most issues affecting the northeast, the government in Bangkok simply chose to ignore the matter. Bangkok did order the refugees to close their schools, disband their police, and become a part of the Thai nation; but these orders, of course, have not been obeyed. The schools merely went underground and the young ones continue to be taught that they are Vietnamese, to speak Vietnamese and Chinese; the police still come out at night and protect the Vietnamese villages; and the refugees have made few steps toward integrating themselves into the Thai way of life. It is simple to spot their establishments—the Krong Throng Hotel and the Leng Hong Restaurant in Sakolnakorn [สกลนคร]; the exotic camera shop just across the street from the Civilized Club in Nakornpanom. One can also easily spot their villages. The homes are built flat on the ground; the Thais build on stilts. And, as I have already pointed out, the North Vietnamese eat dogs; the Thais don’t.

Now, twenty years after they first came to Thailand, the refugees are deeply rooted in the life of the northeast. Whereas the original refugees never became Thai citizens, their children, the so-called "born people, " are Thais. There has been some intermingling and a good deal of intermarriage between Thais and Vietnamese. But, the Vietnamese are still fiercely loyal to Ho Chi Minh."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 36f. -- Fair use]
""The Communists are only taking advantage of a situation that has existed for years, " Tuam Na Nakorn [ท้วม ณ นคร], the mayor of Nakornpanom [นครพนม], said to me. "I am fifty-eight years old and have lived this issue all my life. The government in Bangkok has treated the people of my area like dirt; how dare they now wonder why the people are not loyal to Bangkok. Why should they be?

"I can remember the days when every politician who fell out of favor in Bangkok would be banished up here to be our district officer; we have the worst schools, the lowest income, and we get the bottom of the bucket when money for roads is appropriated. " Tuam Na Nakorn (his name means he is the son of a former governor of the province) paused while he took a long, deliberate sip of whiskey. "I was once head of the labor union here. The government abolished that because we were trying to get better wages and working conditions for the people. Everything we tried to do to help the people was ruled out by those bastards in Bangkok.

"Go ahead and write it down," he told me. "I am one man in the northeast who is neither a Communist nor a puppet for Bangkok. I am now the head of my town. I know what is going on. They are spending thousands of bahts building fancy buildings for Bangkok’s district offices up here; but nothing is being done for the people. At least a thousand men from my town are now either up in the mountains with the Communists or working with the Pathet Lao [ປະເທດລາວ] over across the river."

Then, "boom!" The earth shook and the chairs on the mayor’s front porch rattled.

"You Americans have accomplished something no foreigners have been able to accomplish in the history of Thailand," the mayor lectured me. "We have always been a free people—that is what the word ‘Thai’ means; we escaped colonialism; we outwitted the Japanese. But now America has taken over our country. I am very sad about it all.""

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 39f. -- Fair use]


Abb.: Lage von Nakhon Phanom [นครพนม]
[Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]
 
"Our commitment to Thailand is total and irrevocable," Ambassador Graham Martin [1912 - 1990] said to me.

I paused for a long moment, partly out of shock, but mainly to offer the ambassador time to clarify his statement; he resumed the leisurely eating of his lunch.

"Does this mean our men will die, if necessary, to defend the current government in Bangkok?" I asked.

Martin’s reply was instant and unmistakable: "Yes." Marshall Wright, first secretary of the American embassy in Bangkok and my other luncheon companion raised his eyebrows at me, as if to say, "I told you so."

[...]

According to Graham Martin, these are the major issues involved in the Southeast Asia struggle:

  1. The rising tide of economic expectation among the masses.
  2. The absence of serious commitment beyond the village and/or religious level.
  3. The tyranny and corruption of existing governments—Saigon, Bangkok, and Vientiane [ວຽງຈັນ] in Laos.
  4. Racial tensions between the Chinese and other ethnic groups
  5. The sectional gulf—class conflict, actually—between the peasants and the middle class in the capital city.
  6. The awesome U.S. military presence in the area.
  7. the threat of Red China.

[...]

"The American program comes to this, " Martin said. "We must stop Communist aggression in Southeast Asia; We must support stable and viable governments; we must meet the needs of the masses in such areas as politics, health, and economics. That is what we are here to do; that is what we are going to do. " Then the ambassador made a blunt point: "We are here to stay. Regardless of what you liberals say, we ain’t going home! " Graham Martin is an American servant. He is deeply sorry that the Thais do not have the right to vote, that they have been under martial law for a decade, that they cannot gather to discuss politics. It pains him that the Thai rice farmer gets little benefit from the sale of his grain on the world market and that the salaries of Thai civil servants have been fixed as of 1957, despite that nation’s growing national economy. The American ambassador is truly sorry about all these things, but his prime concern is not the peoples of Thailand. Graham Martin deeply believes that Thailand will get a constitution one day soon. He certainly hopes so. Martin’s concern is with Thailand as a base for our military operations in Southeast Asia. The struggle against Communism is the only thing that really matters.

Casually dressed, in a short-sleeved shirt and slacks, Martin slouched in his chair as he eased it away from the luncheon table. Alternately closing and rubbing his eyes, he diplomatically presented the case for American policy. As Ambassador Martin spoke he knew full well that one of his top aides had given me the same argument a few nights before, and in less diplomatic language.

I had opened the discussion with Martin’s aide by asking how we could justify our presence in Thailand if we would not accept a Chinese presence in Cuba. Graham’s aide countered by saying that American internal political and moral ethics are one thing, that stopping Communist

aggression is another. Therefore we must abandon our own principles and do whatever is necessary to stop Communism.

"You liberals want a democratic world, but you are not willing to do the kinds of things necessary to achieve that world," he said to me. "This is a dog-kill-dog world; we must kill those dogs before they kill us."

When I pressed him for the moral basis of American foreign policy, his reply was shocking:

"It all boils down to the fact that we are right and they are wrong. What we want for the world is good, what the Communists want for the world is bad. We have the right to have our missiles pointed at Russia because they are the bad guys; they don’t have the right to have their missiles pointed at us because we are the good guys. The same goes for China: we have the right to be in Thailand because we are good; China doesn’t have the right to be in Cuba because they are bad. We offer the best hope for Southeast Asia; that is why we are here. That is the way things are and that is the way things are going to be regardless of what we must do to make it that way." "Suppose we have to kill Asians to do it?" I asked. "Then, goddamit," he exploded, "we kill Asians!" Ambassador Martin, of course, didn’t speak with such bluntness, yet he passionately defended everything we are doing in both Thailand and Viet Nam. Then he reminded me once again that our present course is unalterable, that our commitment is irrevocable. Graham Martin wishes it all didn’t have to happen, that history had given him a better diplomatic moment. But he is totally committed to the theology of Americanism. And once one agrees that America is God, that Communism is the Devil, then everything else follows—morally so, at least.

There is art in the manner in which Graham Martin employs language. He effortlessly constructs paragraphs out of medium-size words, but he somehow manages to convey major information without reducing the facts to (precise words. Yet the listener clearly understands what it is that Martin wishes conveyed. The future of Viet Nam is a case in point. Graham Martin did not say this in words, yet he clearly indicated to me that he believes the Communists will probably control all of Viet Nam within ten years. There is little doubt in Martin’s mind that Ho Chi Minh would win any national election during his lifetime. American foreign policy makers are reconciled to this probability. Yet we seek a political, rather than a military, solution to the Viet Nam conflict."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 87ff. -- Fair use]
"Irwin Pernick, a New Yorker and a veteran Foreign Service officer, arrived in Yala [ยะลา] with his wife and child. Now on loan to the United States Information Service, Pernick and his wife moved into a Thai house where Mrs. Pernick spends most of her day protecting their daughter from mad dogs and deadly snakes. Pernick spends his day traveling, with Thai allies, into remote villages near the Malay border where they distribute posters and show films depicting the government in Bangkok as "the good guys, " the Communists as the "bad guys. "


Abb.: Lage von Yala [ยะลา]
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

"This approach simply will not work, " she said. "The people don’t believe in it. Even the sophisticates in Bangkok know that their government is not a ‘good guy. ’ "

Then she discussed the growing unrest among the Chinese, Laotian, and Vietnamese minorities in Thailand.

Again, it was not the newness of the information, but the fact that the Communists are forging their movement out of this unrest that caught my attention.

"The Vietnamese in the north are not free to travel, " she reminded me. "They cannot travel from village to village without the approval of the district officer assigned from Bangkok. They cannot have their own schools, nor can they hold meetings. They are not allowed to work at night. Well, this may stop Communists from meeting in the open, but it also stops the Vietnamese Catholics from attending church in the next village on Sunday, and it stops the Vietnamese fishermen from fishing at night on the Mekong when the catch is good. There is nothing your Ambassador Martin can do to turn these peoples toward Bangkok. They have no alternative but to join us. " As she spoke, I remembered what Maynard Parker [1940 - 1998] had written: "This repression [against the Vietnamese] has been confining. It has forced many neutral non-Communist Vietnamese into the hands of the Communist cadres, street committees, assassination squads, and agitprop teams. " Then she spoke of the Laotians, most of whom are deeply Thai. In essence, here is what she said:

There is no question that thousands of pro-Peking Lao for Laos have filtered into Thailand since 1960. It is all but impossible to distinguish a Thai from a Laotian Lao. Had Thailand been a country where people registered and voted, where individuals were citizens with established records and identities, it would then be a simple matter to distinguish a loyal Thai citizen who happens to be of Laotian extraction from a Lao who has crossed the Mekong bent upon subversion. But the Thai citizen is a nonentity, practically ignored by his government. Thus, once he leaves his small village of, say, twenty or thirty families, there is no way of knowing just who he is or where his loyalty lies. The result is that hundreds, and perhaps

thousands, of loyal Lao have been arrested and held under the martial law that prevails, often for long periods of time, until they can prove their loyalty.

"This is why we have taken to the back villages, " the Thai Communist remarked to me. "For the first time in their history, the lowly peasants are being asked to participate in the coming of a better way of life. Bangkok never did this; they came into the villages and told the peoples what to do. We go into the villages and enlist the peoples’ help in doing something for the people themselves.

"Look, " she said, pointing out toward the street from the cocktail lounge. "See those poor men driving put-puts [tiny three-wheeled scooter cars that have replaced rickshaws in Bangkok]; they don’t own them. They drive day and night, they rent those things from a middleman, a Chinese. These drivers go home with a few bahts a day. They must pay half of that for the put-put. This means the driver is lucky if he makes a dollar a day. Why shouldn’t the state own those things? Why should people work to make money for other people? If that man has to rent his put-put, he should be renting it from the state and the rental money should be going to provide better schools, roads, and housing for that man and his family.

"The same applies to the rice farmer, " she continued. "He farms the rice, sells it to a Chinese middleman who, in turn, sells it to the government. Why shouldn’t the farmer deal with his own government? Why the middle- man? If the Chinese want money, let them go out and work for it like everybody else. "

It was at this point that I raised the question of anti- Chinese feeling among the Thais.

"I am not a racist, " she replied. "This is a class, not a racial conflict. The rich Chinese exploit their own people- This is particularly true in the south. The Chinese peasant

is exploited by the Chinese merchant. The Chinese don’t discriminate, " she added with a touch of flipness; "they exploit Thais, Laotians, Malays—as well as Chinese. "

Then she abruptly switched to another subject. "There is something I had made a point of remembering to talk to you about, " she said. "You have been asking me about Rassamee [รัศมี]. What you seem not to have discovered is that the insurgency movement has an enormous following among Thai women. Rassamee is the glamour figure in the hills, but there are hundreds of Thai women who serve as messengers and supply officers for the insurgency. You should understand this because it is the same thing that has happened to the Negro woman in America. The Thai male has been emasculated, doomed to the rice fields. It is the Thai woman who, as a servant, has seen the better life. She, more than the radio and the television, has taken the gospel of the good life to the peasants. This is why there are so many women involved in the insurgency movement. Thai women are insisting upon a better way of life. "

What would the Thai Communist do if a constitution were promulgated, if the people, men and women, were allowed to elect their officials?

"The constitution will come, " she replied quickly.

"You Americans will see to that. This is the only way you can save face. But it will be like the constitution you are promulgating in Saigon. The elections will be so staggered that the people will never get a sense of full participation and the electorate will be rigged so that only the pro-Bangkok people will have power. In fact, " she continued, "the constitution will create even more dissidents, possible supporters of the insurgency. Bangkok simply is not going to allow the masses to participate in free and open election. We will find fertile ground among those who are not allowed to vote.""

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 102ff.. -- Fair use]
"I am not critical of the Thai government when their censorship of the news is essential to national security. Rather, I speak of the all too frequent instances when the truth is suppressed not for military reasons, but because it might prove politically embarrassing to the government in power. Every dictator has abolished freedom of the press on the grounds that open inquiry and dialogue would endanger the republic. The great fear, of course, is that free discussion might well enlighten the people who, in turn, could bring down the government for malfeasance.

The best evidence is provided by Thai newspapers themselves. The two Thai dailies are rigidly controlled by the government. The two English-language dailies, both foreign-owned, live in fear of being closed down should they stray too far from the government line. As a result, the Thai papers fawn and flourish each day as they give detailed accounts of the goings, comings, and doings of the royal family. There are documented instances in which editors were berated for having failed to carry pictures as well as stories of the activities of the royal ones. When I was in Thailand, not a single Thai reporter was covering die insurgency in the northeast and the south. They sit at their desks and write innocuous little stories about how good things are under the Thanom regime."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 109. -- Fair use]
"Liang Chaiyakarn [เลียง ไชยกาล, 1902 - 1986] is one of Thailand’s best-known politicians. Now a Bangkok lawyer, he was the beloved member of parliament from the northeast during the days of representative government in Thailand. He received me graciously and promised to talk as much as the law would allow.

Question: Do you plan to run for office once the constitution is promulgated?

Answer: Yes. I am very anxious to run. I will stand for my old seat from the northeast.

Question: When do you think Thailand will have a constitution?

Answer: There is no way of knowing. I have friends high in government and they say we should have a constitution in about a year.

Question: What do you think about the Communist insurgency in Thailand?

Answer: I cannot speak of that matter.

Question: Do you think your government is taking adequate measures to arrest the insurgency?

Answer: I cannot speak of that. The law does not allow it.

Question: What do you think of the American presence in Thailand?

Answer: I cannot speak of that. The law does not allow it.

Question: What matters can you address yourself to?

Answer: Other than to say I hope to run for office, I cannot speak. The law does not allow it.

Question: Can you exert any effort toward getting a constitution for Thailand?

Answer: No. I must be silent and wait. I have friends who are in a position to work for a constitution. Once it is promulgated, I can announce my candidacy. Question: Is that all you can do?

Answer: Yes. I can only sit and wait.

Question: Is there any more you can say as of now?

Answer: No. The law does not allow it. But please give my regards to the people of America. I was there as a guest of President Eisenhower. You have a wonderful country.

The interview was over."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 119f. -- Fair use]
"Yet another insight into why Thai education fails to inculcate nationalism can be gained by examining the current behavior of hundreds of teachers in the remote areas. I spent an evening with a group of American Peace Corps workers in northeast Thailand. One of them told of an escalating and disturbing development. He was so determined that his message be heard, that I found a moving letter from him waiting for me when I returned to Los Angeles. The Peace Corps worker wrote, in part:

' When you write about what you saw in Thailand, I hope you include for ALL [capitals are his] to read that there are some of us who actually cry when we see what the United States Military Policy is doing to this country.

Tell them about all the Thai teachers who leave their schools to become interpreters and clerks at our military bases at three times their original salaries.

Tell them about the Thai agriculturalists who desert their experimental stations, who desert their work with the farmers, to work at our military bases.

Their job is "to make the base beautiful and pleasant to the eyes. " They now get five times their original salary.

Tell them about the Thai engineers who leave their road-, dam-, and bridge-construction jobs to build runways and supply houses for our military bases. They now earn seven times their original salaries.

Tell them, tell them...'"

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 137. -- Fair use]
"Honestly translated, this says that the present king’s brother was found dead in his bed, a bullet between his eyes; that the good King Bhumipol was plucked out of school in Switzerland by the military plotters and set upon the throne to keep the masses in mysticism.

There can be no doubt, however, that the king is the most beloved man in Thailand. He is adulated for both his ancestry and his much publicized Buddhist piety. King Bhumipol is a most likable fellow and his activities make excellent fairyland copy for Thai newspapers. The king blows a smooth saxophone and the word is that he actually keeps the ruling military junta from excessive excesses. But, alas, the king is a nobody when it comes to influencing government policy."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 139. -- Fair use]
"The United States Information Service man was a very quiet and correct civil servant. Though friendly, he smiled slowly. His conversation was less brooding and more a matter-of-fact admission of the way things are.

The USIS, which is chartered by Congress to disseminate information about the United States in the remote areas of the world, has been transformed in Thailand into the propaganda arm of the Thai government. Several times a month this USIS official and his Thai employees go on field trips into the back villages. They show films and pass out literature deliberately designed to give Bangkok the "good guy" image. The pretense is over. The notion that the purpose of the USIS is to inform people in Thailand about America is openly scoffed at. Ambassador Graham Martin [1912 - 1990] has barked the orders and the entire American Information and AID [Agency for International Development] program in Thailand is devoted to the propagation of the current Thai regime.

Thai broadcasting, both radio and television, has been taken over by American AID and Information officers. Many hundreds of Americans labor in cramped offices of a downtown Bangkok building, turning out radio and television programs designed to transmute the ruling junta into the Trinity of Southeast Asia. The programs are well done, yet the message is as blatant as any paid political ad. The Thai listeners and viewers are never told that this is propaganda, that the program has been written by Americans, that its basic purpose is to sell Bangkok. Like the word of God, these broadcasts simply come through the air on the wings of omnipotence for the people to hear and obey.

"Can you, in good conscience, tell the Thai villagers that Bangkok is a ‘good guy’?"

"Look," the USIS officer fired back at me, "I don’t construct the USIS program. The program is laid out in Bangkok and Washington. I am told to carry it out. If this is what we have to do to fight Communism, then this is what we have to do. It doesn’t make sense to spend American taxpayers’ money to tell Thais about George Washington and the New Deal when Rassamee [รัศมี] and Yod are running free in the hills. We have to counteract Communist propaganda. Granted, Bangkok is far from a free democracy, but it is the only non-Communist crap game in the country."

"And we are rolling craps for airbases," the pilot interrupted. "Seven come eleven. Daddy needs a new landing strip."

Shortly before midnight, those of us who had managed to survive the Elephant ride went into town for a midnight snack. Nakornpanom [นครพนม] was bulging with the military. The voices of America—the shouts of poor Southern whites and Negroes—crackled through the air:

"Now boy, you pedal this three-wheeled rickshaw fast; you hear?"

"Yaaahooo! I wish I was in Dixie!"

"Did you hear what that peckerwood mother said? " "Watch out for that Thai whore in the red dress. She is a mean one. Last week one of our boys told her she wanted too much money and she whipped out a knife and cut off her own right thumb. Scared the shit out of everybody. " "Lordy, Lord! When we got about fifty miles from Hanoi this morning, the SAMA were so thick you could gather them like eggs. Those Russian missiles sure can fly high. sure was glad when the captain ordered us to drop our load and haul ass out of there. "

"You, Lomax? I heard you debate Malcolm X [1925 - 1965] in Cleveland. You cats sure told it like it was. "

"Professor J. L. Lomax your daddy? Man that cat was my school principal. Ain’t this a bitch. We meet in a Thailand shit house! "

It was as if all mankind was on an eternal Elephant ride. Good and evil canceled each other out and the line between sanity and insanity is called "duty. " I went to my hotel in hope of a long sleep. It was not to be. For early morning was the time when things went "boom! " When the earth shook and the tables rattled."

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 145ff. -- Fair use]
"Three weeks later Paul Sithi-Amnuai [พอล สิทธิอำนวย], Vice President of the Bangkok, Ltd., stunned an audience of American scholars who specialize in Thailand by delivering a totalitarian defense of the current Thai government. "True," Sithi-Amnuai replied in answer to a paper I had read, "I cannot vote in Thailand. But my government does provide me the right to cash my checks and travel. I would rather be a nonvoter in prosperous Thailand than a voter who shares in the poverty of India."

During a sharp exchange with me, Mr. Sithi-Amnuai said the American public had no right to know about their government’s quiet arrangements with Thailand; he even went so far as to say that Americans should seriously examine that clause in their constitution which gives them the right to know what their government is doing. The reserved anthropologists, economists, and political scientists, who just hours before thought me to be an alarmist, lost their scholarly composure. They joined me in demanding to know the exact terms of the American lease on Thai airbases.

"The Thai government," Mr. Sithi-Amnuai informed us, "is acting out of self-interest. That is the whole of the matter. If the world political climate changes, then we in Thailand reserve the right to change our position. As for the airbases, you Americans are in Thailand at our pleasure. If we say ‘Yankee go home,’ then Yankee, you go home!"

"What if you say ‘Yankee come back?’ " I asked.

"Then," our Thai conferee replied with a smile, "Yankee, you come back.""

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 157. -- Fair use]
"Against the day when the great debate over Thailand erupts— and it will—we must list the hard facts we know to be true:
  • We know the current Thai government is a tyrannical military junta.
  • We know the Thai peoples do not have a constitution; they cannot vote. They have lived under martial law for more than a decade.
  • We know indigenous Communist insurgents are operating in the northeast and the south under the leadership of Thais trained in North Viet Nam and China.
  • We know that Thai intellectual and military strength is being drained off into counterinsurgency activity.
  • We know that Secretary of State Dean Rusk [1909 - 1994] and Thailand’s Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman [ถนัด คอมันตร์, 1914 - 2016], formulated a 1962 interpretation of the 1954 SEATO agreement which, at least so the two countries claim, gives them the right to act bilaterally and to carry out military maneuvers they feel are needed to stop either indirect or direct Communist attacks.
  • We know that the details of this 1962 memorandum are not spelled out. We know that the legal and moral basis for America’s use of Thai airfields, as well as for America’s involvement against the Thai insurgents, is not set forth in the Rusk-Thanat document.
  • We know that America is bombing North Viet Nam from Thai airbases.
  • We know that some American forces are training Thais for counterinsurgency and that other Americans are ferrying Thai troops into the mountainous jungles to flush out the Communists.*
  • We know American AID and Information Services officers have been transmuted into propaganda agents for the Bangkok government.
  • We know Americans are committed to die, if necessary, to defend the Thai government.

These are facts about which there can be no debate. "

[Quelle: Lomax, Louis E. <1922 - 1970>: Thailand : the war that is, the war that will be. -- New York : Vintage Books, 1967.  -- 175 S. ; 19 cm. -- (Vintage book ; V-204). -- S. 159f. -- Fair use]

1967-12


Abb.: Laos: distribution of U.S. tactical sorties in Northern and Southern Laos December 1967
[Bildquelle: USAF / Van Staaveren, Jacob: Interdiction in southern Laos, 1960-1968 : the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. -- Washington, D.C. : Center for Air Force History, 1993. -- 360 S. : Ill. ; 24 cm. -- S. 245. -- Public domain]

1967-12

Es erscheint verwaltungsintern:

Conterinsurgency in Thailand : the impact of economic, social, and political action programs (a research and development proposal submitted to the Advanced Research Projects Agency [ARPA]). -- Pittsburgh : American Institutes for Research [AIR], 1967-12

Zweck:

  1. "devise reliable and valid techniques for determining the specific effects of counterinsurgency programs in Thailand;
  2. apply these techniques to ongoing action programs to generate feedback data useful both in the formulation of broad programming strategies and in the design of the specific mechanics of program implementation;
  3. assist the Royal Thai Government in establishing an indigenous capability for the continuing application and refinement of these techniques; and
  4. pave the way for the generalization of the methodology to other programs in other countries."

[a.a.O., S. II. -- Zitiert in: Wakin, Eric: Anthropology goes to war : professional ethics & counterinsurgency in Thailand. -- Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. -- 319 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm. -- (Monograph <University of Wisconsin--Madison. Center for Southeast Asian Studies> ;  No. 7). -- ISBN 978-1-881261-03-2. -- S. 79f. -- Fair use]

1967-12-09 - 1967-12-16

4. South East Asia Peninsular Games in Bangkok. Thailand gewinnt 77 Goldmedaillen, 48 mal Silber, 40 mal Bronze.

König Bhumbol und seine älteste Tochter, Prinzessin Ubolratana Rajakanya Sirivadhana Barnavadi (ทูลกระหม่อมหญิงอุบลรัตนราชกัญญา สิริวัฒนาพรรณวดี, 1951 - ) teilen sich die Goldmedaille in der OK dinghy class yacht racing bei den 4. South East Asia Peninsular Games in Pattaya (พัทยา). Die beiden waren in zwei dinghys "gegeneinander" angetreten. Dass sie gemeinsam durchs Ziel fahren, erspart schwierige protokollarische und imagemäßige Probleme. Königin Sirikit überreicht den beiden überragenden Wassersportlern die Goldmedaillen.


Abb.: ®Emblem
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia. -- Fair use]

1967-12-14

Gründung der ersten Thai NGO (non-governmental organization / องค์การอาสาสมัครเอกชน): The Thailand Rural Reconstruction Movement Foundation (TRRM, มูลนิธิบูรณะชนบทแห่งประเทศไทย ในพระบรมราชูปถัมภ์). Gründer Puey Ungpakorn (ป๋วย อึ๊งภากรณ์ / 黃培謙, 1916 - 1999)


Abb.: ®Logo

1967-12-20

Von Thailand sind nun Selbstwahl-Ferngespräche in die USA möglich. Dazu hat die thailändische PTT von ATT zwei Satellitenleitungen für monatlich $15.000 gemietet.

1967-12-20

Thailands Queen's Cobras töten bei Saigon mindestens 51 Viet-Cong (Việt cộng) und erbeuten viele Waffen des Feindes. Sechs Thai Soldaten werden getötet.

König Bhumibol besucht im Vietnamkrieg verwundete Thai-Soldaten in einem Bangkoker Krankenhaus. Er sagt: "Der Kampf in Vietnam ist ein Kampf, um die Freiheit [!] und Sicherheit in diesem Teil der Welt zu schützen."


Abb.: Amerikanisches Flugblatt mit dem Aufruf an den Viet-Cong, sich zu ergeben
[Bildquelle: Wikipedia. -- Public domain]

1967-12-22

In der New-Phetchaburi Road (ถนนเพชรบุรีตัดใหม่) in Bangkok wird ein "Rest and recreation zone" für US-Militärs eingerichtet. Dort bedienen staatlich registrierte Frauen die Vietnamkämpfer. Die Provinzgouverneure werden aufgefordert, in Provinzen mit US-Stützpunkten ähnliche Einrichtungen zu schaffen.


Lage der  New-Phetchaburi Road (ถนนเพชรบุรีตัดใหม่)
 [Bildquelle: OpenStreetMap. -- Creative Commons Lizenz (Namensnennung, share alike)]

1967-12-30

Wahlen für die Abgeordneten in 118 Städten (เทศบาล) außer Bangkok und Thonburi (ธนบุรี). Es sind die ersten Wahlen seit dem Putsch von 1957. Die Wahlbeteiligung ist unerwartet hoch.

1967-12

Es erscheint intern:

American Institutes for Research [AIR]: Counterinsurgency in Thailand : The impact of economic, social, and political action programs ; (A research and development proposal submitted to the Advanced Research Projects Agency. -- Pittsburgh, PA : American Institutes for Research, 1967-12

1967-12

Bilanz des Jahres 1967 im Vietnamkrieg:

1964-12-14 - 1967-12-31

Die US-Streitkräfte fliegen 183.821 Kampfeinsätze gegen Laos


Abb.: U.S. tactical sorties flown in Laos December 14, 1964 - December 31, 1967
[Bildquelle: USAF / Van Staaveren, Jacob: Interdiction in southern Laos, 1960-1968 : the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. -- Washington, D.C. : Center for Air Force History, 1993. -- 360 S. : Ill. ; 24 cm. -- S. 297. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Transportation and other targets destroyed, and damaged in Laos December 14, 1964 - December 31, 1967
[Bildquelle: USAF / Van Staaveren, Jacob: Interdiction in southern Laos, 1960-1968 : the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. -- Washington, D.C. : Center for Air Force History, 1993. -- 360 S. : Ill. ; 24 cm. -- S. 298. -- Public domain]


Abb.: Bomb, rocket, and other ordnance expenditures in Laos December 14, 1964 - December 31, 1967
[Bildquelle: USAF / Van Staaveren, Jacob: Interdiction in southern Laos, 1960-1968 : the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. -- Washington, D.C. : Center for Air Force History, 1993. -- 360 S. : Ill. ; 24 cm. -- S. 299. -- Public domain]

Verwendete Ressourcen

ausführlich: http://www.payer.de/thailandchronik/ressourcen.htm

Zu Chronik 1968